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THE  LIFE  OF  NAPOLEON 


NAPOLEON  IN  CORONATION  ROHKS 

I'.V  ROHERT  I.EFEVRE 


THE   LIFE   OF 
NAPOLEON 


ARTHUR   HASSALL,   M.A. 

STU»BMT   OF   CHRIST   CHURCH,    OXFORD 


WITH   TWENTY-SINK    ILLUSTRATIONS 


BOSTON 

LITTLE,  BROWN,  &  COMPANY 
1911 


OC205 


PREFATORY  NOTE 

TOURING  the  years  from  Napoleon's  birth  in  1769 
to  1796,  when  the  Directory  was  firmly  es- 
tablished, Europe  passed  through  a  period  of  great 
importance.  In  the  East  of  Europe  the  Partitions  of 
Poland,  1772,  1793,  1795,  and  the  successful  wars  of 
Catherine  II,  against  Turkey,  ending  in  the  Treaties 
of  Kainardji,  1774,  and  Jassy,  1792,  had  marked 
the  rise  of  Russia.  That  event  tended  to  change 
entirely  the  views  hitherto  held  as  to  what  should 
constitute  the  balance  of  power  in  Europe,  and  had 
led  to  important  modifications  in  the  foreign  policy  of 
the  chief  European  States. 

The  rise  of  Russia  to  a  leading  place  in  Europe 
had  to  be  recognized,  while  her  intention  to  take 
part  in  Western  politics  was  unmistakably  shown  in 
1799,  when  Suvorov,  at  the  head  of  a  Russian 
army,  entered  Italy.  While  this  revolution  was  in 
progress  in  the  North  of  Europe,  other  revolutions 
of  a  different  character  were  taking  place  elsewhere. 
In  Poland  the  years  1789-93  witnessed  an  attempt  to 
carry  out  a  revolution,  which,  if  effected,  would  have 


vi  THE  LIFE  OF  NAPOLEON 

given  Poland  an  hereditary  monarchy  and  a  stable 
Government.  As  Poland  was  a  country  of  similar  ex- 
tent to  that  of  France,  the  effect  of  the  establishment 
of  a  consolidated  kingdom  in  the  East  of  Europe 
would  have  been  immense.  The  year  1789  also 
witnessed  revolutions  in  Belgium  and  France — that 
in  the  former  country  being  the  result  of  Joseph  II 's 
attempts  to  change  the  character  of  the  Government, 
and  to  introduce  reforms,  while  that  in  the  latter 
country  was  due  to  a  desire  not  only  to  change  the 
form  of  the  Government,  but  also  to  bring  about 
drastic  reforms. 

While  the  efforts  of  the  Polish  reformers  and  of 
Joseph  II  ended  in  failure,  the  revolutionary  party  in 
France  succeeded  beyond  their  wildest  hopes. 

The  overthrow  of  the  monarchy,  the  rise  of  the 
war  party,  the  desire  of  the  revolutionists  to  spread 
their  doctrines  all  over  Europe,  and,  during  the  pro- 
cess, to  vanquish  England,  rendered  all  other  revolu- 
tionary movements  in  Europe  of  little  account,  as 
compared  with  the  French  Revolution.  That  Revo- 
lution passed  through  a  series  of  stages.  In  1791 
France  had  received  a  Constitution  which  the  majority 
of  Frenchmen  regarded  as  adequate.  But  the  pre- 
dominance, first  of  the  Girondist  party,  and  then  of 
the  Jacobin  party,  together  with  the  outbreak  of  war, 
resulted  in  a  system  of  terror  in  France  which  did 
not  come  to  an  end  till  the  safety  of  France  from  all 


PREFATORY  NOTE  vii 

danger  of  foreign  invasion  was  secured.  In  1795 
the  Government  of  the  Directory  which  ruled  France 
till  1 799  was  established,  and  it  was  during  a  struggle 
in  Paris  which  preceded  its  advent  to  power  that 
Napoleon  Bonaparte  came  prominently  forward  as 
Barras'  lieutenant. 


"  I  "HIS  book  does  not  presume  to  give  a  final 
verdict  upon  the  character  of  Napoleon. 
It  simply  aims  at  conveying  as  far  as  possible  an 
accurate  impression  of  the  man  and  his  times.  One 
writer  has  truly  said  that  "there  is  no  age,  no  per- 
sonality in  history  of  greater  interest,  either  to  France 
or  to  the  world,  than  the  Napoleonic  era  and  Na- 
poleon". Both  as  a  soldier  and  as  a  statesman  he 
rose  superior  to  all  his  contemporaries.  He  waged 
war  on  a  scale  hitherto  unheard  of ;  his  reorganiza- 
tion of  France,  and  his  arrangements  for  the  govern- 
ment of  the  client  states,  bear  evidence  of  the 
possession  of  statesmanlike  qualities  of  a  very  high 
order. 

The  pictures  of  Napoleon,  given  us  by  Madame 
de  Stael  and  Madame  de  Remusat,  are  now  recognized 
as  being  untrustworthy,  and,  therefore,  of  no  historical 
value. 

The  reader  who  has  not  sufficient  leisure  to  study 
the  works  of  Sorel,  Vandal,  Thiebault  and  Fournier 
cannot  do  better  than  read  Mr.  Rose's  "  Life  of 


viii  THE  LIFE  OF  NAPOLEON 

Napoleon " ;  Lord  Rosebery's,  "  Napoleon :  the 
Last  Phase";  and  Gourgaud's  "Diary".  By  the 
perusal  of  these  works  he  will  at  anyrate  obtain  not 
only  something  more  than  an  outline  of  the  history  of 
Europe  during  the  years  1789-1815,  but  he  will  also 
be  enabled  to  form  an  estimate  of  Napoleon  as  a 
Statesman  and  as  a  General. 

Of  the  greatness  of  his  genius  there  can  be  no 
question,  and  Europe  owes  him  an  unspeakable  debt 
of  gratitude.  Without  this  "scavenger  of  God,"  it 
is  difficult  to  see  how  the  sense  of  nationality  in  Italy 
and  Germany  could  have  been  aroused  and  stimu- 
lated. Napoleon  was  not  making  an  extravagant 
statement  when  he  said,  "  Centuries  may  pass  before 
circumstances  combine  to  produce  another  such  as 
I  was". 

The  Bibliography  of  the  Napoleonic  period  is 
rapidly  increasing.  The  list  of  works  connected 
with  the  history  of  Europe  during  that  period,  and  with 
the  life  of  Napoleon,  fills  120  pages  of  Volume  IX  of 
the  "  Cambridge  Modern  History  ".  Mr.  Rose's  "  Life 
of  Napoleon  "  is  probably  the  best  known  to  English- 
men, and  well  deserves  its  high  reputation.  Of 
French  works,  Sorel's  "  History  of  Europe  during  the 
Revolutionary  and  Napoleonic  Era"  is  invaluable  to 
the  student  of  the  general  history  of  the  period. 
Fournier's  "  Life  of  Napoleon,"  and  Vandal's  "  Na- 
pole"on  et  Alexandre  I,"  have  also  a  well-deserved 


PREFATORY   NOTE  ix 

popularity  in  England,  and  add  considerably  to  our 
knowledge  of  the  aims  of  Napoleon  at  various  crises 
in  his  career. 

The  perusal  of  these  works,  together  with  some 
of  the  Memoirs  of  the  time,  will  supply  the  reader 
with  very  accurate  information  regarding  Napoleon's 
life  and  the  times  in  which  he  lived.  Of  these 
Memoirs,  those  of  Generals  Marbot,  Junot,  and  Rapp 
will  be  found  especially  interesting.  Seeley's  "  Life 
of  Stein"  and  Oman's  "History  of  the  Peninsular 
War"  throw  ample  light  upon  the  situation  in 
Germany  and  Spain  during  the  critical  years  which 
preceded  and  witnessed  the  fall  of  Napoleon. 

Vol.  IX  -  -  "  Napoleon"  —  of  the  "  Cambridge 
Modern  History  "  is  in  itself  a  mine  of  information, 
and  should  be  used  as  a  guide-book  for  the  whole 
of  the  Napoleonic  period. 

For  the  early  years  of  Napoleon's  career  I  have 
found  "  The  Growth  of  Napoleon,"  by  Mr.  Norwood 
Young,  most  suggestive.  To  Mr.  H.  A.  L.  Fisher, 
of  New  College,  Oxford,  and  to  Mr.  J.  Holland  Rose, 
of  Christ's  College,  Cambridge,  I  am  under  deep  obli- 
gations. Their  writings  upon  the  Napoleonic  period 
must  be  constantly  consulted  by  any  one  who  is 
studying  the  history  of  Europe  between  1789  and 
1815. 

"  The  Account  of  Napoleon's  Life  on  St.  Helena," 
by  Mr.  Fisher,  in  Vol.  IX  of  the  "Cambridge 


x  THE  LIFE  OF  NAPOLEON 

Modern  History,"  and  the  publication  by  Lord 
Rosebery  of  his  brilliant  description  of  the  later  days 
of  Napoleon  in  the  volume  entitled,  "  Napoleon  :  the 
Last  Phase,"  would,  under  ordinary  circumstances, 
have  rendered  any  account  by  me  of  Napoleon's 
captivity  unnecessary. 

Fortunately,  the  late  Mr.  John  C.  F.  Ramsden, 
of  Willinghurst,  Guildford,  most  kindly  presented  me 
with  a  copy  of  Captain  Henry  Meynell's  "  Memoranda 
of  Conversations  with  Napoleon,"  which  was  pri- 
vately printed  in  1909,  and  of  that  volume  I  have 
made  considerable  use  in  the  last  chapter  of  this  book. 
Captain  Meynell's  "  recollections  undoubtedly  contain 
fresh  matter,  in  addition  to  what  is  related  by  Sir 
Pulteney  Malcolm,"  and  will  be  of  interest  to  all 
students  of  the  Life  of  Napoleon. 


CONTENTS 

CHAPTER  I 

PAGE 

THE  YOUTH  AND  RISE  OF  NAPOLEON,  1769-1795     .         .         i 

CHAPTER  II 
THE  ITALIAN  AND  EGYPTIAN  CAMPAIGNS,  1796-1799        .       22 

CHAPTER  III 
THE  CONSULATE  AND  THE  EMPEROR,  1799-1804      .         .       50 

CHAPTER  IV 
WAR  WITH  EUROPE,   1803-1806 91 

CHAPTER  V 
THE  TREATY  OF  TILSIT,  1807 146 

CHAPTER  VI 

THE  BEGINNING  OF  NAPOLEON'S  INTERVENTION  IN  SPAIN 

AND  THE  CONGRESS  OF  ERFURT,  1807-1808      .         .     174 

CHAPTER  VII 

NAPOLEON  AT  THE  HEIGHT  OF  HIS  POWER,   1808-1812     .     202 

xi 


xii  THE  LIFE  OF  NAPOLEON 

CHAPTER  VIII 

PAGE 

THE   FALL  OF   NAPOLEON,  Moscow,  LEIPZIG,  WATERLOO, 

1813-1815        .  .  ...     236 

CHAPTER  IX 
SUMMARY  OF  NAPOLEON'S  CAREER 274 

CHAPTER  X 
ST.  HELENA,  1815-1821 284 

APPENDICES     .........     303 

INDEX 3x3 


LIST  OF  ILLUSTRATIONS 


NAPOLEON  IN  CORONATION  ROBES      .         .         .         Frontispiece 

From  the  Painting  by  Robert  Lefevre 

FACING   PAGE 

CONTEMPORARY  CRAYON  PORTRAIT  OF  BONAPARTE,  by  one 

of  his  fellow-pupils  (1785)  .....         6 

In  the  possession  of  M.  de  Beaudricourt 

MARIA  LETIZIA  BONAPARTE,  "  MADAME  MERE  "        .         .        12 
From  the  Painting  by  Gerard  at  Versailles 

NAPOLEON  AS  A  GENERAL  OF  THE  REPUBLIC   ...       24 

From  the  Painting  by  H.    E.    P.    Philippoteaux  at   Versailles. 
(Photograph  by  W.  A.  Mansell  &  Co.) 

NAPOLEON  AT  THE  BATTERY  ......   26 

From  a  Water-colour  Drawing  of  the  period 

THE  i8TH  BRUMAIRE 56 

After  a  Contemporary  English  Engraving 

THE  FIRST  CONSUL  AT  MALMAISON          .         .         .         .72 

From  the  Painting  by  J.  B.  Isabey  at  Versailles.     (Photograph  by 
Neurdein  freres) 

JOSEPHINE  AT  MALMAISON 88 

From  the  Painting  by  Prud'hon  at  Versailles.      (Photograph  by 
Neurdein  freres) 

NAPOLEON'S  REDINGOTE  AND  COCKED  HAT      .         .         .128 

From  the  Collection  of  Prince  Victor 

FACSIMILE  LETTER  FROM  NAPOLEON  TO  GENERAL  MASSENA, 

1 8  September,  1805  .         .         .         .         .         .         .136 

THE  KING  AND  QUEEN  OF  PRUSSIA,  WITH  NAPOLEON  AND 

THE  EMPEROR  OF  RUSSIA,  AT  TILSIT         .         .         .152 

From  the  Painting  by  Gosse  at  Versailles.     (Photograph  by  Neur- 
dein freres) 


xiv  THE   LIFE  OF  NAPOLEON 

FACING    PAGE 

PAULINE  BONAPARTE,  PRINCESS  BORGHESE       .         .        .182 

From   the  Statue  by  Canova  in  the   Villa   Borghese,   at   Rome. 
(Photograph  by  Anderson) 

JOSEPH  BONAPARTE  .         .         .         .         .         .         .196 

From  a  Lithograph.     (Photograph  by  Neurdein) 

"THE  EMPEROR"     ........     202 

From  an    Engraving  by   Henry  after   the  drawing  by  Vigneux. 
In  the  possession  ot  Count  Primoli 

THE  EMPRESS  JOSEPHINE         .         .         .         .         .         .218 

From   the  Painting  by   Gerard   at   Versailles.      (Photograph   by 
Neurdein  freres) 

THE  EMPRESS  MARIE  LOUISE 222 

From  the  Painting  by  Ge'rard  at  Versailles.     (Photograph  by  Le'vy) 

MARSHAL  NEY  COVERING  THE  RETREAT  ....     244 

From  the  Pointing  by  Yvon  at  Versailles.     (Photograph  by  Neur- 
dein freres) 

FAREWELL  TO  THE  OLD  GUARD  AT  FONTAINEBLEAU         .     258 

From  the  Painting  by  Horace  Vernet  in  the  Bibliotheque  Nationale 

RECEPTION  BY  THE  SOLDIERS  ......     266 

After  the  Painting  by  Steuben 

THE  KING  OF  ROME        .         .         .         .         .         .        .270 

From  the  Painting  by  Sir  T.   Lawrence,  in  the  collection  of  the 
Duke  of  Bassano 

"SlRE,   YOU   MAY   RECKON  ON  US  AS  ON  YOUR  OLD  GUARD  "       272 
From  a  Lithograph  by  Raffet 

NAPOLEON  AT  LONGWOOD 284 

From  a  Sketch  by  General  Gourgaud 

THE  EXILE 286 

From  a  Water-colour  Sketch  made  by  an  English  Officer  at  Long- 
wood,  24  July,  1820 

NAPOLEON  ON  ST.  HELENA 288 

From  a  Lithograph  by  Horace  Vernet 

PORTRAIT   CAMEO   OF  NAPOLEON   AND  SPECIMEN   OF   HIS 

WRITING  FROM  ST.  HELENA,   1818   .         .         .         .294 

NAPOLEON'S  LAST  DAY 298 

From  the  Sculpture  by  Vicenzo  Vela  at  Versailles 


LIST   OF    ILLUSTRATIONS  xv 

FACING  PAGE 
ON  HIS  DEATHBED 301 

From  a  Sketch  made  by  Captain   Marryat,  by  the  order  of  Sir 
Hudson  Lowe 

RECEPTION  OF  THE  BODY  AT  THE  INVALIDES    .         .         .     302 

From  a  Drawing  by  Ferrogio  and  Gerard 

THE  TOMB  OF  NAPOLEON         .         .         .         .         .         .314 

From  an  anonymous  Lithograph 


THE  LIFE  OF  NAPOLEON 

CHAPTER  I 

THE  YOUTH  AND  RISE  OF  NAPOLEON,  1769-1795 

Birth  and  parentage  of  Napoleon — Early  life — At  the  military 
school  in  Paris — Joins  the  army — His  views  on  religion — In  Corsica, 
1789 — In  Paris,  1792 — Corsica  and  Sardinia,  1792-3 — "LeSouper 
de  Beaucaire  " — The  Siege  of  Toulon,  1793 — Italy,  1794 — Vende- 
miaire. 

"NT  APOLEON  was  to  all  intents  and  purposes  an 
•*•  ^  Italian — and  one  of  the  most  remarkable  Italians 
that  the  world  has  ever  seen.  In  one  sense  he  was  the 
last  as  he  was  the  greatest  of  that  remarkable  race 
of  adventurers  who  flourished  in  all  parts  of  Europe 
during  the  eighteenth  century.1 

But  the  period  from  1789  to  1815  which  witnessed 
the  rise  and  fall  of  Napoleon  cannot  be  said  to  belong 
to  any  century.  It  certainly  had  few  of  the  character- 
istics of  the  eighteenth  ;  it  was  in  no  sense  part  of  the 
nineteenth  century.  It  is  the  period  which  saw  the 

1  For  a  summary  of  the  evidence  bearing  on  the  date  of 
Napoleon's  birth,  see  Baring  Gould,  "Life  of  Napoleon  Bona- 
parte," p.  6. 

i 


2  THE  LIFE  OF  NAPOLEON 

birth  of  Modern  Europe,  which  event  was  directly 
hastened  by  the  instrumentality  of  Napoleon,  who 
acquired  a  most  remarkable  ascendancy  over,  and 
exercised  a  most  profound  influence  upon,  France  and 
indeed  Europe.  France  at  the  time  of  the  beginning 
of  his  ascendancy  required  order  and  organization, 
and  Europe  needed  reconstruction.  The  rule  of  the 
benevolent  despots  had  proved  inadequate  to  the  needs 
of  the  time,  and  till  the  Peace  of  Tilsit  Napoleon  in 
destroying  the  effete  system  of  the  Holy  Roman  Em- 
pire, in  expelling  the  Austrians  from  Italy  and  in  ex- 
posing the  stagnation  which  had  settled  upon  Prussia, 
was  laying  the  foundations  of  Modern  Europe.  After 
Tilsit  the  inevitable  though  to  him  unexpected  results 
of  his  work  began  gradually  to  be  seen  in  the  rise  of 
national  feeling  in  the  countries  which  he  had  conquered 
or  overrun  ;  and  the  steady  growth  of  that  national 
feeling  in  Europe  led  inevitably  to  his  downfall. 

Napoleon  was  born  on  15  August,  1769,  the 
year  of  the  birth  of  Castlereagh  and  Wellington.  It 
has,  however,  been  asserted  that  he  was  born  on  7 
January,  1768,  when  the  French  authority  over  Corsica 
was  by  no  means  fully  established,  and,  therefore,  if 
Napoleon  was  born  in  1768  it  is  incorrect  to  say  that 
Napoleon  was  born  a  French  subject. 

Napoleon  was  the  second  son  of  Charles  Bona- 
parte and  Laetetia  Ramolino,  both  members  of  Corsi- 
can  families.  Charles  Bonaparte  was  himself  the  son 
of  Joseph  who  had  secured  from  the  Grand  Duke  of 
Tuscany  the  right  to  bear  the  Buonaparte  arms. 


THE  RISE  OF  NAPOLEON  3 

This  right  was  gained  on  28  May,  1757,  and  in  1760 
Joseph  died.  His  son  Charles  was  born  at  Ajaccio  in 
1746  and  in  June,  1764,  married  the  beautiful  Laetetia. 

Corsica  was  at  that  time  under  the  influence  of 
Paoli,  who  in  1767  invited  Charles  Bonaparte  to  leave 
Italy  and  to  take  up  his  residence  in  Ajaccio.  Conse- 
quently Charles  and  Laetetia  returned  to  Corsica  in 
1767,  and,  as  has  been  stated,  it  is  declared  by  some 
writers  that  at  Corte,  on  7  January  in  the  following 
year,  their  first  son  Napoleon  was  born,  and  that  Paoli 
was  his  godfather.  Madame  Junot,  however,  relates 
that  on  9  November,  1799,  she  had  a  long  conversa- 
tion with  Napoleon's  mother  who  spoke  emphatically 
on  the  subject.  "  I  know  not  why,"  she  said,  "  it  has 
been  reported  that  Paoli  was  Napoleon's  godfather. 
It  is  not  true ;  Laurent  Jiubega  (a  relation  of  Na- 
poleon) was  his  godfather."1  Geltruda,  wife  of 
Nicolo  Parivisino,  was  his  other  godparent.  Napo- 
leon's elder  brother,  Joseph  Nabulione,  was  born  on 
7  January,  1768,  at  Corte,  and  no  doubt  his  second 
Christian  name  is  partly  answerable  for  the  confusion 
between  his  birth  and  that  of  the  great  Napoleon. 

In  the  struggle  headed  by  General  Pascal  Paoli 
against  the  forces  of  Louis  XV,  Carlo  Bonaparte  took 
a  conspicuous  part,  and  was  given  the  rank  of  Major. 
On  the  final  conquest  of  Corsica  by  the  French,  Carlo 
was  only  persuaded  to  remain  on  the  island  through 
the  efforts  of  his  uncle,  a  canon  of  the  Church.  In 

1 "  Memoirs  of  Napoleon,"  by  the  Duchess  d'Abrantes,  Vol.  I, 
p.  194.  London,  Bentley,  1836. 


4  THE  LIFE  OF  NAPOLEON 

1773  Carlo  represented  the  Corsican  nobles  when  a 
deputation  of  the  three  estates  was  sent  to  the  King 
of  France.  Shortly  after  this  visit  he  became  pro- 
curator e  reale  of  Ajaccio. 

On  i  January,  1779*  Napoleon  and  his  brother 
Joseph  were  placed  in  a  school  at  Autun  under  the 
Abbe  de  Chardon  in  order  that  they  might  learn 
French. 

The  Abbe  in  his  Reminiscences  tells  us  that 
Napoleon's  character  was  thoughtful,  gloomy,  and 
imperious.  In  three  months  he  had  acquired  a 
satisfactory  knowledge  of  French. 

Fortunately  for  his  family,  Charles  Bonaparte  had 
secured  the  friendship  of  General  Count  Marbceuf, 
the  Governor  of  Corsica,  and  it  was  owing  to  the 
latter's  influence  that  Carlo's  second  son,  Napoleon, 
was  on  19  May,  1779,  placed  by  the  Marshal  de 
S£gur,  the  French  Minister  at  War,  as  an  Eleve  du 
Roi  in  the  Ecole  Militaire  at  Brienne  in  the  province 
of  Champagne.  At  the  Military  College,  where  he 
remained  till  October,  1784,  his  individuality  at  once 
made  itself,  felt. 

The  Jicole  Militaire  was  under  the  direction  of 
the  fathers  called  Minims.  There,  under  the  supervi- 
sion of  Father  Petrault,  Napoleon  learnt  the  rudiments 
of  mathematics,  and  at  the  same  time  studied  ancient  and 
modern  languages,  geography,  literature,  history,  and 
every  branch  of  military  science.  While  at  the  Royal 
Military  Academy  of  Brienne  Napoleon  devoted  him- 
self to  his  studies.  He  showed  moroseness  of  temper, 


THE  RISE  OF  NAPOLEON  5 

courted  solitude,  was  absorbed  in  his  own  pursuits  and 
studies,  and  was  unpopular  with  his  schoolfellows.  He 
gloried  in  being  a  Corsican,  and  declared  that  he  would 
deliver  Corsica  from  its  dependence  upon  France. 

His  moods  apparently  varied ;  at  one  time  he 
appeared  to  be  a  quiet,  hard-working  student,  at 
another  time  he  would  be  quarrelsome  and  head- 
strong. The  general  opinion,  however,  was  that  it 
was  impossible  to  persuade  him  to  change  his  opinion 
when  once  he  had  made  up  his  mind.  His  character, 
said  Pichegru,  who  afterwards  conquered  Holland, 
and  was  then  on  the  staff  of  teachers,  was  inflexible. 

In  1783  Keralio,  a  royal  inspector  of  military 
schools,  recommended  Napoleon,  whose  conduct  he 
described  as  most  exemplary,  and  whose  work  showed 
thought,  for  promotion  to  the  Military  School  of  Paris. 
Before  the  recommendation  could  take  effect  Keralio 
was  succeeded  by  Reynaud  who,  however,  in  1784 
selected  Napoleon  with  four  others  to  go  to  the 
Military  College  in  Paris.  There  he  remained  from 
October,  1784,  to  October,  1785,  and  was  treated  with 
contempt  by  the  noble  students  whose  indolence  and 
extravagance  contrasted  markedly  with  the  quiet 
and  studious  character  of  the  life  led  by  the  future 
Emperor. 

In  August,  1785,  after  his  final  examination, 
Napoleon  received  the  appointment  of  sub-lieutenant 
in  the  Artillery.  He  was  thereupon  ordered  to  join 
the  regiment  of  La  Fere  then  stationed  at  Valence. 
At  Valence  he  remained  with  his  regiment  La  Fere 


6  THE  LIFE  OF  NAPOLEON 

till  September,  1786,  when  he  left  for  long  leave,  and 
returned  to  Corsica.  He  was  still  an  ardent  Corsican 
and  an  admirer  of  Paoli,  burning  with  a  desire  to 
avenge  his  country's  wrongs.  He  continued  his 
studies,  working  chiefly  at  mathematics  and  Italian, 
and  was  a  constant  reader  of  the  works  of  Corneille, 
Racine,  Voltaire,  and  Rousseau. 

In  Corsica  he  remained  for  a  year,  till  September, 
1787,  when,  owing  to  the  possibility  of  war  with 
Prussia  he  was  recalled.  But  Vergennes  being  dead, 
French  foreign  policy  under  Montmorin  entered  upon 
a  tranquil  period  and  all  danger  of  war  passed  away. 
Bonaparte  therefore  was  able  to  visit  Paris,  where  he 
remained  from  September  to  December,  1787,  when 
he  returned  to  Corsica,  arriving  at  Ajaccio  early  in 
January,  1788.  His  father  died  in  the  following 
month.  Bonaparte  only  remained  in  the  island  till 
June  when  he  rejoined  his  regiment  at  Auxonne. 
While  in  Corsica  he  dined  with  the  officers  of  the 
French  artillery  garrison,  and  his  conversation  as 
described  by  a  brother  officer  makes  it  quite  evident 
that,  though  only  eighteen  years  old,  Bonaparte 
showed  himself  far  better  informed  than  his  brother 
officers  in  knowledge  of  ancient  and  modern  history.1 
It  was  evident  that  he  was  still  a  patriotic  Corsican, 
resenting  the  French  occupation  of  his  island  home. 
It  was  also  quite  evident  that  he  was  already  far 
better  educated  than  the  ordinary  French  officer,  and 
that  he  was  always  revolving  in  his  mind  social  pro- 

1  See  Norwood  Young,  "  Growth  of  Napoleon,"  pp.  157-8. 


THE   FIRST   PORTRAIT   FROM    LIFE  TAKEN   OF   NAPOLEON 

FROM   A   CRAYON   SKETCH    BY   ONE   OF    HIS   FELLOW   PUPILS 

ON  IT  is  WRITTEN:  "MIO  CARO  AMICO  BUONAPARTE,  PONTORMINI,  DEL  1785,  TOURNOXE' 


THE  RISE  OF  NAPOLEON  7 

blems.  He  remained  with  his  regiment  at  Auxonne 
from  June,  1788,  to  September,  1789.  Those  months 
mark  an  epoch  in  his  career,  for  he  now  fell  under 
the  influence  of  Baron  J.  P.  du  Teil,  the  Commander 
of  the  Artillery  School  at  Auxonne. 

The  outbreak  of  the  Revolution  in  May,  1789, 
was  followed  by  mutinous  acts  on  the  part  of  the 
regiment.  On  23  August  the  officers  took  an  oath 
not  to  employ  troops  against  the  citizens  unless 
authorized  to  do  so  by  the  civil  or  municipal  officers. 

During  these  years  from  1785  to  1789  Napoleon 
had  had  some  experience  of  the  world,  and  had  worked 
hard.  While  at  Valence  and  Auxonne  the  young 
Corsican  studied  not  only  mathematics,  in  which  he 
acquired  great  proficiency,  but  also  history.  He  was 
also  much  influenced  by  Rousseau's  writings,  and  de- 
fended the  latter's  attack  on  Christianity  in  the  "  Social 
Contract "  against  the  criticisms  of  a  Protestant  pastor 
of  Geneva.  In  his  view  the  perfection  of  society  and 
the  welfare  of  mankind  could  be  secured  without  the 
aid  of  religion.  He  advocated  the  adoption  of  a 
general  uniformity  of  life,  which  could  only  be  attained 
by  means  of  the  State.  According  to  him  "  the 
Christian  creed  was  directly  hostile  to  a  perfect  polity," 
for  it  encouraged  individual  liberty  of  thought,  and 
"by  bidding  men  look  forward  to  another  life  it 
rendered  them  too  submissive  to  the  evils  of  the 
present ". l 

The  adherence  to  these  opinions  explains  not  only 

lSee  "Quarterly  Review,"  No.  396,  p.  340. 


8  THE  LIFE  OF  NAPOLEON 

Napoleon's  sympathy  with  the  French  Revolution, 
but  also  his  admiration  of  Robespierre,  and  his  friend- 
ship with  the  younger  Robespierre. 

His  arrival  in  Corsica  from  Auxonne  in  the  autumn 
(September)  of  1789  was  followed  by  many  stirring 
events.  He  was  already  imbued  with  the  revolution- 
ary doctrines  and  at  once  joined  a  small  party  in  Corsica 
in  organizing  a  revolutionary  committee  and  a  national 
guard.  In  adopting  these  measures  he  encountered 
much  opposition.  In  Ajaccio  the  royalist  party  were 
supreme,  and  De  Barrin,  the  Commandant,  suppressed 
all  revolutionary  movements.  In  Bastia,  the  capital  of 
the  island,  however,  the  revolutionists  prevailed.  Sup- 
ported by  Paoli  who  had  been  amnestied,  and  facilitated 
by  the  definite  incorporation  of  Corsica  with  France 
(decreed  on  30  November,  1789,  by  the  National 
Assembly  of  France),  revolutionary  doctrines  spread 
in  the  island.  A  General  Assembly  met  at  Orezzo  in 
the  autumn  of  1790,  Paoli  being  elected  president, 
and  Napoleon  took  a  leading  part  in  the  debates.1  In 
February,  1791,  he  rejoined  his  regiment  at  Auxonne, 
taking  with  him  his  brother  Louis,  the  future  King  of 
Holland.  He  was  not  liked  by  his  brother  officers, 
partly  owing  to  his  foreign  extraction,  partly  to  his 
political  views  and  bitter  tongue.  In  June,  1791,  he 
was  promoted  to  the  rank  of  first  lieutenant,  and  was 

1  "  A  young  artillery  officer,  extremely  thin,  very  brown,  with 
piercing  eyes,  a  serious  expression,  and  a  slight  Italian  accent." 
Such  is  a  description  of  Napoleon  at  this  time.  (See  Norwood 
Young,  "The  Growth  of  Napoleon,"  p.  224.) 


THE  RISE  OF  NAPOLEON  9 

sent  to  join  the  Fourth  Regiment,  then  stationed  at 
Valence,  a  town  which  embraced  with  fervour  the  re- 
volutionary cause.  Bonaparte  was  now  an  avowed 
supporter  of  the  Republican  party.  He  was  a  member 
of  the  Revolutionary  Club  where  he  delivered  in- 
flammatory speeches,  and  on  14  July,  the  anniversary 
of  the  fall  of  the  Bastille,  he  and  the  other  officers  took 
an  oath  of  fidelity  to  the  nation  and  the  new  Constitu- 
tion. In  September  of  the  same  year  he  again  visited 
Corsica,  and  found  Ajaccio  in  a  state  of  tumult.  He 
at  once  took  part  in  the  disputes  that  rent  the  town, 
behaved  with  "unscrupulous  violence,"  and  was  de- 
nounced to  the  authorities  in  Paris  by  the  Commander 
of  the  garrison  for  instigating  the  disturbances  of  the 
public  peace.  The  French  War  Office  took  the  view 
of  the  Commander,  declared  that  Bonaparte  had 
ignored  the  orders  for  his  return  to  his  regiment,  and 
struck  him  off  the  list  of  the  army.  Meanwhile,  on 
i  April  he  had  been  promoted  to  second  lieutenant- 
colonel  of  the  2nd  Battalion  of  Corsican  Volunteers. 

Nothing,  however,  remained  for  Bonaparte  but  to 
get  the  order  of  the  War  Office  rescinded,  and  accord- 
ingly he  left  Corsica  in  May,  1792,  and  proceeded  to 
Paris.  War  against  the  Emperor  had  been  declared 
on  20  April,  and  officers  would  in  all  probability  be 
required  for  active  service.  On  his  arrival  on  28  May, 
he  found  that  city  in  a  most  disturbed  condition.  "  It 
is  flooded  with  strangers,"  wrote  Napoleon  to  Joseph, 
4 'and  the  discontented  are  very  numerous.  The 
national  guard  which  remained  at  the  Tuileries  to 


io  THE  LIFE  OF  NAPOLEON 

guard  the  King  has  been  doubled  .  .  .  the  news  from 
the  frontiers  is  always  the  same  :  it  is  probable  that 
our  troops  will  retire  in  order  to  carry  on  a  defensive 
war.  Desertion  is  very  frequent  among  the  officers. 
Our  position  is  very  critical  in  every  respect." 

He  watched  with  disgust  the  proceedings  of  the 
mob  on  20  June.  "  Why,"  he  said  to  Bourrienne, 
"  have  they  let  in  all  that  rabble  (to  the  Tuileries 
gardens),  they  should  sweep  off  four  or  five  hundred 
of  them  with  the  cannon."  On  22  June  he  wrote  to 
his  brother  Joseph  a  description  of  the  scene.  In  a 
further  letter  on  3  July,  he  expresses  his  contempt  for 
the  revolutionists  and  for  the  men  at  the  head  of 
affairs,  as  "  being  little  worth  the  trouble  one  takes  to 
obtain  their  favour.  You  know  the  history  of  Ajaccio  ; 
that  of  Paris  is  exactly  the  same  ;  perhaps  men  here 
are  even  smaller,  worse,  greater  calumniators,  and 
more  censorious." 

His  anxiety  for  the  future  of  France  was  much  in- 
creased by  the  events  of  io  August.  On  that  day  he 
was  a  witness,  from  the  other  side  of  the  Seine,  of  the 
disorderly  scenes  which  resulted  in  the  fall  of  the 
monarchy.  In  his  opinion  the  Swiss,  under  good 
leadership,  would  have  easily  and  completely  routed 
their  opponents.  Unfortunately,  however,  Louis  XVI 
ordered  the  troops  to  cease  firing,  and  that  order  sealed 
the  fate  of  the  monarchy.  On  that  day  Napoleon  was 
himself  in  some  danger,  as  he  "  excited  many  looks  of 
hostility  and  defiance  as  being  unknown  and  suspect ". 

In  the  meantime,  on  io  July,  he  had  been  reinstated 


THE  RISE  OF  NAPOLEON  n 

in  the  army,  and  had  been  given  the  rank  of  captain 
in  the  Fourth  Regiment.  His  rank  as  captain  was 
to  date  from  6  February,  1792,  and  he  received  his 
arrears  of  pay.  He  left  Paris  early  in  September  in 
company  with  his  sister,  Marianne  (Elisa),  and  arrived 
safely  at  Ajaccio  on  14  September.  Early  in  1793 
he  took  part  in  an  expedition  against  Sardinia  which, 
owing  to  no  fault  of  his,  proved  a  failure.  Troubles 
in  Corsica  forced  the  Bonaparte  family  to  leave  the 
island,  on  n  June,  1793,  and  after  landing  at  Toulon 
to  proceed  to  Marseilles. 

"  What  a  flight  it  was,"  writes  Captain  Bingham, 
"  one  exile  became  Emperor  of  France  and  King  of 
Italy  ;  another  reigned  first  at  Naples,  then  at  Madrid  ; 
Lucien  became  Prince  of  Canino ;  Louis  sat  on  the 
throne  of  Holland  ;  Marianne  became  Grand  Duchess 
of  Tuscany  ;  Pauline  a  Princess ;  and  Abbe  Fesch 
a  Cardinal."1  Jerome  and  Caroline  who  were  left 
behind  also  became  famous  ;  the  former  was  destined 
to  be  King  of  Westphalia,  the  latter  to  sit  on  the 
throne  of  Naples. 

Meanwhile,  on  13  June,  Bonaparte  joined  his 
regiment  at  Nice,  but  he  was  soon  called  upon  to  take 
part  in  the  reduction  of  Avignon,  which  town  with 
Lyons,  Marseilles,  and  Toulon  refused  obedience  to 
the  Committee  of  Public  Safety.  Avignon  was  soon 
reduced  to  submission,  and  on  28  July,  Bonaparte, 
now  with  the  rank  of  Capitaine  Commandant,  pro- 

1  Bingham,  "  Letters  and  Despatches  of  the  First  Napoleon," 
Vol.  I,  p.  30.  London,  1884. 


12  THE  LIFE  OF  NAPOLEON 

ceeded  to  Beaucaire.  In  consequence  of  a  dispute 
with  some  merchants  whom  he  met  there,  he  wrote 
a  dialogue  called  "  Le  Souper  de  Beaucaire,"  in  which 
he  gave  his  reasons  for  adopting  in  Corsica  Jacobin 
principles  in  opposition  to  Paoli  and  his  adherents. 
It  is  evident  that  his  volte-face  was  due  to  his  con- 
viction that  Jacobin  principles  and  not  Corsican 
patriotism  were  destined  to  win  the  day.  By  the 
orders  of  Salicetti  and  other  deputies  then  in  Pro- 
vence, the  "Souper  de  Beaucaire"  was  in  August 
published  at  the  expense  of  the  Treasury. 

Some  writers  would  date  Napoleon's  rise  from  the 
siege  of  Toulon.  It  is  therefore  of  some  interest  to 
notice  the  opinion  already  formed  of  him  by  his 
brother  Lucien.  "  I  tell  you,"  the  latter  wrote  to 
Joseph,  on  24  June,  1792,  "  I  have  always  discerned 
in  Napoleon  an  ambition  not  entirely  egotistical,  but 
which  overcomes  his  desire  for  the  public  good  ;  I 
am  convinced  that  in  a  free  State  he  would  be  a 
dangerous  man.  He  seems  to  me  to  have  a  strong 
inclination  to  be  a  tyrant,  and  I  believe  he  would  be 
one  if  he  were  King."  1 

In  the  autumn  of  1793  Bonaparte,  who  had  now 
definitely  decided  to  find  his  career  not  in  Corsica  but 
in  France,  took  part  in  the  recapture  of  Toulon  which 
had  handed  itself  over  to  the  British  and  Spanish 
fleets.  Dommartin,  who  commanded  the  artillery, 
was  wounded  on  7  September,  and  Bonaparte  was 

1  Quoted  from  Norwood  Young,  "The  Growth  of  Napoleon," 
pp.  271,  272. 


MARIA   LETIZIA   BONAPARTE,    'MADAME   MERE1 

FROM    THE    PAINTING    BY   O7.KARU    AT    VERSAILLES 


THE  RISE  OF  NAPOLEON  13 

appointed  in  his  place.  He  had  now  his  first  oppor- 
tunity of  seeing  real  warfare,  and  throughout  the 
operations  for  the  recapture  of  Toulon  he  showed 
consistent  activity  and  courage. 

It  was  an  anxious  time  for  the  French  officers  who 
upon  any  failure  might  fall  into  disfavour  with  the 
ruling  Committee  of  Public  Safety  in  Paris  and  be 
guillotined.  Bonaparte  did  not  approve  of  the  way 
in  which  Carteaux,  the  French  commander,  formerly 
a  painter,  conducted  the  operations,  and  wrote  letters 
full  of  complaint  and  criticism  to  the  Committee  in 
Paris.  He  also  asked  that  an  artillery  officer  of  high 
rank  should  be  sent  to  Toulon.  On  6  November, 
Dugommier,  "  a  brave  veteran,"  and  General  du  Tell 
arrived.  The  former  superseded  Carteaux  as  com- 
mander-in-chief,  and  the  latter  took  command  of  the 
artillery. 

Success  followed  these  changes.  Whoever  held  the 
fort  1'Aiguillette  commanded  the  harbour.  On  the 
night  of  1 8  December  the  French  captured  the  fort, 
and  on  19  December,  1793,  the  French  forces  entered 
Toulon.  Though  Napoleon  had  throughout  shown 
undeniable  ability,  Du  Teil  and  the  whole  artillery 
staff  must  share  in  the  credit  of  the  capture  of  Toulon. 
The  legend  that  Bonaparte  was  in  command  of  the 
artillery  was  invented  later,  and  Napoleon's  statement 
at  St.  Helena  that  Du  Teil  "understood  nothing 
about  artillery,"  is  not  borne  out  by  the  testimony  of 
Dugommier  who,  when  reporting  on  the  siege  of 
Toulon,  declared  that  Du  Teil's  "  distinguished  services 


i4  THE  LIFE  OF  NAPOLEON 

.  .  .  deserve  the  recognition  of  the  nation,"  and  that 
he  "  showed  in  all  his  dispositions  much  intelligence 
and  military  talents".1 

At  the  same  time  it  is  undeniable  that  Bonaparte 
had  acquitted  himself  well,  and  his  fortunes  began 
with  the  success  at  Toulon.  In  the  "  Moniteur  "  of  7 
December,  1793,  Dugommier  wrote :  "Among  those 
who  distinguished  themselves  most,  and  who  aided 
me  to  rally  the  troops  and  push  them  forward,  are 
citizens  Buona  Parte  .  .  .  Arena  and  Cervoni ".  At 
Toulon  Bonaparte  first  met  Junot,  who  attracted  his 
attention  by  his  coolness  under  fire.  He  also  at  that 
time  acquired  a  lifelong  ascendancy  over  Marmont. 

Lord  Acton,  in  his  "  Lectures  on  the  French  Re- 
volution," points  out  that  the  first  event  of  Bonaparte's 
career  was  the  spectacle  of  a  British  fleet  flying  before 
him  by  the  glare  of  an  immense  conflagration.  He 
also  notices  that  in  their  retirement  the  English  only 
"imperfectly  destroyed  the  French  ships  they  could 
not  at  once  take  away,  leaving  the  materials  for  the 
Egyptian  expedition  ".2 

The  siege  of  Toulon  was  thus  an  event  of  some 
importance  in  Bonaparte's  career. 

Napoleon  was  not  long  idle.  The  war  between 
France  and  Europe  was  at  its  height,  and  French 
armies  were  fighting  in  the  Low  Countries,  on  the 

1  Quoted  by  Norwood  Young  in  "  The  Growth  of  Napoleon," 
p.  326.  London,  John  Murray,  1910. 

2 Acton,  "Lectures  on  The  French  Revolution,"  p.  315. 
London,  Macmillan,  1910. 


THE  RISE  OF  NAPOLEON  15 

Spanish  frontier,  and  in  Italy.  In  that  quarter  the 
French  force  was  divided  into  the  army  of  the  Alps 
and  the  army  of  Italy.  The  latter  army  was  com- 
manded by  General  Dumerbion,  a  man  of  no  military 
capacity,  and  Bonaparte  commanded  the  artillery. 
He  was  ordered  to  draw  up  a  plan  of  campaign  for 
both  armies,  but  before  his  plan  could  be  carried  out 
Robespierre  had  fallen,  and  the  Government,  by  the 
advice  of  Carnot,  stopped  the  operations  in  Italy  and 
ordered  the  armies  to  occupy  the  chief  passes  of  the 
Alps. 

During  July  Bonaparte  had  been  sent  by  the 
younger  Robespierre  on  a  mission  to  Genoa  to  per- 
suade that  city  (which  was  ostensibly  neutral)  not  to 
allow  the  coalition  to  occupy  its  territory.  The  Re- 
volution of  Thermidor  (27  July,  1794)  was  followed 
by  the  arrest  and  imprisonment  of  Bonaparte  in  Fort 
Carre  near  Antibes.  The  arrest  was  due  to  his  well- 
known  friendship  with  the  younger  Robespierre  and 
generally  with  the  Robespierre  clique.  However,  on 
20  August,  he  was  set  at  liberty.  His  early  difficulties 
were  not  yet  over.  Corsica  was  practically  in  the 
hands  of  the  English,  and  in  March,  1795,  an  expedi- 
tion, in  which  were  Bonaparte,  his  brother  Louis  and 
Marmont,  was  fitted  out  to  recover  the  island.  The 
English  fleet,  however,  who  were  on  the  watch,  cap- 
tured two  of  the  French  ships  and  forced  the  re- 
mainder to  return  to  France.  Bonaparte,  who  was 
General  of  Brigade,  then  received  orders  to  take 
command  of  the  artillery  of  the  army  of  the  west,  and 


i6  THE  LIFE  OF  NAPOLEON 

in  May  he  arrived  in  Paris.  He  had  no  wish  to  take 
up  his  appointment,  and  an  opportune  illness  enabled 
him  to  be  on  furlough  for  some  months,  and  conse- 
quently he  was  in  Paris  during  most  of  that  eventful 
year.  During  the  first  eight  months  he  lived  quietly 
in  Paris  corresponding  with  his  relations  and  watching 
events.  He  professed  and  probably  felt  sympathy 
with  the  revolutionists,  and  was  opposed  to  all  at- 
tempts at  a  reaction  in  favour  of  the  monarchy.  On 
29  May,  1795,  in  a  letter  to  his  brother  Joseph  he 
says:  "Gentlemen  in  green  neckcloths  are  arrested 
here  on  the  suspicion  that  they  are  Jesuits.  Many 
are  arrested  suspected  to  be  emigrants.  We  begin 
to  perceive  that  the  Royalists  are  to  be  feared  because 
they  believe  themselves  to  be  favoured,  and  that  it  is 
time  to  end  their  hopes." 

Joseph,  who  married  Julie,  the  daughter  of  a  rich 
merchant,  was  now  living  in  Marseilles,  where  he  had 
taken  refuge  owing  to  the  insurrection  in  Corsica 
against  France.  Napoleon  was  at  this  time  engaged 
to  the  sister  of  Julie,  Eugenie  D6sir£e,  who  later 
became  the  wife  of  Bernadotte.  In  June,  1795, 
Napoleon  declares  that  he  intends  to  have  his  portrait 
painted,  as  such  is  the  wish  of  Desiree,  but  at  the 
same  time  he  writes  in  a  melancholy  vein.  "  Life," 
he  says,  "is  a  flimsy  dream  soon  to  be  over."  From 
his  letters  it  would  appear  that  Paris  was  assuming 
its  normal  aspect  and  that  confidence  was  returning. 

1  "  The  Confidential  Correspondence  of  Napoleon  Bonaparte 
with  his  Brother  Joseph,"  p.  3.  London,  John  Murray,  1855. 


THE  RISE  OF  NAPOLEON  17 

In  a  very  interesting  letter  written  on  18  July,  he 
gives  a  very  remarkable  account  of  the  life  of  the 
Parisians  after  they  had  emerged  from  the  Reign  of 
Terror. 

"  Luxury,  pleasure,  and  the  arts  are  reviving  here 
in  a  wonderful  manner.  Yesterday  they  acted 
'Phedre'  at  the  Opera  House  for  the  benefit  of  a 
former  actress ;  the  crowd  was  immense  from  two 
o'clock  in  the  afternoon,  although  the  prices  were 
trebled.  Equipages  and  dandies  are  re-appearing. 
.  .  .  Libraries  are  formed,  and  we  have  lectures 
on  history,  chemistry,  botany,  astronomy,  etc.  We 
have  heaped  together  here  all  that  can  make  life  amus- 
ing and  agreeable ;  reflection  is  banished.  Women 
go  everywhere  ;  to  the  theatres,  to  the  public  walks, 
to  the  public  theatres.  ...  A  woman  does  not  know 
her  value  or  the  extent  of  her  empire  till  she  has  spent 
six  months  in  Paris."1 

It  was  quite  evident  that  the  reaction  had  come 
to  stay.  The  singing  of  the  "  Reveil  du  Peuple  "  and 
the  "  Marseillaise  "  in  the  theatres  caused  disturbances  ; 
there  was  a  feeling  of  satisfaction  that  the  Constitution 
was  approaching  completion.  In  July  he  described 
in  a  letter  the  overthrow  of  the  emigres  who  had 
landed  at  Quiberon,  and  wonders  at  Pitt's  folly  in 
sending  1 2,000  men  to  attack  France.  The  victory 
at  Quiberon,  together  with  the  conclusion  of 
peace  with  Spain,  Naples,  and  Parma,  undoubtedly 

1  "  The  Confidential  Correspondence  of  Napoleon  Bonaparte 
with  his  Brother  Joseph,"  p.  6. 


i8  THE  LIFE  OF  NAPOLEON 

strengthened  the  hands  of  the  executive  and  enabled 
more  attention  to  be  paid  to  Italy,  from  which  country 
the  Austrians  and  Sardinians  were  engaged  in  at- 
tempting to  expel  the  French.  "We  shall  soon," 
wrote  Napoleon  on  i  August,  1795,  "have  some 
very  serious  work  in  Lombardy."  In  August  it 
seemed  not  unlikely  that  Napoleon  might  be  sent  to 
Turkey  as  General  of  artillery  in  order  to  organize 
the  Sultan's  artillery.  Napoleon  had  decided  that 
in  that  event  he  would  have  Joseph  appointed  Consul. 
Fortunately  for  Napoleon  he  was  not  sent  to  Turkey, 
but  remained  in  Paris  watching  very  carefuily  the 
movements  of  the  French  armies  and  studying  the 
political  situation.  "  The  Constitution,"  he  wrote  on  6 
September,  "will  be  accepted  unanimously  ;  the  only 
cause  of  alarm  is  the  Decree  retaining  two-thirds  of 
the  Convention." 

His  view  proved  to  be  correct,  and  it  was  only 
through  Napoleon's  firmness  and  skill  in  suppressing 
the  rising  of  Vend£miaire  that  the  obnoxious  portion 
of  the  Constitution  was  retained. 

During  September  the  Constitution  had  been 
completed,  and  Napoleon  on  12  September  wrote 
saying  that  the  crisis  was  over,  and  that  the  Republic 
was  secure.  Later  in  the  month,  however,  he  became 
aware  that  the  Constitution  with  its  obnoxious  clause 
retaining  two-thirds  of  the  Convention  was  not  going 
to  be  accepted  quietly.  At  two  in  the  morning  of  6 
October  (the  night  of  13-14  Vendemiaire)  he  wrote : 
"  At  last  all  is  over.  The  Convention  order  the 


19 

Section  Lepelletier  to  be  disarmed.  It  repulsed  the 
troops.  .  .  .  The  Convention  appointed  Barras  to 
command  the  military  force :  the  committees  ap- 
pointed me  second  in  command.  We  made  our  dis- 
positions ;  the  enemy  marched  to  attack  us  in  the 
Tuileries.  We  killed  many  of  them — they  killed 
thirty  of  our  men,  and  wounded  sixty.  We  have 
disarmed  the  sections  and  all  is  quiet.  As  usual  I 
was  not  wounded.  P.S. — Fortune  favours  me."1 

Vende"miaire  testified  to  the  incapacity  of  the 
royalists  in  France  who,  instead  of  biding  their  time 
and  trusting  to  the  increase  of  their  influence  at  the 
annual  elections,  had  blundered  into  a  struggle  for 
which  the  Thermidorians  had  prepared.  By  means 
of  his  cannon  Napoleon  had  crushed  the  Jeunesse 
Dorte,  "had  ensured  the  continuance  under  legal 
forms  of  the  Jacobin  rule,  and  destroyed  the  hopes 
alike  of  a  royalist  restoration  and  of  a  moderate 
republic ".  Mallet  Du  Pan 2  and  others  had  hoped 
for  the  establishment  of  a  constitutional  monarchy. 
But  the  time  had  not  yet  come  for  a  restoration  of 
the  Bourbons,  and  the  upper  classes,  a  large  propor- 
tion of  whom  were  emigres,  had  not  yet  realized  that 
the  greater  part  of  the  French  nation  would  be 
satisfied  with  nothing  less  than  the  Constitution  of 
1791.  It  would  be  impossible  to  realize  the  absolute 

1  "  The  Confidential  Correspondence  of  Napoleon  Bonaparte 
with  his  Brother  Joseph,"  p.  23. 

2  "  Mallet  Du  Pan  and  the  French  Revolution,"  by  Bernard 
Mallet.     London,  Longmans,  1902. 


20  THE  LIFE  OF  NAPOLEON 

blindness  of  the  emigres,  or  to  comprehend  their 
incapacity  to  understand  the  political  situation  in 
France,  did  we  not  possess  in  the  history  of  the 
Bourbon  Restoration  from  1814  to  1830  evidence 
that  most  of  the  members  of  that  family  had  even 
then  learned  nothing.  The  emigres  were  by  no 
means  displeased  at  the  failure  of  Vend£miaire, 
"because  the  livery  of  the  ancien  regime  had  not 
been  at  once  assumed,"  and  because  the  royalism  "of 
its  authors  did  not  possess  its  sixteen  quarterings " ! 
How  could  any  cause  hope  to  succeed  with  such 
supporters  ?  They  were  naturally  the  despair  of  all 
moderate  and  sensible  royalists  who,  like  Mallet  Du 
Pan,  aimed  at  the  establishment  of  a  constitutional 
monarchy  after  the  English  type. 

The  advent  of  the  Directory  to  power  put  an  end 
not  only  to  all  hopes  of  a  Bourbon  restoration,  but 
also  to  all  chance  of  peace.  During  its  tenure  of  office, 
from  1795  to  1799,  Napoleon  laid  the  foundation  of 
his  supremacy  in  France.  In  1795  he  was  merely  an 
artillery  officer  who  owed  his  prominence  at  Vende"- 
miaire  to  the  accident  of  his  being  in  Paris  at  the  time, 
and  to  his  friendship  with  Barras.  In  1799  he  was 
the  most  prominent  French  subject,  and  sufficiently 
powerful  to  drive  the  Directory  from  power,  and  to 
seize  the  reins  of  office. 

CHIEF   DATES 

Birth  of  Napoleon 15  August,  1769. 

At  school  at  Autun,  and  at  Brienne  .  .  .  .1779. 
At  the  military  school  in  Paris 1784. 


THE  RISE  OF  NAPOLEON  21 

Sub-lieutenant  in  the  regiment  of  La  Fere       .         .         .     1785. 
In  Corsica    .........     1786. 

Visits  Paris   .........     1787. 

In  Corsica  and  at  Auxonne    ......     1788. 

Outbreak  of  the  French  Revolution         .         .         .         .1789. 

In  Corsica    ....      August,  1789  to  February,  1791. 

At  Auxonne  ....  February  to  June,  1791. 

At  Valence  (first  lieutenant)  .         .        June  to  September,  1791. 
In  Corsica    ....        September,  1791  to  May,  1792. 

In  Paris May  to  September,  1792. 

Expedition  to  Sardinia  .         .         .         .         .         .         .1793. 

The  Bonaparte  family  leave  Corsica        ....     1793. 

The  Siege  of  Toulon      .......     1793. 

With  the  Army  in  Italy          ......     1794. 

The  Revolution  of  Thermidor        ....     July,  1794. 

Vendemiaire          ........     1795. 


CHAPTER  II 
THE  ITALIAN  AND  EGYPTIAN  CAMPAIGNS,  1796-1799 

Bonaparte  commands  the  army  in  Italy — His  appearance — 
Justification  of  his  appointment — His  victories — The  Preliminaries 
of  Leoben — The  Franco-Spanish  Alliance — The  Papacy — The 
Cisalpine  Republic — Fructidor — Peace  of  Campo  Formio — Bona- 
parte at  Rastadt — In  Paris — The  Egyptian  Expedition — The 
Battle  of  the  Nile — Acre — Bonaparte's  return  to  France — The 
political  situation,  1799. 

T  7ENDEMIAIRE  was  destined  to  mark  an  epoch 
*  not  merely  in  the  history  of  France  but  also  in 
the  history  of  Europe.  The  man  who  defeated  the 
insurgents  was  Bonaparte,  "  through  whose  genius  the 
Revolution  was  to  subjugate  the  continent ".  There  is 
no  doubt  that  owing  to  his  conduct  in  the  conflict  of 
Vende"miaire  Bonaparte  obtained  the  Italian  command. 
He  had  by  his  conduct  secured  the  favourable  notice  of 
Carnot,  he  was  supported  by  Barras,  and  before  the 
end  of  1795  he  was  appointed  Commander-in-Chief  of 
the  Interior.  During  the  winter  he  took  the  greatest 
possible  interest  in  the  Italian  army,  and  never  ceased 
his  efforts  to  secure  the  appointment  of  Commander- 
in-Chief  of  the  army  of  Italy. 

On    2    March,    1796,    when    in    his    27th    year, 

32 


THE  ITALIAN  CAMPAIGN  23 

he  received  that  appointment.  On  9  March  he 
married  Josephine,  and  on  27  March  he  arrived  at 
Nice,  the  head-quarters  of  the  French  army  of  Italy. 
He  had  now  the  opportunity  which  he  had  been  wait- 
ing for,  and  the  post  which  enabled  him  to  show  the 
superiority  of  his  qualifications  to  those  of  his  contem- 
poraries. 

In  appointing  him  to  the  command  in  Italy  the 
Directors  were  taking  a  considerable  risk.  But  his 
personality  had  impressed  many  of  the  leading  men 
in  Paris ;  his  action  during  the  events  of  Vend£miaire 
had  attracted  attention  ;  he  had  already  some  acquain- 
tance with  the  Italian  theatre  of  war.  He  was  con- 
sequently in  a  position  to  push  forward  his  demand 
for  the  command  of  the  army  in  Italy.  Moreover, 
he  was  familiar  with  the  Italian  language,  and  in  this 
respect  was  better  suited  than  were  such  men  as 
Kellermann  or  Davoust  for  the  appointment.  He 
was  indeed  better  qualified  for  the  post  than  any  of 
his  contemporaries,  for  in  addition  to  his  acquaintance 
with  Italian  he  had  received  the  best  military  educa- 
tion ;  he  had  gained  valuable  experience  at  the  siege 
of  Toulon,  and  in  1794  he  had  drawn  up  for  the 
Italian  campaign  plans  which  would  have  proved 
successful  had  Carnot  not  ordered  a  general  retire- 
ment. As  it  was,  his  plans  were  carried  out  under 
his  own  direction  in  1796. 

His  Corsican  origin  was  in  itself  an  advantage, 
for  "the  Corsicans,"  we  are  told,  "had  a  widespread 
reputation  for  being  persons  of  rare  qualities,  amongst 


24  THE  LIFE  OF  NAPOLEON 

whom  a  prodigy  might  easily  be  found  V  Moreover, 
his  Corsican  rearing  led  him  to  treat  his  soldiers  as 
personal  friends,  and  in  this  way  he  inspired  feelings 
of  devotion  to  himself.  His  personal  influence  over 
his  soldiers  never  lessened.  It  was,  moreover,  an  im- 
mense advantage  to  be  far  removed  from  Paris.  His 
natural  promptitude  and  habit  of  making  rapid  de- 
cisions thus  had  full  play,  and  when  directions  arrived 
from  Paris  the  matter  treated  of  in  those  directions 
had  already  been  settled  by  Bonaparte  in  his  own  way. 
He  alone  of  the  French  generals  secured  perfect 
freedom  of  action,  which  in  itself  was  an  unspeakable 
advantage  when  opposing  the  generals  of  continental 
powers,  none  of  whom  could  have  any  freedom  of 
action. 

Then  Bonaparte's  youth  was  another  advantage. 
In  his  early  campaigns  he  was  opposed  by  men  much 
older  than  himself,  such  as  Beaulieu,  Wurmser,  and 
Alvinzi — men  who  could  not  easily  adapt  themselves 
to  new  conditions  of  warfare. 

His  career  falls  naturally  into  two  periods.  The 
first  period  begins  with  his  arrival  at  Nice  and  ends 
with  the  Treaty  of  Tilsit  in  1 807.  During  that  period 
Napoleon  effected  a  most  useful  work.  He  initiated 
the  growth  of  Italian  unity,  and  he  cleared  the  ground 
for  the  firm  establishment  of  the  feeling  of  nationality 
in  Germany.  That  period  saw  his  famous  Italian  cam- 
paign, his  Egyptian  expedition,  the  Marengo,  Auster- 

1  Norwood  Young,  "The  Growth  of  Napoleon,"  p.  359, 
London,  John  Murray. 


NAPOLEON   AS   A  GENERAL  OF   THE   REPUBLIC 

FROM    THE    PAINTING    By    H.    E.    P.    PHILIPHOTEAUX    AT   VERSAILLES 


THE  ITALIAN  CAMPAIGN  25 

litz,  Jena,  and  Friedland  campaigns.  It  saw  the 
establishment  of  the  French  power  in  Italy,  it  saw 
the  power  of  the  French  Empire  at  its  height. 

From  the  Treaty  of  Tilsit  may  be  dated  the 
second  period  in  Napoleon's  career,  a  period  which 
witnessed  his  superhuman  efforts  to  ruin  Great 
Britain,  by  the  stern  enforcement  of  the  continental 
system.  The  attempted  execution  of  this  project 
involved  him  in  the  Spanish  and  Russian  Wars,  and 
in  the  War  of  Liberation  which  finally  effected  his 
overthrow. 

The  description  of  Bonaparte  given  by  Mr.  Nor- 
wood Young  in  "  The  Growth  of  Napoleon,"  is  admir- 
able. In  1796  "he  measured  5  feet  5f  inches,  and 
was  very  thin,  with  small  hands  and  feet.  His  hands 
were  always  in  a  clean  and  cared-for  condition  ;  they 
were  his  one  vanity.  He  had  a  sickly,  pale  olive 
complexion.  His  lank,  chestnut  hair  he  allowed,  fol- 
lowing a  not  unusual  custom  in  the  Republican  Army, 
to  grow  so  long  that  it  reached  his  shoulders.  It  was 
this  frail  appearance,  so  unwarlike,  so  far  removed 
from  the  soldier  type,  that  earned  him  the  title  of 
petit  caporal,  and  aided  him  in  assuming  the  character 
of  an  abnormal  being."1 

Much  of  his  success  in  the  Italian  campaign  was 
by  some  of  his  leading  opponents  in  1796  ascribed  to 
his  Corsican  blood. 

The  Archduke  Ferdinand,  it  is  said,  had  declared 
that  Bonaparte  being  a  Corsican  was  enterprising  and 

1  Norwood  Young,  "  The  Growth  of  Napoleon,"  p.  357. 


26  THE  LIFE  OF  NAPOLEON 

likely  to  attack,  while  Colli's  chief  of  staff,  Costa  de 
Beaurepaire,  wrote  :  "  General  Bonaparte,  a  creature 
of  Barras,  is  not  known  for  any  stirring  achievement ; 
but  he  is  regarded  as  a  profound  theorist  and  a  man 
of  genius  ".l 

On  his  arrival  at  Nice  he  found  that  all  was  ready 
for  an  advance.  Scherer's  victory  at  Loano  in  1794 
had  enabled  the  French  to  occupy  a  position  suitable 
as  the  starting-point  of  a  fresh  campaign. 

The  French  army  of  Italy  was  at  that  time  the 
best  in  Europe,  but  when  Napoleon  reached  Nice  it 
was  in  a  dejected,  half-starved  condition.  For  two 
years  it  had  been  campaigning  on  the  outskirts  of 
Northern  Italy  and  had  become  discontented  and  un- 
disciplined. Bonaparte  at  once  established  his  in- 
fluence over  them  by  the  issue  of  a  stirring  address. 
"  Soldiers,  you  are  ill-fed  and  almost  naked.  The 
Government  owes  you  much  but  can  do  nothing  for 
you.  Your  patience,  your  courage  do  you  honour, 
but  bring  you  neither  advantage  nor  glory.  I  in- 
tend to  lead  you  to  the  most  fertile  plains  in  the 
world.  Rich  provinces,  great  cities  will  be  in  your 
power.  There  you  will  find  honour  and  glory  and 
wealth.  Soldiers  of  the  Army  of  Italy,  will  you  be 
found  wanting  in  courage  and  constancy  ?  " 

On  arriving  at  Nice  Bonaparte  found  opposed  to 
him  the  Austrian  and  Sardinian  armies.  On  12  April 
he  defeated  the  Austrians  in  the  battle  of  Montenotte, 
which  has  been  described  as  a  necessary  operation 

1  Norwood  Young,  "  The  Growth  of  Napoleon,"  p.  354. 


THE  ITALIAN  CAMPAIGN  27 

but  not  a  serious  battle.  According  to  an  enthusi- 
astic admirer  of  Bonaparte  this  was  "  the  first  in  a 
series  of  eighteen  great  pitched  battles  that  he  won 
before  the  peace  of  Campo  Formio  in  1797,  and  the 
names  of  which  still  reflect  his  early  glory  ".a 

By  his  victory  at  Montenotte  Bonaparte  prevented 
the  Austrians  from  joining  their  Sardinian  allies. 
"  My  title  of  nobility,"  Bonaparte  declared  later, 
"  dates  from  the  battle  of  Montenotte.  On  the  follow- 
ing day,  13  April,  the  Austrians  again  suffered  defeat 
at  Milesimo,  and  on  the  i5th  an  Austrian  division, 
unaware  that  on  the  previous  day  the  Austrian 
forces  had  been  defeated  and  driven  from  Dego,  re- 
occupied  the  village  only  to  suffer  a  severe  defeat  at 
the  hands  of  Bonaparte. 

All  danger  of  a  union  of  the  Austrian  and  Sar- 
dinian armies  was  now  removed,  and  Bonaparte  was 
enabled,  after  a  struggle  at  Mondovi,  to  force  the 
court  of  Turin  to  sign  the  armistice  of  Cherasco. 
When  the  Piedmontese  officers  expressed  surprise  at 
Bonaparte's  impatience  to  receive  the  treaty  duly 
signed  from  the  Sardinian  Government,  the  conqueror 
replied,  "  I  may  often  lose  a  battle,  but  I  shall  never 
lose  a  minute".  Savoy  and  Nice  were  ceded  to 
France,  the  fortresses  of  Alessandria,  Tortona,  and 
Coni  were  placed  in  the  hands  of  the  French,  and 
other  fortresses  were  destroyed.  Bonaparte  had 
now  secured  "  the  keys  of  the  Alps,"  and  he  was 

1Kielland,  "  Napoleon's  Men  and  Methods,  "p.  19.  London, 
A.  Owen  &  Co.,  1909. 


28  THE  LIFE  OF  NAPOLEON 

able  to  concentrate  his  efforts  upon  the  Austrian 
army. 

The  Milanese  were  now  open  to  the  French  attack, 
and  on  10  May  the  passage  of  the  Adda  at  Lodi 
was  effected.  Lodi,  in  Bonaparte's  own  words  on  the 
evening  of  the  battle,  was  not  much  of  an  affair  ;  later 
in  his  career,  however,  he  used  both  it  and  Montenotte 
as  a  basis  of  the  Napoleonic  legend.  The  "as- 
tonishing passage  of  the  bridge  of  Lodi,"  became  the 
subject  for  painters.  Bonaparte,  by  his  personal 
bravery  on  10  May,  had  roused  the  enthusiasm  of 
the  army  which  saluted  him  as  le  petit  caporal. 

Lodi  was  certainly  an  epoch  in  the  life  of  Bona- 
parte. Frequently  during  the  previous  years  he  had 
indulged  in  ambitious  hopes  and  fantastic  dreams. 
Before  Vend^miaire  his  ambition  had  been  noted,  and 
indeed  during  the  early  years  of  the  Revolution  he 
had  not  unfrequently  shown  that  his  expectations 
were  by  no  means  of  a  moderate  order. 

At  St.  Helena,  however,  he  said  to  Las  Cases  : 
"  Vendemiaire  and  even  Montenotte  did  not  lead  me 
to  regard  myself  a  man  out  of  the  ordinary.  It  was 
only  after  Lodi  that  the  idea  came  to  me  that  I  might, 
after  all,  indeed  become  a  decisive  actor  on  the 
political  stage.  Then  arose  the  first  gleam  of  high 
ambition."  The  success  at  Lodi  strengthened  Bona- 
parte's position  enormously.  He  became  a  popular 
hero  in  Paris,  and  was  henceforward  free  from  all 
interference  on  the  part  of  the  Directors,  who  no 
longer  dare  oppose  him. 


THE  ITALIAN  CAMPAIGN  29 

On  15  May  he  entered  Milan,  and  wrote  to  his 
brother  Joseph  that  the  French  were  masters  of  all 
Lombardy.  Then  followed  the  severe  and  prolonged 
struggle  over  the  famous  "quadrilateral,"  ending  with 
the  surrender  of  Mantua  by  the  veteran  Austrian 
General  Wurmser,  and  the  supremacy  of  the  French 
in  Northern  Italy. 

After  occupying  Milan  Bonaparte  issued  a  pro- 
clamation for  the  purpose  of  inspiring  the  Italians  with 
ideas  of  liberty.  He  declared  that  his  object  was  "to 
restore  the  capitol ;  to  replace  there  the  statues  of  the 
heroes  who  have  rendered  it  immortal ;  to  rouse  the 
Romans  from  centuries  of  slavery — such  will  be  the 
fruit  of  our  victories  ;  they  will  form  an  era  in  history  ; 
to  you  will  belong  the  glory  of  having  changed  the 
most  beautiful  part  of  Europe  ". 

This  declaration  did  not  prevent  him  from  wring- 
ing 20,000,000  francs  from  the  Italians,  or  from  de- 
stroying Brescia.  The  French  troops  entered  Verona  ; 
Beaulieu,  the  Austrian  commander,  retired  into  the 
Tyrol,  and  Bonaparte  began  his  long  series  of  attempts 
to  capture  the  well-fortified  town  of  Mantua. 

Wurmser,  Beaulieu's  successor,  entered  Mantua 
on  i  August,  but  was  defeated  at  Lonato  on  3  August 
and  at  Castiglione  on  5  August,  and  retired  into  the 
Tyrol.  In  September  Wurmser  again  entered 
Mantua  in  order  to  reinforce  the  garrison,  but  he 
himself  was  besieged.  In  November  Alvinzi  en- 
deavoured to  raise  the  siege.  But  though  checked 
on  12  November  at  Caldiero  Bonaparte  proved  vie- 


30 

torious  in  the  three  days'  battle  at  Arcola  (15-17 
Nov.)  and  Alvinzi  fell  back  to  the  mountains.  For 
some  two  months  no  serious  operation  was  under- 
taken and  both  French  and  Austrians  received  rein- 
forcements. 

On  14  January,  1797,  however,  an  Austrian 
army  under  Alvinzi,  advancing  down  the  Adige,  was 
defeated  by  Bonaparte,  who  on  16  January  crushed  a 
column  under  Provera  which  had  penetrated  to  the 
suburbs  of  Mantua. 

On  2  February,  1797,  Mantua  itself  capitulated, 
and  the  era  of  Hapsburg  predominance  in  Italy  came 
to  an  end.  From  this  time  onwards  the  desire  for 
freedom  and  independence  steadily  developed  in  Italy. 

During  the  Italian  campaign  many  of  those  who 
became  celebrated  French  generals  leaped  into  pro- 
minence. Lannes,  Berthier,  Oudinot,  Mass£na,  and 
others  distinguished  themselves  and  showed  the  pos- 
session of  military  qualities  which  was  at  once  recog- 
nized by  the  young  Bonaparte.  His  ambitious 
schemes  had  now  taken  a  concrete  form,  and  he  was 
resolved  to  become  the  first  man  in  France. 

On  7  April,  1797,  the  advance  guard  of  the 
French  arrny  arrived  at  Leoben.  The  Austrians 
were  completely  outgeneralled,  and  after  one  more  de- 
feat under  the  very  walls  of  the  Austrian  capital  itself 
Austria  would  be  at  the  mercy  of  the  French  con- 
queror. In  Vienna  itself  panic  reigned,  and,  in  spite 
of  the  brave  words  of  Thugut,  the  party  in  favour  of 
peace  gained  the  day. 


31 

Anxiety,  too,  for  the  welfare  of  the  Court  of 
Naples  rendered  Francis  eager  to  end  the  war ;  the 
new  Tsar,  Paul  I,  showed  no  desire  to  oppose  the 
French,  and  by  its  withdrawal  from  the  Mediter- 
ranean the  English  fleet  could  no  longer  impede 
French  operations  in  Italy.  Preliminaries  were  there- 
fore signed  at  Leoben  on  18  April,  but  Thugut  suc- 
ceeded in  postponing  the  conclusion  of  a  definite 
peace. 

Various  circumstances  had  contributed  to  this 
striking  success  on  the  part  of  the  young  general. 
Germany  was  still  far  from  being  united  in  opposition 
to  the  French.  Frederick  William  1 1  of  Prussia  had 
on  5  August,  1796,  signed  a  secret  supplement  to  the 
Treaty  of  Basel,  while  Baden,  Wurtemberg,  and 
Bavaria  anticipating  in  a  way  the  events  of  1806,  when 
the  Confederation  of  the  Rhine  was  formed,  had  entered 
into  negotiations  with  the  Directory. 

Moreover,  the  action  of  Spain  had  facilitated  in  a 
most  striking  fashion  Bonaparte's  conquest  of  Lom- 
bardy.  On  10  August,  1796,  Charles  IV,  under  the 
influence  of  his  minister  Godoy,  had  at  San  Ildefonso 
signed  an  offensive  and  defensive  alliance  with  the 
French  Republic,  and  the  Spanish  fleet  effected  a 
junction  with  the  French  fleet  at  Toulon.  Spain  had 
declared  war  upon  Great  Britain  on  9  October,  1796, 
and  the  same  month  Sir  John  Jervis,  finding  himself 
outnumbered,  was  forced  to  withdraw  from  Corsica 
and  the  Mediterranean.  No  British  fleet  appeared 
again  in  that  sea  for  some  eighteen  months,  in  spite 


32  THE  LIFE  OF  NAPOLEON 

of  the  defeat  of  the  Spanish  fleet  by  Jervis  in  the 
battle  of  St.  Vincent  on  14  February,  1797. 

Moreover,  before  invading  the  Tyrol  Bonaparte 
had  taken  steps  to  secure  his  position  in  Central  as 
well  as  in  Northern  Italy.  In  1796  he  had  occu- 
pied the  Legations  of  Ferrara  and  Bologna,  and  early 
in  1797  he  had  advanced  on  Rome  and  forced  Pius 
VI  to  sign  on  19  February  the  Treaty  of  Tolentino. 

During  1796  he  had  fully  realized  the  immense 
power  wielded  by  the  Papacy,  and  had  ignored  the 
orders  of  the  Directory  to  destroy  the  Pope's  authority. 
At  the  same  time  while  he  was  asserting  that  in  order 
to  quiet  the  "  alarmed  consciences  of  many  nations," 
he  was  anxious  to  become  the  saviour  far  more  than 
the  destroyer  of  the  "  Holy  See,"  he  was  making  pre- 
parations to  secure  the  all-important  seaport  of  Ancona. 
His  policy  to  the  Papacy  at  this  period  was  in  reality 
that  of  an  opportunist.  He  was  resolved  that  the 
Pope  should  realize  that  better  terms  would  be  ob- 
tained from  him  than  from  the  Directors.  At  the 
same  time  he  did  not  hesitate  to  impose  upon  "  the 
old  fox,"  as  in  a  private  letter  he  styled  the  Pope,  the 
humiliating  Treaty  of  Tolentino  (19  February,  1797), 
which  insisted  upon  the  payment  of  a  heavy  fine,  and 
the  removal  to  Paris  from  Rome  of  one  hundred  works 
of  art. 

The  importance,  however,  of  gaining  over  to  his 
side  the  clerical  influence  in  Italy  was  not  lost  upon 
Bonaparte,  who  in  setting  up  a  republican  form  of 
government  in  Northern  Italy  declared  that  "the 


THE  ITALIAN  CAMPAIGN  33 

morality  of  the  Gospel  is  that  of  equality,"  and  hence- 
forth it  is  most  favourable  "to  the  republican  govern- 
ment" which  he  then  imposed  upon  the  Italians.  In 
following  this  policy  Bonaparte  was  acting  independ- 
ently of  the  Directors,  who  would  have  preferred  the  de- 
struction of  the  Papacy  and  the  abolition  of  religion. 

The  success  which  attended  Napoleon's  arms  had 
thus  completely  outweighed  the  effects  of  the  retreat 
of  Moreau  from  Southern  Germany,  necessitated  by 
the  failure  of  Jourdan  to  hold  his  own  against  the 
Archduke  Charles,  the  failure  of  Hoche  to  land  a 
force  in  Ireland  in  December,  1796,  and  the  arrival 
in  Portugal  of  a  British  force  under  Sir  Charles 
Stuart. 

The  cessation  of  hostilities  with  Austria,  which 
followed  the  negotiations  at  Leoben,  left  Bonaparte  free 
to  complete  the  subjugation  of  Northern  Italy.  On 
1 6  May  Venice  was  occupied,  the  ancient  Government 
of  Genoa  was  dissolved,  and  on  14  June  the  Ligurian 
Republic  was  set  up. 

On  9  July  the  Cisalpine  Republic,  consisting  of 
the  Northern  Italian  States,  with  the  exception  of 
Piedmont,  was  formed  and  the  Ionian  Islands  were 
annexed  to  France.  It  only  remained  to  convert  the 
Preliminaries  of  Leoben  into  a  permanent  peace. 
Those  Preliminaries,  as  the  Austrian  Court  knew,  had 
been  signed  by  Bonaparte  without  the  authorization 
of  the  Directory,  then  involved  in  a  political  and 
religious  crisis  which  threatened  to  result  in  its  over- 
throw. 

3 


34  THE  LIFE  OF  NAPOLEON 

Should  the  fall  of  the  Directory  take  place  it 
seemed  as  if  a  reaction  against  its  foreign  as  well  as 
its  home  policy  would  assert  itself,  and  that  con- 
sequently Austria  might  secure  more  advantageous 
terms  from  a  new  French  Government  whose  policy 
was  opposed  to  that  of  its  predecessor.  That  Thugut's 
expectations  were  not  groundless  is  apparent  from 
a  consideration  of  the  state  of  parties  in  France. 

During  1796  and  indeed  till  September,  1 797,  when 
the  Revolution  of  Fructidor  took  place,  there  had  been 
little  religious  persecution.  The  Directors  were  far 
more  interested  in  foreign  than  in  domestic  matters, 
and  the  Constitution  of  the  year  III  apparently  re- 
moved all  religious  difficulties.  The  laws  against 
emigrants  and  refractory  priests  remained  to  a  great 
extent  in  abeyance,  and  it  is  asserted  that  up  to 
Fructidor  only  twenty  priests  suffered  death  under  the 
Directory.  The  Pope  recommended  with  certain  re- 
servations obedience  to  the  civil  power,  many  priests 
returned,  and  the  churches  were  crowded.  It  is  said 
that  by  the  summer  of  1797  the  old  religious  services 
were  conducted  in  3  8,000  parishes.  A  crisis,  however, 
occurred  a  few  months  after  the  elections  of  1797. 

In  May,  1797,  elections  to  the  Directorate  and 
Legislative  Body  took  place.  These  elections  gave 
the  country  an  opportunity  of  showing  its  dissatisfac- 
tion with  the  majority  of  the  Directors,  and  its  hatred 
of  all  who  had  been  concerned  with  the  Reign  of 
Terror.  Of  the  Legislative  Body  only  eleven  out  of 
the  216  retiring  members,  most  of  whom  stood  again, 


THE  ITALIAN  CAMPAIGN  35 

were  elected,  their  places  being  taken  by  men  of 
moderate  or  royalist  opinions.  The  reactionary  or 
Clichian  party — so  called  because  its  members  met  in 
the  Rue  de  Clichy — was  composed  of  able  men  who 
were  united  in  desiring  to  expel  from  power  all  who 
had  been  concerned  with  the  Reign  of  Terror,  and  in 
wishing  to  carry  out  a  peace  policy  abroad.  The 
party,  however,  was  not  united  with  regard  to  the  future 
government  of  France.  Some  of  its  members  wished 
to  secure  the  return  of  the  Bourbons,  and  the  re-estab- 
lishment of  the  ancien  regime,  while  others  advocated 
a  constitutional  monarchy  of  the  English  type.  But 
the  fact  that  the  Bourbons  would  not  accept  the  Con- 
stitution of  1791  weakened  the  Clichian  party,  and  at 
the  same  time  the  desire  for  a  universal  peace  was  not 
shared  by  the  army  or  by  Bonaparte. 

The  news  of  the  signature  of  the  Preliminaries  of 
Leoben  was  received  with  great  satisfaction  in  Paris, 
and  the  Directors  at  once  sent  Hoche  to  Holland  to 
prepare  for  the  invasion  of  England.  The  financial 
distress  in  France  had  been  considerably  relieved  by 
the  fact  that  the  large  French  armies  were  living  at 
the  expense  of  other  countries,  while  the  money  sent 
back  by  the  French  generals  came  at  a  most  opportune 
time. 

Moreover,  three  Directors,  Barras,  Reubell,  and 
Larevelliere,  had  resolved  to  spare  no  efforts  to  keep 
themselves  in  power.  In  the  early  autumn  they 
appealed  to  Bonaparte  who  sent  Augereau  to  Paris. 
On  4  September,  with  2000  soldiers,  he  carried  out  the 


36  THE  LIFE  OF  NAPOLEON 

Revolution  of  8  Fructidor.  The  reactionary  move- 
ment was  suppressed  with  severity,  and  the  Directory 
was  maintained  in  power  for  another  two  years. 
Nevertheless  though  the  Directory,  owing  to  Bona- 
parte's genius  and  to  the  efficiency  of  the  French 
armies,  had  overthrown  the  Austrians  and  gained 
supremacy  in  Italy,  failure  attended  its  efforts  to  sub- 
jugate Great  Britain.  Within  a  week  of  the  signature, 
on  17  October,  of  the  Peace  of  Campo  Formio,  the 
French  plans  for  the  invasion  of  England  had  already 
been  entirely  overthrown,  and  England  was  saved  from 
immediate  attack  by  the  defeat  of  the  Dutch  fleet  on 
ii  October,  1797,  at  the  battle  of  Camperdown. 

The  Peace  of  Campo  Formio  revealed  to  the  world 
Bonaparte's  determination  to  secure  the  supremacy  of 
France  in  the  Mediterranean,  and  has  an  especial 
importance  in  that  he  was  now  enabled  to  define  his 
Eastern  ambitions.  The  Austrians  might  have  Venice 
so  long  as  France  secured  the  Adige  boundary  for  the 
Cisalpine  Republic,  and  the  Rhine  boundary  together 
with  the  Ionian  Islands. 

The  conquest  of  Italy  was  now  virtually  complete, 
and  the  way  prepared  for  the  future  expansion  of 
France  in  the  Levant.  Bonaparte's  brilliant  Italian 
campaign  had  a  far-reaching  importance  for  Italy  no 
less  than  for  France.  The  old  order  was  overthrown 
in  Italy,  and  was  followed  by  a  slow  though  steady 
growth  of  the  feeling  of  nationality.  Thus  the 
campaigns  of  1796-7  constitute  an  epoch  in  the  history 
of  Italian  unity.  None  the  less  do  those  campaigns 


THE  ITALIAN  CAMPAIGN  37 

mark  an  epoch  in  the  history  of  France.  The  victories 
won  proved  to  be  a  distinct  step  in  Napoleon's  rise  to 
supremacy  in  France,  and  form  "  the  starting-point 
of  a  series  of  campaigns  prompted  by  personal  ambition 
and  a  desire  for  national  aggrandizement".1 

Moreover,  the  predominance  of  military  instincts 
over  democratic  theories  was  now  assured.  The 
army  had  illustrated  its  political  power  in  the  events 
of  Fructidor.  Henceforward  its  predominance  be- 
came unmistakable.  The  age  of  revolutionary  princi- 
ples was  over,  and  a  policy  of  aggression  towards 
foreign  countries  at  once  begins.  As  head  of  the 
victorious  army  Bonaparte  was  now  all-powerful,  and 
his  ambitious  policy  was  shortly  revealed  to  an  aston- 
ished and  unprepared  world. 

The  years  1796  and  1797  were  indeed  of  import- 
ance to  Europe  no  less  than  to  Bonaparte.  Europe 
suddenly  realized  that  in  Bonaparte  she  had  to  deal 
with  a  man  whose  military  genius  was  only  equalled 
by  his  political  sagacity  no  less  than  by  his  ambition. 

From  April  till  30  October,  1797,  Bonaparte  and 
Josephine  lived  in  the  villa  of  Passeriano  near  Udine. 
Probably  these  months  constitute  the  happiest  period 
in  Napoleon's  life.  During  that  period  his  brother 
Joseph  was  acting  as  French  ambassador  in  Rome 
and  was  engaged  in  continual  negotiations  with  the 
Pope.  Bonaparte  watched  the  intrigues  of  the  Papacy 
and  the  Court  of  Naples  with  ill-concealed  impatience. 
"  I  cannot  believe  it,"  he  wrote  on  29  September, 
1  "Cambridge  Modern  History,"  Vol.  VIII,  p.  593. 


38  THE  LIFE  OF  NAPOLEON 

"though  I  have  perceived  for  some  time  a  sort  of 
coalition  between  the  courts  of  Naples  and  Rome, 
and  even  of  Florence.  It  is  the  alliance  of  the  rats 
against  the  cat." 

Had  the  Pope  happened  to  die  at  this  juncture  it 
appears  certain  that  Bonaparte  would  have  done  all 
he  could  to  prevent  the  election  of  a  successor.  To 
Bonaparte  France  was  the  first  nation  in  the  world, 
and  therefore  he  felt  justified  in  adopting  what  his 
enemies  might  consider  a  somewhat  arrogant  tone  in 
dealing  with  things  spiritual  as  well  as  with  things 
temporal. 

On  16  November,  1797,  Bonaparte,  who  had  been 
in  Milan  since  30  October,  set  out  from  Milan  for 
Rastadt  where  the  diplomatists  of  Germany  were 
gathered  together  to  consider  the  new  situation  which 
had  arisen.  The  political  problems  of  Germany,  since 
the  conquest  of  the  Netherlands  and  of  the  Milanese, 
and  the  extension  of  France  to  the  Rhine,  had  become 
for  the  first  time  of  some  interest  to  the  conqueror 
of  Italy.  On  his  journey  by  way  of  Mont  Cenis, 
Geneva,  and  Basle  he  was  treated  with  the  greatest 
respect.  At  Basle  indeed  the  chief  men  of  the  city 
made  special  efforts  to  win  his  favour,  and  Bonaparte 
took  the  opportunity  of  congratulating  them  and  the 
Genevans  upon  their  democratic  feelings.  He  ar- 
rived at  Rastadt  on  the  evening  of  25  November, 
and  his  arrival  created  no  little  stir.  The  members 
of  the  peace  deputation  showed  great  anxiety  to  see 
the  conqueror  of  Italy,  and  Mr.  Fisher  relates  how 


THE  ITALIAN  CAMPAIGN  39 

they  described  "  his  yellow  complexion,  his  thin  body, 
his  lively  gestures,  and  profound  glance,  his  dress  rich 
but  careless,  his  bearing  courteous  but  unrestrained  by 
diplomatic  forms".1 

During  his  stay  at  Rastadt  he  gained  much  know- 
ledge of  Germans  and  German  politics.  He  realized 
that  French  interest  lay  in  the  secularization  of  the 
ecclesiastical  territories  and  in  winning  over  the 
middle  German  states,  which  always  tended  to  re- 
gard Austria  and  Prussia  with  jealousy.  To  the  en- 
voys of  the  free  towns  to  whom  he  expatiated  on  his 
love  of  liberty  he  was  especially  civil,  and  he  openly 
expressed  his  contempt  for  Austria,  and  "his  disgust 
at  the  delay  of  the  Austrian  plenipotentiaries  to  appear 
at  the  congress  ".  His  avowed  object  in  his  conver- 
sations was  to  show  that  Austria  was  the  real  enemy 
of  the  Reich. 

On  2  December,  after  arranging  with  the  Austrian 
envoy,  Cobenzel,  a  military  convention  with  regard  to 
Mainz  and  Venice,  Bonaparte  left  Rastadt  for  Paris. 
There  he  received  the  well-deserved  "homage  of  an 
enraptured  people  ".  The  Italian  campaign  of  1796-7 
was  of  immense  importance  to  Europe.  It  proved 
the  starting-point  of  the  national  movement  in  Italy. 
From  this  time  the  Italians  began  to  develop  a  crav- 
ing for  unity,  and  a  feeling  for  nationality.  For 
France  Bonaparte's  successes  marked  "the  definite 

Wisher,  "Napoleonic  Statesmanship:  Germany,"  p.  32. 
Oxford,  The  Clarendon  Press,  1903. 


40  THE  LIFE  OF  NAPOLEON 

ascendancy  of  military  instincts  over  the  democratic 
theories  of  the  Revolution  V 

Bonaparte  reached  Paris  on  5  December,  and 
though  the  populace  received  him  with  acclamation 
the  Directors  eyed  him  with  distrust — which  found 
some  justification  in  a  speech  in  which  the  young 
conqueror  hinted  that  he  was  uncertain  whether  he 
should  make  a  revolution  in  France  or  devote  his 
attention  to  the  liberation  of  Greece.  He  was,  how- 
ever, soon  appointed  to  the  command  of  what  was 
termed  the  Army  of  England  (General  en  chef  de 
l'arm£e  d'Angleterre),  and  turned  his  thoughts  to  the 
destruction  of  England's  maritime  power.  England's 
power  in  his  opinion  could  be  destroyed  by  direct  in- 
vasion, or  by  an  attack  through  Egypt  upon  India, 
or  by  a  systematic  attack  upon  her  commerce  as  was 
afterwards  carried  out  by  the  continental  system. 
At  this  time  he  ostensibly  spent  most  of  February, 
1798,  in  considering  the  possibility  of  an  invasion  of 
England,  the  prospect  of  which  roused  the  patriotic 
feelings  of  the  English  nation,2  but  before  the  end  of 

1 " Cambridge  Modern  History,"  Vol.  VIII,  p.  593. 

2  Over  twenty  of  the  Kent  clergy  raised  regiments  in  their 
parishes  and  placed  themselves  in  command.  This  movement 
was  organized  by  the  Hon.  and  Rev.  Lord  George  Murray  then  in 
charge  of  the  Parish  of  Hunton  near  Maidstone.  In  April  the 
Archbishop  of  Canterbury  issued  a  circular  letter  to  the  clergy  of 
his  diocese  in  which  he  mentioned  that  the  country  was  expecting 
the  appearance  of  a  desperate  and  malignant  enemy.  He  added 
that  if  the  "enemy  set  his  foot  upon  our  shores  our  hand  with  that 
of  every  man  must,  in  every  way,  be  against  those  who  come  for 


THE  ITALIAN  CAMPAIGN  41 

the  month  he  reported  against  such  a  project  and  re- 
commended the  seizure  of  the  mouths  of  the  Rhine 
and  the  Elbe,  or  an  expedition  to  the  Levant.  The 
adoption  of  the  last  suggestion  would,  he  believed,  not 
only  ruin  England's  commerce  with  the  East  Indies, 
but  would  permanently  destroy  England's  trade  in  the 
Mediterranean,  and  would  force  her  to  relinquish  her 
hold  upon  India.  For  some  months  he  had  pondered 
over  his  "Oriental  plan"  which  in  1798  seemed  to 
him  capable  of  realization.  In  1798  England  had 
practically  withdrawn  from  the  Mediterranean.  She 
had  relinquished  her  hold  on  Corsica,  and  though  she 
possessed  Gibraltar  had  taken  no  steps  to  prevent  the 
Mediterranean  from  becoming  a  French  lake.  In 
spite  of  its  victories  of  St.  Vincent  and  Camperdown, 
the  British  fleet  was  in  a  very  unsatisfactory  condition, 
as  shown  by  the  mutinies  at  the  Nore  and  Spithead. 
The  fleets  of  Spain  and  Holland  could  now  be  united 
with  the  French  fleet,  and  this  union  would  threaten 
the  British  supremacy  of  the  high  seas. 

The  Peace  of  Campo  Formio  had  given  the  French 
the  Ionian  Islands — of  great  value  to  France  now  that 
she  was  supreme  in  Italy.  The  commandant  of  the 
Knights  of  St.  John  at  Malta  had  been  won  over  by 
bribery,  while  in  India  Tippoo  Sahib  of  Mysore  was 
a  French  ally.  It  would  seem  that  it  only  required 
the  French  conquest  of  Egypt  to  bring  to  an  end  the 
British  dominion  in  India. 

purposes  of  rapine  and  desolation,  the  avowed  champions  of 
Anarchy  and  Irreligion,  defying  the  Living  God  ". 


42  THE  LIFE  OF  NAPOLEON 

The  Egyptian  expedition  has  been  described  as 
"little  more  than  a  dramatic  interlude  in  Napoleon's 
career  ".  At  the  same  time  it  must  be  remembered  that 
though  it  proved  to  be  a  useful  interval  during  which 
the  Directory  rapidly  collapsed,  the  Egyptian  expedi- 
tion had  several  claims  to  attention.  In  the  first  place, 
during  the  months  which  were  occupied  by  that  ex- 
pedition, it  became  clearly  apparent  that  in  religious 
matters  Bonaparte  was  an  opportunist.  During  the 
months  after  the  settlement  of  peace  at  Leoben  he 
held  a  court  at  Milan,  and  while  there  fully  realized 
the  importance  of  the  Church  as  a  great  governing 
power.  He  checked  in  Milan  the  excesses  of  the 
Italian  Jacobins  who  in  1796  had  dragged  the  statue 
of  St.  Ambrose  through  the  streets,  and  who  among 
other  profanities  had  turned  several  churches  into 
Jacobin  clubs.  Against  these  excesses  a  reaction  had 
set  in  which  found  a  supporter  in  Bonaparte.  He 
won  over  many  Italian  bishops  to  his  side,  and  at  the 
same  time  endeavoured  to  preserve  a  level  balance 
in  religious  matters. 

When,  however,  he  was  in  Egypt  he  endeavoured 
to  win  over  the  Moslems  by  declaring  that  the  French 
had  overthrown  the  Pope  and  the  Knights  of  Malta. 
Moreover,  while  in  the  East  he  did  not  hesitate  to 
try  to  win  over  the  Christians  of  the  Lebanon  by 
specious  words.  But  all  chance  of  gaining  the  de- 
finite support  of  these  Christians  was  lost  as  soon  as 
Sir  Sidney  Smith  had  astutely  caused  copies  of  Bona- 
parte's Moslem  proclamations,  when  he  was  in  Egypt, 


THE  ITALIAN  CAMPAIGN  43 

to  be  distributed  among  the  inhabitants  of  the 
Lebanon. 

The  Egyptian  expedition  has  been  compared  to 
the  Russian  campaign  of  1812.  Both  were  failures, 
and  in  both  cases  Bonaparte  left  his  army  in  diffi- 
culties. But  his  secret  departure  from  Egypt  marked 
an  important  stage  in  his  rise  to  supreme  power, 
while  his  return  from  Smorgoni  in  1812  in  no  sense 
contributed  to  any  restoration  of  his  power.  In  many 
respects,  however,  the  Egyptian  campaign  is  interest- 
ing. For  the  first  time  the  world  was  informed  of 
Bonaparte's  ambitious  but  vague  Eastern  schemes. 
Further,  the  occupation  of  Egypt  by  Frenchmen  had 
been  suggested  to  Louis  XIV,  and  though  Bona- 
parte's expedition  ended  in  failure  the  interest  of 
France  in  Egypt  continued  all  through  the  nine- 
teenth century,  till  it  received  a  severe  check  in 
1882. 

Further,  the  Egyptian  expedition  drew  attention 
to  the  military  qualities  not  only  of  Kl£ber  and  Desaix 
but  also  of  Junot,  Rapp,  Lannes,  and  Davoust.  The 
Egyptian  expedition,  too,  brought  home  to  Bonaparte 
the  absolute  necessity  for  a  powerful  fleet.  But  Tra- 
falgar ruined  all  chance  of  defeating  the  English  at 
sea,  and  his  schemes  were  henceforth  perpetually 
checked  by  the  want  of  a  fleet. 

Bonaparte's  preparations  for  the  Egyptian  ex- 
pedition were  most  elaborate.  Early  in  1798  he  had 
engaged  several  Arab  interpreters ;  he  had  arranged 
for  a  number  of  the  learned  members  of  the  lately 


44  THE  LIFE  OF  NAPOLEON 

founded  Institute  of  France  to  accompany  him ;  for 
the  equipment  of  the  expedition  he  had  wrung 
money  from  the  Pope  and  the  citizens  of  Rome. 
Difficulties  of  all  sorts — financial  and  material — had 
been  overcome,  and  on  19  May  the  fleet,  composed 
of  contingents  from  Corsica,  Genoa,  Marseilles,  and 
Civita  Vecchia,  set  sail. 

The  ostensible  object  of  this  expedition  was  to 
drive  the  English  as  far  as  possible  from  their  pos- 
sessions in  the  Red  Sea  and  the  East,  to  cut  through 
the  Suez  Canal,  to  take  possession  of  Egypt  and  the 
Red  Sea,  to  ameliorate  the  lot  of  the  inhabitants  of 
Egypt,  and  to  keep  on  good  terms  with  the  Turks. 
Moreover,  Napoleon  had  resolved  to  seize  Malta, 
and  with  its  capture  and  with  the  establishment  of 
the  French  in  Egypt  an  overwhelming  blow,  it  was 
believed,  would  have  been  struck  at  England's  power 
not  only  in  the  Mediterranean  but  also  in  Egypt  and 
the  East.  Admiral  Brueys,  however,  was  keenly 
alive  to  the  risks  run  by  his  unwieldy  fleet,  but  for  a 
time  those  fears  were  falsified. 

On  19  May  Bonaparte  wrote  from  on  board 
"  1'Orient,"  then  at  Toulon,  that  he  was  just  setting  sail, 
and  on  the  25th  that  they  were  just  about  to  pass  Bastia, 
adding  that  he  had  not  been  "  sick  on  the  open  sea". 
In  his  letters  on  the  voyage  he  urges  Joseph  to  be 
kind  to  his  (Bonaparte's)  wife,  Josephine,  and  these 
directions,  in  view  of  what  happened  in  later  years, 
have  a  pathetic  ring  about  them.  Malta,  which  owing 
to  the  cowardice  of  the  Grand  Master  the  French 


THE  ITALIAN  CAMPAIGN  45 

occupied  after  a  harmless  cannonade  of  ten  days,  is, 
he  declares,  the  strongest  place  in  Europe. 

By  good  luck  the  fleet  escaped  the  notice  of  Nelson 
who  was  cruising  off  Crete  and  reached  Alexandria 
in  safety.  That  city  was  taken,  the  battle  of  the 
Pyramids  was  fought  and  won  on  July  21,  and  Cairo 
was  occupied  on  23  July.  "  Egypt,"  wrote  Bonaparte 
on  25  July,  "  is  the  richest  country  in  the  world  for 
wheat,  rice,  pulse,  and  meal."  In  the  same  letter  he 
indicates  a  feeling  of  deep  distress  with  regard  to  the 
conduct  of  Josephine  during  his  absence.  "  I  have," 
he  writes,  "  much  domestic  distress,"  and  he  adds  the 
remarkable  statements  that  he  "  may  be  in  France  in 
two  months,  that  he  intends  on  arriving  in  France 
to  shut  himself  up  in  a  villa  for  the  winter,  that  he  is 
tired  of  human  nature,  that  greatness  fatigues  him, 
that  at  29  glory  has  become  flat ". 

There  seems  little  doubt  that  his  suspicions  with 
regard  to  Josephine  occupied  and  disturbed  his 
mind  during  the  whole  of  the  Egyptian  campaign. 

Nelson's  victory,  known  as  the  battle  of  the  Nile, 
on  1-2  August,  had,  however,  destroyed  the  French 
fleet  and  shut  up  Bonaparte  and  his  army  in  Egypt. 
Full  of  resource,  however,  Bonaparte  resolved  to  con- 
vert Egypt  into  a  firm  base  and  to  continue  his 
efforts  to  rouse  malcontents,  such  as  Tippoo  Sahib 
in  India,  to  rise  against  the  English.  In  order  to 
overthrow  a  Turkish  army  then  advancing  by  land 
he  proceeded  to  Palestine,  but  Sidney  Smith's  defence 
of  Acre,  followed  later  by  the  lack  of  food  and  water, 


46  THE  LIFE  OF  NAPOLEON 

and  by  an  outbreak  of  plague,  caused  the  retreat  of 
the  French  army  to  Egypt.  "  The  shadow  of  such 
deeds  as  the  massacre  at  Jaffa  .  .  .  and  the  charge  of 
having  given  opium  to  a  large  number  of  pest-stricken 
French  soldiers  .  .  .  was,"  it  is  said,  "cast  over  the 
figure  of  the  young  General." l  In  Egypt  the  Turkish 
fleet  had  disembarked  1000  troops,  who  were,  however, 
overthrown  at  the  battle  of  Aboukir  on  21  July. 

At  St.  Helena  Napoleon  recognized  the  decisive 
character  of  the  siege  of  Acre.  "  Without  the  Eng- 
lish filibuster  and  the  French  emigrants  who  directed 
the  Turkish  artillery,  and  who  with  the  plague  made 
me  raise  the  siege,  I  would,"  he  declared,  "  have 
conquered  half  Asia  and  come  back  upon  Europe  to 
seek  the  thrones  of  France  and  Italy."1  On  his  re- 
turn to  Egypt  Bonaparte,  it  is  believed,  received  news 
from  France  which  indicated  that  the  "pear  was  ripe". 
On  2  August  Sir  Sidney  Smith  sent  him  a  packet 
of  papers,  and  he  at  once  decided  to  return  to  France 
with  the  utmost  speed  leaving  his  army  in  Egypt 
under  K16ber. 

On  23  August  he  sailed  with  Marmont,  Lannes, 
and  Berthier  from  Alexandria  in  a  small  frigate — the 
"  Muiron" — and  landed  at  St.  Raphael  in  the  bay  of 
Frejus  forty-seven  days  later,  on  9  October,  1799. 

At  St.  Helena  Napoleon  expressed  his  regret 
that  he  had  ever  left  Egypt.  He  would  far  rather 

1Kielland,  "Napoleon's  Men  and  Methods, "p.  33. 
2  Quoted  by  Lord  Rosebery,   "  Napoleon  :  the  Last  Phase," 
p.  201. 


THE  ITALIAN  CAMPAIGN  47 

have  been  Emperor  of  the  East  than  Emperor  of  the 
West.  Had  he  taken  Acre  he  would  have  marched 
to  India.  "I  should,"  he  said,  "have  assumed  the 
turban  at  Aleppo,  and  have  headed  an  army  of  200,000 
men.  The  East  only  awaits  a  man."  He  saw 
clearly  that  a  power  in  possession  of  Egypt  could 
threaten  if  not  eventually  conquer  India.  Leibnitz  had 
advised  Louis  XIV  to  occupy  Egypt,  but  unlike 
Napoleon  the  French  monarch  never  realized  that 
France,  mistress  of  Egypt,  might  (Napoleon  said 
would]  become  mistress  of  India.  By  becoming 
ruler  of  the  East,  Napoleon  would  have  emulated 
Alexander  the  Great,  for  whom  he  had  a  deep  ad- 
miration. 

His  journey  through  France  was  a  triumphal  pro- 
gress. Marbot  describes  the  scene  as  Napoleon 
passed  through  Lyons.  Crowds  blocked  the  streets, 
and  amid  universal  rejoicings  cried,  "  Vive  Bonaparte 
qui  vient  sauver  la  patrie".  He  reached  Paris  on  16 
October,  and  for  three  days  refused  to  see  Josephine. 
It  was  only  in  consequence  of  Bourrienne's  entreaties 
that  a  reconciliation  was  effected.  Napoleon's  arrival 
in  France  at  this  juncture  proved  to  be  a  memorable 
event  in  his  career  and  in  the  history  of  Europe. 
The  Russian  fleet  could  easily  have  rendered  his  safe 
arrival  in  France  impossible,  but  as  had  already 
been  often  the  case  Napoleon  was  aided  by  the  parti- 
cularist  aims  of  one  or  other  of  the  allies.  In  the 

1  Quoted  by  Lord  Rosebery,  "Napoleon:  the  Last  Phase, 
pp.  148-9. 


48  THE  LIFE  OF  NAPOLEON 

war  of  the  Second  Coalition  the  Austrians,  bent  on 
territorial  aggression,  had  first  thwarted  and  then 
quarrelled  with  the  Russians,  while  the  Russians 
themselves  instead  of  using  their  fleet  for  the  purpose 
of  keeping  Napoleon  in  Egypt  were  bent  on  securing 
Malta,  Ancona,  the  Ionian  Islands,  and  Corsica. 

The  shortsightedness  of  the  allies  and  their  selfish 
aims  thus  proved  of  incalculable  value  to  Napoleon, 
who  was  enabled  to  return  to  France  at  a  very  critical 
moment  in  her  history.  On  his  arrival  in  Paris  he 
soon  realized  that  the  country,  weary  of  the  tyranny 
and  incompetence  of  the  Directorate  and  of  its  inabil- 
ity to  govern  or  even  to  preserve  order,  was  anxious 
for  peace  abroad  and  for  an  honest,  a  stable,  and  a 
methodical  republican  government  at  home. 

He  also  found  that  his  position  was  far  different 
from  what  it  was  after  the  Peace  of  Campo  Formio. 
Then  he  was  a  hero  but  only  for  the  moment. 
"They  have  only  to  see  me,"  he  said,  "three  times 
at  the  play  to  tire  of  me.  They  would  run  after  me 
just  as  eagerly  if  I  were  on  my  way  to  the  scaffold. 
If  I  remain  long  without  doing  anything  I  am  done 
for."  It  was  a  far  different  state  of  things  in  October, 
1799.  Throughout  France  men  longed  for  a  strong 
hand  to  drive  back  the  foreigner  and  to  restore  peace 
and  order.  With  a  unanimity  which  it  is  difficult  to 
explain,  Frenchmen  now  concentrated  their  thoughts 
upon  Napoleon  as  the  man  who  would  be  the  saviour 
of  his  country. 

Napoleon's  reconciliation  with  Josephine  was,  it  is 


THE  ITALIAN  CAMPAIGN  49 

said,  brought  about  mainly  by  the  recognition  of  the 
fact  that  a  serious  quarrel  with  his  wife  might  interfere 
with  the  ambitious  plans  which  he  was  meditating, 
and  which  were  executed  some  three  weeks  later. 

CHIEF  DATES 

Bonaparte  appointed  Commander-in-Chief  of  the 

Army  in  Italy  .         .         .         .         .2  March,  1796. 

The  Battle  of  Montenotte  ....  12  April,  1796. 
The  Battle  of  Milesimo  .....  13  April,  1796. 
The  Battle  of  Dego  .....  14  April,  1796. 
The  Treaty  of  Cherasco  ....  14  April,  1796. 

The  Battle  of  Lodi 10  May,  1796. 

Bonaparte  enters  Milan  .....  15  May,  1796. 
The  Battle  of  Lonato  .  .  -  .  .  .  3  August,  1796. 
The  Battle  of  Castiglione  ....  5  August,  1796. 
The  Battle  of  Arcola  .  .  .  15-17  November,  1796. 
Capitulation  of  Mantua  ....  2  February,  1797. 
The  Treaty  of  Tolentino  .  .  .  19  February,  1797. 

The  French  at  Leoben  .....  7  April,  1797. 
Revolution  of  the  8  Fructidor  .  .  .  4  September,  1797. 
The  Peace  of  Campo  Formio  .  .  .  17  October,  1797. 
At  Rastadt  .  .  25  November  to  2  December,  1797. 

In  Paris 5  December,  1797. 

The  Egyptian  Expedition  starts  .  .  -19  May,  1798. 
The  Battle  of  the  Nile  ....  1-2  August,  1798. 
The  Siege  of  Acre  .....  1-2  August,  1798. 
Bonaparte  leaves  Egypt  .  .  .  .  23  August,  1799. 

His  arrival  in  Paris  ....          1 6  October,  1799. 


CHAPTER  III 

THE  CONSULATE  AND  THE  EMPEROR,  1799-1804 

France  in  1799 — Unpopularity  of  the  Directory — Brumaire — 
The  Consulate — Napoleon's  character — The  Marengo  campaign — 
Hohenlinden — The  Treaty  of  Luneville — The  Armed  Neutrality 
of  1800-1 — Its  failure — Napoleon's  policy  to  Naples  and  Portugal 
— The  Treaty  of  Amiens — Paris  after  the  conclusion  of  peace — 
Popularity  of  the  peace  in  France — Napoleon  Consul  for  life — 
The  Constitution — The  Code  Napoleon — The  Concordat — Na- 
poleon's defence  of  his  religious  policy — General  character  of 
the  Consulate — Cadoudal's  conspiracy — The  execution  of  the 
Due  d'Enghien — Napoleon  becomes  Emperor — The  French  Em- 
pire— The  court  and  nobility. 

"  I  ^HE  period  from  1799  to  1804 begins  with  the  fall 
of  the  Directory  and  closes  with  the  establish- 
ment of  the  Napoleonic  Empire.  The  weakness  of 
the  Directory  since  the  coup  dttat  of  Fructidor,  in 
1797,  had  steadily  increased,  and  its  unpopularity  had 
become  widespread.  It  had  interfered  with  established 
beliefs,  it  had  failed  to  preserve  order  in  the  country, 
its  armies  had  been  driven  from  Italy.  France  in 
1799  was  in  a  condition  of  anarchy  and  disorder; 
liberty  no  longer  existed,  and  all  free  institutions  had 
disappeared.  The  army  was  the  real  master  of  the 
situation,  but  the  army  did  not  realize  its  power. 

50 


THE  CONSULATE  AND  EMPEROR     51 

Fortunately  it  did  not  oppose  the  coup  d'dtat  of 
Brumaire,  which,  badly  arranged  and  clumsily  carried 
out,  was  found  to  have  strong  popular  support.  That 
accomplished  Bonaparte,  having  won  Marengo  and 
re-established  the  credit  of  the  French  arms,  speedily 
climbed  to  a  position  of  supreme  power.  In  him 
Frenchmen  readily  saw  a  necessary  absolutism  taking 
the  place  "of  a  corrupt  and  inefficient  oligarchy ". 

The  landing  of  Napoleon  at  Frejus  thus  proved 
to  be  the  turning-point  in  the  history  of  Europe. 
Between  1799  and  1815,  in  consequence  of  the  safe 
return  of  Napoleon  from  Egypt,  Europe  underwent 
a  thorough  but  necessary  revolution.  The  quarrels 
and  jealousies  of  the  allies  during  the  war  of  the 
Second  Coalition,  the  selfishness  of  Prussia,  the 
divisions  in  Italy,  the  lethargic  condition  of  Spain, 
illustrate  the  necessity  for  a  period  of  thorough  reform. 

Had  the  European  body  politic  been  in  a  sound 
and  healthy  condition  it  could  not  have  found  a  more 
favourable  situation  than  was  presented  to  it  in  1799 
for  reducing  the  overgrown  power  of  France,  but  the 
selfishness  and  shortsightedness  of  the  allies,  the  want 
of  a  cordial  understanding,  the  complete  lack  of  any 
system  of  co-operation — all  combined  to  complete  the 
failure  of  the  Second  Coalition.  "  Fourteen  years 
were  to  elapse  before  there  occurred  so  favourable  an 
opportunity  of  checking  the  overweening  pretensions 
of  France  ;  and  then  it  was  a  Europe  vivified  by 
the  reforms  originating  from  the  Revolution  which 
finally  beat  down  the  might  of  Napoleon." 


52  THE  LIFE  OF  NAPOLEON 

"  We  were  plunging  under  full  sail  back  to  the 
abyss  of  the  Terror." 

In  1799  the  majority  of  Frenchmen  desired  peace 
and  order.  The  working  men  had  acquired  land,  a 
settled  position,  and  a  competence.  To  them  the 
period  of  revolution  was  over,  and  they  had  no  wish 
either  to  see  the  Bourbons  restored  or  to  plunge 
France  into  further  disorder.  Among  the  lowest 
orders  in  Paris  Jacobin  principles  indeed  prevailed. 
But  it  can  hardly  be  said  that  even  among  them  the 
Directory  was  popular.  Since  its  triumph  on  the  8 
Fructidor  the  Directory  had  became  steadily  more 
and  more  unpopular.  It  had  endeavoured  to  suppress 
Catholicism  by  means  of  what  were  practically  lettres 
de  cachet.  The  observance  of  the  Dtcadi  was  in- 
sisted upon,  and  no  religious  liberty  was  permitted. 
Moreover,  order  was  not  preserved  in  the  country, 
which  was  infested  by  brigands.  Rebellion  was 
chronic  in  the  west  of  France,  trade  was  disorganized, 
the  State  was  practically  bankrupt ;  on  19  July,  1799, 
the  daily  journals  recorded  that  "there  is  no  longer 
any  business  doing  on  the  Bourse  in  Paris.  Every 
day  money  becomes  tighter."  So  unpopular  did  the 
Directory  become  that  recruiting  for  the  army  was 
rendered  wellnigh  impossible,  and  the  recruits  took 
to  brigandage.  France  was  in  a  state  of  anarchy 
and  disorder  when  Napoleon  escaped  from  Egypt. 
On  returning  to  France  he  found  that  the  old  en- 
thusiasm of  1789  had  vanished.  Ten  years  of  revolu- 

1  Vandal,  "  L'Avenement  de  Bonaparte,"  Vol.  I,  p.  197. 


THE  CONSULATE  AND  EMPEROR  53 

tion  had  wrought  many  changes,  and  had  dissipated 
many  hopes.  The  majority  of  Frenchmen  "  were  so 
thoroughly  sick  of  Jacobinism,  and  all  its  works,  that 
they  wished  to  rid  themselves  not  only  of  the  Revolu- 
tion, but  of  the  monstrous  regime  to  which  it  had 
given  birth,  though  they  had  no  desire  to  return  to 
the  old  one  with  all  its  abuses.  They  longed  for 
quiet,  order,  and  a  cessation  of  proscription  at  home 
and  of  war  abroad."  l 

Such  was  the  opinion  of  Mallet  du  Pan  who  had 
watched  the  events  in  France  for  so  many  years,  and 
whose  judgment  upon  the  Directory  was  remarkable 
for  its  sagacity  and  accuracy.  But  Napoleon  found 
not  only  that  the  Directory  had  failed  hopelessly  in 
its  task  of  governing  France,  but  that  it  had  also 
failed  in  its  foreign  policy.  Though  the  French 
armies  had  proved  successful  against  the  Russians  in 
Switzerland,  and  against  the  Russians  and  British  in 
Holland,  Italy  was  lost.  "  The  glory  of  our  arms  was 
tarnished,  our  conquests  lost,  our  territory  threatened 
with  invasion."  This  somewhat  exaggerated  state- 
ment represents,  however,  the  general  feeling  in 
France  in  the  autumn  of  1799. 

The  events  which  filled  those  momentous  days 
between  9  October,  1799,  when  Napoleon  landed  at 
Frejus,  and  9  November  (18  Brumaire),  when  the 
Directory  was  overthrown,  were  of  momentous  im- 
portance to  France  and  indeed  to  Europe. 

On   his    arrival    in    Paris    Napoleon  found    the 

1  "The  Edinburgh  Review,"  No.  411,  p.  79. 


54  THE  LIFE  OF  NAPOLEON 

Government  of  the  Directory  disorganized  and  dis- 
credited. "  The  Revolution  having  destroyed  all  the 
old  corporations,  legal,  religious,  and  industrial,  had 
left  the  individual  face  to  face  with  the  State,  so  that 
an  extreme  theory  of  collective  control  had  been 
insensibly  but  logically  substituted  for  the  individualism 
of  1789 V 

But  the  local  functionaries  were  incapable  either 
from  ignorance  or  fear  to  perform  their  duties,  as  the 
State  which  was  bankrupt  made  no  attempt  "to 
organize  education,  to  tend  the  sick,  to  assist  the 
poor,  to  check  brigandage,  to  punish  crime,  to  check 
disorder,"  or  to  carry  on  the  work  of  internal  ad- 
ministration. France  was  in  a  most  precarious 
position.  There  was  a  general  desire  for  an  honest, 
capable  Republican  Government,  which  in  accordance 
with  the  shortlived  Constitution  of  1791,  should 
recognize  Roman  Catholicism,  and  having  assured 
to  France  its  natural  frontiers  of  the  Rhine,  the  Alps, 
and  the  Pyrenees,  should  give  the  country  a  period  of 
peace.  "  Peace  abroad,  and  methodical  government 
at  home,"  was  the  desire  of  a  large  majority  of 
Frenchmen. 

Till  1799  the  power  of  the  Directory  was  based 
on  military  successes  abroad,  but  the  expulsion  of  the 
French  from  Italy  by  the  Russians  and  Austrians 
was  not  in  the  minds  of  the  French  nation  com- 
pensated for  by  Massena's  victory  at  Zurich  on  25-26 
September,  by  Suvorov's  retirement  into  Bavaria,  or 
1  "Cambridge  Modern  History,"  Vol.  VIII,  p.  665. 


THE  CONSULATE  AND  EMPEROR     55 

by  the  evacuation  of  Holland  by  the  Duke  of  York 
in  October. 

Owing  to  the  selfish  and  particularist  aims  of  the 
allies  and  to  the  inaction  of  Prussia,  France  though 
temporarily  deprived  of  Italy  had  in  reality  nothing 
to  fear  from  the  European  Coalition  which  had  indeed 
already  broken  up.  Nevertheless  the  loss  of  Italy 
had  robbed  the  Directory  of  its  one  remaining  hope 
of  continuing  in  power,  and  the  army  now  demanded 
a  change  of  government.  Everything  being  in  a 
chaotic  and  uncertain  condition,  an  opportunity  was 
given  to  Abb6  Sieyes  to  carry  out  his  famous  intrigue 
which  had  for  its  object  the  overthrow  of  the 
Directory  and  the  establishment  of  a  government 
more  in  harmony  with  the  wishes  of  the  French 
nation. 

The  revolution  of  Brumaire  has  been  described 
as  "a  Day  of  Dupes";  Sieyes  and  those  who  sup- 
ported him  had  no  wish  to  set  up  a  military  despotism. 
"All  men,  however,"  writes  Marbot,  "understood 
that  some  great  change  was  necessary  and  in- 
evitable." Some  thought  a  mere  change  of  Directors 
would  suffice,  others  like  Sieyes  thought  that  the 
reins  of  power  should  be  placed  in  the  hands  of  some 
strong  man,  but  one  who  would  certainly  not  attempt 
to  establish  a  despotism.  Of  the  possible  leaders  in 
such  a  movement,  Bernadotte,  Massena,  and  Moreau, 
the  first-named  was  not  considered  to  be  sufficiently 
capable,  Massena  was  a  mere  soldier,  and  Moreau, 
who  was  lazy,  refused  to  lead  a  movement.  He  was 


56  THE  LIFE  OF  NAPOLEON 

not  a  politician,  and  in  times  of  peace  preferred  hunt- 
ing to  politics.  On  his  refusal  to  act,  Sie"yes  had 
written  to  Napoleon  then  in  Egypt  acquainting  him 
with  the  condition  of  France. 

The  revolution  of  Brumaire  was  partly  the  work 
of  the  tactful  and  courageous  Lucien  Bonaparte  and  of 
the  astute  Talleyrand,  but  owed  its  success  in  no  small 
degree  to  Sie"yes.  During  the  few  weeks  previous 
to  the  coup  d'ttat  of  Brumaire,  Lucien  had  scope  for 
his  undoubtedly  great  abilities.  It  was,  however, 
Sie"yes  who,  when  Napoleon  hesitated,  said,  "they," 
the  Council  of  500,  "have  put  you  outside  the  law, 
put  them  outside  the  Hall ".  Lucien  always  con- 
sidered that  after  Brumaire  Napoleon  regarded  him 
with  jealousy.  The  feud  between  them  became  well- 
nigh  irreconcilable,  and  Lucien,  with  the  title  of  Prince 
of  Canino,  settled  at  Rome,  devoting  himself  to  artistic, 
literary,  and  agricultural  pursuits.  During  the  crisis 
of  Brumaire  he  had  certainly  shown  considerable  tact 
and  courage. 

The  Directory  fell  without  exciting  the  regret  of 
any  section  of  Frenchmen.  Its  lack  of  governing 
power,  its  failure  to  hold  Italy,  together  with  the 
absence  of  social  stability  in  France,  and  the  financial 
disorganization  which  everywhere  prevailed,  justified 
the  general  satisfaction  felt  at  the  events  of  the  19 
Brumaire. 

But  though  the  coup  d'ttat  had  succeeded,  "  though 
much  was  to  be  gained  by  the  concentration  of  the 
executive  authority,  and  much  also  by  the  suppression 


THE  CONSULATE  AND  EMPEROR     57 

of  extravagant  political  debate,  the  price  was  destined 
to  be  such  as  no  one  in  France  imagined  on  that 
November  evening,  while  the  deputies  were  rushing 
wildly  through  the  park,  and  the  fog  was  falling 
upon  the  last  fevers  of  the  French  Revolution  "-1 

Brumaire  was  not  a  victory  of  the  army — "  it  was 
not  by  the  sword  that  he  had  seized  power" — and 
Napoleon  found  himself  at  the  head  of  affairs  in 
France  not  by  means  of  merely  military  support,  but 
rather  through  the  instrumentality  of  public  opinion. 
Napoleon  even  after  Brumaire  was  far  from  being 
sure  of  the  army,  least  of  all  of  the  garrison  of  Paris, 
and  one  of  his  first  duties  was  to  negotiate  with  the 
generals.  Opposition  also  came  from  the  "intel- 
lectuals," the  friends  of  Madame  de  Stae'l,  from"  ideo- 
logues," and  from  professional  men.  Napoleon's 
strength,  it  has  been  said,  "  lay  in  public  opinion,  in 
the  weakness  of  the  Councils,  the  corrupt  discredited 
conventionals  and  terrorists,  in  the  support  of  the  work- 
ing classes  of  Paris  who  feared  reaction,  as  well  as  of 
the  middle  classes  eager  for  orderly  government  and 
peace  ".  Moreover,  the  peasants  and  working  men 
generally  throughout  France  "  were  sick  of  the  Re- 
public as  understood  by  the  Jacobins,  of  its  corruption, 
its  horrors,  and  its  bombast  ".2 

From  ii  November  to  25  December,  1799,  the 
three  Consuls  of  the  French  Republic,  Sieves,  Roger 

1  "Cambridge  Modern  History,"  Vol.  VIII,  p.  688. 
2 See  Aulard,  "The  French  Revolution,  a  Political  History," 
translated  by  Bernard  Miall.     London,  Fisher  Unwin,  1910. 


58  THE  LIFE  OF  NAPOLEON 

Ducos,  and  Napoleon,  composed  "an  Executive  Com- 
mission invested  with  the  full  powers  of  the  Directory  ". 
On  Christmas  Day  the  new  Constitution,  under  which 
the  government  was  soon  to  fall  entirely  into  the  hands 
of  Napoleon,  came  into  being.  That  Constitution,  the 
character  of  which  will  be  described  later,  was  obviously 
drawn  up  in  great  haste,  and  bristled  with  imperfections. 
Many  of  its  clauses  were  vague,  many  of  its  arrange- 
ments lacked  defmiteness,  in  several  cases  machinery 
was  lacking  for  the  due  execution  of  several  of  its 
enactments. 

In  1799,  however,  France  demanded  a  strong 
government.  The  fear  of  Socialism  was  ever  before 
the  eyes  of  the  middle  classes,  and  to  avert  the  triumph 
of  Socialistic  ideas  the  majority  of  Frenchmen  were 
willing  for  a  time  to  sacrifice  a  certain  amount  of  liberty. 
Napoleon  "  believed  in  the  magic  of  private  property," 
and  was  rewarded  by  the  confidence  which  during  the 
Consulate  and  for  many  years  after  France  placed 
in  him. 

The  character  of  Napoleon  can  only  be  understood 
after  a  careful  study  of  his  life,  and  only  by  remember- 
ing that  he  was  an  Italian  in  temperament.  From  his 
earliest  youth  he  was  liable  to  violent  outbursts  of 
temper — Corsican  passionateness — which  led  him  at 
times  to  commit  acts  such  as  the  execution  of  the  Due 
d'Enghien,  which  were,  to  say  the  least,  regrettable. 
He  had  no  strict  regard  for  truth,  and  "of  the  many 
base,  blackhearted  lies  which  have  been  brought  home 
to  Bonaparte,  the  slander  of  his  dead  colleague 


THE  CONSULATE  AND  EMPEROR     59 

(Admiral  Brueys,  who  was  defeated  at  the  battle  of  the 
Nile)  is  one  of  the  basest ".  The  fact  was  he  lied  if  it 
was  convenient  to  him  to  do  so,  and  consequently  not 
much  reliance  can  be  placed  on  much  that  he  said  and 
wrote  at  St.  Helena. 

His  organization  of  France  during  the  Consulate 
shows  his  extraordinary  breadth  of  view  and  his 
mastery  of  detail,  a  powerful  imagination,  a  largeness 
of  perception,  the  possession  of  an  infinite  patience — 
such  were  some  of  the  qualities  which  he  possessed  in 
a  marked  degree.  Often  when  he  refused  to  listen  to 
suggestions  it  was  found  that  he  had  more  knowledge 
of  the  facts  than  those  who  tendered  the  advice. 
"His  Majesty's  character,"  writes  Gourgaud,  "is  a 
combination  of  contrasts." 

Before,  however,  Napoleon  could  show  his  remark- 
able genius  for  organization,  by  not  only  making  the 
Constitution  workable,  but  by  using  it  as  a  means  for 
establishing  himself  as  the  despotic  ruler  of  France, 
it  was  necessary  first  to  establish  order  at  home  and 
then  to  deal  with  the  external  foes  of  France. 

La  Vendee  was  at  that  time  in  full  revolt.  Napoleon 
at  once  issued  a  masterly  manifesto  offering  an  amnesty 
to  all  who  laid  down  their  arms,  but  threatening  death 
to  all  who  resisted.  As  Napoleon  had  an  army  on 
which  he  could  rely,  and  as  to  the  astonishment  of  the 
Vendeeans  he  showed  respect  for  their  religion,  the 
pacification  of  La  Vendee  was  easily  accomplished. 

Till,  however,  Marengo  had  been  fought  and  won 
Napoleon's  position  was  uncertain.  France  desired 


60  THE  LIFE  OF  NAPOLEON 

peace  and  rest,  and  it  was  only  after  Great  Britain 
and  Austria  had  declined  to  consider  any  terms  of 
peace  which  did  not  include  "  the  withdrawal  of  France 
within  her  former  frontiers,  and  the  re -establishment 
of  the  monarchy,"  that  Napoleon  opened  the  famous 
campaign  of  1800. 

Opposed  to  France  were  the  nations  who  had 
formed  the  Second  Coalition.  England,  Austria, 
Russia,  Turkey,  Sweden,  and  Denmark  had  been 
its  original  members.  But  Russia,  owing  to  the  con- 
duct of  the  Austrians,  had  recalled  its  chief  army  under 
Suvorov,  from  Italy,  and  had,  moreover,  become 
temporarily  alienated  from  England. 

Napoleon  with  his  habitual  adroitness  at  once  com- 
prehended the  situation.  He  released  a  number  of 
Russian  prisoners,  and  sent  them  back  to  Russia  with 
a  courteous  message  to  Paul  I.  That  half-demented 
sovereign  was  at  once  won,  and  till  his  death  be- 
came a  warm  admirer  of  the  First  Consul.  Freed 
from  all  danger  from  an  attack  by  Russia,  or  from 
Prussia,  which  still  pursued  its  neutral  line  of  policy, 
Napoleon  was  able  to  devote  all  his  attention  to  the 
Austrians  in  Italy. 

The  allies,  by  continuing  hostilities,  thus  played 
into  the  hands  of  Napoleon,  whose  real  object  was  to 
secure  unlimited  power  by  war  and  the  support  of 
the  army.  That  army  was  starving,  and  was  anxious 
for  war  as  the  speediest  means  of  securing  food, 
money,  honour,  and  comfort.  Moreover,  a  success- 
ful campaign  would  replenish  the  French  Treasury 


THE  CONSULATE  AND  EMPEROR  61 

which  under  the  wasteful,  dishonest,  and  incompetent 
rule  of  the  Directory  had  run  dry.1  "Our  task," 
said  Napoleon  to  the  army  on  the  day  following 
Brumaire,  "  is  not  to  defend  our  own  frontiers  but  to 
invade  the  territory  of  our  foes,"  and  no  sooner  was 
the  renewal  of  the  struggle  with  Austria  and  England 
imminent  than  he  held  out  to  the  army  the  hope  of  a 
speedy  end  to  all  their  anxieties.  "  Victory,"  he 
assured  the  soldiers,  "  will  give  you  bread." 

Rarely  was  Napoleon's  power  of  rapid  organization 
seen  to  greater  advantage  than  during  the  early 
weeks  of  1800.  Though  Moreau  had  on  the  Rhine 
some  1 10,000  men  accustomed  to  war,  Mass6na's 
troops  stationed  near  Genoa  who  numbered  but 
25,000  were  disorganized. 

Napoleon  at  once  set  to  work  to  form  with  the 
aid  of  Berthier  a  fresh  army,  and  reinforced  by  some 
18,000  of  Moreau's  force  found  himself  on  the  plains 
of  Lombardy  in  the  middle  of  May  at  the  head  of 
70,000  men. 

The  crossing  of  the  Great  St.  Bernard  on  20 
May  was  fraught  with  considerable  danger.  And 
yet  Napoleon,  with  his  army  dragging  its  artillery, 
performed  this  difficult  operation.  The  men  "  un- 

1  "  On  ne  pouvait  esperer  mettre  fin  a  la  detresse  financiere 
du  pays  qu'en  faisant  contribuer  les  voisins  au  paiement  des 
impots,  soit  en  les  annexant  bonnement  soit  en  creant  sur  les 
frontieres  de  la  France  une  ceinture  de  republique  vassales  ayant 
a  supporter  leur  part  des  charges  de  l'e"tat."  Fournier,  "  Napoleon 
I,"  Vol.  I,  p.  216.  Paris,  Emile  Bouillon. 


62  THE  LIFE  OF  NAPOLEON 

locked  the  cannon  from  their  stocks,  put  them  in  the 
hollow  trunks  of  trees,  and  then  one-half  the  battalions 
dragged  them  up  the  mountain  while  the  other  half 
carried  the  arms  and 'accoutrements  of  their  comrades, 
with  stores  of  provisions  for  five  days  ".  The  fright- 
ful precipice  of  St.  Pierre  demanded  the  greatest  care, 
and  Napoleon  nearly  lost  his  life  by  slipping  from  his 
mule  down  one  of  them.  His  guide,  however,  seized 
him  just  in  time,  and  was  rewarded  with  1000 
francs. 

On  22  May  Ivrea  was  taken,  and  on  the  28th 
Napoleon  wrote  an  account  of  its  capture  to  Joseph. 
"We  fell  down  upon  them  here,"  he  says,  "like  a 
thunderbolt :  the  enemy  did  not  in  the  least  expect 
us,  and  even  now  can  hardly  believe  that  we  are 
here."  On  2  June  he  was  at  the  gates  of  Milan. 

In  the  battle  of  Marengo,  fought  on  14  June, 
Napoleon,  though  at  first  technically  beaten,  was  able 
through  the  timely  arrival  of  Desaix  to  defeat  the 
Austrians,  with  a  loss  of  9000  men  killed  and  wounded. 

Soon  after  the  opening  of  the  battle  the  Austrians 
occupied  the  village  of  Marengo,  and  the  French  right 
wing  and  centre  were  compelled  to  retreat.  At  three 
o'clock  in  the  afternoon  the  battle  seemed  lost,  and  the 
aged  Austrian  General  Melas  left  the  field  and  sent 
messages  to  Vienna  to  announce  his  victory.  Till  five 
o'clock  the  French  slowly  retreated,  and  then  Desaix 
arrived — only  to  be  himself  shortly  afterwards  killed 
by  a  cannon  ball. 

But  the  troops  which  he  brought  with  him  amply 


THE  CONSULATE  AND  EMPEROR  63 

avenged  his  death,  and  led  by  Bondet  threw  themselves 
upon  the  Austrian  grenadiers  who  were  commanded  by 
General  Zack.  At  the  same  time  Kellermann  attacked 
them  on  their  flank,  while  the  French  left  wing  ad- 
vanced. The  village  of  Marengo  was  reoccupied  and 
a  decisive  victory  was  won. 

During  the  closing  scenes  of  this  famous  battle, 
the  confidence  of  the  troops  who  had  borne  the  heat 
of  the  day  was  entirely  restored  by  the  courage  shown 
by  "  the  little  man  on  the  white  horse  "  who  was  ever 
in  the  front,  and  no  small  part  of  the  credit  of  the 
victory  was  due  to  Napoleon,  whose  orders  were 
skillfully  carried  out  by  Desaix  and  Kellermann. 

In  Paris  the  victory  was  celebrated  by  illuminations, 
and  Louis,  the  Bourbon  claimant  to  the  French  throne, 
wrote  to  congratulate  the  successful  general. 

The  battle  of  Marengo  was  the  real  turning-point 
in  Napoleon's  career.  Defeat  would  have  ruined  him 
and  his  family.  As  it  was,  the  reverses  suffered  by 
the  Austrians  on  the  Danube  during  the  summer  of 
i  Soo,1  culminating  in  their  disastrous  defeat  by  Moreau 
at  Hohenlinden,  "a  victory  more  brilliant  and  more 
complete  than  that  of  Marengo,"  rendered  Francis  II 
ready  to  consider  the  question  of  peace.  Moreover, 
the  Austrians  had  been  driven  out  of  Italy  which  was 
again  in  French  hands,  and  at  the  same  time  the  Tsar 
Paul  had  not  only  entered  upon  a  quarrel  with  Great 
Britain  over  the  question  of  Neutrals,  but  had  made 

lOn  19  June  Moreau  had  defeated  Kray  in  the  battle  of 
Hochstadt. 


64  THE  LIFE  OF  NAPOLEON 

advances  to  Napoleon.  The  distrust  felt  by  both 
Russia  and  Prussia  of  Austria  contributed  in  no  small 
degree  to  the  position  of  supremacy  to  which  Napoleon 
attained.  Cobenzel  who  had  succeeded  Thugut  as 
Austrian  Foreign  Minister,  and  whose  natural  hesita- 
tion in  agreeing  to  the  French  terms  was  severely 
criticized  by  Napoleon,  was  compelled  most  reluctantly 
to  agree  to  the  proposed  terms,  and  on  9  February, 
1 80 1,  signed  what  he  styled  the  "  terrible  "  Treaty  of 
Luneville.  France  was  now  assured  in  her  possession 
of  the  German  districts  on  the  left  bank  of  the  Rhine, 
and,  moreover,  definitely  obtained  Belgium  and 
Luxemburg.  In  Italy  she  gained  the  frontier  of  the 
Adige,  and  the  Cisalpine  and  Ligurian  Republics  were 
placed  under  her  protection.  French  troops  occupied 
Piedmont  in  the  North  and  Taranto  in  the  South, 
and  Tuscany — now  the  kingdom  of  Etruria — was 
ruled  by  the  Duke  of  Parma  (a  mere  figurehead)  ; 
Rome  was  defenceless,  and  the  King  of  Naples 
owed  his  preservation  to  the  influence  of  the  Tsar  Paul. 
Marengo  placed  Napoleon's  power  on  a  sound  basis 
— it  was  the  first  occasion  since  1791  when  public 
rejoicings  were  spontaneous  and  universal.  "  The 
French  nation,"  Napoleon  declared,  "  is  satisfied  with 
the  Treaty,  and  I  am  extremely  pleased  with  it." 

After  the  conclusion  of  the  Peace  of  LuneVille 
Napoleon  seemed  in  a  strong  position.  Contributions 
from  Holland,  Portugal,  and  Italy  enabled  him  to  pay 
his  troops  without  taxing  the  French  people,  while  in 
various  parts  of  Europe,  especially  in  Germany,  his 


THE  CONSULATE  AND  EMPEROR    65 

armies  lived  on  the  inhabitants  among  whom  they 
were  quartered.  Denmark,  Sweden,  and  Russia  were 
prepared  to  war  against  England.  He  therefore  pro- 
posed to  continue  with  vigour  his  struggle  with  Eng- 
land, and  to  overcome  her  resistance  by  his  occupation 
of  Egypt,  and  by  intrigues  in  India  and  Ireland.  The 
hostility  of  Paul  of  Russia  to  England  and  the  forma- 
tion of  the  Armed  Neutrality  would  prove,  he  thought, 
of  great  value  in  the  furtherance  of  his  crusade  against 
the  unconquerable  Island  kingdom.  Paul,  indeed, 
carried  away  by  his  fantastic  imagination,  spoke  of 
invading  India  by  way  of  Khiva  and  Herat.  On  20 
January,  1801,  before  the  Treaty  of  Luneville  was 
signed  Napoleon  had  declared  that  peace  with  the 
Emperor  was  of  no  importance  compared  with  the 
Russian  alliance,  which  he  trusted  would  overpower 
England  and  preserve  Egypt  to  France. 

The  Armed  Neutrality  of  1800-1  seemed  to  Na- 
poleon to  offer  an  excellent  opportunity  of  ruining 
British  trade  in  the  North.  He  had  failed  to  ruin 
that  trade  in  the  East,  but  this  time  he  had  every 
reason  to  expect  success.  Russia,  Prussia,  Sweden, 
and  Denmark  had  united  in  protesting  against 
England's  right  to  search  the  ships  of  Neutrals,  and 
to  confiscate  as  contraband  of  war  all  goods  of  belli- 
gerents found  on  them.  Thus  at  a  period  when 
Russia  and  Prussia  might  reasonably  have  been  ex- 
pected to  unite  with  England  against  France,  those 
Powers  combined  with  Sweden  and  Denmark  in  an 
attempt  to  weaken  the  leading  opponent  of  Napoleon, 


66  THE  LIFE  OF  NAPOLEON 

A  series  of  misfortunes,  however,  wrecked  all  the 
hopes  of  Napoleon.  Not  only  had  the  British  seized 
Malta  on  5  September,  1800,  but  on  8  March,  1801, 
the  battle  of  Copenhagen  in  which  the  Danish  fleet 
was  in  great  part  destroyed,  preceded  by  the  failure 
of  the  French  fleet  to  succour  the  army  left  in  Egypt, 
and  followed  by  the  death  of  Paul  I  on  23  March, 
upset  the  calculations  which  he  had  formed  of  striking 
a  severe  blow  at  British  commerce.  "In  concert  with 
the  Tsar,"  he  told  Bourrienne,  "  I  was  sure  of  striking 
a  mortal  blow  at  the  English  power  in  India.  A  palace 
revolution  has  overturned  all  my  projects."  Never- 
theless he  still  endeavoured  to  isolate  Great  Britain, 
and  hoped  by  closing  the  ports  of  Western  and 
Southern  Europe  to  her  ships  to  bring  her  to  terms. 

The  new  Tsar  Alexander  was,  however,  hostile 
to  Napoleon.  Russia  was  a  large  producer  of  articles 
carried  by  British  ships,  and  as  Great  Britain  was 
Russia's  chief  customer  the  material  interests,  especially 
of  the  landowners  who  were  for  the  most  part  the  great 
nobles,  were  bound  up  with  peace  with  the  Govern- 
ment of  George  III.  On  17  June  the  Treaty  of  St. 
Petersburg  re-established  good  relations  between  Eng- 
land and  Russia. 

Napoleon  had  already  shown  that  he  completely 
under-estimated  the  vitality  of  a  State  like  England 
round  which  centred  a  far-reaching  commercial  system. 
He  never  understood  the  maritime  problem  with  which 
he  had  to  deal.  H  enceforward,  however,  the  possibility 
of  closing  the  North  of  Europe  to  British  trade,  and  of 


THE  CONSULATE  AND  EMPEROR  67 

combining  the  Baltic  navies  against  the  navy  of  Great 
Britain,  became  one  of  the  fixed  ideas  of  his  mind. 

While  he  was  endeavouring  to  support  the 
Northern  Powers  in  a  League  against  Great  Britain, 
he  had  not  been  idle  in  the  South  of  Europe. 

On  28  March,  1801,  he  made  an  agreement  known 
as  the  Treaty  of  Florence  with  the  kingdom  of  the 
Two  Sicilies.  By  this  Treaty  Naples  was  to  exclude 
from  her  ports  the  ships  and  the  commerce  of  England 
and  Turkey.  The  South  of  Italy  was  to  be  occupied 
by  15,000  French  troops  in  order  to  facilitate  com- 
munication with  Egypt.  His  hope  was  that  by  means 
of  naval  combinations  the  Northern  ports  could  be 
closed  to  English  ships,  that  Egypt  might  remain  in 
French  hands,  and  that  England  would  be  forced  to 
make  peace. 

However,  on  21  March,  the  combined  English  and 
Turkish  armies  won  the  battle  of  Alexandria ;  on  27 
June  Cairo  fell  into  the  hands  of  the  British,  and  on  2 
September  the  French  were  compelled  to  make  a  con- 
vention abandoning  Egypt. 

While  he  was  hoping  for  French  successes  in  the 
Mediterranean,  Napoleon  had  instigated  Spain  to 
attack  Portugal.  On  I  October,  1800,  he  had  con- 
cluded with  Spain  the  Treaty  of  Ildefonso,  by  which 
Tuscany  (the  kingdom  of  Etruria)  was  promised  to  the 
Queen  of  Spain's  daughter  who  had  married  the  Bour- 
bon Prince  of  Parma.  On  21  March,  i8oi,the  Prin- 
cess took  possession  of  the  new  kingdom.  On  its  part 
Spain  ceded  to  France,  Parma,  Elba,  and  Louisiana, 


68  THE  LIFE  OF  NAPOLEON 

and  promised  to  attack  Portugal — the  ally  of  England. 
A  Spanish  army,  aided  by  a  French  corps,  did  indeed 
invade  Portugal,  but  on  6  June,  1801,  the  Treaty  of 
Badajos  ended  the  war.  Portugal,  to  the  infinite 
rage  of  Napoleon,  who,  however,  had  received  a 
large  sum  of  money  from  the  Portuguese,  refused  to 
close  her  ports  to  English  commerce. 

Thus  at  the  end  of  1801,  the  sea  power  of  Great 
Britain  remained  unconquered.  The  Northern  Coali- 
tion had  been  dispersed  ;  the  great  States,  apart  from 
France,  showed  friendly  feelings  towards  Great 
Britain.  The  control  of  the  Mediterranean  was  still 
in  the  hands  of  the  British  fleet ;  the  French  had 
failed  in  Egypt. 

The  situation  certainly  was  far  from  favourable  to 
Napoleon.  France  was  practically  isolated,  Russia 
was  ready  to  challenge  her  supremacy  in  Germany  and 
Italy  ;  the  neutrality  of  Prussia  was  uncertain  ;  Austria 
was  anxious  for  an  opportunity  of  evading  the  terms 
of  the  Treaty  of  Luneville.  All  Napoleon's  grandiose 
projects  had  failed.  The  English  were  supreme  in 
Egypt  and  the  Mediterranean  ;  Spain  had  made  peace 
with  Portugal ;  Denmark  had  been  compelled  by 
Nelson  to  desert  the  Armed  Neutrality. 

Napoleon  at  once  realized  that  his  best  policy  was 
to  come  to  terms  with  Great  Britain.  On  i  October, 
1 80 1,  the  preliminaries  of  peace  with  Great  Britain 
were  signed.  He  had  found  it  necessary  to  make  a  truce 
with  the  English  nation  while  he  reorganized  France 
from  within,  and  brought  more  completely  under  his 


THE  CONSULATE  AND  EMPEROR  69 

control  Holland,  Switzerland,  Italy,  and  to  some  extent 
Germany.  In  other  words,  he  realized  that  a  period 
of  peace  would  enable  him  to  establish  his  own 
supremacy  on  a  firm  basis  in  France,  and  French 
supremacy  outside  her  borders,  while  he  would  be 
able  to  make  adequate  preparations  to  renew  the 
struggle  with  Great  Britain  in  a  few  years.  Thus  his 
first  attempt  to  establish  his  supremacy  over  Europe 
had  failed. 

In  the  negotiations  at  Amiens  the  French  repre- 
sentatives, of  whom  Joseph  Bonaparte  was  the  chief, 
outwitted  the  English  Government  on  many  points. 
England  certainly  gained  Trinidad  and  Ceylon,  but 
the  Dutch  recovered  the  Cape  of  Good  Hope.  France 
undertook  to  restore  Egypt  to  Turkey,  to  guarantee 
the  integrity  of  Portugal,  and  to  retire  from  Naples. 
England  agreed  to  evacuate  Malta,  never  expecting 
that  the  French  would  continue  to  occupy  Holland, 
Piedmont,  and  Switzerland.  On  8  October  peace  was 
formally  made  with  Russia,  the  latter  power  engaging 
not  to  support  the  Bourbons,  while  Napoleon  engaged 
not  to  aid  the  Poles.  Treaties  with  Turkey  and 
Bavaria  marked  the  final  pacification  of  Europe. 

Unfortunately  Addington  had  not  insisted  upon 
the  independence  of  Holland  and  Switzerland.  In  his 
opinion  Article  1 1  of  the  Treaty  of  Luneville  "  which 
expressly  guaranteed  the  independence  of  the  Batavian 
Republic,"  and  Article  2  of  the  Franco-Dutch  Conven- 
tion "  of  the  29  August,  1 80 1,  which  specified  that  the 
French  troops  should  only  remain  in  the  Batavian 


70  THE  LIFE  OF  NAPOLEON 

Republic  until  the  general  peace,"  rendered  the  evacua- 
tion of  Holland  a  necessary  and  immediate  consequence 
of  the  Treaty  of  Amiens.  Napoleon,  however,  refused 
to  evacuate  Holland,  and  at  the  same  time  demanded 
that  the  English  should  quit  Malta  without  delay. 
As  neither  party  would  yield,  matters  drifted  on  till 
the  outbreak  of  war  in  1 803. 

In  her  "Memoirs"  the  Duchess  d'Abrantes  has 
given  us  a  very  interesting  account  of  Paris  on  the 
conclusion  of  the  Treaty  of  Amiens.  Paris  was 
thronged  with  foreigners,  among  whom  were  Charles 
Fox,  Lord  and  Lady  Cholmondeley,  the  Duchess  of 
Gordon,  and  Lady  E.  Foster  afterwards  Duchess  of 
Devonshire. 

"  Nothing,"  we  are  told,  "  could  exceed  Napoleon's 
extreme  and  rigid  economy  in  all  his  private  concerns  ; 
but  when  circumstances  required  it,  he  could  equal  in 
magnificence  the  most  sumptuous  sovereign  of  the 
East."1 

At  this  time  he  disliked  foreigners,  and  in  spite 
of  some  attempts  never  succeeded  in  acquiring  more 
than  a  smattering  of  English.  But  he  insisted  that 
foreigners  should  be  treated  with  courtesy  and  shown 
the  art  treasures  in  Paris. 

An  Englishman  in  Paris  describes  Napoleon  at  a 
Review  on  3  August,  1802.  "  Bonaparte,"  he  says, 
"  wore  a  plain  green  coat  with  a  narrow  white  cloth 
edging  at  the  seams  .  .  .  and  a  cocked  hat  without 

1 "  Memoirs  of  Napoleon,"  by  the  Duchess  d'Abrantes, 
Vol.  I,  p.  538.  London,  Bentley,  1836. 


THE  CONSULATE  AND  EMPEROR    71 

any  lace.  His  hair  is  very  black,  and  is  cropped 
very  close  to  his  head  and  neck,  so  that  his  ears  are 
all  bare.  It  falls  down  over  his  brow.  His  com- 
plexion is  swarthy,  his  face  long,  a  fine  nose,  his  eyes 
are  very  dark,  and  his  eyebrows  fall,  or  are  drawn 
down,  much  over  his  eyes.  His  cheek  bones  are 
high,  and  his  cheeks  sink  between  the  bones  of  the 
face  and  those  of  the  chin,  which  gives  him  a  wasted 
consumptive  look.  His  upper  lip  projects  in  the 
middle  of  his  mouth  considerably  over  the  under  one, 
and  his  chin  is  sharp  and  prominent.  .  .  .  To  me 
he  appeared  to  have  the  look  of  anxiety  or  rather  of 
fear.  He  was  mounted  on  a  beautiful  Arabian  grey 
horse,  one  of  the  most  perfect  animals  I  ever  saw. 
.  .  .  During  all  that  period  (nearly  an  hour  and  a 
half)  he  never  once  opened  his  lips,  nor  did  he  turn 
his  head  to  the  right  or  to  the  left.  .  .  .  No  person 
spoke  to  him,  nor  was  he  cheered  or  huzzaed,  either 
when  he  came  into  the  Cour  or  when  he  departed."1 
After  the  settlement  of  peace  with  Great  Britain, 
France  seemed  to  have  secured  what  she  had  desired 
for  many  years,  a  period  of  tranquillity.  Napoleon 
had  been  accepted  as  the  head  of  the  State,  because 
he  had  overthrown  the  Directory  whose  execrable 
home  policy  had  covered  it  with  disgrace,  and  because 
he  had  won  Marengo  and  regained  Italy.  France 
had  entered  upon  a  brilliant  period  in  her  annals — 
and  if  peace  had  been  prolonged  for  ten  or  even  for 

1  Quoted  by  Harold  Wheeler  in  "  The  Story  of  Napoleon," 
p.  126,  from  the  Diary  of  Robert  Sym. 


72  THE  LIFE  OF  NAPOLEON 

five  years  it  is  difficult  "to  conjecture  what  might 
have  been  the  course  of  history  ". 

After  Marengo  Napoleon's  position  in  France  was 
assured.  The  French  nation,  however,  still  desired 
peace — and  a  long  continuance  of  peace.  "  The 
millions  who  by  successive  plebiscites  confirmed 
Napoleon  in  the  possession  of  sovereign  power  ex- 
pected that  he  would  establish  orderly  and  methodical 
government  and  maintain  equality."  They  never 
realized,  however,  that  in  setting  up  Napoleon  they 
were  giving  themselves  a  master  whose  aims  ran 
directly  counter  to  those  of  the  majority  of  the  French 
nation. 

Most  Frenchmen  hoped  to  see  the  establishment 
of  a  Republic,  and  of  the  Constitution,  with  modi- 
fications, of  1791.  Napoleon,  on  the  other  hand,  lost 
no  time  in  bringing  about  the  restoration  of  mon- 
archical rule  with  himself  as  monarch.  The  nation, 
satisfied  with  having  secured  what  it  called  its 
"natural"  boundaries — namely,  the  Rhine,  the  Alps, 
and  the  Pyrenees — desired  peace.  Napoleon,  on  the 
other  hand,  never  ceased  planning  for  the  extension 
of  France  beyond  her  borders — an  extension  which 
could  only  be  effected  by  acts  of  invasion,  and  a 
period  of  conquest.  Like  the  army,  he  desired  war. 
During  the  period  of  peace,  indeed,  he  never  ceased 
from  acts  of  aggression  and  from  arranging  plans  of  con- 
quest. In  1802,  after  the  conclusion  of  peace,  he  an- 
nexed Elba,  Piedmont,  Parma,  and  Piacenza,  while 
from  1 80 1  to  1805  he  was  constantly  devising  schemes 


THE    FIRST   CONSUL  AT    MALMAISON 

FROM    THE    PAINTING    BY  J.    B.    ISABEY   AT    VERSAILLES 


THE  CONSULATE  AND  EMPEROR     73 

against  the  English  in  India.  These  schemes  indeed 
failed,  but  it  was  not  till  1810  that  Mauritius  was 
captured  from  France  and  a  continual  menace  to 
British  merchantmen  removed. 

In  August,  1802,  Napoleon  was  appointed  Consul 
for  life,  and  a  new  period  in  French  history  is  entered 
upon.  The  Concordat  with  the  Pope  brought  to 
France  international  peace,  while  the  Peace  of  Amiens 
with  England  gave  the  country  that  rest  from  war 
which  all  Frenchmen  desired.  The  position  of  France 
was,  moreover,  immensely  strengthened  by  the  dis- 
cord which  prevailed  in  Germany.  On  25  February, 
1803, tne  reconstruction  of  Germany  was  decided  upon, 
and  the  Holy  Roman  Empire  came  practically  to  an 
end. 

The  victory  of  Marengo  placed  Napoleon  in  a 
position  of  supremacy  in  the  world  of  politics  ;  the 
Peace  of  Luneville  and  the  Peace  of  Amiens  streng- 
thened enormously  that  position.  France  had  now 
obtained  a  welcome  respite  from  war.  She  also 
desired  the  establishment  of  order  and  a  settled  form 
of  government.  Napoleon  in  1802  had  an  excellent 
opportunity  of  showing  his  skill  as  an  administrator, 
and  at  the  same  time  of  advancing  towards  the  attain- 
ment of  despotic  power.  The  Constitution  of  the 
year  VIII,  or  the  Consulate,  indeed  bristled  with 
checks  and  balances,  and  Bonaparte  as  First  Consul 
seemed  to  all  but  a  few  astute  heads  simply  a  primus 
inter  pares.  Frenchmen  desired  a  restoration  of  the 
Republic  and  a  return  to  the  Constitution  of  1791. 


74  THE  LIFE  OF  NAPOLEON 

They  aimed  at  personal  security  and  freedom  in  place 
of  anarchy  and  oppression.  A  policy  of  tolerance 
and  the  recognition  of  religion  as  the  basis  of  society 
were  required  to  satisfy  the  majority  of  Frenchmen 
who  had  seen  with  pleasure  the  overthrow  of  the 
Directory. 

Though  the  men  who  carried  out  the  revolution 
of  Brumaire  had  no  intention  of  giving  to  Napoleon  the 
position  of  a  dictator,  they  had  unconsciously  acted 
well  for  French  interests  in  placing  the  successful 
general  at  the  head  of  the  new  Government.  For 
Napoleon  was  by  nature  an  ideal  administrator,  with 
a  passion  for  efficiency.  His  administrative  capacity 
was  simply  prodigious,  and  no  living  man  was  his 
superior  in  the  art  of  organization. 

But  this  power  of  evolving  order  out  of  chaos,  of 
choosing  efficient  instruments  for  carrying  out  the 
work  of  reorganization,  and  of  assuring  to  France 
peace  within  her  borders,  was  accompanied  by  an 
overweening  ambition.  Napoleon  was  already  de- 
termined to  make  himself  supreme,  and  to  use  the 
general  desire  for  reforms  and  reorganization  as  a 
step  towards  imperialism. 

The  new  Constitution  itself,  which  had  been 
hurriedly  drawn  up,  afforded  opportunities  for  a  man 
of  Bonaparte's  determination  for  the  creation  of  a 
despotism.  The  Legislature  was  divided  between  the 
Legislative  Body  of  300,  and  the  Tribunate  of  100, 
both  bodies  being  chosen  by  the  Senate.  The  Tri- 
bunate's duty  was  to  discuss  laws  but  not  to  vote, 


THE  CONSULATE  AND  EMPEROR     75 

while  to  the  Legislative  Body  was  assigned  the  duty 
of  voting  on  the  laws  which  had  been  already  dis- 
cussed by  the  Tribunate.  The  Legislature  thus  had 
no  popular  foundation,  and  its  powers  divided  between 
two  bodies  were  closely  curtailed  and  checked  by  the 
Senate  of  eighty  and  by  the  Council  of  State,  the 
members  of  both  bodies  being  nominated  by  the 
Consuls.  While  the  Council  of  State  initiated  the 
laws,  the  Senate  had  power  to  veto  any  laws  which 
endangered  the  Constitution. 

The  Senate,  while  it  erected  and  controlled  the 
Legislative  Body  and  the  Tribunate,  soon  found  it- 
self powerless  before  the  strong  Executive  which  it 
had  set  up.  Three  Consuls  appointed  by  the  Senate 
formed  the  Executive  Authority,  and  the  First  Consul, 
Napoleon,  was  given  powers  which  soon  enabled  him 
to  sweep  away  all  the  checks  which  had  been  devised 
by  the  Constitution. 

The  appointment  of  Ministers  was  given  to  Bona- 
parte as  First  Consul,  and  he  at  once  constructed  a 
Ministry  after  his  own  heart.  Lucien  Bonaparte 
(who  was  succeeded  in  1801  by  Chaptal)  became 
Minister  of  the  Interior,  Pouche*  remained  Minister  of 
Police,  Decres  became  Minister  of  the  Navy,  Barbe- 
Marbois  Minister  of  the  Public  Treasury,  Dejean 
Minister  of  Military  Affairs,  and  in  1802  Regnier  was 
appointed  Minister  of  Justice. 

The  local  administration  was  organized  with  the 
same  care  that  characterized  Napoleon's  systematic 
organization  of  the  central  administration. 


76  THE  LIFE  OF  NAPOLEON 

Over  each  Department  was  placed  a  "  PreTet," 
who  presided  over  the  Council  of  the  Department, 
while  in  the  towns  the  Councils  were  presided  over  by 
the  Mayors  who  were  appointed  by  the  "  PreTets  ". 
These  "  PreYets,"  who  were  chosen  with  great  care, 
proved  admirable  officials.  They  were  already 
skilled  in  administrative  work,  and  under  their  super- 
vision the  local  administrators  worked  well. 

Civil  and  Criminal  Tribunals  were  set  up  over 
which  was  a  Cour  de  Cassation  at  Paris.  The  judges 
were  appointed  by  the  First  Consul  for  life.  To  the 
ordinary  Frenchman  Napoleon  appeared  to  be  re- 
storing the  Republic,  and  his  title  of  First  Consul 
roused  no  feelings  of  suspicion.  The  measures  taken 
on  the  fall  of  the  Directory  were  statesmanlike,  and 
France  and  her  armies  believed  that  a  new  era  in  the 
history  of  revolutionary  government  had  dawned. 
Very  few  realized  that  the  promulgation  of  the  Con- 
stitution of  the  year  VIII  was  the  first  step  in  the 
establishment  of  a  despotism. 

The  Code  Napoleon  which  carried  out  the  codi- 
fication of  the  French  law  was  a  remarkable  illustra- 
tion of  Napoleon's  energy.  Like  the  legal  reforms 
of  Justinian,  Napoleon's  Code  remains  the  most  per- 
manent of  the  gifts  of  the  Consulate  to  France.  The 
French  Revolution  had  led  to  endless  confusion,  but 
had  also  cleared  the  way  for  a  code  of  uniform  laws. 
The  French  people,  in  Napoleon's  opinion,  desired 
equality,  and  the  Code  Napoleon  provided  them  with 
equal  justice,  "  one  weight,  one  measure,  one  law  ". 


THE  CONSULATE  AND  EMPEROR     77 

Henceforward  all  citizens  had  equal  opportunities  of 
advancement.  Already  the  Convention  and  Direc- 
tory had  made  efforts  to  provide  a  code.  But  it  was 
not  till  after  Marengo  that  a  period  of  calm  ensued, 
and  a  committee  of  lawyers  was  appointed  on  12 
August,  1800,  to  draw  up  a  Civil  Code.  "  That  code," 
writes  Mr.  Fisher,  "harmonized  the  discoveries  of 
democratic  jurisprudence  with  the  ripe  and  tested 
wisdom  of  the  legists  of  the  monarchy."  It  remains 
"  the  most  durable  monument  of  Napoleon's  genius  ",l 

During  his  campaign  in  Italy  in  1796-7  Napoleon 
showed  his  realization  of  the  value  of  Christianity  as 
an  effective  political  force.  His  Moslem  proclama- 
tions during  the  Egyptian  expedition  were  merely 
temporary  expedients  to  serve  a  certain  purpose,  and 
after  Brumaire  he  at  once  acted  in  opposition  to  the 
belief  held  by  men  of  revolutionary  temperament  and 
as  a  rule  by  the  army  that  Catholicism  was  hostile  to 
liberty. 

The  history  of  his  efforts  to  carry  out  this  striking 
revolution  in  Republican  policy  is  a  signal  proof  of 
his  astuteness  and  determination.  To  those  who 
professed  Catholicism  Brumaire  came  as  a  most  wel- 
come relief.  The  unlimited  persecution  which  had 
disgraced  the  last  two  years  of  the  Directory  came  to 
an  end,  the  laws  of  deportation  were  repealed,  the 
opening  of  churches  was  allowed,  and  gradually  the 
observance  of  Ddcadi  was  ignored  by  the  religious 

1  Fisher,  "  Napoleonic  Statesmanship  :  Germany,"  Oxford, 
The  Clarendon  Press,  1903. 


78  THE  LIFE  OF  NAPOLEON 

world.  The  condition  of  the  clergy  was  at  the  time 
pitiable,  their  lands  had  been  confiscated,  public 
worship  had  been  checked,  and  was  barely  legal,  a 
schism  still  divided  the  "  non-juring "  from  the  con- 
stitutional clergy. 

Nevertheless  the  Catholic  Church  remained  a 
great  force,  and  her  immense  influence  could  not  be 
ignored.  Of  all  the  various  religions  adhered  to  in 
France  that  of  Catholicism  rested  on  the  most  stable 
foundations,  and  remained  unchanged.  Its  influence 
was  fully  recognized  by  Napoleon  who  determined  to 
direct  its  policy  ;  he  saw  that  its  complete  re-establish- 
ment was  advisable  if  not  absolutely  necessary  for  the 
success  of  his  political  schemes,  but  he  was  equally 
resolved  that  the  disendowment  of  1790  must  not  be 
interfered  with.  He  was  determined  to  carry  through 
a  plan  for  the  redistribution  of  dioceses  and  parishes, 
and  to  procure  not  only  the  Papal  recognition  of  the 
constitutional  orders,  but  also  the  Papal  sanction  to 
his  right  to  nominate  to  bishoprics,  and  to  rearrange 
the  dioceses  and  parishes. 

During  the  years  from  1790  to  1794  the  Church 
had  remained  a  State  Institution  in  accordance  with 
the  Civil  Constitution  of  the  clergy  set  up  in  1 790 ; 
the  salaries  of  the  clergy  being  paid  from  the  public 
treasury.  But  the  vast  majority  of  the  clergy  refused 
to  take  the  oath  of  allegiance  which  the  revolutionists 
demanded,  and  were  in  consequence  subject  to  ex- 
treme persecution.  The  Act  of  1790  was  simply  "a 
return  to  despotic  precedents,  and  the  old  contempt 


THE  CONSULATE  AND  EMPEROR  79 

for  human  liberty,"  and  by  it  thousands  of  the  clergy 
and  faithful  Catholics  who  had  hitherto  warmly  sup- 
ported the  Revolution  were  alienated. 

In  September,  1794,  by  order  of  the  Convention, 
salaries  paid  to  the  conforming  priests  ceased,  Church 
and  State  were  thus  separated,  and  till  Napoleon 
made  the  Concordat  with  the  Pope  all  creeds  were 
on  the  same  level.  But  in  France  Catholicism  was 
still  a  force,  and  in  spite  of  the  persecuting  policy  of 
the  Directory  from  1797  to  1799  the  Catholics  con- 
tinued without  any  help  from  the  State  and  inde- 
pendent of  Rome  to  hold  their  services. 

For  two  years  after  Brumaire  liberty  of  conscience 
and  liberty  of  worship  were  tacitly  allowed,  Catholic 
services  were  not  interfered  with,  the  clergy  reas- 
sumed  their  clerical  dress,  the  Seminarists  began  to 
return  to  France  and  their  duties.  It  seemed  as 
though  Catholicism  separated  from  the  State  would 
remain  simply  a  spiritual  power.  Protestantism  was 
not  interfered  with,1  Jews  were  tolerated.  The 
doctrine  of  liberty  and  equality  in  religion  seemed  to 
be  fully  recognized,  the  Gregorian  Calendar  came 
more  into  use,  and  many  shops  remained  closed  on 
Sundays. 

Napoleon  himself  fully  realized  the  strength  of 
Catholicism,  the  advantages  of  a  union  between 
Church  and  State  and  the  importance  of  enlisting  on 

1  It  has  been  stated  that  at  this  time  there  were  in  France 
3,000,000  Protestants,  17,000,000  Freethinkers,  15,000,000  Ca- 
tholics. (See  Pressense,  "  L'Eglise  et  la  Revolution  Franchise  ".) 


8o  THE  LIFE  OF  NAPOLEON 

his  side  one  of  the  great  forces  in  French  society. 
While,  however,  he  was  quite  willing  to  restore  the 
connexion  between  the  Papacy  and  the  Gallican 
Church  he  was  determined  that  bishops  should  be 
nominated  by  himself  and  that  he  should  direct  their 
policy. 

He  studied  Bossuet's  writings  in  order  to  make 
himself  conversant  with  the  views  of  that  strenuous 
upholder  of  French  liberties,  and  he  only  acted  after 
mature  deliberation. 

There  is  no  evidence  that  Napoleon  was  in  his  policy 
to  the  Church  governed  by  any  love  for,  or  belief  in 
religion.  His  action  was  the  result  of  cool  calcu- 
lation. By  the  restoration  and  public  recognition  of 
the  Catholic  religion  he  secured  the  gratitude  of  a 
considerable  portion  of  Frenchmen.  At  the  same  time 
he  checked  the  growth  of  a  voluntary  movement 
and  brought  the  Church  within  his  system  of  cen- 
tralization. 

The  Papal  acquiescence  to  the  Concordat  was 
only  obtained  after  much  wrangling.  It  was  obviously 
the  interest  and  desire  of  the  Papacy  to  bring  about 
a  renewal  of  the  union  of  the  French  Government 
and  the  Catholic  Church.  But  the  Pope  struggled 
hard  against  the  necessity  of  accepting  Napoleon's 
terms,  in  accordance  with  which  the  Civil  Constitution 
of  1790 — the  democratic  element  being  eliminated— 
was  the  basis  of  the  proposed  Concordat.  The  Pope 
for  some  time  resisted  the  demand  that  he  should 
recognize  the  "  constitutional "  priests  and  "  con- 


THE  CONSULATE  AND  EMPEROR    81 

stitutional"  orders,  but  Napoleon  eventually  secured 
this  recognition  and  himself  nominated  to  the  new 
Episcopate  at  least  ten  from  among  the  constitutional 
clergy.  Thus  the  Pope  had  to  acknowledge  the 
validity  of  the  constitutional  orders,  and  to  accept 
Napoleon's  future  nominations  to  bishoprics,  as  well 
as  his  plan  for  the  redistribution  of  dioceses  and 
parishes.  In  other  respects  the  Pope  was  compelled 
to  leave  the  civil  power  master  of  the  clergy,  who 
being  salaried  were  bound  to  conform  to  the  edicts 
of  the  State.  The  Government  was  to  countersign 
all  addresses  sent  by  the  Pope  to  the  clergy,  to  give 
its  sanction  to  the  meeting  of  all  councils  and  diocesan 
synods,  and  generally  to  supervise  the  conduct  of  its 
secular  clergy.  For  the  payment  of  the  clerical 
salaries  the  French  taxpayers  were  called  upon  to  pay 
an  immense  sum. 

On  15  July,  1 80 1,  Gonsalvi  and  Joseph  Bonaparte 
signed  the  Concordat,  the  negotiations  for  which  had 
been  carried  on  in  Rome  by  Joseph  who  was  in  con- 
stant correspondence  with  Napoleon.  On  15  August, 
at  the  suggestion  of  the  Papal  Legate,  a  "fete  de 
Napoleon  "  was  celebrated  in  Notre  Dame.  At  the 
entrance  the  priests  received  Napoleon  singing  Ecce 
mitto  angelum  meum,  qui  preparabit  meant  viam. 
Many  of  those  who  witnessed  the  ceremony,  and  who 
had  taken  part  in  the  early  years  of  the  French  Re- 
volution, and  struggled  to  destroy  the  power  of  the 
Roman  Church  in  France,  resented  bitterly  its  restor- 
ation by  a  French  Consul.  In  later  years  it  is  said 

6 


S2  THE  LIFE  OF  NAPOLEON 

that  Napoleon  regarded  the  Concordat  as  the  great 
mistake  of  his  administration.  He  himself  had  no 
fixed  religious  beliefs,  and  his  restoration  of  the  Catho- 
lic religion  in  France  was  merely  a  matter  of  policy. 
In  1802,  however,  he  was  about  to  place  the  French 
Government  on  a  monarchical  basis,  and  by  the 
Concordat  he  had  for  the  time  secured  the  support  of 
"  the  disciplined  host  of  the  Catholic  Church  ". 

In  a  memorial  written  at  St.  Helena  in  1816  he 
declares  that  when  on  the  fall  of  the  Directory  he  had 
seized  the  helm  he  had  "  weighed  the  importance  of 
religion "  and  had  decided  to  re-establish  it.  By 
coming  to  an  understanding  with  the  Pope,  he  had 
caused  war  to  cease  between  the  two  clerical  parties. 

Besides,  his  understanding  with  the  Pope  allowed 
him  to  use  his  influence  sooner  or  later  with  100,000,000 
Catholics.1 

There  is  little  doubt  that  Napoleon  in  restoring 
Roman  Catholicism  in  France  was  pursuing  a 
statesmanlike  policy,  and  one  that  commended  itself 
to  the  masses  in  France.  That  being  so,  he  was  wise 
in  ignoring  the  opinions  of  the  refractory  clergy,  of  the 
Jacobins,  and  of  those  who,  like  Madame  de  Stael, 
desired  the  establishment  of  Protestantism  in  France. 

Thus  in  1801  by  the  Concordat  Napoleon  paci- 
fied France,  and  by  allowing  religious  liberty  he  had 
acted  wisely.  "  I  wanted,"  he  said,  during  his 
captivity  in  St.  Helena,  "to  establish  universal  liberty 

1  "  The  Exile  of  St.  Helena,"  by  Philippe  Gonnard,  pp.  165-6. 
London,  W.  Heinemann,  1907. 


THE  CONSULATE  AND  EMPEROR  £3 

of  conscience.  I  wanted  everyone  to  be  allowed  to 
think  and  believe  in  his  own  way,  and  all  men,  whether 
Catholics,  Protestants,  Mahometans  or  Deists,  to  be 
equal."1 

During  the  Consulate  his  measures  had  for  their 
aim,  he  declared,  economy  and  the  general  benefit  of 
all  classes.  In  1799  the  French  nation  was  practically 
without  a  system  of  education  and  a  large  proportion 
of  the  people  were  uneducated.  Their  condition  in 
1799  may  be  appreciated  if  it  is  remembered  that  even 
in  1804  96  per  cent  could  not  read. 

Nevertheless  the  Press  was  not  free,  and  before 
long  it  became  apparent  that  the  foundations  of  a 
powerful  monarchy  were  being  carefully  laid.  Order 
had  been  established  in  Church  and  State,  law  was 
enforced  in  the  administration. 

Guizot  declared  that  "  Napoleon's  greatest  and 
most  arduous  achievement  was  the  revivification  of  the 
idea  of  authority — an  idea  which  it  was  thought  that 
the  Great  Revolution  had  completely  discredited  ". 

Napoleon  was  a  strong  believer  in  the  principle  of 
power  and  domination,  and  disbelieved  in  the  principles 
of  private  judgment  and  individual  liberty. 

The  Consulate  had  many  merits ;  equality  before 
the  law  was  recognized,  merit  was  recompensed, 
education  was  organized  and  its  cost  lowered — in  a 
word,  the  interests  of  the  community  were  secured  by 
a  firm,  intelligent,  and  stable  Government.  Napoleon 

1  "The  Exile  of  St.  Helena,"  by  Philippe  Gonnard,  p.  127. 


84  THE  LIFE  OF  NAPOLEON 

brushed  aside  the  charge  that  he  in  1804  usurped  the 
throne.  According  to  him  he  found  the  crown  in  the 
gutter  and  the  French  people  placed  it  on  his  head. 
He  defended  his  creation  of  a  nobility  on  the  ground 
that  it  contributed  to  the  stability  of  the  State  to  attach 
to  the  idea  of  nobility  the  conception  of  services  ren- 
dered to  the  State.  That  his  rule  was  mild  was  in 
his  opinion  proved  by  the  fact  that  his  eight  prisons 
only  contained  243  persons,  and  that  the  annual  in- 
spection of  these  prisons  made  by  the  Councillors  of 
State  precluded  any  risk  of  arbitrary  detention. 
Napoleon  in  fact  insisted  that  while  he  allowed  re- 
ligious liberty,  his  system  of  criminal  justice  gave 
France  a  complete  measure  of  political  liberty. 

After  August,  1802,  when  Napoleon  was  appointed 
for  life,  none  could  doubt  that  they  would  shortly 
witness  the  establishment  of  the  Empire.  If  Napoleon 
had  only  given  France  a  period  of  peace  for  ten  or 
even  for  five  years  he  could  have  concentrated  his 
energies  on  civil  and  colonial  enterprises.  France 
would  have  become  so  strong  that  "it  is  impossible 
to  conjecture  what  would  have  been  the  course  of 
European  history  ". 

In  1803,  when  war  with  England  broke  out,  the 
world  saw  the  definite  opening  of  a  new  period  marked 
by  the  appearance  of  the  Empire,  and  by  the  definite 
attempt  on  the  part  of  Napoleon  to  establish  his 
supremacy  over  Europe  and  to  extend  his  influence 
over  Asia  and  Australasia. 

Napoleon  had  satisfied  the  wishes  of  those  who 


THE  CONSULATE  AND  EMPEROR    85 

desired  the  establishment  of  a  methodical  and  orderly 
government.  His  "  administration  surpassed  in 
methodical  and  intelligent  vigour  anything  Europe 
had  hitherto  seen  ".  Moreover,  as  regarded  the  peace 
which  Frenchmen  desired,  Napoleon  protested  that 
peace  had  been  the  object  of  his  most  strenuous  en- 
deavours, but  that  "the  inveterate  malignity  of  the 
enemies  of  France  and  of  the  Revolution  refused 
all  terms  compatible  with  her  honour  and  safety ". 
For  a  time  Napoleon's  glorious  victories  and  the 
plunder  of  conquered  nations  reconciled  the  French 
nation  to  the  wars  in  which  France  found  herself, 
while  before  the  war  with  England  had  proceeded 
little  more  than  a  year  the  Consulate  gave  place  to 
the  Empire.  That  change  in  the  government  of 
France  had  been  hastened  by  the  discovery  of  plots 
against  Napoleon's  life. 

The  conspiracy  of  Cadoudal  had  been  discovered 
in  February,  1 804,  and  Cadoudal  himself  was  arrested 
on  9  March.  The  plot  had  wide  ramifications  and 
had  been  to  a  great  extent  hatched  in  London,  and 
both  Moreau  and  Pichegru  were  implicated.  Na- 
poleon convinced  himself,  or  appeared  to  convince 
himself,  that  a  prince  was  to  head  the  movement,  and 
that  the  Due  d'Enghien,  then  living  quietly  at  Etten- 
heim  near  the  Rhine,  was  to  take  command  of  the 
"  assassins ".  Without  any  delay  d'Enghien  was 
seized  on  14  March,  and  on  21  March  he  was  shot  at 
Vincennes.  On  16  April  Pichegru  died  in  prison  ; 
Cadoudal  and  several  of  his  fellow-conspirators  were 


86  THE  LIFE  OF  NAPOLEON 

executed,  and  Moreau  who  sailed  in  June  to  America 
was  pardoned. 

Cadoudal's  conspiracy,  which  undoubtedly  threat- 
ened the  life  of  Napoleon,  was  the  last  of  many  minor 
conspiracies  during  the  Consulate.  To  Napoleon 
Moreau  represented  the  dissatisfied  republicans,  and 
d'Enghien  the  relentless  royalists.  Napoleon  had 
now  struck  terror  into  the  hearts  of  his  opponents 
and  no  further  opposition  to  him  was  forthcoming. 
"We  have  done  more  than  we  hoped  to  do,"  Cadoudal 
had  said  while  in  prison,  "we  meant  to  give  France  a 
King,  and  we  have  given  her  an  Emperor." 

No  doubt  in  the  case  of  the  Due  d'Enghien, 
Napoleon  was  betrayed  into  an  exhibition  of  "  Corsi- 
can  passionateness,"  for  though  by  no  means  cruel 
by  nature  he  was  liable  to  outbursts  of  passion  when 
he  committed  deeds  over  which  he  grieved  later. 
But  the  execution  of  the  Due  d'Enghien  was  no 
worse  than  the  murder  of  the  French  envoys  at 
Rastadt  on  28  April,  1799,  by  some  Austrian  hussars, 
and  very  little  worse  than  the  abstention  of  the  British 
Government  from  checking  plots  against  Napoleon's 
life  which  were  hatched  in  England. 

On  1 8  May,  1804,  Napoleon,  at  the  age  of  33 
years  and  8  months,  took  the  title  of  Emperor  with 
the  name  of  Napoleon  I.  The  discovery  of  the 
conspiracy  of  Georges  Cadoudal  in  February  had 
hastened  the  establishment  of  the  Empire.  On  29 
March  Napoleon  had  declared  that  the  interests  of 
France  demanded  an  hereditary  ruler,  and  on  the 


THE  CONSULATE  AND  EMPEROR    87 

following  day  the  Senate  had  petitioned  him  to  be- 
come their  ruler  de  jure  as  well  as  de  facto.  His  ac- 
ceptance of  the  imperial  dignity  marked  the  close  of 
a  development  which  had  steadily  proceeded  since 
the  deposition  of  Louis  XVI  in  1792. 

In  that  year,  writes  M.  Sorel,  "le  peupleavait  fait 
la  table  rase ;  il  avait  delegue  sa  souverainete  a  une 
Convention  de  sept  cents  membres ;  cette  assembled 
en  avait  delegue  1'exercice  a  un  Comit6  de  neuf 
membres  ;  puis  on  etait  passe\  a  travers  les  plebiscites, 
a  un  Directoire  de  cinq,  a  un  Consulat  de  trois ; 
1'evolution  aboutissait  a  1'unite".  Napoleon  had 
ample  justification  for  taking  into  his  own  hands  the 
government  of  France.  There  was  danger  of  anarchy 
from  within,  and  there  was  the  likelihood  of  invasion 
from  without.  Constitutional  government  at  that 
time  was  impossible,  and  Napoleon  realized  that 
concentration  of  authority  in  the  hands  of  one  man 
was  necessary.  He  was,  he  declared,  the  rider  of  a 
spirited  horse,  who  in  order  to  keep  a  straight  course 
was  compelled  to  control  his  steed  with  bit  and  curb. 

For  some  years  after  the  establishment  of  the 
Empire  the  French  coins  which  were  issued  bore 
"  Napoleon  Empereur"  on  one  side  and  "  Republique 
Francaise"  on  the  other.  The  Napoleonic  absolut- 
ism was  essentially  different  from  the  Bourbon  absol- 
utism. It  was  based  on  democracy  not  on  privilege, 
and  "  its  keynote  was  equality — equality  of  burdens, 
and  equality  of  rights".  It  was  avowedly  a  govern- 
ment of  efficiency,  and,  moreover,  it  was  a  govern- 


88  THE  LIFE  OF  NAPOLEON 

ment  of  conciliation ;  all  Frenchmen  could  hope  for 
employment,  and  all  internal  discords  were  healed. 
Thus  equality,  the  passion  of  all  Frenchmen,  was 
secured,  and  the  laws  civil  and  criminal  dealt  equal 
justice  to  all.  The  Legion  of  Honour  symbolized 
equality,  and  was  the  reward  of  every  kind  of  talent. 

Within  a  few  years  of  Brumaire  Napoleon  had 
effected  a  complete  revolution  in  the  administration 
of  France.  That  administration  became  centralized, 
and  "  its  stability  has  survived  every  political  crisis  ". 
He  founded  the  University,  he  gave  France  the 
Code  Napoleon,  he  established  the  Bank  of  France, 
he  inaugurated  the  Come'die  Franchise,  he  arranged 
the  Concordat.  In  place  of  the  chaos  in  which  France 
was  plunged  in  1799  he  established  order,  he  regu- 
lated education,  he  set  on  foot  an  administrative 
system.  No  doubt  the  Napoleonic  reorganization 
was,  as  Taine  declares,  imperfect,  but  nevertheless  it 
remains  the  framework  of  French  society,  and  has 
outlived  numerous  upheavals  and  political  crises. 
"Napoleon,"  writes  Mr.  Bodley,  "seemed  to  be 
called  into  being — a  miraculous  or  at  all  events  an  ab- 
normal figure — to  save  the  existence  of  France  ;  and 
that  his  work  has  lasted  without  any  serious  effort  to 
upset  it  shows  how  good  it  was."1 

During   the    Consulate  a   new  Court    had  been 

gradually   formed   at   the   Tuileries,    and    the    Paris 

salons  again  became  prominent  and  Paris  life  became 

as  gay  as  ever.     Thus  the  way  was  prepared  for  a 

1  Bodley,  "France,"  Vol.  I,  p.  109. 


JOSEPHINE  AT   MALMAISON 

FROM    THE    PAINTING    BY   J'RUD'HOX    AT   VERSAILLES 


THE  CONSULATE  AND  EMPEROR  89 

rapid  development  of  the  nobility  of  the  Empire. 
"  An  aristocracy  is  necessary  to  every  nation,"  was 
Napoleon's  defence  of  the  growth  of  dignitaries,  civil 
and  military,  during  his  rule  in  France.  Moreover, 
he  asserted  that  the  way  to  honour  was  open  to  every- 
one. "During  my  reign,"  he  asserted,  "every 
Frenchman  could  say  to  himself :  '  If  I  deserve  it  I 
shall  be  Prime  Minister,  Grand  Officer  of  the  Empire, 
Baron,  Count,  Duke,  or  even  King '.  There  was  no 
obstacle  for  anyone."  By  granting  equality  he  could 
say  that  the  nobility  was  the  people's  nobility.1 

Before  the  close  of  1804  Napoleon  had  conferred 
immeasurable  benefits  upon  the  French  nation.  It 
trusted  him  fully,  and  though  desirous  of  peace,  soon 
reconciled  itself  to  war  with  its  hated  enemy — Great 
Britain. 

It  was  in  fact  not  till  after  1 808,  when  the  brilliant 
romance  of  Napoleon's  early  victories  had  worn  off, 
that  the  spirit  of  moderation,  which  marked  the  temper 
of  the  French  people  in  1799  and  the  following  years, 
began  to  revolt  against  the  later  extravagancies  of 
the  Imperial  policy. 

CHIEF  DATES 

The  Revolution  of  Brumaire  .         .         .     November,  1799. 

Bonaparte  First  Consul          ....     December,  1799. 

Election  of  Pope  Pius  VII 1800. 

Marengo       .         .         .         .         .         .         .         14  June,  1800. 

Hochstadt 19  June,  1800. 

Treaty  of  Ildefonso        .         .         .         .  i  October,  1800. 

1  Gonnard,  "  The  Exile  of  St.  Helena,"  p.  1 24. 


THE  LIFE  OF  NAPOLEON 


Hohenlinden        .... 

The  Second  Armed  Neutrality 

The  Treaty  of  LuneVille         .... 

Battle  of  Copenhagen  ..... 

Battle  of  Alexandria      ..... 

Death  of  Paul  I,  Accession  of  Alexander  I 
Treaty  of  Florence        ..... 

The  Treaty  of  Badajos  .... 

The  Concordat     ...... 

The  Peace  of  Amiens   ..... 

Napoleon  Consul  for  life        .... 

Creation  of  the  Legion  of  Honour 
Outbreak  of  war  between  England  and  France 
French  invasion  of  Hanover 
Cadoudal's  plot,  execution  of  d'Enghien 


.  2  December,  1800. 
1 6- 1 8  December,  1800. 
.    9  February,  1801. 
8  March,  1801. 
21  March,  1801. 
24  March,  1801. 
28  March,  1801. 
6  June,  1 80 1. 
15  July,  1801. 
March,  1802. 
May,  1802. 
May,  1802. 
May,  1803. 
May,  1803. 
March,  1804. 


CHAPTER  IV 

WAR  WITH  EUROPE,   1803-1806 

Reopening  of  the  war  with  England — The  camp  at  Boulogne 
— War  with  Austria  and  Russia — Trafalgar — Austerlitz — The 
Treaty  of  Pressburg — The  German  Revolution — Maida — The  end 
of  the  Holy  Roman  Empire — Joseph's  rule  in  Naples — Jena 
—  Napoleon  supreme  in  Germany  —  His  family  policy  —  The 
Berlin  Decree — The  Continental  System. 

HP*  HE  years  1803-5  are  of  enormous  importance 
in  European  history.  They  saw  the  opening 
of  the  final  struggle  between  Napoleon  and  Great 
Britain  ;  they  witnessed  the  slow  beginnings  of  a  new 
life  in  Germany  rendered  possible  by  the  revolution 
effected  in  that  country  under  the  influence  of  the 
First  Consul.  It  is  no  longer  possible  to  accept  the 
view  of  the  late  M.  Sorel  that  Napoleon's  wars  after 
1803  were  "the  logical,  the  necessary  consequence  of 
the  legitimate  desire  of  France  to  secure  her  '  natural 
limits,'  and  of  the  determination  of  Europe  to  deprive 
her  of  all  territory  acquired  after  1792". 

It  is  equally  impossible  to  assert  that  "after  1802 
Napoleon  did  but  continue  the  policy  of  the  Directory, 
of  the  Convention,  of  Louis  XIV".  It  is  probably 
nearer  the  truth  to  say  that  Napoleon  recognized  that 

91 


92  THE  LIFE  OF  NAPOLEON 

in  England  he  found  the  irreconcilable  opponent  to 
his  determination  to  give  France  what  he  considered 
as  her  natural  frontiers.  So  long  as  he  regarded 
Holland  and  Belgium  as  lying  within  those  natural 
frontiers,  so  long  would  he  find  in  England  an  irrecon- 
cilable enemy.  After  1803  Napoleon  was  by  no 
means  content  to  aim  at  the  objects  desired  by  the 
Convention  ;  he  determined  not  merely  "  to  restore 
to  France  her  'natural  limits,'  but  to  make  conquests 
beyond  her  borders  ". 

With  the  opening  of  the  struggle  with  Great 
Britain,  France  entered  upon  a  period  of  war  which 
continued  till  the  entry  of  the  allies  into  Paris  in 
1814,  followed  by  the  departure  of  Napoleon  to  Elba. 
During  the  years  from  1803-14,  the  war  between 
France  and  Great  Britain  never  ceased,  and  conse- 
quently there  is  much  to  be  said  for  the  view  that 
the  "  great  drama  of  the  Napoleonic  period  "  centred 
round  that  struggle.  At  the  same  time  it  is  probably 
true  that  Napoleon  regarded  the  war  with  Great 
Britain  as  merely  a  temporary  obstacle  to  the  realiza- 
tion of  his  Eastern  schemes — the  establishment  of 
French  influence  in  Turkey;  the  partition  of  its 
dominions,  being  accompanied  by  the  setting  up  of  a 
subservient  Sultan  at  the  head  of  a  small  kingdom  en- 
circling Constantinople  ;  the  establishment  of  French 
supremacy  in  the  Mediterranean,  and  the  conquest  of 
India. 

Till  1811  such  appears  to  be  the  main  object,  the 
ground  plan  of  Napoleon's  policy. 


WAR  WITH  EUROPE,  1803-1806       93 

While  waiting  for  a  favourable  concatenation  of 
events  which  should  enable  him  to  emulate  and  sur- 
pass Alexander,  he  was  led  by  his  wars  with  Austria, 
Prussia,  and  Russia  to  emulate  Charles  the  Great,  and 
to  continue  and  develop  the  policy  of  Francis  I,  of 
Richelieu,  and  of  Louis  XIV  towards  Germany. 
His  conquests  in  Central  Europe  were  followed  by 
the  careful  organization  of  the  States  included  in  the 
Confederation  of  the  Rhine,  and  of  Italy. 

His  supremacy  in  Germany  and  Italy  necessitated 
the  establishment  of  rulers  in  the  various  parts  of 
Europe  which  acknowledged  his  sway,  and  therefore 
he  inaugurated  a  family  policy  which  was  fully  de- 
veloped in  1810  when  his  brothers  were  ruling  in 
Holland,  Spain,  and  Westphalia — Northern  Italy 
under  a  stepson ;  Southern  Italy  under  a  brother-in- 
law  ;  Tuscany  under  a  sister.1  The  rulers  of  Bavaria, 
Baden,  and  Wiirtemberg  had  all  married  relations 
of  Napoleon  whose  son,  the  King  of  Rome,  was 
intended  to  govern  Italy.  This  family  policy  had, 
however,  for  its  chief  object  the  overthrow  of  Great 
Britain.  That  accomplished  the  Emperor  would  be 
able  to  carry  out  his  Oriental  schemes. 

No  one  reading  the  account  of  Napoleon's  doings 
between  the  opening  of  the  negotiations  at  Amiens 
and  the  outbreak  of  war  in  1803  can  accept  his  as- 
sertion, made  when  a  prisoner  at  St.  Helena,  that  he 
was  pacific  at  heart,  that  he  was  fired  by  the  benevolent 
intention  of  bestowing  liberal  institutions  upon  the 
1  Fisher,  "  Bonapartism,"  p.  45. 


94  THE  LIFE  OF  NAPOLEON 

reorganized  nations  of  Europe,  and  that  his  admirable 
intentions  had  been  frustrated  by  "  the  implacable 
hatred  "  of  the  rulers  of  Europe — wicked  men  who 
had  "  never  ceased  to  make  war  on  France  and  her 
principles  ". 

At  St.  Helena  Napoleon  insisted  at  great  length 
and  with  much  emphasis  that  England  forced  war 
upon  him  in  1803.  He  desired  "general  peace  as 
the  only  condition  of  the  regeneration  of  Europe,"  but 
from  the  Campo  Formio  settlement  a  coalition  "  fostered 
and  upheld  by  England,"  who  "was  paying  Europe 
for  trying  to  kill  France,"  existed  either  publicly  or 
privately.  He  declared,  moreover,  that  England, 
aware  that  peace  would  bring  to  France  prosperity 
and  render  her  the  metropolis  of  the  world,  insisted 
upon  a  renewal  of  war  in  I8O3-1  Even  the  Peace  of 
Amiens,  he  asserted,  was  due  solely  to  the  loyalty  of 
Cornwallis,  and  was  concluded  against  the  wishes  of 
the  English  Ministry.  "  I  honestly  thought  at  Amiens," 
Napoleon  said,  "  that  the  fate  of  France,  of  Europe, 
and  of  myself  was  settled  and  that  war  was  ended.  It 
was  the  English  Cabinet  which  rekindled  everything." 
Ignoring  the  question  of  Holland,  he  endeavoured 
to  prove  that  the  retention  of  Malta  by  England  was 
the  real  cause  of  the  war  in  i8o3-2 

He  averred,  moreover,  at  St.  Helena  that  in  1803 
he  had  been  driven  into  universal  war,  and  into 
assuming  the  Dictatorship  of  Europe,  in  order  to 

1  Gonnard,  "The  Exile  of  St.  Helena,"  pp.  146,  147. 

2  Ibid.  p.  148. 


WAR  WITH  EUROPE,  1803-1806       95 

obtain  that  peace  which  he  always  so  sorely  desired. 
While  making  these  assertions  Napoleon  omitted  to 
add  that  though  he  desired  peace  in  1802  and  1803, 
he  wanted  it  on  his  own  terms.  He  further  omitted 
to  point  out  that  at  the  time  of  the  rupture  of  the 
Peace  of  Amiens  he  showed  no  intention  of  being 
satisfied  with  the  possession  of  the  "natural"  boun- 
daries of  France — the  Rhine,  the  Alps,  and  the 
Pyrenees.1  Therefore  such  assertions  as  the  following 
may  sound  plausible,  but  they  are  historically  worth- 
less. "  I  honestly  thought  at  Amiens,"  he  declared 
at  St.  Helena,  "that  the  fate  of  France,  of  Europe, 
and  of  myself  was  settled,  and  that  war  was 
ended.  If  England  and  France  could  have  acted 
together,  how  much  good  we  might  have  done  !  We 
should  have  brought  about  the  emancipation  of  all 
nations,  we  should  have  established  peace  and  pro- 
sperity everywhere."  But  in  all  these  reflections  he 
makes  no  allusion  to  his  aggressions  in  Switzerland 
and  elsewhere  during  the  period  of  peace,  or  to  his 
continual  occupation  of  Holland  contrary  to  the  terms 
of  the  Treaty  of  Luneville. 

In  1803  Napoleon  had  by  the  continuance  of  his 
policy  of  aggression,  carried  on  during  a  period  of 
peace,  made  the  reopening  of  war  inevitable.  That 
war  was  to  be  not  only  a  war  of  propaganda,  and  a 
war  of  aggression,  but  a  duel  between  Great  Britain 
and  France,  during  which  Napoleon  eventually 

1  Gonnard,  "  The  Exile  of  St.  Helena,"  pp.  149-53. 


96  THE  LIFE  OF  NAPOLEON 

found  himself  faced  by  the  new  force  of  militant 
democracy. 

By  Article  10  of  the  Treaty  of  Luneville  Napoleon 
guaranteed  the  independence  of  the  Batavian  Republic. 
This  guarantee  was  repeated  in  Article  2  of  the 
Convention  of  the  Hague.  This  evacuation  was  to 
take  place  as  soon  as  peace  was  concluded  with  Eng- 
land. As  soon,  therefore,  as  the  Peace  of  Amiens  had 
been  signed  the  British  Government  were  justified  in 
expecting  that  the  evacuation  would  take  place.  To 
England  the  independence  of  Holland  was  a  matter 
of  vital  necessity.  So  long  as  Holland  was  in  the 
hands  of  Napoleon,  the  Cape  of  Good  Hope,  lately 
restored  to  the  Dutch,  might  at  any  moment  "  become 
the  base  of  operations  of  French  cruisers  and  priva- 
teers preying  upon  English  East  Indiamen  V 

Napoleon's  object  in  1 802  and  onwards  was  simply 
to  subjugate  all  Europe  in  order  to  destroy  Great 
Britain's  trade,  and  to  exhaust  her  so  completely  that 
there  should  be  no  existing  check  to  his  scheme  of 
universal  empire.  Like  Alexander  the  Great,  he 
desired  not  only  to  conquer  Europe  but  to  subjugate 
India.  Like  Charles  the  Great,  he  was  resolved 
while  executing  his  schemes  for  the  establishment  of  a 
world-empire  to  carry  out  a  policy  of  family  aggran- 
disement. In  Holland,  Spain,  Westphalia,  and  Italy 
he  endeavoured,  as  has  already  been  stated,  when  at 
the  height  of  his  power  in  1 8 10,  to  establish  his  relations 
as  sub-kings,  who  should  look  to  Paris  for  direction. 

1  Coquelle,  "  England  and  Napoleon,"  p.  18. 


WAR  WITH  EUROPE.  1803-1806        97 

The  action  of  Napoleon  in  forcing  Great  Britain 
to  plunge  into  war  proved  in  the  end  to  be  a  fatal 
mistake.  And  apparently  no  one  realized  more 
clearly  than  did  Napoleon  in  his  calmer  moments,  the 
necessity  for  a  period  of  peace  in  order  to  complete 
his  preparations. 

Somewhat  naturally  French  writers  have  endea- 
voured to  fix  the  blame  for  the  reopening  of  the  war 
upon  Great  Britain.  The  breach  of  the  peace,  they 
say,  was  due  to  the  treacherous  refusal  of  the  English 
to  evacuate  Malta,  though  the  French  had  withdrawn 
from  various  positions  in  South  Italy.  Thus  they 
assert  that  while  the  French  had  loyally  fulfilled  their 
engagements,  the  English  had  in  a  most  dishonest 
manner  refused  to  carry  out  their  promises.  Unless 
the  ordinary  reader  has  a  close  and  accurate  know- 
ledge of  the  history  of  the  time,  he  is  liable  to  be  de- 
ceived by  such  an  inaccurate  presentation  of  the  facts. 
The  evacuation  of  Southern  Italy  was  not  a  matter 
with  which  the  Treaty  of  Amiens  had  anything  to  do. 
That  evacuation  had  been  arranged  between  Napoleon 
and  the  King  of  Naples  by  the  Treaty  of  Florence 
signed  on  28  March,  1801. 

About  the  annexation  of  Piedmont  to  France, 
and  the  invasion  of  Switzerland — both  effected  during 
the  period  of  peace — the  same  French  writers  say 
nothing.  Nor  do  they  seem  to  realize  that  the  con- 
tinued occupation  of  Holland,  in  direct  contravention 
to  the  terms  of  the  Treaty  made  by  Napoleon  with 
Austria,  could  not  be  tolerated  by  Great  Britain. 

7 


98  THE  LIFE  OF  NAPOLEON 

That  Power  had  shortly  after  the  Treaty  of  Amiens 
showed  her  desire  for  peace  in  an  unmistakable 
manner.  She  had  restored  Minorca  to  Spain,  and 
Martinique,  Goree,  Saint  Pierre,  Miquelon,  and  the 
Isle  of  Saint  Marcouf  to  France.  Moreover,  she  had 
not  only  withdrawn  from  Elba,  but  had  declared  her 
willingness  to  surrender  Malta.  Before,  however, 
Malta  had  been  evacuated  British  Ministers  became 
convinced  of  Napoleon's  bad  faith  as  seen  in  his 
annexation  of  Piedmont,  his  occupation  of  Switzer- 
land, and  his  refusal  to  evacuate  Holland. 

It  is  difficult  to  explain  or  understand  Napoleon's 
conduct,  when  it  seems  undoubted  that  he  desired  a 
continuance  of  peace  in  order  to  develop  the  internal 
resources  of  his  country,  and  by  this  means  to  place 
France  in  the  foremost  position  in  Europe.  That  he 
really  recognized  the  advantages  to  be  gained  by 
France  from  a  prolongation  of  peace  seems  to  be 
proved  from  the  fact  that  England,  not  France,  de- 
livered the  ultimatum  in  the  spring  of  1803  and 
declared  war. 

The  real  explanation  of  the  outbreak  of  war  would 
seem  to  be  found  in  Napoleon's  failure  to  understand 
the  character  of  the  English  nation ;  his  failure  to 
appreciate  the  depth  of  the  national  resentment  in 
England  at  his  actions  and  general  attitude,  and  his 
belief  that  the  Addington  Cabinet  was  incapable  of 
any  active  resistance  to  his  policy. 

He  never  realized  that  his  overbearing  and  in- 
sulting conduct  increased  the  risk  of  a  fresh  outbreak 


WAR  WITH  EUROPE,  1803-1806       99 

of  war  between  England  and  France.  In  the 
autumn  of  1802  he  was  forced  to  recognize  the  failure 
of  his  ambitious  projects  connected  with  Louisiana  and 
the  Mississippi,  for  the  success  of  which  the  subjuga- 
tion of  San  Domingo  was  necessary.  The  failure  in 
San  Domingo  rendered  it  imperative  that  the  issues 
between  England  and  France  should  be  settled  in 
Europe.  Undismayed  at  his  failure  in  the  West, 
Napoleon  redoubled  his  efforts  in  Europe.  In  answer 
to  the  Dutch  he  declared  that  he  would  not  withdraw 
his  troops  from  Holland  till  England  had  carried  out 
the  terms  of  the  Treaty  of  Amiens  and  had  ceased 
her  intrigues  at  The  Hague.  He  was  resolved  to  get 
Malta  into  his  hands  and  to  use  it  as  a  base  for  his 
operations  in  the  East,  and  only  too  late  realized  that 
the  English  occupation  of  Malta  was  regarded  by  his 
enemies  as  a  set-off  to  his  occupation  of  Holland  and 
Switzerland,  to  his  annexation  of  Piedmont,  and  to 
his  creation  of  the  kingdom  of  Etruria,  and  of  the 
Ligurian  Republic — both  of  which  were  under  the 
control  of  France.  Moreover,  he  never  appreciated 
the  depth  of  the  hostile  feeling  to  him  which  was 
aroused  in  England  by  his  virtual  prohibition  of  the 
entry  of  English  manufactures  into  France.  It  was  dis- 
tinctly the  interest  of  Great  Britain  to  renew  the  war, 
and  the  opportunity  of  tearing  up  the  Treaty  of  Amiens 
was  gladly  seized  upon  by  many  leading  Englishmen.1 

1  In  his  preface  to  "  Napoleon's  Men  and  Methods,"  by  A. 
Kielland,  Mr.  Oscar  Browning  writes  :  "  There  can  be  no  doubt 
but  that  it  (the  Treaty  of  Amiens)  was  broken  by  England  ". 


ioo          THE  LIFE  OF  NAPOLEON 

Sebastiani's  report  which  appeared  early  in  1803 
had  stirred  up  the  indignation  of  the  English  Govern- 
ment, which  in  face  of  the  open  avowal  of  the  Em- 
peror's designs  in  the  East  became  more  determined 
than  ever  to  retain  its  hold  on  Malta  as  a  check  to 
Napoleon's  projects.  As  early  as  the  autumn  of  1 802 
Napoleon  had  sent  Brune  to  Constantinople  in  order 
to  re-establish  French  influence  in  Turkey.  Thus, 
while  the  strain  of  the  Emperor's  trade  prohibitions 
increased  the  tension  between  the  two  countries,  and 
the  continual  occupation  of  Holland  by  French  troops 
rendered  war  on  the  part  of  England  justifiable  and 
unavoidable,  the  appearance  of  Sebastiani's  report 
rendered  war  wellnigh  inevitable. 

On  6  March,  1803,  Napoleon  had  despatched 
General  Decaen  with  an  insignificant  force  to  the 
East  Indies,  and  till  his  return  peace  was  essential  for 
the  development  of  his  plans. 

Decaen's  instructions  were,  we  are  told,  "  drawn 
up  in  such  a  manner  as  to  make  it  clear  that  war  was 
not  anticipated  till  about  September,  I8O4".1  On  n 
March,  1803,  however,  Napoleon  had  learnt  with 
profound  irritation  that  England  was  thoroughly 
alarmed  at  his  threats,  and  was  arming  in  order  to 
preserve  Malta,  and  generally  to  be  prepared  in  case 
of  the  fresh  outbreak  of  war. 

Napoleon  was  undoubtedly  taken  aback  at  the 
English  attitude.  Decaen  could  not  reach  the  East 
Indies  for  some  weeks,  and  upon  a  declaration  of  war 
1  "  Cambridge  Modern  History,"  Vol.  IX,  p.  209. 


WAR  WITH  EUROPE,   1803-1806      101 

might  with  his  whole  force  be  captured.  Moreover, 
the  French  fleet  was  by  no  means  ready  for  war,  and 
a  considerable  portion  of  it  was  operating  in  the  West 
Indies  against  San  Domingo.  Nevertheless,  in  order 
probably  to  be  ready  for  all  emergencies,  troops  were 
at  once  collected,  naval  preparations  were  made,  and 
England's  perfidy  was  denounced  to  the  rulers  of 
Spain,  Russia,  and  Prussia.  In  fact,  before  the  close 
of  March,  all  arrangements  were  made  for  operations 
in  Hanover  and  elsewhere  should  war  suddenly  break 
out. 

What,  too,  increased  the  tension  between  the  two 
countries  towards  the  close  of  1802  and  in  the  early 
weeks  of  1803,  and  rendered  the  preservation  of 
peace  wellnigh  impossible,  was  the  general  belief  in 
England  that  Napoleon  meditated  an  early  invasion 
of  the  country.  On  this  point  English  opinion  was, 
however,  probably  wrong,  though  Napoleon's  violent 
language  to  Lord  Whitworth,  and  his  restless  ambi- 
tion, fully  justified  the  apprehensions  felt  by  the 
English  people. 

Napoleon  had  probably  no  idea  that  his  menaces 
and  talk  of  invading  England  would  be  taken  seriously. 
It  must  have  been  obvious  to  him  that  France  re- 
quired a  period  of  tranquillity.  Moreover,  as  has  been 
pointed  out,  time  was  required  for  the  development 
of  his  plans  for  the  conquest  of  India,  for  the  over- 
throw of  the  English  power  in  the  East,  and  for  the 
strengthening  of  the  fleet,  which  was  in  a  disorganized 
condition. 


102          THE  LIFE  OF  NAPOLEON 

"  L'Angleterre!  Voila  la  racine  des  discordes 
Europiennes. "  By  these  words  Napoleon  from  the  time 
of  the  rupture  of  the  Peace  of  Amiens  endeavoured  to 
explain  and  to  extenuate  his  endeavours  to  dominate 
the  whole  of  Europe.  From  18  May,  1803,  the  date 
of  the  reopening  of  the  war  with  England,  to  1814, 
41  all  his  wars  with  Austria  and  Prussia,  with  Spain 
and  Russia,  which  acted  with  such  solvent  power 
upon  the  old  fabric  of  Europe,  rose  out  of  the  war 
with  England  and  are  connected  with  it  "-1  Before 
the  actual  declaration  of  war  between  England  and 
France  in  1803,  Napoleon  had  indeed  shown  his  pre- 
science by  quietly  preparing  to  occupy  Hanover.  In 
April,  1803,  troops,  as  has  already  been  stated,  were 
massed  at  Nimeguen,  and  no  sooner  had  war  with 
Great  Britain  begun  than  General  Mortier  at  the 
head  of  22,000  troops  entered  Hanover.  Weakness 
prevailed  at  Hanoverian  governmental  head -quarters, 
and  on  8  June  the  Convention  of  Suhlingen,  followed 
on  5  July  by  the  Elbe  Convention,  placed  Hanover 
in  the  hands  of  Napoleon.  Hanover,  by  this  rapid 
movement  of  troops,  so  characteristic  of  Napoleon, 
was  closed  to  British  trade,  and  moreover  found  itself 
compelled  to  support  the  army  of  occupation.2  The 
first  step  towards  the  establishment  of  the  continental 
system  was  thus  taken,  and  proved  the  forerunner  of 
a  policy  which  aimed  at  hermetically  closing  Europe 
to  Great  Britain's  commerce. 

1  Fisher,  "  Napoleonic  Statesmanship :  Germany,"  p.  49. 

2  See  Ward,  "  England  and  Hanover  ". 


WAR  WITH  EUROPE,  1803-1806      103 

Three  days  after  the  Convention  of  Suhlingen 
had  been  signed  Decaen,  escorted  by  Admiral  Linois, 
arrived  before  Pondicherry,  but  the  British  authorities 
in  Madras  refused  to  hand  over  the  town. 

Before  the  end  of  the  year  Arthur  Wellesley  over- 
threw the  Mahrattas  at  Assaye  and  Argaum,  while 
Lake  overthrew  Scindiah's  forces  and  occupied  Delhi. 

"  In  three  months  the  results  of  the  toil  of  Scin- 
diah,  the  restless  ambition  of  Holkar,  the  training 
of  European  officers  and  the  secret  intrigues  of 
Napoleon  were  all  swept  to  the  winds."  Perron,  a 
French  adventurer  who  had  drilled  the  armies  of  the 
Mahratta  chiefs,  returned  to  France  in  disgrace.  Na- 
poleon's disappointment  at  the  failure  of  his  hopes 
was  deep,  though  Decaen  and  Linois,  who  escaped 
to  the  lie  de  France,  managed  during  the  ensuing 
years  to  inflict  serious  losses  upon  British  trade  by 
their  frequent  captures  of  merchantmen. 

No  man  in  Europe  was  more  fitted  than  Napoleon 
for  the  immense  struggles  which  lay  before  him.  His 
mind  was  constantly  revolving  plans,  the  success  of 
which  depended  entirely  on  his  military  ability  and 
vigilance.  Napoleon's  power  of  work  was  extraordin- 
ary, and  the  account  of  his  activity  as  given  by  Meneval 
fills  one  with  astonishment.  He  often  called  his 
secretary  in  the  middle  of  the  night,  or  at  four  in  the 
morning,  when  he  would  dictate  letters  or  sign  docu- 
ments. His  ideas,  we  are  told,  developed,  as  he 

lRose,  "The  Life  of  Napoleon  I,"  Vol.  I,  pp.  377,  378. 
London,  George  Bell  &  Sons,  1902. 


104          THE  LIFE  OF  NAPOLEON 

dictated,  with  "an  abundance  and  a  clearness  which 
showed  that  his  mind  was  firmly  riveted  to  the  subject 
with  which  he  was  dealing  ;  they  sprang  from  his  head 
even  as  Minerva  sprang,  fully  armed,  from  the  head  of 
Jupiter  ".l  During  his  labours  he  would  often  send  for 
sherbet  and  ices,  and  the  work  finished  he  would  return 
to  bed.  He  had  most  elaborate  reports  supplied  by 
Ministers  of  War  and  Marine,  and  these  he  so  thor- 
oughly mastered  that  he  always  knew  the  exact  strength 
of  each  regiment,  the  positions  which  they  were  to 
occupy  in  time  of  war,  and  the  places  at  which  they  should 
be  stationed  in  the  time  of  peace.  He  loved  to  study 
these  reports,  especially  those  relating  to  the  ships  of 
the  navy.  His  memory,  however,  was  so  retentive 
that  he  knew  better  than  his  Ministers  the  composition 
of  each  corps.  His  memory  was  equally  good  with 
regard  to  places  or  persons,  and  his  power  of  concen- 
tration upon  a  given  subject  was  most  remarkable. 
He  rarely  wrote  himself,  but  preferred  to  dictate  his 
wishes  to  a  secretary.  He  had  no  difficulty  in  finding 
words  with  which  to  express  his  thoughts,  and  usually 
his  words  were  alive  with  fire  and  energy.  He  was 
equally  at  home  in  dealing  with  commercial,  financial, 
diplomatic,  military,  or  governmental  matters,  and  could 
pass  from  one  subject  to  another  without  any  difficulty. 
Fortunately  for  himself  he  could  go  to  sleep  at  will, 
and  he  would  often  spend  whole  days  without  appar- 
ently doing  any  work.2 

1  De  Me"neval,    "  Memoirs   of  Napoleon,"   Vol.    I,  p.  368. 
Hutchinson,  London. 

zlbid.  Vol.  I,  pp.  374,  376. 


WAR  WITH  EUROPE,   1803-1806      105 

Much  of  the  success  which  attended  his  projects 
was  due  to  the  enormous  care  with  which  he  made  his 
preparations.  Nothing  was  left  to  luck.  His  plans 
were  subjected  to  the  closest  scrutiny,  and  by  his 
calculations  and  arrangements  adverse  chances  were 
minimized.  It  would  have  been  surprising  if  his  plans 
which  had  been  prepared  with  so  much  skill  and  care 
had  failed.  These  remarks,  however,  are  only  true 
with  regard  to  Napoleon's  campaigns  in  Germany  and 
to  some  extent  in  Italy.  His  campaigns  were  only 
successful  so  long  as  they  did  not  clash  with  national 
feeling.  Against  national  feeling,  and  against  Great 
Britain's  sea  power,  his  most  careful  calculations  ended 
in  failure. 

During  many  years  he  entirely  under-estimated  the 
immense  strength  which  Great  Britain  wielded  through 
her  naval  supremacy,  and  he  entirely  failed  to  ap- 
preciate the  power  which  a  country  possesses  when 
once  national  feeling  is  aroused. 

The  question  whether  Napoleon  really  intended 
to  invade  England  at  this  time,  1803-5,  has  been 
fully  discussed  by  many  writers. 

Evidence  for  and  against  has  been  produced,  and 
even  now  historians  are  divided  in  opinion.  There 
seems  little  doubt  that  in  England  there  was  a  wide- 
spread belief  in  the  reality  of  the  danger.  In  spite 
of  the  view  of  Bourrienne  and  Miot  de  Melito  that 
"  the  invasion  scheme  was  only  a  feint  intended  to 
dissimulate  his  (Napoleon's)  plans  of  conquest  on  the 
Continent,"  most  historians  to-day  prefer  to  accept  the 


io6          THE  LIFE  OF  NAPOLEON 

view  of  M£neval,  Napoleon's  secretary,  corroborated 
by  Napoleon  himself  when  a  prisoner  at  St.  Helena, 
that  the  invasion  of  England  was  intended.  Captain 
Mahan  has  no  doubt  that  Napoleon's  invasion  schemes 
were  certainly  not  "a  blind,"  and  agrees  with  the 
opinions  of  Ney,  Marmont,  and  Davoust ;  while  as 
late  as  1906  Dr.  Rose,  inhis  introduction  to  "Napoleon's 
Last  Voyages,"  declares  that  the  Emperor's  "  extensive 
preparations  on  the  northern  coast "  make  it  "  difficult 
to  believe  that  he  did  not  really  intend  to  strike  at 
London ".  In  this  view  he  is  also  supported  by 
Barante  (a  friend  of  Daru,  Secretary-General  of  the 
Minister  of  War  who  was  with  Napoleon  at  Boulogne), 
and  who,  after  calling  attention  to  the  enormous  pre- 
parations made  at  Boulogne,  suggests  that  "Des  le 
commencement  de  1805,  ^  tenait  en  reserve  un  autre 
vaste  entreprise  pour  la  substituer  a  la  descente  si 
elle  (la  descente  en  Angleterre),  ne  pouvait  etre  tent£e. 
La  grand  armee  campde  sur  les  cotes  de  France  de- 
puis  Brest  jusqu'a  Amsterdam  serait  dirig£e  contre 
1'Autriche."1 

Whatever  view  is  held  with  regard  to  the  proba- 
bility of  an  invasion  of  England,  the  Boulogne  army, 
at  any  rate,  proved  an  irresistible  weapon  in  the 
hands  of  Napoleon  during  his  campaign  against  Aus- 
tria in  the  autumn  of  1805. 

At  the  time  of  the  opening  of  the  campaign  Great 
Britain  was  in  a  position  far  different  from  that  which 

1See  "Quarterly  Review,"  No.  415,  p.  435. 


WAR  WITH  EUROPE,   1803-1806      107 

she  occupied  at  the  time  of  the  accession  to  power  of 
the  Addington  Ministry. 

The  year  1803,  which  saw  the  rupture  of  the 
Peace  of  Amiens,  was  remarkable  in  many  ways. 
Wellesley's  victories  of  Assay e  and  Argaum  over  the 
Mahrattas  secured  the  British  position  in  India  from 
all  chance  of  immediate  downfall,  while  in  Ireland 
the  arrest  and  execution  of  Robert  Emmet  averted 
all  danger  of  any  serious  rising.  In  the  following 
year  Pitt  formed  his  second  Ministry,  and  at  once  sup- 
ported with  enthusiasm  the  Russian  proposals  for  the 
formation  of  a  European  Coalition  against  France. 

During  the  period  when  an  expedition  from 
Boulogne  to  England  seemed  feasible  Napoleon  fre- 
quently revolved  in  his  mind  the  question  of  an 
expedition  to  India.  The  choice  of  a  general  cap- 
able of  leading  such  an  expedition  was  difficult,  and 
while  thinking  the  matter  over  he  often  regretted 
the  death  of  Desaix  at  Marengo.  That  general  had 
just  those  political  gifts  which  fitted  him  for  carry- 
ing out  an  undertaking  as  stupendous  as  an  expedi- 
tion to  India  would  prove  to  be. 

Meneval,  whose  secretarial  work  brought  him  into 
close  contact  with  Napoleon,  has  no  doubt  with  regard 
to  Napoleon's  intention  of  invading  England.  He 
himself  had  little  doubt  that  such  an  invasion  would 
be  eminently  successful.  One  victory  would  place 
London  in  the  hands  of  the  Emperor,  and  in  three 
months  the  British  Isles  would  be  completely  con- 
quered. 


io8          THE  LIFE  OF  NAPOLEON 

It  was  only,  he  says,  the  unfortunate  blunder  of 
Admiral  Villeneuve  in  putting  back  into  Cadiz  instead 
of  coming  to  join  the  Brest  fleet,  and  Austria's 
declaration  of  war,  which  led  to  the  abandonment  of 
this  great  enterprise. 

During  the  early  months  of  1805  Napoleon  had 
not  been  idle.  The  success  of  his  projects  for  the 
invasion  of  England  depended  upon  the  ability  of  the 
French  admirals  to  deceive  Nelson  and  to  concen- 
trate in  the  English  Channel.  Meanwhile,  his 
presence  was  demanded  in  Italy,  where  the  position 
of  the  French  required  strengthening.  On  10  May, 
1805,  Napoleon  entered  Milan.  His  journey,  we 
read,  was  one  triumphal  procession,  and  while  in 
Milan  his  salon  was  crowded  by  diplomatists.  On  26 
May  he  was  crowned  with  the  iron  crown  of  Italy, 
and  a  herald  proclaimed  him  as  "  Napoleon  Emperor 
of  the  French  and  King  of  Italy  ". 

Realizing  that  the  possession  of  Genoa  was  indis- 
pensable in  his  struggle  with  England,  he  united  the 
city  and  its  possessions  to  his  Empire  and  virtually 
opened  the  continental  blockade.  While  in  Italy, 
however,  his  great  project  of  an  invasion  of  England 
was  seen  to  be  impossible  owing  to  the  activity  of 
the  English  fleet,  and  the  consequent  failure  of  Ville- 
neuve to  reach  the  English  Channel. 

Meanwhile,  news  of  the  formation  of  a  great 
European  Coalition  reached  the  ears  of  Napoleon  who 
on  8  July  left  Turin,  arriving  in  Paris  on  the  nth. 
Till  12  August,  however,  he  clung  to  his  hope  that 


WAR  WITH  EUROPE,  1803-1806      109 

an  invasion  of  England  would  be  possible.  After 
that  day  he  realized  that  his  project  of  an  invasion  of 
England  was  impossible,  and  he  turned  his  attention 
to  the  consideration  of  "a  continental  war".  On 
12  August  he  wrote  that  unless  Austria  disarmed  he 
would  march  against  her. 

This  decision  marked  the  beginning  of  what  was 
an  all-important  development  in  Napoleon's  plans. 
He  had  already  resolved  to  become  master  of  the 
Mediterranean.  The  overthrow  of  Austria  was  the 
first  step  towards  the  supremacy  of  Napoleon,  not 
only  in  Germany  but  also  over  the  Mediterranean. 
It  marked  the  second  stage  in  the  revolution  which 
had  already  broken  out  in  Central  Europe. 

Simultaneously  with  the  beginning  of  the  life-and- 
death  struggle  with  Great  Britain  had  begun  the  re- 
construction of  Germany.  That  reconstruction  was 
virtually  a  revolution,  the  outbreak  of  which  facilitated 
to  an  enormous  degree  Napoleon's  conquest  of  Austria 
and  later  of  Prussia.  In  the  case  of  France  it  must  be 
remembered  that  it  was  not  till  she  had  experienced 
more  than  ten  years  of  struggles  within  and  without, 
after  the  revolution  of  1789,  that  she  found  under  the 
government  of  the  Consulate  an  opportunity  of  estab- 
lishing a  well-ordered  government,  of  reorganizing  and 
placing  on  a  sound  basis  her  finances,  and  of  effecting 
a  satisfactory  settlement  of  the  relations  of  Church  and 
State. 

The  French  Revolution  was  a  movement  which 
occupied  several  years  and  passed  through  several 


no          THE  LIFE  OF  NAPOLEON 

stages.  Similarly  the  Revolution  of  Germany  did 
not  take  place  in  one  year,  but  also  passed  through 
several  stages  and  was  marked  by  four  distinct  events. 
These  events  have  been  summarized  as  follows  : — 

1.  The  Principal  Resolution  of  the  Imperial  Deputa- 
tion which,  asserted  in  1803,  secularized  the  Empire 
and  inaugurated  the  absorption  of  the  small  by  the 
large  States. 

2.  The  war  of  the  Third  Coalition.     The  Peace 
of  Pressburg  found  Austria  at  the  mercy  of  Napoleon 
who  had  been  aided  by  Baden,  Bavaria,  and  Wur- 
temberg. 

3.  The    creation   of  the    Confederation   of   the 
Rhine,  1806,  which  marked  the  final  end  of  the  Holy 
Roman  Empire. 

4.  The  formal  abdication  of  the  Emperor  Francis 
II  from  his  position  as  Emperor  in  August,  1806. 

"  The  French  Revolution,"  writes  Mr.  Fisher  in 
his  "  Studies  in  Napoleonic  Statesmanship  in  Ger- 
many "  (p.  22),  "supplied  the  electric  shock  which 
woke  Germany  from  her  lethargy,"  while  M.  Joseph 
Reinach,  the  author  of  "  De  1'influence  historique  de 
la  France  sur  rAllemagne,"  says  the  same  thing  in 
even  more  emphatic  language :  "  La  Revolution 
fran9aise  est  pour  rAllemagne  ce  que  le  Nil  est  pour 
1'Egypte,  le  fleuve  createur  qui  couvre  la  veille  terre 
de  ses  flots,  la  f6conde  et  fait  sortir  les  moissons  de 
son  sein".1 

In  1789  and  the  years  immediately  following 
1See  "Quarterly  Review,"  No.  415,  p.  440. 


WAR  WITH  EUROPE,   1803-1806      in 

neither  the  German  Government  nor  German  society 
was  prepared  to  welcome  the  French  Revolution, 
though  in  no  country  was  a  complete  Revolution 
more  necessary  than  in  Germany. 

Under  the  influence,  however,  of  the  French 
Revolution,  and  of  Napoleon's  victorious  campaigns 
which  ended  at  Campo  Formio  and  Luneville,  the 
political  map  of  Germany  became  completely  changed. 
The  old  ideas  which  had  for  ages  dominated  the  small 
German  principalities  disappeared,  and  gradually  a 
new  conception  of  the  meaning  of  such  words  as 
Patriotism  and  State  were  evolved.  A  national 
literature  began  to  spring  up,  and  gradually  the  literary 
supremacy  in  Europe  which  had  been  enjoyed  by 
England  during  the  early  years,  and  by  France 
during  the  later  years  of  the  eighteenth  century, 
passed  to  Germany.  Equally  important  was  the 
effect  of  the  Revolution  of  1803  uP°n  the  map  of 
Germany.  Over  300  small  States  disappeared,  and 
when  the  Holy  Roman  Empire  definitely  came  to  an 
end  in  1806,  Germany  consisted  of  Austria  and 
Prussia,  and  a  number  of  secondary  States  of  which 
Bavaria,  Saxony,  and  Hesse  were  the  chief.  This 
Revolution,  as  drastic  as  any  which  had  hitherto  been 
effected  in  Europe,  was  thus  due  in  the  first  place  to 
the  conquests  of  Napoleon  and  to  the  selfish  policy  of 
Austria  which  had  long  since  ceased  to  recognize  its 
Imperial  responsibilities.  The  Revolution  was  also 
furthered  by  the  absence  of  any  national  feeling  in 
Germany,  and  by  the  fatal  neutrality  of  Prussia 


ii2          THE  LIFE  OF  NAPOLEON 

during  the  last  four  months  of  1805  when  the  des- 
tinies of  Germany  hung  in  the  balance. 

The  conduct  of  Prussia  provided  indeed  ample 
evidence  of  the  necessity  of  a  revolution,  and  it  is 
difficult  to  avoid  the  conviction  that  Napoleon's  vic- 
tories at  Austerlitz  and  Jena,  and  his  consequent 
supremacy  in  Germany,  were  in  the  end  unspeakably 
beneficial  to  the  whole  of  Central  Europe. 

In  1803  Germany,  like  France  in  1789,  definitely 
began  her  revolution,  that  revolution  which  first  and 
foremost  demanded  the  destruction  of  the  Holy 
Roman  Empire  with  its  three  centres,  political  at 
Vienna,  legislative  at  Ratisbon,  and  judicial  at 
Wetzlar,  and  with  its  division  of  Germany  into 
circles  for  administrative,  taxative,  and  judicial  pur- 
poses— a  revolution  which  had  been  begun  at  Campo 
Formio  and  LuneVille.  It  was  now  definitely  pro- 
claimed to  the  world  in  February,  1803,  by  the 
Principal  Resolution  of  the  Imperial  Deputation. 

Hitherto  there  had  been  little  evidence  of  a  re- 
volutionary spirit  in  Germany  ;  but  at  the  same  time 
there  was  no  trace  of  any  national  feeling.  This 
absence  of  the  feeling  of  nationality  had  rendered 
German  opinion  indifferent  to  the  partial  disappear- 
ance of  many  of  the  ecclesiastical  States  before  1803. 

The  revolution  which  was  begun  in  Germany  in 
1803  implied  the  secularization  and  Protestantization 
of  the  Empire  and  a  complete  change  in  Austria's 
position  in  Germany. 

The  peculiar  influence  which  Austria  had  hitherto 


WAR  WITH  EUROPE,  1803-1806      113 

exercised  in  the  affairs  of  Germany  was  at  once  de- 
stroyed, but  Austria's  power  was  thereby  strengthened 
and  consolidated.  Her  territory,  too,  became  more 
compact,  though  the  position  which  hitherto  had  given 
her  "a  natural  authority  and  pre-eminence  in  the 
affairs  of  the  Empire  "  was  taken  from  her. 

Austria's  position  in  Germany  had  hitherto  been 
of  a  most  remarkable  and  peculiar  character.  Her 
rulers  since  1438  (if  we  except  the  years  1742-5 
when  a  Bavarian  Elector  had  been  Emperor)  had 
been  Emperors  as  well  as  Austrian  monarchs,  and 
her  connexion  with  Germany  was  of  a  most  intricate 
character.  The  majority  in  the  Electoral  College 
had  been  Roman  Catholic  ;  she  had  held  a  majority 
in  the  Imperial  Diet.  She  had  thus  for  centuries 
wielded  a  "  natural  authority  and  pre-eminence  in  the 
affairs  of  the  Empire  ". 

All  this  was  now  changed,  and  the  revolution 
which  gave  her  a  more  compact  territory  lost  her  this 
position  of  pre-eminence  in  Germany.  The  Chamber 
of  Electors  henceforth  was  to  number  ten  ;  of  its  mem- 
bers, the  Archbishop  of  Mainz  remained  the  one 
ecclesiastical  elector,  though  he  was  transplanted  to 
Ratisbon,  the  new  Electors  being  the  rulers  of  Baden, 
Wiirtemberg,  Hesse- Cassel,  and  Salzburg. 

In  the  Chamber  of  Princes  the  majority  passed 
from  the  hands  of  the  Roman  Catholics  into  those  of 
the  Protestants,  from  the  South  to  the  North,  from 
the  party  of  Austria  to  the  party  of  Prussia.  Owing 
to  the  occupation  of  the  left  bank  of  the  Rhine  by  the 

8 


ii4          THE  LIFE  OF  NAPOLEON 

French  that  Chamber  of  Princes  now  only  numbered 
eighty-two  instead  of  a  hundred.  Of  these  twenty- 
six  (instead  of  as  of  old  thirty-four)  votes  were 
spiritual,  and  fifty-six  (instead  of  sixty)  temporal. 
The  Third  Chamber,  that  of  Imperial  towns,  of 
which  only  six  (Hamburg,  Bremen,  Llibeck,  Frank- 
fort, Augsburg,  Nuremberg)  existed,  now  disappeared. 

Thus  the  Empire  was  definitely  secularized,  for 
the  spiritual  princes  were  for  the  most  part  non-existent, 
the  temporal  princes  having  taken  possession  of  many 
of  the  secularized  bishoprics.  The  majority,  too,  was 
now  definitely  Protestant,  the  Protestants  numbering 
fifty-three  and  the  Roman  Catholics  eighty-three. 
Thus  with  the  strengthening  of  Prussia,  Bavaria, 
Baden,  and  Wiirtemberg,  the  whole  internal  balance 
of  power  was  overturned,  and  it  was  evident  that 
Germany  was  nearing  the  end  of  her  mediaeval 
constitution. 

The^rj-/  stage  in  the  German  Revolution  was  thus 
accomplished,  the  Empire  became  secularized  and 
Protestantized  ;  and  the  pre-eminence  of  Austria  in 
Germany  was  undermined.  It  only  required  the 
Austerlitz  campaign  to  complete  the  final  stages  in  a 
revolution  which  entirely  changed  the  character  and 
political  position  of  Germany. 

On  23  August,  1805,  the  French  troops  received 
the  order  to  march.  Napoleon's  decision  had  not  been 
taken  too  soon.  The  long  period  of  inaction  had  been 
accompanied  by  the  increase  of  military  offences,  by 
desertion,  and  insubordination.  For  some  two  years 


WAR  WITH  EUROPE,   1803-1806      115 

the  army  had  experienced  repeated  disappointments, 
in  striking  contrast  to  the  occasional  periods  of  eager 
expectation,  and  the  general  condition  of  the  troops 
was  becoming  serious.  With  the  order  to  march  the 
moral  tone  was  at  once  restored,  and  full  of  hope  and 
determination  the  army  set  out  for  the  Danube. 
While  Napoleon  was  engaged  on  the  Austerlitz  cam- 
paign, his  brother  Joseph  was  his  representative  in 
Paris,  and  during  the  next  few  months  the  latter  re- 
ceived some  interesting  letters  from  the  Emperor. 
On  23  September  Napoleon  left  Paris,  and  from  25 
September  to  i  October  was  at  Strassburg ;  on  i 
October  he  was  at  Wurzburg  on  the  Neckar,  and  there 
on  2  October  he  heard  at  the  Court  Theatre  the  German 
"  Don  Juan,"  the  music  of  which  he  much  admired.  On 
9  October  his  head-quarters  were  at  Zusmarshausen, 
where  was  fought,  in  1648,  one  of  the  last  battles  of  the 
Thirty  Years'  War,  and  on  the  evening  of  that  day  he 
reached  Munich,  having  surrounded  Ulm  with  his 
troops. 

The  surrender  of  that  city  by  Mack  followed  on 
20  October,1  but  Napoleon,  who  on  27  October  was 
still  at  Munich,  now  realized  that  the  equivocal  conduct 
of  Prussia  might  develop  into  open  hostility.  Never- 
theless he  showed  no  feeling  of  nervousness  as  to  the 

1 A  week  after  the  capitulation  of  Ulm,  Captain  J.  W.  Wright, 
R.N.,  who  had  been  taken  prisoner  in  1804  at  Quiberon  Bay,  came 
to  a  violent  end  in  Paris.  His  death,  like  that  of  the  Due  d'Enghien, 
has  been  described  as  one  of  the  episodes  in  Napoleon's  career 
which  proved  "  most  repugnant  to  British  opinion  ". 


n6          THE  LIFE  OF  NAPOLEON 

result  of  the  campaign.  "  Before  a  fortnight,"  he  wrote, 
"  I  shall  have  opposed  to  me  100,000  Prussians  and 
60,000  Austrians,  sent  from  Italy  or  from  the  other 
reserves  of  that  kingdom.  I  shall  conquer  them,  but 
probably  not  without  loss."1 

On  30  October  he  was  at  Braunau,  "  one  of  the  keys 
of  Austria,  well  fortified  and  full  of  magazines,"  and 
on  15  November  he  arrived  at  Vienna,  where  he 
captured  vast  stores  of  ammunition,  2000  pieces  of 
cannon  and  100,000  muskets. 

The  weather  during  October  had  been  cold,  with 
heavy  snow  and  hard  frost.  So  far  Napoleon  had  met 
with  little  opposition,  and  had  already  formed  a  poor 
opinion  of  the  Russians.  The  Russian  army,  he  says, 
rob  and  steal  everywhere  to  the  great  disgust  of  the 
people.  The  Russian  officers  "look  down  on  the 
Austrians  who  seem  no  longer  to  like  fighting ;  the 
men  (Russians)  are  brutes  who  do  not  know  an 
Austrian  from  a  Frenchman  ".  The  critical  moment 
was  now  at  hand,  though  even  as  late  as  28  November 
when  the  Prussian  Haugwitz  appeared  at  the  French 
head-quarters,  Napoleon  seemed  to  think  that  peace 
might  be  at  once  concluded.  He  was  anxious  to  re- 
turn to  Paris,  and  wrote  from  the  seat  of  war  to  hasten 
the  completion  of  the  Tuileries.  Meanwhile,  stirring 
events  of  vast  import  to  France  and  to  Napoleon's 
schemes  had  taken  place  elsewhere. 

Saint-Cyr  had  been  ordered  to  occupy  Naples,  and 
in  case  he  should  not  be  able  to  hold  his  own  against 
1 "  Correspondence  with  Joseph,"  Vol.  I,  p.  60. 


WAR  WITH  EUROPE,   1803-1806      117 

any  combined  attack  by  the  British  and  Russians, 
Napoleon  had  decided  to  send  Villeneuve's  fleet  to 
Italy.  That  fleet  was  lying  off  Cadiz,  but  Villeneuve 
was  in  disgrace,  and  in  consequence  on  18  September 
Admiral  Prasily  was  ordered  to  proceed  at  once  to 
Cadiz  to  supersede  Villeneuve  (who  was  to  repair  to 
Paris),  and  to  sail  to  Naples.  A  rumour  of  Napoleon's 
intention  to  supersede  him  reached  Villeneuve  from 
Madrid,  and  thinking  that  Nelson's  fleet  numbered  less 
ships  than  it  really  did  he  sailed  on  19  October  from 
Cadiz  with  the  intention  of  proceeding  to  Naples. 
The  battle  of  Trafalgar,  fought  on  2 1  October,  saw  the 
destruction  of  twenty -one  of  the  thirty -three  ships  that 
composed  Villeneuve's  fleet.  Great  Britain's  suprem- 
acy of  the  sea  was  by  that  battle  finally  assured. 

The  battle  of  Trafalgar  was  in  one  sense  a  mere 
episode  in  the  great  campaign  which  England,  in 
alliance  with  Russia,  was  waging  against  Napoleon. 
The  latter  undoubtedly  regarded  Italy  as  the  starting- 
point  for  operations  in  the  Ottoman  Empire,  as  well  as 
against  the  British  power  in  I  ndia.  While  Pitt  directed 
Great  Britain's  foreign  policy,  Lord  Barham,1  the 
director  of  naval  strategical  operations,  "handled  the 
fleet  with  a  mastery  never  equalled  since  Anson's  days  ". 

The  campaign  of  1805,  from  the  British  and  Russian 
side,  was  intended  to  be  one  of  combined  aims,  and 
alliances  with  the  great  military  Powers  of  the  Con- 
tinent were  to  be  secured.  France  was  to  be  prevented 

1  Charles  Middleton  became  Admiral  in  1787,  and  was  created 
Lord  Barham  in  1805. 


n8          THE  LIFE  OF  NAPOLEON 

from  seizing  Sicily,  the  base  of  the  supplies  for  the 
British  fleet ;  and  if  possible  a  combined  force  of 
Russians  and  British  was  to  be  landed  in  Southern 
Italy.  Thus  the  British  navy  was  to  be  employed  on 
the  Italian  coast,  and,  provided  Prussia  joined  the 
Coalition,  in  the  North  Sea  and  Baltic.  Thus  the 
battle  of  Trafalgar  had  a  most  damaging  effect  upon 
Napoleon's  plan  for  securing  Sicily  and  supremacy 
in  the  Mediterranean. 

In  1806  Sicily  was  safe  from  danger  of  becoming 
a  French  possession,  and  the  British  in  possession 
of  the  Cape  controlled  the  route  to  India.  Thus  the 
adoption  by  the  British  Government  in  1805  °f  a  policy 
of  "  aggressive  action  and  interference  with  Napoleon's 
designs,"  had  in  spite  of  Prussia's  defection  and 
Austria's  defeat  been  to  a  great  extent  successful  in 
the  Mediterranean.  The  British  fleet  remained  in 
undisputed  command  of  the  sea.  "  The  ships  at 
Trafalgar,"  it  has  been  said,  "were  the  victors  at 
Waterloo." 

On  1 8  November,  while  at  Znaym,  Napoleon  re- 
ceived the  first  news  of  Trafalgar,  and  of  the  failure  of 
the  hopes  which  he  had  founded  on  the  possession  of 
a  strong  fleet.  All  his  hopes  of  acquiring  immediate 
mastery  of  the  Mediterranean  were  shattered.  Unde- 
terred, however,  by  the  failure  of  the  plans  which  he 
had  formed  of  overthrowing  the  sea  power  of  Great 
Britain,  Napoleon  pursued  a  bold  course.  His  posi- 
tion was  most  critical,  for  had  Prussia  declared  war  his 
line  of  communications  might  have  been  easily  cut  by 


WAR  WITH  EUROPE,   1803-1806      119 

the  Prussian  troops.  While,  however,  the  King  of 
Prussia  hesitated,  Napoleon  was  aided  by  the  impetu- 
osity of  the  Tsar  who  brought  on  the  battle  of  Austerlitz 
under  conditions  favourable  to  the  exercise  of  the 
French  Emperor's  military  skill.  On  the  evening  of 
i  December,  Napoleon  received  the  plaudits  of  his 
army  as  he  rode  round  the  camp  to  the  light  of  torches 
made  of  straw.  On  2  December  the  battle  of  Auster- 
litz was  fought,  and  proved,  as  far  as  Austria  was 
concerned,  decisive. 

The  right  wing  which  played  the  most  important 
part  in  the  battle  was  led  by  Soult,  the  left  wing  by 
Lannes  ;  while  Bernadotte  was  in  command  in  the 
centre.  Murat  led  the  cavalry  which  was  drawn  up 
in  two  lines.  Under  Napoleon  were  ten  battalions  of 
the  guard  supported  by  some  battalions  of  grenadiers 
under  Oudinot. 

Soon  after  the  sun  had  risen  the  battle  began,  and 
after  two  hours  of  hard  fighting  the  Russian  Field- 
Marshal,  Kutusof,  who  had  the  chief  command,  was 
forced  to  relinquish  his  attempt  to  regain  the  heights 
of  Pratzen  and  to  give  way.  Lannes  and  Murat 
drove  back  the  enemies'  right  wing,  General  Rapp 
made  a  remarkable  charge  with  the  cuirassiers,  the 
General  being  himself  badly  wounded,  and  when 
Napoleon  arrived  to  support  Soult  the  battle  was 
virtually  over. 

In  the  matter  of  pensions  to  the  relations  of  the 
French  soldiers  who  had  fallen,  Napoleon  behaved,  as 
he  always  did,  in  a  princely  manner,  while  to  the  leading 


120          THE  LIFE  OF  NAPOLEON 

generals  he  gave  honours  and  estates.  Eugene  Beau- 
harnais  became  Viceroy  of  Italy ;  Berthier,  Prince  of 
Neuchatel ;  Murat,  Grand  Duke  of  Berg.  Not  long 
afterwards  his  brother  Louis  was  created  King  of 
Holland,  and  Joseph,  King  of  Naples.  Bavaria, 
Wurtemberg,  and  Baden  had  aided  him,  and  while 
the  two  former  were  made  kingdoms,  the  last-named 
was  created  a  Grand  Duchy. 

Many  officers  were  also  handsomely  rewarded  for 
their  energy  and  bravery.  In  a  letter  to  Joseph, 
written  the  following  day,  Napoleon  infers  that  he 
tried  to  save  a  column  of  Russians  who  had  taken  re- 
fuge on  a  frozen  lake.  Till  quite  lately  it  was  believed 
that  the  French  batteries  by  the  Emperor's  orders 
first  fired  on  the  ice  near  the  shore  and  then  on  the 
parts  of  the  ice  on  which  the  Russians  stood,  and  that 
6000  Russians  were  thus  destroyed.1  Two  days  later 
Francis  of  Austria  sued  for  terms,  and  at  4  o'clock 
on  the  morning  of  27  December,  1805,  the  Peace  of 
Pressburg  was  signed  by  Talleyrand,  Prince  Lechten- 
stein,  and  General  Gurlay,  and  the  war  between 
France  and  Austria  came  to  an  end. 

The  Treaty  of  Pressburg  was  for  Napoleon  a  great 
triumph.  Throughout  the  whole  campaign  he  had 
shown  remarkable  resourcefulness  and  determination. 
He  had  on  20  December  declared  that  if  peace  was 
not  quickly  made,  there  would  be  an  engagement 
which  would  not  leave  the  Austrian  monarchy  "the 

1  The  whole  story  of  the  drowning  of  the  Russians  is  now  dis- 
credited. 


WAR  WITH  EUROPE,   1803-1806      121 

shadow  of  a  resource  ".  His  overthrow  of  Austria 
was  at  once  followed  by  the  beginning  of  a  system 
of  establishing  his  brothers  and  relations  as  kings, 
and  on  31  March,  1806,  he  inaugurated  the  system 
by  the  issue  of  an  order  to  his  brother  Joseph  to 
assume  the  Neapolitan  Crown. 

The  Treaty  of  Pressburg  was  followed  by  the 
Treaty  of  Schonbrunn  (Jan.,  1806)  with  Prussia,  the 
Government  of  which  by  its  vacillating  policy  had  de- 
livered itself  into  the  hands  of  Napoleon.  Disappoint- 
ment at  its  conduct  was  the  immediate  cause  of  the 
death  of  Pitt. 

The  way  was  now  cleared  for  the  third  step  in  the 
German  Revolution,  viz.  the  setting  up  of  the  Con- 
federation of  the  Rhine.  Its  establishment  marked 
the  definite  end  of  the  Holy  Roman  Empire,  and  led 
immediately  to  the  fourth  and  last  stage  in  the 
German  Revolution,  marked  by  the  abdication  by 
Francis  of  Austria  of  his  Imperial  Crown. 

The  brilliance  of  the  victory  of  Austerlitz  has 
blinded  many  historians  to  the  doubtful  wisdom  of  the 
Treaty  of  Pressburg.  That  Treaty  completed  the 
humiliation  of  Austria,  and  carried  out  the  aims  of 
successive  French  rulers  and  ministers  since  the  days 
of  Francis  I.  That  monarch,  like  Richelieu,  Mazarin, 
Louis  XIV  and  Fleury,  had  aimed  at  the  subjugation 
of  the  Hapsburg  monarchy  and  the  partition  of  its 
territories.  The  Treaty  of  Pressburg  saw  Austria 
shut  out  of  Italy  and  Switzerland,  and  driven  back 
from  the  Rhine.  It  saw  Bavaria  and  Wiirtemberg 


122          THE  LIFE  OF  NAPOLEON 

created  monarchies,  with  which  the  new  Grand  Duchy 
of  Baden  divided  between  them  the  Austrian  pos- 
sessions in  the  West.  By  that  Treaty  Napoleon 
thought  he  had  once  and  for  all  crushed  Austria,  and 
rendered  her  unable  for  all  time  to  hinder  the  exe- 
cution of  his  world- wide  Imperial  schemes.  Four 
years  later,  when  in  1809  Austria  again  tried  issues 
with  France,  Napoleon  realized  his  mistake  of  1805. 
In  spite  of  the  severity  of  the  terms  of  the  Treaty 
of  Pressburg,  Austria  was  able  to  reorganize  her  armies, 
and  to  regain  her  strength.  Looking  back  on  the 
events  of  1805  ^  'ls  evident  that  Napoleon  ought 
either  to  have  utterly  destroyed  Austria  or  to  have 
adopted  Talleyrand's  advice  and  returned  to  the 
policy  of  Bernis  and  Kaunitz  which  is  known  as  the 
Diplomatic  Revolution.  From  1756  to  1792  France 
and  Austria  were  nominally  allies,1  and  Talleyrand 
argued  that  a  Franco-Austrian  alliance  would  render 
Russia  helpless  and  would  exclude  Great  Britain  from 
the  Continent.  Such  an  alliance,  in  his  opinion,  could 
have  been  effected  by  the  grant  of  the  Danubian 
Principalities  to  Austria  as  a  compensation  for  her 
exclusion  from  Italy  and  Germany. 

Relying,  however,  on  his  alliance  with  Prussia 
which  shortly  came  to  an  end,  and  on  the  stability  of 
the  Confederation  of  the  Rhine  which  he  had  already 
begun  to  build  up,  Napoleon,  perhaps  naturally,  re- 

1  Since  1774,  when  Louis  XVI  became  King  of  France,  and 
Vergennes  the  chief  Minister,  the  Franco-Austrian  alliance  had 
been  practically  non-existent. 


WAR  WITH  EUROPE,   1803-1806      123 

fused  to  believe  in  the  possibility  of  any  future  danger 
from  Austria. 

Moreover,  as  his  chief  object  at  that  time  was  the 
ruin  of  England's  trade,  it  was  most  important  to 
secure  the  adhesion  of  Russia  and  Prussia  to  his 
"  continental  system  ".  The  grant  of  the  Danubian 
Principalities  to  Austria  would  permanently  alienate 
Russia.1  Filled  with  confidence  at  the  overwhelming 
success  of  the  French  arms,  Napoleon,  therefore, 
hastened  in  the  early  months  of  1806  to  complete  the 
edifice  of  the  Confederation  of  the  Rhine  and  to  take 
steps  for  securing  French  supremacy  in  the  Mediter- 
ranean. The  idea  of  a  settlement  of  Germany  by 
means  of  a  Confederation  of  the  smaller  German 
princes  acting  in  subordination  to  France  was  first 
conceived  in  the  sixteenth  century.  Richelieu  had 
endeavoured  to  put  the  idea  into  execution,  and 
Mazarin,  in  assisting  in  the  formation  of  the  League 
of  the  Rhine,  could  rest  satisfied  that  he  had  seriously 
weakened  the  power  of  the  Hapsburgs  and  had  given 
France  a  leading  position  in  Germany.  It  was  only 
the  folly  of  Louis  XIV  that  to  a  great  extent  undid 
the  work  of  the  two  astute  cardinals.  At  the  time  of 
the  Austrian  Succession  War  Belle- Isle  returned  to 
the  policy  of  Richelieu  and  Mazarin,  and  elaborated 
a  plan  which  in  its  general  features  anticipated  that 
followed  by  Napoleon.  But  Austria  proved  too  strong, 
the  French  were  driven  from  Germany,  and  the  only 

1  Atkinson,  "A  History  of  Germany,  1715-1815,"  p.  404. 
London,  Methuen  &  Co. 


i24          THE  LIFE  OF  NAPOLEON 

result  of  Belle-Isle's  policy  was  the  advancement  of 
Prussia.  The  Franco- Austrian  alliance  of  1756  gave 
Germany,  after  the  close  of  the  Seven  Years'  War, 
rest  for  thirty  years — which  was  broken  by  the  Wars 
of  the  French  Revolution.  During  those  wars  one 
party  in  the  Directory  advocated  the  policy  of  driving 
Austria  eastwards,  and  Prussia  behind  the  Elbe,  and 
forming  a  confederation  of  the  secondary  German 
States  under  the  aegis  of  France.  In  1806  Napoleon, 
sure  of  his  Prussian  alliance,  carried  out  the  German 
policy  of  the  ancien  regime  with  his  own  additions 
and  stamped  with  his  own  individuality. 

The  Confederation  of  the  Rhine,  which  was  finally 
agreed  upon  on  17  July,  1806,  consisted  of  a  number 
of  princes  of  the  Empire.  A  Diet  composed  of  two 
colleges — the  College  of  Kings  and  that  of  Princes — 
settled  the  affairs  of  the  Confederation,  of  which 
Napoleon  was  named  Protector.  Indirectly  Germany 
gained  much  from  Napoleon's  enforced  simplification 
of  its  territory.  The  small  courts  which  had  been 
hotbeds  of  corruption  were  swept  away,  and  the 
German  people  enjoyed  for  a  time  better  government 
than  had  been  bestowed  on  them  by  the  vast  host  of 
petty  princes.  But  the  primary  object  of  Napoleon's 
policy  to  Germany  was  to  ensure  the  subordination 
of  the  members  of  the  Confederation  to  himself.  The 
better  the  States  were  governed  the  greater  would  be 
their  ability  to  contribute  men  and  money  for  the 
furtherance  of  his  schemes.  In  the  articles  which 
regulated  the  Confederation  it  was  expressly  laid 


WAR  WITH  EUROPE,  1803-1806      125 

down  that  "there  should  be  between  the  French 
Empire  and  the  Confederate  States  of  the  Rhine, 
collectively  and  separately,  an  alliance  in  virtue  of 
which  every  continental  war,  in  which  one  of  the 
contracting  parties  might  be  involved,  would  become 
immediately  common  to  all  the  others,"  and  the 
actual  number  of  troops  to  be  supplied  by  each 
State  was  mentioned.  The  establishment  of  the 
Confederation  of  the  Rhine  brought  to  an  end  the 
Holy  Roman  Empire.  And  on  6  August,  1806, 
Francis  of  Austria  formally  renounced  the  Imperial 
title. 

After  the  overthrow  of  Prussia  at  Jena  and 
Auerstadt  Saxony  joined  the  Confederation  of  the 
Rhine,  and  its  Elector  received  the  title  of  King,  and 
bound  himself  to  supply  Napoleon  with  20,000  troops. 
Napoleon  had  thus  made  a  considerable  advance  to- 
wards the  realization  of  his  idea  of  making  Europe 
into  a  single  State  or  Confederation  of  States  under 
the  hegemony  of  France,  with  a  "  unity  of  codes,  of 
opinions,  of  views,  of  interests  ".  There  is  no  doubt 
that  the  pressure  which  he  brought  to  bear  upon 
Prussia  at  the  time  of  the  Treaty  of  Tilsit  to  join  the 
Confederation  of  the  Rhine,  had  for  its  object  the 
political  annihilation  of  that  State.  As  it  was,  Prussia 
was  only  saved  from  extinction  by  Alexander's  op- 
position to  Napoleon's  harsh  treatment  of  the  country, 
and  by  the  Spanish  rising  which  diverted  Napoleon 
from  his  design  to  effect  Prussia's  complete  destruction. 
For  some  years,  however,  Prussia  was  a  quantity 


126          THE  LIFE  OF  NAPOLEON 


)  and  Napoleon's  command  of  the  immense 
military  resources  of  the  Confederation  of  the  Rhine 
enabled  him  to  overthrow  Austria  in  1  809  and  to  in- 
vade Russia  in  1812,  without  any  fear  of  opposition 
from  Prussia.  Being  unable  to  annex  Prussia  to  the 
Confederation  of  the  Rhine,  Napoleon,  after  Jena, 
robbed  Prussia  of  her  Polish  possessions,  and  set 
up  the  kingdom  of  Westphalia. 

"Among  the  political  creations  of  Napoleon  in 
Germany,"  writes  Mr.  Fisher,  "  the  most  curious  and 
important  was  the  kingdom  of  Westphalia."  It  was 
formed  in  1  807  and  consisted  of  lands  taken  from  the 
King  of  Prussia,  the  Duke  of  Brunswick,  and  the 
Elector  of  Hesse-Cassel.  It  extended  from  the 
Elbe  to  Osnabriick,  and  from  Bremen  to  Marburg, 
and  thus  included  Prussians,  Brunswickers,  and 
Hessians.  Over  this  small  but  important  State, 
Napoleon  placed  his  youngest  brother  Prince  Jerome, 
with  the  title  of  king.  A  good  constitution  given  to 
the  new  kingdom  by  Napoleon  was  rendered  in  the 
end  ineffective  by  a  licentious  Court  and  a  lazy  and 
voluptuous  King.  Jerome's  incompetence  was  soon 
recognized  by  Napoleon,  who  took  the  kingdom  under 
his  care  and  succeeded  in  establishing  for  a  short  time 
some  sort  of  order.  "A  good  system  of  finance,  a 
zealous  and  well-directed  administrative  class,  and 
a  sound  though  somewhat  autocratic  constitution," 
was  given  to  the  Westphalians,  who  till  the  Moscow 
campaign  were  prepared  to  accept  Napoleon's  system 


WAR  WITH  EUROPE,  1803-1806      127 

with  equanimity.1  But  Jerome's  incapacity,  Napoleon's 
interferences,  the  increasing  financial  burdens,  the  de- 
mand for  soldiers,  all  arrested  civil  progress,  and  the 
Russian  expedition  finally  brought  to  an  end  the 
history  of  the  Westphalian  kingdom. 

From  the  history  of  Napoleon's  policy  during  the 
first  six  months  of  1806  two  facts  seem  clear.  His 
mind  was  not  bent  on  the  immediate  subjugation 
of  Prussia,  and  he  had  as  yet  not  formulated  "any 
permanent  plan  for  the  settlement  of  Europe  ".2  After 
the  overthrow  of  Prussia  at  Jena  and  Auerstadt  in  the 
autumn  of  1806,  the  formation  of  the  kingdom  of 
Westphalia  in  1807,  an^  the  conclusion  of  the  Treaty 
of  Tilsit  in  1807  with  Russia,  the  German  policy  of 
Napoleon  becomes  more  intelligible,  and  we  are  able 
to  appreciate  its  advantages,  its  defects,  and  its  results. 

The  policy  itself  was  no  new  one.  It  had  been,  as 
has  been  said,  advocated  and  in  part  carried  out  by 
Francis  I,  by  Richelieu,  by  Louis  XIV,  and  by  Fleury. 
But  in  the  days  of  Napoleon  the  policy  could  be  justified 
on  surer  grounds  than  on  previous  occasions.  Since 
the  days  of  Fleury  the  partitions  of  Poland  had  taken 
place,  and  projects  for  the  partition  or  the  absorption 
of  Bavaria  by  Austria  had  again  and  again  appeared. 
In  1744,  in  1778  and  1785,  in  1793  and  in  1799 
Austrian  statesmen  had  considered  the  possibility  of 

1  Fisher,  "  Studies  in  Napoleonic  Statesmanship  :  Germany," 
p.  291.     Oxford,  The  Clarendon  Press. 

2  "  Bonapartism,"  pp.  52-3.     Oxford,  The  Clarendon  Press. 


128          THE  LIFE  OF  NAPOLEON 

a  union  of  Bavaria  with  the  Hapsburg  monarchy. 
There  seemed  nothing  dishonest  or  reprehensible  on 
the  part  of  a  strong  power  considering  schemes  for 
rounding  off  its  territory  by  the  absorption  of  weaker 
States.  Before  1806  the  conquest  of  the  Rhine 
frontier  by  France  had  necessitated  a  considerable  re- 
adjustment of  German  territories,  and  the  overthrow 
of  Austria  at  Austerlitz  was  followed  by  the  forma- 
tion of  the  Confederation  of  the  Rhine  in  1 806.  That 
Confederation  had  in  itself  much  to  commend  itself  to 
the  inhabitants  of  Germany.  The  number  of  German 
principalities  had  been  reduced  from  365  to  39  in  1803. 
In  1806  the  middle  States,  such  as  Bavaria  and 
Wiirtemberg,  gained  large  and  important  accessions 
of  territory,  their  rulers,  moreover,  receiving  royal  titles. 
On  17  July  the  Treaty  of  the  Confederation  of  the 
Rhine  was  signed  in  Paris,  by  fifteen  princes  of  the 
Empire,  of  whom  the  Kings  of  Bavaria  and  Wiirtem- 
berg, the  Landgrave  of  Hesse-Darmstadt,  the  Duke 
of  Cleves  and  Berg  (Prince  Joachim  Murat),  and 
Dalberg,  the  Arch-Chancellor,  were  the  most  im- 
portant. The  affairs  of  the  Confederation  were  to  be 
managed  by  two  colleges.  Of  these  the  College  of 
Kings  included  the  Arch-Chancellor,  henceforward  to 
be  styled  the  Prince- Primate,  the  Kings  of  Bavaria 
and  Wiirtemberg,  and  the  Grand  Dukes  of  Berg, 
Hesse- Darmstadt,  and  Baden.  The  College  of  Princes 
included  the  remainder  of  the  princes.  Of  this  Con- 
federation of  Princes  the  Emperor  of  the  French  was 
Protector. 


NAPOLEON'S   REDINGOTE   AND  COCKED   HAT 

FROM    THE    COLLECTION    OF    PRINCE   VICTOR 


WAR  WITH  EUROPE,  1803-1806      129 

Arrangements  were  also  made  in  the  Treaty  of  the 
Confederation  of  the  Rhine  for  the  simplification  of 
the  map  of  Germany.  Hitherto  Germany  may  be 
said  to  have  consisted  of  the  large  kingdoms  of  Austria 
and  Prussia,  of  a  number  of  middle  States  such  as 
Bavaria,  Saxony,  Baden,  Wilrtemberg,  Hesse  and  the 
Nassaus,  and  of  a  number  of  small  principalities  held 
by  the  Imperial  knights,  and  by  the  free  towns.  The 
petty  courts  connected  with  this  last  section  of  German 
rulers  were  now  swept  away.  The  celebrated  Stein, 
who  belonged  to  this  category  of  lesser  princes,  lost 
his  estates,  but  seems  to  have  realized  that  a  recon- 
structed Germany  was  impossible  so  long  as  these 
"petty  courts,  full  of  picturesque  anomalies,"  but  "the 
hotbeds  of  tiny  and  contemptible  intrigue,"  l  were  al- 
lowed to  exist.  Though  the  ancient  sovereign  rights 
of  these  dispossessed  princes  were  thus  destroyed, 
they  were  left  in  the  enjoyment  of  many  of  their 
privileges.2 

A  step  of  vital  importance  in  the  interests  of  the 
future  administrative  unity  of  Germany  was  thus  taken, 
and  the  way  was  thus  unconsciously  being  prepared 
for  the  growth  of  a  feeling  of  nationality.  From  1806 
"the  formation  of  a  united  Germany  without  the 
Hapsburgs  became  one  of  the  permanent  political 
ideas  in  the  German  mind  ".3  Some  years  had,  how- 

1  Fisher,    "Napoleonic   Statesmanship:    Germany,"   p.    119. 
Oxford,  The  Clarendon  Press. 

2  Ibid.  p.  119. 

3  Fisher,  "  Bonapartism,"  p.  53.    Oxford,  The  Clarendon  Press, 
9 


i3o          THE  LIFE  OF  NAPOLEON 

ever,  to  elapse,  and  many  bitter  experiences  had  to  be 
undergone  before  Germany  as  a  whole  could  unite  in 
a  concerted  movement  for  the  expulsion  of  French 
soldiers  from  its  soil,  and  for  the  partial  elimination  of 
French  ideas  from  the  German  system.  It  took  seven 
years  to  eradicate  from  the  members  of  the  Confedera- 
tion of  the  Rhine  their  pro-French  and  selfish  ten- 
dencies. It  was  not  till  1813  that  the  whole  German 
people  united  in  the  War  of  Liberation. 

At  the  time,  however,  of  the  formation  of  the  Con- 
federation, its  members  recked  little  of  their  duties  to 
their  -country  and  had  no  realization  of  the  possible 
future  of  Germany.  "  They  were  alike  traitors  to  a 
great  historic  tradition,  and  blind  to  the  higher  things 
of  the  future.  It  was  one  of  those  moments  in  history 
when  vulgar  greed  is  made  the  instrument  of  social 
and  political  improvement." 

The  growth  of  German  nationality  was  thus  a  direct, 
but  as  far  as  Napoleon  was  concerned  a  most  unex- 
pected, result  of  the  French  conquest.  Though  France 
indeed  made  Germany,  it  did  so  contrary  to  the  inten- 
tion of  Napoleon.  One  of  the  Emperor's  objects  was 
to  form  Europe  into  a  Grand  Empire  which,  under  the 
direction  of  France,  should  overcome  Great  Britain. 
Europe,  in  fact,  was  to  become  a  vast  French  camp  in 
which  preparations  for  the  overthrow  of  Great  Britain 
should  never  cease  till  the  downfall  of  Great  Britain 
had  been  accomplished.  The  national  interests  of 

1  Fisher,  "Napoleonic  Statesmanship:  Germany,"  pp.  119, 
1 20.  Oxford,  The  Clarendon  Press. 


WAR  WITH  EUROPE,   1803-1806      131 

the  rest  of  Europe  were,  in  view  of  this  object,  to  be 
mercilessly  disregarded,  and  the  characteristics  of 
Napoleon's  system  were  to  be  "  its  close  far-reaching 
network,  these  all-pervading  Imperial  eyes,  the  omni- 
potence of  the  civil  authority  in  a  military  empire  ".* 
Paris  was  to  be  the  centre  of  the  Empire,  French  was 
to  be  the  official  language,  a  fusion  of  heterogeneous 
races  was  to  be  accomplished — the  whole  to  be 
governed  by  a  supreme  centralized  bureaucracy. 

Napoleon  at  this  period  of  his  career  made  no  pre- 
tence of  being  actuated  by  any  but  purely  selfish 
motives,  though  from  St.  Helena  he  assured  the  world 
that  he  had  always  been  actuated  by  the  most  noble 
and  justifiable  ambitions.  The  German  princes  were 
to  become  permanently  the  allies  of  France,  which 
was  to  dictate  the  policy  which  they  were  submissively 
to  follow.  By  Article  35  of  the  Confederation  of  the 
Rhine  it  was  provided  that  there  should  be  between 
the  "  French  Empire  and  the  Confederate  States  of 
the  Rhine,  collectively  and  separately,  an  alliance  in 
virtue  of  which  every  continental  war,  in  which  one 
of  the  contracting  parties  might  be  involved,  would 
become  immediately  common  to  all  the  others  ".  In 
France  Napoleon's  Empire  was  based  upon  the  sup- 
port of  the  peasantry.  In  Germany  he  was  allied  not 
with  the  peasants  but  with  the  princes.  Thus  his 
position  in  Germany  depended  upon  "personal  prestige, 
the  force  of  arms,  and  the  alliance  of  the  ruling  princes  ". 
Faced  by  the  War  of  Liberation,  which  was  "a  move- 

1  Fisher,  "  Bonapartism,"  p.  58. 


132          THE  LIFE  OF  NAPOLEON 

ment  of  peoples  "  and  an  "  outburst  of  the  old  passion 
for  political  liberty,"  Napoleon  fell. 

The  campaign  of  Austerlitz  thus  had  far-reaching 
results  for  Europe.  The  dissolution  of  the  Holy 
Roman  Empire  implied  a  revolution  in  Germany,  the 
full  effects  of  which  were  only  recognized  after  many 
years  of  war,  and  after  many  revolutionary  movements. 

The  immediate  effect  which  attracted  the  attention 
of  European  rulers  and  statesmen  was  the  firm  superim- 
position  of  the  Napoleonic  system  upon  the  middle 
States  of  Germany,  and  the  advancement  of  members 
of  his  own  family.  Bavaria  and  Wiirtemberg  became 
kingdoms,  and  Baden  a  Grand  Duchy.  Berthier, 
whose  absence  from  his  side  was  so  serious  a  matter 
for  Napoleon  during  the  Waterloo  campaign,  was 
made  Prince  of  Neuchatel,  and  Murat,  who  had 
married  Caroline  Bonaparte,  Grand  Duke  of  Berg 
and  Cleves  ;  Eugene  Beauharnais,  son  of  Josephine, 
was  appointed  Viceroy  of  Italy,  and  married  a  daughter 
of  the  ruler  of  Bavaria.  Soon  afterwards,  in  March, 
1806,  Joseph  Bonaparte  became  King  of  Naples,  and 
on  5  June,  1806,  Louis  Bonaparte  was  declared  King 
of  Holland,  while  to  Pauline  Bonaparte  was  given  the 
principality  of  Guastalla  which  was  ceded  to  the 
kingdom  of  Italy  a  few  months  later  (Aug.,  1806). 
Duchies  in  Italy  were  also  carved  out  and  bestowed 
upon  generals  like  Soult  and  politicians  like  Talley- 
rand. By  these  means  a  new  nobility  was  gradually 
formed. 

In    1807    Jerome    Bonaparte    became    King   of 


WAR  WITH  EUROPE,  1803-1806      133 

Westphalia — which  State  was  created  for  the  purpose 
of  keeping  Prussia  in  check  and  as  a  step  in  the  denation- 
alization of  Germany.  But  the  foolish  and  incapable 
rule  of  Jerome,  coupled  with  the  unpopularity  of  the 
continental  system,  resulted  in  the  failure  of  Napoleon's 
policy,  and  the  "trend  of  public  opinion  set  steadily 
away  from  Paris  and  towards  Berlin  ". 

With  the  abdication  of  the  Emperor  Francis  on  6 
August,  1806,  from  his  position  as  Emperor,  the  Holy 
Roman  Empire  thus  came  definitely  to  an  end.  Just 
as  the  modern  history  of  France  opens  with  the 
meeting  of  the  States-General  in  1789,  so  the  modern 
history  of  Germany  dates  its  beginning  from  the  events 
of  1806. 

At  the  same  time,  however,  the  years  1805  and  1806 
mark  definitely  the  beginning  of  a  new  period  in  the 
history  of  France  and  in  the  career  of  Napoleon. 
Hitherto,  though  many  indications  can  be  found  of 
ambitious  projects  with  regard  to  the  extension  of 
French  domination  over  the  Mediterranean  and  in  the 
East,  there  was  no  definite  proof  that  Napoleon  aimed 
at  the  complete  subjugation  of  Austria  and  Prussia. 
But  the  formation  of  the  Third  Coalition  gave  him 
the  opportunity  of  crushing  Austria,  while  the  rashness 
of  Prussia  afforded  him  an  excuse,  for  a  time  removing 
that  Power  from  the  list  of  great  European  nations. 
The  overthrow  of  Prussia  at  Jena  on  14  October,  1806, 
came  upon  Europe  like  a  thunderbolt.  It  had  not 
been  realized  how  superior  were  the  French  armies 
to  those  of  Prussia,  nor  what  an  advantage  it  was  for 


i34          THE  LIFE  OF  NAPOLEON 

France  to  be  able  to  draw  her  armies  from  not  only 
France  proper  but  also  from  "  the  whole  left  bank  of 
the  Rhine,  with  Belgium  and  Holland,  Switzerland, 
Piedmont,  much  of  Lombardy  and  the  South- Western 
States  of  Germany  itself".1  The  victory  of  Austerlitz 
had  ended  once  and  for  all  any  hope  that  Napoleon 
would  continue  to  adopt  a  temporizing  policy  towards 
Austria  and  Prussia,  and  it  only  required  the  rash  de- 
claration of  war  by  Frederick  William  to  complete  the 
subjugation  of  Germany  by  the  French  Emperor. 

The  decline  and  fall  of  Prussia  forms  one  of  the 
most  dramatic  events  of  the  early  years  of  the  XlXth 
century,  and  resulted  in  the  unquestioned  supremacy 
of  Napoleon  in  central  and  southern  Europe.  In 
1805-6  Napoleon  "had  eliminated  Austria  from  the 
German  system,  and  left  Germany  divided  between 
Frederick  William  and  himself".2  He  had  thus  suc- 
cessfully carried  out  a  policy  which  with  varying  success 
had  been  aimed  at  by  Francis  I,  Richelieu,  Mazarin, 
Louis  XIV,  and  Belle-Isle. 

So  long  as  the  League  of  Princes  was  directed 
against  the  Hapsburgs  it  had  within  it  the  elements  of 
stability.  In  1806  Napoleon  and  the  King  of  Prussia 
divided  Germany  between  them,  and  the  policy  desired 
by  the  Directory  in  1 795  had  been  carried  out.  Never- 
theless there  was  a  sense  of  insecurity  in  Prussia,  where 
the  death  of  William  Pitt  had  been  deeply  regretted 
among  the  educated  classes,  who  had  recognized  in  him 

^eeley,  "Life  and  Times  of  Stein,"  Vol.  I,  p.  163. 
2  Fisher,  "Bonapartism,"  p.  382. 


WAR  WITH  EUROPE,  1803-1806      135 

Napoleon's  most  formidable  opponent.  Nevertheless 
peace  between  France  and  Prussia  continued  during 
the  first  eight  months  of  1806  till  Napoleon's  pro- 
vocative policy,  which  to  his  astonishment  was  im- 
mediately resented,  resulted  in  the  war  with  Prussia, 
the  French  victories  of  Jena  and  Auerstadt,  and  till 
1813  the  complete  dominance  of  France  in  Germany. 
During  the  first  half  of  1806  there  was  no  apparent 
likelihood  of  war  between  France  and  Prussia.  The 
fall  of  the  Holy  Roman  Empire  clearly  showed  how 
useless  were  the  efforts  of  Russia  and  England  to  re- 
strain the  onward  course  of  Napoleon's  policy.  Both 
England  and  Russia  entered  into  negotiations  with 
Napoleon,  who  appeared  not  to  be  disinclined  to 
consider  peace  proposals.  He  seemed  anxious  to 
consolidate  his  new  position  as  Head  of  the  German 
Body  of  Princes,  and  at  the  same  time  to  make  pre- 
parations for  carrying  out  his  policy  of  extending  the 
French  power  in  the  East.  Prussia,  which  was  not  a 
member  of  the  German  Confederation,  was  to  be  lulled 
into  a  sense  of  security  by  the  prospect  of  being  Head 
of  a  North  German  Confederation.  It  would  appear 
that  Napoleon's  real  intention  was  to  exclude  Prussia 
from  all  influence  in  Germany,  but  early  in  August, 
when  his  negotiations  with  Russia  and  England  came 
to  a  close,  Napoleon  concluded  that  those  two  Powers 
were  forming  a  new  Coalition  with  Prussia.  It  was 
at  this  moment  that  his  famous  offer  of  Hanover  to 
England,  followed  by  the  murder  of  Palm,  the  book- 
seller, on  25  August,  aroused  a  bitter  feeling  in  Prussia. 


136          THE  LIFE  OF  NAPOLEON 

These  two  circumstances  tended  to  decide  the  vacillat- 
ing Prussian  army  to  prepare  for  war. 

Already  on  9  August  the  Prussian  army  had 
been  mobilized,  and  Frederick  William  was  led  to 
believe  that  his  cause  was  by  no  means  a  hopeless 
one. 

Napoleon  at  first  treated  the  Prussian  preparations 
with  contempt.  His  mind  had  been  occupied  during 
the  first  six  months  of  1 806  partly  in  the  reconstruction 
of  Germany,  but  mainly  with  the  future  of  Italy.  He 
was  resolved  to  secure  Sicily  and  the  mastery  of  the 
Mediterranean.  He  would  thus  be  able  to  carry  out 
those  Eastern  projects  which  had  been  so  rudely  in- 
terrupted by  the  battle  of  the  Nile,  by  his  failure  to 
take  Acre,  and  by  his  defeat  at  Trafalgar.  In  1806 
his  Italian  schemes  seemed  to  him  to  have  in  them  the 
elements  of  success. 

Though,  however,  Joseph  established  himself 
in  the  kingdom  of  Naples,  he  was  unable  to  take 
Sicily.  Indeed,  an  English  squadron  under  Sir 
Sidney  Smith  could  have  destroyed  the  town  of 
Naples  by  bombardment  early  in  May.  The  situation 
was  graphically  described  by  Sidney  Smith.  "  The 
city,"  he  says,  "  was  illuminated  on  account  of  Joseph 
Bonaparte  proclaiming  himself  King  of  the  Two 
Sicilies !  The  junction  of  the  '  Eagle '  (the  other  ships 
being  the  '  Pompei,'  '  Excellent,'  '  Intrepid,'  and 
'  Athenian ')  made  us  five  sail  of  the  line,  and  it  would 
have  been  easy  for  their  fire  to  have  interrupted  this 
ceremony  and  show  of  festivity,  but  I  considered  that 


Z  H 

a  ^ 

o-  < 

co  H 

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s  ^ 

g§ 

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i-l  H 

PH  U 


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co  O 


WAR  WITH  EUROPE,  1803-1806      137 

the  unfortunate  inhabitants  had  evil  enough  on  them  ; 
that  the  restoration  of  the  capital  to  its  lawful  sovereign 
and  its  fugitive  inhabitants  would  be  no  gratification 
if  it  should  be  found  a  heap  of  ruins,  ashes,  and  bones, 
and  that  as  I  had  no  force  to  land  and  keep  order  in 
case  of  the  French  army  retiring  to  the  fortresses,  I 
should  leave  an  opulent  city  a  prey  to  the  licentious 
part  of  the  community  who  would  not  fail  to  profit  by 
the  confusion  the  flames  would  occasion :  not  a  gun 
was  fired." 

In  Napoleon's  correspondence  there  is  no  indication 
that  he  realized  that  the  existence  of  Joseph's  capital 
was  due  to  the  humanity  of  an  English  Admiral,  nor 
is  there  any  allusion  to  the  fact  that  Sidney  Smith,  on 
ii  May,  dislodged  the  French  garrison  from  the 
Island  of  Capri :  "which  from  its  situation  protecting 
the  coasting  communication  southward  was  a  great 
object  for  the  enemy  to  keep,  and  by  so  much  one  for 
me  to  wrest  from  him  ". 

On  1 1- 1 2  May  the  French  on  Capri  agreed  to  a 
capitulation,  and  the  English  Admiral  undertook  to 
convey  the  French  officers  and  soldiers  to  the  mainland. 
On  24  May  Napoleon  wrote  to  Joseph  that  he  had 
foreseen  what  would  happen  at  Capri,  and  that  the 
only  way  to  keep  a  "  solitary  island  was  to  put  into  it  a 
great  many  troops  or  none  at  all  ".  In  the  same  letter 
he  warned  Joseph  not  to  be  "  intoxicated  by  the  de- 
monstrations of  the  Neapolitans,"  and  assures  him  that 
Sir  Sidney  Smith  is  a  man  whom  it  is  easy  to  deceive 
.  .  .  "all  that  he  wants  is  to  make  a  noise,  and  the 


i38          THE  LIFE  OF  NAPOLEON 

more  you  talk  about  him  the  more  he  will  intrigue ". 
Napoleon  had  no  doubt  that  he  could  capture  Sicily 
and  so  become  supreme  in  the  Adriatic  and  indeed 
in  the  Mediterranean.  On  i  August  he  assured 
Joseph  that  a  year  sooner  or  a  year  later  he  would  be 
master  of  Sicily. 

The  defeat  of  Reynier  on  4  July,  in  the  battle 
of  Maida — a  battle  which  had  a  beneficial  effect  upon 
the  spirits  of  the  English  troops  who  realized  that  the 
French  were^not  irresistible — had  simply  led  Napoleon 
to  criticize  severely  the  military  operations  in  Italy. 
The  capture  of  Gaeta  later  in  the  month  somewhat 
reassured  him,  and  he  remained  determined  to  secure 
Sicily.  The  victory  of  Maida,  moreover,  showed  that 
the  British  Government,  which  since  Trafalgar  had 
been  inspired  by  a  false  sense  of  security,  had  now 
realized  the  importance  of  preventing  the  French 
occupation  of  Sicily.  That  island  was  regarded  by 
Napoleon  as  the  stepping-stone  for  France  towards 
the  East.  Had  it  not  been  for  the  outbreak  of  the 
war  with  Prussia  he  would  certainly  have  visited 
Naples  at  the  end  of  September.  As  it  was,  he  con- 
tinued throughout  the  remainder  of  the  year,  and 
indeed  throughout  1807, to  send  frequent  and  minute 
instructions  to  Joseph  for  the  administration  of  his 
kingdom.  In  spite  of  the  revolt  in  southern  Italy, 
consequent  on  the  British  victory  of  Maida,  Joseph 
during  the  ensuing  two  years  succeeded  in  establish- 
ing order  in  the  finances  and  contentment  among 


WAR  WITH  EUROPE,  1803-1806      139 

the  people.  His  constructive  work  in  Naples  deserves 
the  highest  praise.1 

These  Italian  projects  were,  however,  interrupted 
by  the  attitude  taken  up  by  Prussia  in  August.  On 
12  September  Napoleon  wrote  that  "Prussia  is 
arming  in  a  most  ridiculous  manner  ".  He  had  no 
fear  of  the  Prussian  army,  and  was  justifiably  confi- 
dent. He  knew  that  he  could  shortly  be  at  the  head 
of  150,000  troops  and  had  little  doubt  that  he  could 
reduce  Berlin  and  St.  Petersburg  to  submission. 
When  once  he  realized  that  Prussia  was  resolved 
upon  war  he  made  his  preparations  in  characteristic 
fashion. 

Pretending  that  he  was  engaged  in  Paris  in  hunt- 
ing and  other  amusements,  he  made  ready  to  crush 
Prussia  if  the  necessity  of  doing  so  was  forced  upon 
him.  By  18  September  it  became  evident  that  a  war 
with  Prussia  had  become  wellnigh  inevitable.  The 
European  horizon,  he  declared,  "  is  rather  dark  ;  it  is 
possible  I  may  soon  be  at  war  with  the  King  of  Prussia". 
It  is  said  that  at  Paris  on  26  September,  Napoleon, 
while  studying  a  map,  foretold  the  overthrow  of  the 
Prussian  army  about  15  October.  On  i  October  he 
left  Mainz  for  Wurzburg,  where  he  assembled  his 
army,  and  a  dispatch  sent  on  3  October  to  Roche- 
foucauld, the  French  ambassador  in  Vienna,  "gives 
a  most  vivid  picture  of  Napoleon's  mind  at  this  time  ". 
In  it  he  declared  that  he  was  resolved  to  break  off 

1 "  Napoleon's  Correspondence  with  Joseph,"  Vol.  I,  pp. 
120-3. 


140          THE  LIFE  OF  NAPOLEON 

all  alliance  with  Prussia.  "I  will,"  he  writes,  "have 
no  alliance  with  a  power  so  changeable  and  so  con- 
temptible." 

At  the  same  time  he  declared  that  he  was  willing 
to  be  at  peace  with  her,  as  he  felt  he  had  no  right  to 
shed  uselessly  the  blood  of  his  subjects.  None  the 
less,  though  he  desires  a  continental  alliance  to  support 
his  maritime  projects,  he  will  not  rely  upon  the  friend- 
ship of  Prussia,  for  "she  is  now,  as  she  was  in  1740, 
and  always  has  been,  without  consistency  and  without 
honour  ".  In  the  same  dispatch  he  declares  himself 
in  favour  of  an  Austrian  alliance  based  on  the  inde- 
pendence of  Turkey.  An  Austrian  alliance,  he  writes, 
would  secure  the  peace  of  Europe  and  enable  him  to 
turn  his  attention  to  his  fleet.  "  I  am  not,"  he  re- 
iterates, "  opposed  to  a  system  which  might  unite  me 
more  closely  to  Austria." 

In  this  interesting  dispatch  we  see  that  his  real 
aim  was  maritime  supremacy,  which  would  secure  the 
predominance  of  France  in  the  Mediterranean  and 
in  the  Councils  of  Turkey.  Though  the  outbreak  of 
war  with  Prussia  was  only  a  matter  of  days,  he  re- 
garded such  a  war  with  contempt,  and  merely  as  a 
slight  interruption  in  his  vast  plans  for  securing  a 
position  of  supremacy  in  Europe.  England,  he 
declared,  will  be  tired  of  constant  failure  and  will  soon 
make  peace.  In  any  case  he  expected  in  a  month  or 
two  to  be  master  of  the  Mediterranean. 

On  his  part  Frederick  William  could  at  any  rate 
point  to  the  fact  that  his  relations  with  Russia  were 


WAR  WITH  EUROPE,  1803-1806      141 

on  a  friendly  footing,  and  he  had  some  reason  to  ex- 
pect aid  from  England,  if  not  from  Austria,  in  the 
event  of  the  outbreak  of  a  war  with  France.  In 
consequence  of  the  Partitions  of  Poland  his  territory  was 
larger  than  that  ruled  over  by  Frederick  the  Great, 
and  the  Prussian  army  was  still  regarded  as  one  of 
the  most  formidable  armies  in  Europe.  The  outbreak 
of  war  with  France  in  October,  1806,  a  war  which 
continued  till  July,  1807,  brought  with  it  a  rapid 
disillusionment  to  all  those  who  had  not,  like  the  old 
Duke  of  Brunswick,  realized  the  change  which  had 
come  over  the  Prussian  army  since  the  days  of 
Frederick  the  Great.  The  King  of  Prussia  and  his 
generals  were  confident  of  victory.  Of  the  two 
Prussian  armies  one  was  under  the  King  and  Bruns- 
wick, the  other  was  under  Prince  Hohenlohe.  Both 
armies  were  completely  defeated,  the  former  at 
Auerstadt,  by  Davoust,  who  was  created  Prince  of 
Auerstadt  for  his  brilliant  victory  ;  the  latter  at  Jena, 
by  Napoleon. 

On  27  October  Napoleon  rode  triumphantly  into 
Berlin  and  was  welcomed  by  the  population  effusively 
and  enthusiastically.  An  and- French  feeling  did  not 
exist  in  Germany  in  1806  or  1807.  That  feeling  was 
created  later  by  French  excesses.  Such  of  the  Prussian 
forces  as  had  not  yet  been  annihilated  or  captured 
retreated  in  the  direction  of  the  still  formidable 
Russian  army,  while  Napoleon  spent  the  winter  in 
Eastern  Prussia  whence  he  directed  affairs  in  Paris 
and  in  Italy.  Before  the  end  of  the  year  Napoleon 


142          THE  LIFE  OF  NAPOLEON 

had  secured  a  useful  ally  in  Saxony  whose  Elector  was 
given  the  title  of  King  on  4  December,  and  who  joined 
the  Rhenish  Confederacy.  On  the  other  hand,  the 
Duke  of  Brunswick,  the  Elector  of  Hesse-Cassel,  and 
the  Prince  of  Orange  were  deprived  of  their  posses- 
sions. 

Napoleon,  though  forced  for  a  few  months  to  divert 
his  attention  from  his  Mediterranean  schemes  to  the 
task  of  crushing  Prussia,  never,  however,  ceased  to 
revolve  plans  for  the  destruction  of  the  power  of 
Great  Britain ;  the  only  real  obstacle,  as  he  believed, 
to  his  supremacy  in  Europe.  On  1 1  November  he 
wrote  to  his  brother  Joseph,  in  Naples,  that  the  news 
of  his  successes  in  Prussia  had  thrown  London  into 
consternation.  He  added  that  the  occupation  of 
Hamburg,  which  he  had  just  effected,  together  with 
the  declaration  of  the  blockade  of  the  British  Islands 
by  the  Berlin  Decree,  would  increase  that  uneasiness. 

The  language  used  in  drawing  up  the  Berlin 
Decree  on  21  November  gives  some  indication  of 
the  feelings  held  by  Napoleon  towards  England.  It 
is  asserted  that  England's  monstrous  abuse  of  the 
right  of  blockade  is  "altogether  worthy  of  the  age  of 
barbarism,"  and  is  "advantageous  to  that  power  to  the 
prejudice  of  every  other  ".  Consequently  Napoleon 
decreed  that  the  British  Isles  were  in  a  state  of 
blockade,  that  all  commerce  and  correspondence  with 
them  was  prohibited,  that  all  Englishmen  found  in 
any  country  were  prisoners  of  war,  and  that  the  use 
of  English  goods  was  forbidden.  These  and  other 


WAR  WITH  EUROPE,   1803-1806      143 

articles  were  issued  by  Napoleon  in  the  hope  that 
British  trade  would  be  ruined,  and  that  England 
would  be  compelled  to  sue  for  peace. 

This  thunderbolt  was  followed  up  by  the  Milan 
Decree  of  17  December,  1807,  and  Napoleon  hoped 
that  British  commerce  would  by  means  of  these  de- 
crees be  destroyed.  These  decrees,  however,  had 
not  the  desired  effect  and  must  be  numbered  among 
Napoleon's  colossal  failures.  Owing  to  the  lack  of 
a  fleet  he  was  unable  to  blockade  the  British  ports, 
and  so  to  bring  about  the  submission  of  his  hated  foe. 
Moreover,  these  decrees  first  brought  home  to  the 
populations  of  Europe  the  real  character  of  the 
tyranny  of  the  French  Emperor.  "  Every  poor  man 
who  was  debarred  from  the  means  of  providing  sugar 
or  cloth  for  his  family  felt  a  grievance."  Sugar  was 
at  that  time  brought  chiefly  from  Britain's  colonies, 
and  the  Decree  depriving  continental  Europe  of  sugar 
was  keenly  resented.  Beetroot  factories,  however, 
rapidly  sprang  into  existence,  and  the  resentment  at 
the  effect  of  the  Decree  upon  the  supply  of  sugar  was 
gradually  modified. 

It  was  not  till  a  few  years  later  that  the  thorough- 
going enforcement  of  the  continental  system  proved 
too  great  to  be  borne,  and  contributed  greatly  to  the 
rising  of  the  nations  against  the  Napoleonic  domi- 
nation. 

With  regard  to  the  subject  of  sugar,  Napoleon, 
when  on  St.  Helena,  declared  "that  if  the  war  with 
England  had  lasted  two  or  three  years  longer,  France 


144          THE  LIFE  OF  NAPOLEON 

would  not  have  had  any  further  occasion  for  Colonies, 
as  he  had  already  caused  to  be  made  in  France,  sugar 
from  the  Beet  Root". 

As  a  memento  of  the  overthrow  of  Prussia  the  Car 
of  Victory,  in  copper,  by  Schadow,  which  stood  on  the 
top  of  the  Brandenburger  Thor,  at  the  end  of  the 
Unter  den  Linden,  was  carried  off  to  Paris  and  not 
restored  till  after  the  fall  of  Napoleon. 

With  the  defeat  of  Prussia  at  Jena  and  Auerstadt 
came  the  punishment  of  Saxony  for  the  support  which 
its  ruler  had  given  to  Frederick  William.  At  Posen, 
on  1 1  December,  the  Elector  was  forced  to  accept 
Napoleon's  terms.  Saxon  troops  were  to  aid 
Napoleon  in  combating  the  Prussians  and  Russians, 
while  the  King  of  Saxony  was  to  pay  a  heavy  subsidy 
and  to  become  the  faithful  ally  of  Napoleon.  The 
rulers  of  Hesse-Cassel  and  Brunswick  were  deposed, 
William  Frederick  of  Orange,  who  governed  a  small 
principality — Fulda-Corvey — suffered  the  same  fate. 
"  Napoleon  was  now  Master  of  Northern  Germany 
from  end  to  end."1 

CHIEF  DATES 

War  between  France  and  Great  Britain  ....  1803. 
Napoleon  Emperor  of  the  French  .  .  .  March,  1804. 
His  coronation  ......  December,  1804. 

The  camp  at  Boulogne 1803-1805. 

Outbreak  of  war  with  Austria  and  Russia        .         .         .     1805. 
Trafalgar,  Ulm      ......        October,  1805. 

Austerlitz      .......     December,  1805. 

Wisher,  "  Napoleonic  Statesmanship,"  p.  141, 


WAR  WITH  EUROPE,  1803-1806      145 

Peace  of  Pressburg  (France  and  Austria)          .  January,  1806. 

Treaty  of  Paris  (France  and  Prussia)       .         .  February,  1806. 

Joseph  Bonaparte  King  of  Naples  .         .         .  March,  1806. 

Battle  of  Maida July,  1806. 

The  Confederation  of  the  Rhine     .         .         .  June- July,  1806. 

End  of  the  Holy  Roman  Empire    .         .         .  August,  1806. 

Jena  and  Auerstadt October,  1806. 

The  Berlin  Decree         .....  November,  1806. 


10 


CHAPTER  V 

THE  TREATY  OF  TILSIT,    1807 

Napoleon  and  the  Mediterranean — The  Russian  campaign 
— Eylau,  Heilsberg,  and  Friedland — The  Treaty  of  Tilsit — Position 
of  Prussia — Summary  of  Napoleon's  political  activities,  January- 
June,  1807 — His  correspondence  with  Joseph — The  real  meaning 
of  the  Treaty  of  Tilsit — Napoleon's  policy  after  Tilsit — The  seizure 
by  England  of  the  Danish  fleet — The  Treaty  of  Fontainebleau — 
The  plan  of  the  Partition  of  Portugal — The  real  aims  of  Napoleon 
and  Alexander — Napoleon's  policy  to  the  Papacy — His  religious 
policy  explained  at  St.  Helena — Consideration  of  his  policy  after 
Tilsit — France  after  Tilsit — The  growth  of  national  feeling  in 
Europe. 

A  FTER  the  conclusion  of  the  Treaties  with  Austria 
+  \  at  Pressburg  on  I  January,  and  with  Prussia  at 
Paris  on  15  February,  1806,  Napoleon  had  devoted 
his  energies  to  the  completion  of  the  reconstitution  of 
Germany,  and  to  attempts  to  secure  Sicily.  The 
overthrow  of  Austria  and  the  subservience  of  Prussia 
had  removed  all  obstacles  in  the  way  of  the  dissolution 
of  the  Empire  and  of  the  formation  of  the  Confed- 
eration of  the  Rhine.  On  6  August,  1806,  the  Em- 
peror Francis  II  had  recognized  that  the  Empire  no 
longer  existed,  and  became  Francis  I  Emperor  of 

Austria.     As  Protector  of  the  Confederation  of  the 

146 


THE  TREATY  OF  TILSIT,  1807      147 

Rhine  which  included,  apart  from  Prussia  and  Austria, 
the  principal  states  in  Germany,  Napoleon  had  se- 
cured a  dominant  position  in  Central  Europe. 

His  determination  to  become  all-powerful  in  the 
Mediterranean  had  been  shown  by  his  strenuous 
efforts  in  1 806  to  obtain  Sicily.  The  victory  of  Maida, 
won  by  Sir  John  Stuart  on  4  July,  had  checked  the 
execution  of  Napoleon's  plan,  while  the  discovery  of 
his  duplicity  in  connexion  with  his  secret  negotiations 
with  Russia,  Great  Britain's  ally,  had  alienated  Fox, 
and  on  his  death  Lord  Howick  resolved  not  to  trust 
the  French  Emperor  any  longer.  Napoleon,  however, 
did  not  withdraw  from  his  determination  to  secure 
the  island.  His  possession  of  Sicily  would,  in  his 
opinion,  change  the  face  of  the  Mediterranean.  It  was 
only  the  presence  of  British  forces  that  prevented 
Joseph  Bonaparte,  and  after  him  Murat,  from  con- 
quering the  island  between  1807  and  1812. 

In  1806  and  1807,  however,  the  chances  of  the 
British  Empire  being  able  to  hold  its  own  against 
Napoleon  seemed  doubtful.  The  war  between  France 
and  Prussia  in  the  autumn  of  1806  had  resulted  in 
the  occupation  of  Berlin  by  the  French.  Recognizing 
the  impossibility  of  winning  Great  Britain  over  to  an 
acquiescence  in  his  policy,  Napoleon  had  resolved  to 
crush  her  at  all  costs.  His  Berlin  Decree,  issued  on 
21  November,  1806,  was  intended  to  exclude  Great 
Britain  from  the  Continent  until  she  restored  her 
colonial  conquests.  Before,  however,  he  could  carry 
out  his  policy  of  excluding  Great  Britain  from  all 


148          THE  LIFE  OF  NAPOLEON 

intercourse  with  the  Continent,  or  could  partition 
Prussia,  Napoleon  had  either  to  crush  or  to  come  to 
some  agreement  with  the  Russian  Emperor.  To 
occupy  Russian  troops  in  Turkey,  Napoleon  sent 
Sebastiani  to  Constantinople.  In  December,  1806, 
Turkey  declared  war  upon  Russia,  and  Napoleon 
sent  French  officers  to  aid  the  Turks.  He  thus  com- 
pelled Alexander  to  maintain  a  considerable  force  on 
the  Turkish  frontier  during  the  first  six  months  of  1807. 
He  also  carried  on  negotiations  with  Persia,  and 
Alexander,  fearful  for  her  Eastern  interests,  felt  com- 
pelled to  keep  troops  near  Persia.  At  Eylau,  on 
8  February,  1 807,  Napoleon  fought  a  drawn  battle  with 
the  Russians,  but  in  May  Lefebre  captured  Dantzic — 
valuable  as  a  base  from  which  the  army  could  be 
furnished  with  corn ;  on  10  June,  a  most  sanguinary 
conflict,  known  as  the  battle  of  Heilsberg,  took  place 
with  no  decisive  results  ;  and  on  14  June  Napoleon 
won  a  battle  at  Friedland,  which  proved  to  be  in  its 
effects  of  decisive  importance.  That  battle  was 
shortly  followed  by  the  Treaty  of  Tilsit.  The  Treaty 
of  Tilsit  was  a  great  relief  to  Napoleon.  Until  he 
had  come  to  terms  with  Russia  no  settlement  could 
be  made  with  regard  to  Prussia,  nor  could  the  con- 
tinental blockade,  first  established  by  the  Berlin 
Decree  in  November,  1 806,  be  enforced.  Moreover, 
Eylau  had  made  a  period  of  peace  necessary  for 
Napoleon.  The  French  losses  had  been  immense, 
and  the  discouragement  of  the  army  profound. 
Fortunately  for  him  a  strong  body  of  Russian 


THE  TREATY  OF  TILSIT,  1807      149 

opinion  insisted  on  peace  after  the  Russian  defeat 
of  Friedland. 

Friedland,  a  battle  which  the  rash  Bennigsen,  the 
Russian  general,  ought  never  to  have  fought,  took  place 
on  14  June,  and  the  Russians  lost  over  i5,ooomenkilled 
and  wounded.  It  was  a  victory  for  Napoleon  (whose 
losses  were  about  a  half  less  than  those  of  the  Russians) 
as  decisive  as  was  that  of  Marengo. 

The  retreat  of  the  Russians  after  the  battle  was 
not  seriously  interfered  with,  and  during  the  night 
following  no  effort  to  pursue  was  made.  Probably 
Napoleon  was  anxious  not  to  make  a  permanent 
enemy  of  Alexander  ;  if  so,  this  would  explain  the  in- 
action of  the  French  cavalry.  He  had  already,  in 
March,  1807,  when  writing  to  Talleyrand,  declared 
that  he  would  prefer  a  Russian  to  an  Austrian  alliance. 
In  his  struggle  with  Great  Britain  it  was  essential  to 
secure  the  co-operation  of  Russia  with  its  long  sea- 
board. If  he  could  put  an  end  to  the  trade  between 
England  and  Russia  an  important  step  would  have 
been  taken  towards  the  subjugation  of  the  Island  king- 
dom. The  importance  of  the  victory  of  Friedland, 
therefore,  cannot  be  exaggerated.  On  19  June  the 
Russian  army  recrossed  the  Niemen  ;  on  21  June  an 
armistice  was  agreed  upon  ;  and  on  the  same  day 
Alexander  informed  Frederick  William  of  Prussia 
that  he  had  resolved  to  ally  himself  with  France. 

Alexander's  motives  for  this  sudden  change  of  atti- 
tude were  various,  and  there  is  no  doubt  that  the  atti- 
tude and  views  of  his  generals  had  considerable  weight 


150         THE  LIFE  OF  NAPOLEON 

with  him.  At  the  Russian  head-quarters  there  was  an 
almost  general  demand  for  peace,  and  the  Grand 
Duke  Constantine,  who  was  supported  by  Czartoryski, 
Kurakin  the  Gallophil  Russian  Minister,  and  others, 
informed  Alexander  that  the  temper  of  the  army 
being  what  it  then  was,  he  could  not  but  remind  him 
of  the  fate  of  his  father  the  Tsar  Paul.  Alexander, 
moreover,  had  developed  an  admiration  for  Napoleon, 
and  he  was  justly  irritated  with  the  English  Govern- 
ment which  had  given  him  little  or  no  help,  and  which 
was  enforcing  against  Russia  "a  most  stringent  mari- 
time code  ".  Though  Alexander,  as  late  as  the  battle  of 
Friedland,  had  given  the  King  of  Prussia  no  hint  of 
a  possible  change  of  policy,  the  Russian  generals  had 
for  some  time  past  conceived  the  greatest  contempt 
for  the  Prussians,  and  after  Friedland  openly  objected 
to  sacrifice  Russia  for  Prussia.  Budberg,  a  Livonian, 
had  succeeded  Czartoryski  on  17  June,  1806,  as 
Chancellor,  and  hitherto  his  sympathies  had  been 
decidedly  Prussian.  Though  he  was  compelled  to 
accept  his  master's  new  policy,  and  to  inform  Harden- 
berg  on  21  June,  1807,  that  the  Russian  political 
system  of  alliances  was  completely  changed,  he  realized 
even  thus  early  that  an  alliance  between  Alexander 
and  Napoleon  could  not,  in  the  nature  of  things,  be 
of  long  duration,  nor  could  it  offer  to  Europe  any 
chance  of  a  period  of  tranquillity.  On  i  September, 
1807,  before  the  Treaty  of  Tilsit  was  six  weeks  old, 
he  informed  Leveson-Gower,  the  British  envoy  in  St. 
Petersburg,  that  "the  continental  peace  cannot  be 


THE  TREATY  OF  TILSIT,  1807     151 

of  long  duration  :  any  peace  with  France  must  be 
considered  as  a  momentary  respite,  and  by  no  means 
as  affording  any  prospect  of  permanent  tranquillity ; 
neither  the  French  Government,  nor  the  French 
people,  is  ripe  for  peace  ;  they  retain  too  much  of  their 
revolutionary  restlessness.  We  must  employ  this 
moment  of  repose  in  preparing  the  means  of  resistance 
against  another  attack."1 

By  the  terms  of  the  Treaty,  which  was  finally  con- 
cluded on  9  July,  Prussia  lost  heavily,  being  reduced 
to  half  her  original  dimensions.  While  East  Frisia 
was  given  to  Holland,  most  of  her  provinces  west  of 
the  Elbe  were  included  with  Hesse,  partly  in  the 
Grand  Duchy  of  Berg,  partly  in  the  new  kingdom  of 
Westphalia  which  was  to  be  ruled  by  Jerome  Bona- 
parte. Her  Polish  Provinces,  with  the  exception  of 
Bialystock  which  was  to  go  to  Russia,  and  Dantzic 
which  became  nominally  independent,  were  to  form 
the  Duchy  of  Warsaw,  under  the  King  of  Saxony 
to  whom  was  given  Cottbus.  Alexander,  moreover, 
gave  up  all  claim  to  Corfu,  Cattaro,  and  the  Ionian 
Isles,  and  declared  his  readiness  to  recognize  Joseph 
Bonaparte  as  King  of  Sicily,  if  Ferdinand  was  given 
the  Balearic  Isles  or  Crete. 

By  the  secret  articles  it  was  decided,  if  Great 
Britain  did  not  make  peace  by  i  November  and  re- 
store all  conquests  made  since  1805,  tnat  France  and 
Russia,  which  now  joined  the  continental  system, 
should  unite  against  her  and  call  upon  Austria,  Den- 

1  Quoted  in  "  Cambridge  Modern  History,"  Vol.  IX,  p.  304. 


152          THE  LIFE  OF  NAPOLEON 

mark,  Sweden,  and  Portugal  to  co-operate.  More- 
over, it  was  decided,  if  Turkey  did  not  make  peace 
within  three  months,  that  France  and  Russia  would 
unite  against  her. 

Prussia  was  thus  abandoned  by  Alexander,  who, 
however,  never  allowed  Napoleon  to  annihilate  her. 
Great  Britain  and  Turkey  were  the  chief  objects  of  the 
opposition  of  the  two  kings.  Both  countries,  in  the 
event  of  the  non-acceptance  of  the  terms  offered  them, 
were  to  be  attacked  by  the  united  forces  of  Napoleon 
and  Alexander.  Prussia  had  lost  about  half  of  her 
territory,  was  forced  behind  the  Elbe,  and  became 
subservient  to  France  and  Russia.  Had  it  not  been 
for  the  opposition  of  Alexander  to  Napoleon's  proposals 
for  her  destruction  Prussia  would  have  disappeared 
from  the  list  of  nations,  and  the  Vistula  would  have 
become  the  dividing  line  between  the  French  and 
Russian  monarchies. 

During  the  period  between  the  overthrow  of 
Prussia  and  the  Peace  of  Tilsit  with  Russia,  i.e. 
between  October,  1806,  and  July,  1807,  Napoleon  had 
been  in  Eastern  Europe.  During  the  severe  weather 
which  always  characterized  the  winters  in  that  portion 
of  Europe  he  enjoyed  excellent  health.  At  the  same 
time  his  political  activities  never  ceased.  In  Novem- 
ber, 1806,  he  had  issued  the  celebrated  Berlin  Decree 
declaring  the  British  Isles  in  a  state  of  blockade  and 
prohibiting  all  commerce  with  them.  He  kept  up  a 
constant  correspondence  with  Joseph  and  sent  most 
minute  instructions  with  reference  to  the  government 


THE  KING  AND  QUEEN  OF   PRUSSIA  WITH   NAPOLEON  AND 
THE   EMPEROR  OF  RUSSIA  AT  TILSIT 

AFTER    A.    PAINTING    BY  GOSSE    AT   VERSAILLES 


THE  TREATY  OF  TILSIT,   1807      153 

of  Naples.  From  Naples  he  withdrew  large  numbers 
of  troops  for  his  forthcoming  campaign  in  Poland. 
In  December,  1806,  the  whole  of  Poland  had  declared 
for  Napoleon,  and  troops  were  being  raised  in  every 
direction.  The  attitude  of  Austria,  however,  caused 
Napoleon  some  uneasiness,  and  though  he  received 
from  Vienna  pacific  assurances  he  very  character- 
istically acted  as  though  hostilities  were  likely  to 
break  out.  He  formed  two  camps,  one  at  Verona, 
and  one  at  Brescia,  and  he  advised  Joseph  not  to 
send  for  his  wife  from  Paris  till  the  political  situation 
in  Italy  was  more  assured.  Already  he  had  adopted 
the  plan  of  employing  men  of  all  nationalities  in  his 
Grande  Armde. 

The  Polish  legion  in  1806  was  in  Naples,  but  was 
recalled  to  serve  against  Russia.  Several  thousands 
of  Neapolitans  were  also  summoned  to  serve  in 
Germany  and  elsewhere.  In  January,  1807,  Napoleon 
ordered  Joseph  to  send  him  the  regiments  which  had 
been  defeated  at  Maida,  as  he  wished  to  have  them 
under  his  own  eye.  "They  have,"  he  said,  "to  wipe 
out  the  shame  of  having  been  beaten  by  the  English." 
It  is  unnecessary  to  wonder  at  Napoleon's  successful 
career  when  one  marks  not  only  his  close  attention  to 
the  smallest  details,  but  also  the  fact  that  this  attention 
to  detail  did  not  in  any  way  interfere  with  his  concep- 
tion of  Empire.  In  the  early  months  of  1807,  though 
his  attention  was  concentrated  upon  his  campaign 
against  Russia,  he  never  ceased  to  follow  the  events 
in  Joseph's  kingdom  of  Naples  with  the  closest  interest. 


154          THE  LIFE  OF  NAPOLEON 

On  28  January  he  wrote  to  Joseph  :  "  Your  fortunes 
and  victories  have  interposed  between  us  vast 
countries  ;  you  are  on  the  shores  of  the  Mediter- 
ranean, I  am  on  those  of  the  Baltic  ;  but  on  the 
harmony  of  our  measures  we  tend  towards  the  same 
object.  Keep  a  watch  on  your  coast :  do  not  suffer 
it  to  be  approached  by  the  English  or  by  their 
commerce."  A  curious  sidelight  is  thrown  on  the 
aspirations  and  high  spirit  of  the  French  soldiers 
when  we  read  of  the  murmurings  of  the  troops  in 
Naples  because  they  have  not  the  opportunities 
enjoyed  by  their  comrades  in  Poland  of  acquiring 
distinction.  Somewhat  naturally  the  news  of  the 
prodigious  victories  gained  in  Germany,  and  of  the 
promotions  won,  increased  their  dissatisfaction  with 
their  own  position — engaged  "  in  a  painful  and  obscure 
war ".  Napoleon's  reply  to  Joseph's  letters  with 
reference  to  this  discontent  was  very  characteristic. 
"  Allow  no  complaining.  With  the  French  you  must 
show  firmness.  The  army  of  Naples  has  no  cause 
for  murmuring.  Say  to  them,  '  Do  you  complain  ? ' 
Ask  General  Berthier,  he  will  tell  you  that  your 
Emperor  has  been  living  for  weeks  upon  potatoes, 
and  bivouacking  in  the  snows  of  Poland.  You  may 
judge  from  this  of  what  happens  to  the  officers  ;  they 
get  nothing  to  eat  but  mere  meat.1  .  .  .  Neither  the 
staff  nor  the  colonels  nor  the  other  regimental  officers 
have  taken  their  clothes  off  for  the  last  two  months, 
some  not  for  four  months  (I  myself  have  been  a 

1  Napoleon's  "  Correspondence  with  Joseph,"  Vol.  I,  p.  233. 


THE  TREATY  OF  TILSIT,   1807      155 

fortnight  without  taking"  off  my  boots)  in  the  middle 
of  snow  and  mud  .  .  .  fighting  with  our  bayonets 
frequently  under  grape  shot  .  .  .  After  having  de- 
stroyed the  Prussian  monarchy,  we  are  fighting  against 
the  remnant  of  the  Prussians,  against  Russians, 
Cossacks,  and  Kalmucks,  and  the  tribes  of  the  North 
who  formerly  conquered  the  Roman  Empire.  We 
have  war  in  all  its  fierceness  and  all  its  horrors.  In 
such  fatigues  every  one  has  been  more  or  less  ill, 
except  myself,  for  I  never  was  stronger ;  I  have 
grown  fat."1  From  this  remarkable  letter  we  can 
learn  the  secret  of  Napoleon's  rapid  and  overwhelming 
successes.  Indomitable  resolution,  careful  forethought, 
a  readiness  to  share  in  all  the  discomforts  of  a  cam- 
paign— such  qualities  were  bound  to  bring  success  to 
their  possessors. 

During  the  winter  campaign  of  1806-7  Napoleon 
had  ample  opportunity  of  exhibiting  to  the  world  his 
possession  of  these  qualities,  as  well  as  his  consummate 
knowledge  of  the  currents  of  European  opinion.  His 
acquaintance  with  the  immediate  needs  of  his  army 
was  equally  complete.  Writing  to  Talleyrand  who 
was  at  Warsaw  on  the  evening  of  1 2  March,  he  urges 
him  to  send  every  day  to  his  head-quarters  at  Osterode, 
eight  days'  journey  from  Warsaw,  50,0x30  rations  of 
biscuit  and  20,000  pints  of  brandy.  "  The  success," 
he  says,  "  of  the  greatest  combinations,  indeed  the  fate 
of  Europe,  depends  on  a  question  of  subsistence."5 

Napoleon's  "Correspondence  with  Joseph,"  Vol.  I,  p.  232. 
*  Ibid.  pp.  234-5. 


156          THE  LIFE  OF  NAPOLEON 

"  If  I  have  bread,"  he  continues,  "  to  beat  the  Russians 
is  child's  play."  He  was  right.  During  a  long 
winter  campaign,  such  as  Napoleon  was  experiencing, 
the  question  of  the  commissariat  was  of  the  first 
importance.  The  matter  was,  as  he  declared,  "more 
important  than  all  the  negotiations  in  the  world 
.  .  .  these  rations  and  pints  of  brandy  will  spoil  the 
combinations  of  all  the  hostile  powers  ".  Throughout 
May,  while  the  fate  of  France  and  indeed  Europe 
hung  upon  the  success  of  the  French  arms  over  those 
of  the  Russians  in  the  coming  final  struggle,  Napoleon 
was  writing  instructions  to  Joseph  on  even  minute 
points.  His  confidence  in  his  ability  to  defeat  the 
Russians  and  to  triumph  over  all  his  difficulties  was 
justified,  for  the  victory  of  Friedland,  fought  on  14 
June,  the  anniversary  of  Marengo,  was  followed  by 
the  Treaty  of  Tilsit.  The  battle  of  Friedland  was 
indeed,  as  Napoleon  declared,  as  decisive  as  those  of 
Marengo,  of  Austerlitz,  and  of  Jena. 

While  the  negotiations  were  proceeding  which 
eventuated  in  the  Treaty  of  Tilsit,  Napoleon  kept  his 
attention  firmly  fixed  on  the  Mediterranean,  and  never 
ceased  to  consider  plans  for  establishing  his  supremacy 
in  that  quarter. 

Corfu  (which  with  Cattaro  had  been  definitely 
assigned  to  France)  was  to  become  an  important 
French  station  ;  Joseph  was  to  begin  the  construction  of 
two  ships  of  seventy-four  guns  to  be  launched  in  the 
spring  of  1 808 ;  Napoleon's  mind  was  evidently  full  of 
plans  for  the  development  of  the  French  power  in  the 


THE  TREATY  OF  TILSIT,  1807      157 

Eastern  Mediterranean.  An  officer  was  sent  from  Tilsit 
to  Corfu  to  act  as  chief  of  the  staff ;  Joseph  was  to  keep 
some  "brigs  or  gun  boats  at  Taranto,  Otranto,  or 
Brindisi  in  order  to  keep  the  communications  open 
between  Corfu"  and  Naples.  Corfu  was  to  be 
victualled  immediately,  and  everything  necessary  was 
to  be  sent  there.  Throughout  his  correspondence  with 
Joseph,  Napoleon  insisted  on  men  of  action  being  chosen 
to  carry  out  all  his  plans.  "  I  look  upon  men  of 
learning  and  brilliancy,"  he  declared,  "as  I  do  upon 
coquettes. " 

During  the  eight  months  which  followed  the  con- 
clusion of  the  Treaty  of  Tilsit,  i.e.  from  July,  1807,  to 
i  April,  1808,  Napoleon  remained,  with  the  excep- 
tion of  a  short  visit  to  Milan,  in  or  near  Paris,  while 
Joseph,  a  king  since  1806,  remained  in  his  kingdom  of 
Naples. 

During  these  months  Napoleon's  main  aim  was  to 
deliver  the  Continent  from  the  presence  of  the  English 
and  to  force  England  to  come  to  terms  with  him. 
Consequently  he  concentrated  his  attention  not  only 
upon  the  conversion  of  the  Baltic  and  the  Mediter- 
ranean into  French  lakes,  but  also  upon  becoming 
supreme  over  the  whole  of  the  Spanish  Peninsula. 

The  Treaty  of  Tilsit  marks  the  firm  establishment 
of  Napoleon's  power  over  Central  Europe.  The 
treaty  of  Luneville  had  given  France  the  left  bank  of 
the  Rhine,  a  priceless  possession,  for  the  attainment  of 
which  Frenchmen  had  longed  through  many  cen- 
turies. Napoleon  himself  was  only  32  years  old  in 


158          THE  LIFE  OF  NAPOLEON 

1 80 1  when  he  gave  France  this  invaluable  territory. 
Between  the  conclusion  of  the  Treaty  of  Luneville 
and  the  Treaty  of  Tilsit,  Europe  had  itself  experienced 
a  revolution  which  to  a  great  extent  had  been  acceler- 
ated by  Napoleon's  defeat  of  Austria.  In  1805  Austria 
had  been  overthrown  ;  in  July,  1806,  the  Holy  Roman 
Empire  had  come  to  an  end,  and  in  October  of  the 
same  year  Prussia  had  been  crushed.  In  June,  1807, 
the  Treaty  of  Tilsit  with  Russia  closes  a  period  of  un- 
precedented successes. 

At  the  same  time  the  Peace  of  Tilsit,  unlike  the 
Peace  of  Utrecht  or  the  Peace  of  Paris  in  1763,  did 
not  mark  an  epoch  in  European  history,  nor  did  it 
effect  a  permanent  settlement  of  questions  which  had 
long  been  in  dispute.  It  rather  belongs  to  that  class 
of  temporary  arrangements  which  like  the  Peace  of 
Ryswick  or  the  Peace  of  Amiens  merely  gave  breath- 
ing time  to  the  combatants.  Soldiers  might  indeed 
hope  that  a  period  of  rest  from  war  would  follow  the 
pacification  arranged  by  Napoleon  and  Alexander,  but 
Napoleon  himself  regarded  the  peace  "as  the  begin- 
ning of  a  new  time  of  activity,  in  which  the  forces  of 
the  Continent  were  to  be  used  for  the  humbling  of 
Great  Britain,  and  in  due  course  for  the  prosecution  of 
new  schemes  in  the  East  ".* 

The  task  of  humbling  Great  Britain  was  no  easy 

one,  and  as  upon  its  realization  depended  the  success 

of  his  Eastern  schemes  Napoleon  at  once  took  the 

matter  in  hand.      By  securing  his  predominance  in  the 

1  "Cambridge  Modern  History,"  Vol.  IX,  p.  294. 


THE  TREATY  OF  TILSIT,   1807      159 

Baltic  and  in  the  Spanish  Peninsula,  Napoleon  hoped 
to  intimidate  Great  Britain's  allies,  ruin  her  trade,  and 
force  her  to  agree  to  his  terms.  His  domination  of 
the  land  would,  he  thought,  amply  compensate  for  his 
failure  to  dominate  the  sea,  and  by  a  firm  enforcement 
on  his  part  of  the  Berlin  Decree  Great  Britain  would 
be  brought  to  her  knees.  According  to  his  expecta- 
tions this  Decree  would  "deal  a  deadly  blow"  at  the 
Island  State. 

The  attempt  to  carry  out  what  was  one  of  the 
principal  objects  of  his  policy,  viz.  the  complete  humili- 
ation of  Great  Britain,  thus  involved  Napoleon  in 
various  schemes.  French  supremacy  in  the  Baltic,  the 
complete  conquest  of  Spain  and  Portugal,  French 
ascendancy  in  the  Mediterranean,  the  destruction  of 
the  Turkish  power  on  its  complete  subordination  to 
France,  the  continued  subordination  of  the  German 
powers  to  his  will,  and  the  continuance  of  the  Russian 
alliance  were  all  absolutely  necessary  for  the  success 
of  Napoleon's  designs  against  Great  Britain.  Thus 
the  Emperor's  undertakings  were  indeed  "complex 
and  many-sided  "  ;  but  through  them  all  runs  one  main 
thread.  Once  Great  Britain  ruined  and  conquered, 
then  the  difficulties  in  the  way  of  the  realization  of 
Napoleon's  Eastern  schemes  would  be  comparatively 
small. 

There  seems  little  doubt  that  at  Tilsit  Napoleon 
had  looked  forward  "to  the  accession  of  the  Danish 
fleet  to  the  naval  resources  of  France,  Russia,  Holland, 
Spain,  Northern  Italy,  and  probably  Portugal". 


160          THE  LIFE  OF  NAPOLEON 

Such  a  combination  would,  he  thought,  be  sufficient 
to  drive  Great  Britain  from  the  Baltic  and  Mediter- 
ranean and  bring  about  her  submission.  Russia, 
Holland,  Northern  Italy,  and  Spain  could  be  counted 
upon  for  support  in  the  anti-British  crusade.  It  only 
remained  to  coerce  Denmark  and  Portugal. 

Canning  was  therefore  fully  justified  in  his  seizure 
of  the  Danish  fleet,  and  in  thus  destroying  Napoleon's 
plan  of  looking  upon  the  Danish  navy  as  "  the  right 
wing  in  the  naval  operations  eventually  to  be  carried 
out  against  the  mistress  of  the  seas  ". 

Before  the  seizure  of  the  Danish  fleet  by  Canning, 
Napoleon  had  determined  (i)  to  do  all  in  his  power 
to  keep  Russia  a  subservient  ally,  and  (2)  by  bringing 
Portugal  and  Spain  into  the  continental  system  to 
force  England  to  come  to  terms,  and  to  complete  his 
plans  for  the  complete  enslavement  of  Italy.  His 
endeavour  to  obtain  control  over  the  Mediterranean 
in  1805  nad  been  foiled  by  the  battle  of  Trafalgar. 
He  now  endeavoured  to  secure  the  same  object  by 
establishing  his  power  over  Portugal  as  well  as  Spain. 
In  the  autumn  of  1807,  however,  the  bombardment 
of  Copenhagen,  followed  by  the  seizure  of  the  Danish 
fleet  by  Canning,  struck  a  severe  blow  at  the  attempt 
to  force  Denmark  into  the  Napoleonic  system. 

His  failure  there  only  increased  Napoleon's 
intention  of  succeeding  in  Portugal,  Spain,  and  Italy. 
The  resistance  which  he  met  with  in  the  Spanish 
Peninsula  in  1808  was  of  enormous  importance,  be- 
cause he  was  forced  to  postpone  his  Mediterranean  and 


THE  TREATY  OF  TILSIT,  1807      161 

Eastern  plans,  and  the  delay  in  the  realization  of  these 
plans  caused  by  that  resistance  gave  time  to  Prussia 
and  Austria  under  Stein  and  Stadion  "  to  reorganize 
the  resources  of  those  countries,  and  prepare  them  for 
vigorous  and  effective  resistance  in  the  future". 

On  27  October,  1807,  Napoleon's  plans  with  re- 
gard to  Spain  and  Portugal  began  to  take  shape  in 
the  Treaty  of  Fontainebleau.  He  had  already  in 
1 806  discussed  the  question  of  the  partition  of  Portugal 
with  Godoy.  By  the  Treaty  of  Fontainebleau  the 
greater  part  of  Portugal  was  to  be  divided  between 
the  Queen  of  Etruria  (a  Spanish  princess)  and  her 
son,  the  grandson  of  Charles  IV,  and  Godoy,  the 
disposal  of  the  intermediate  districts  to  be  settled  later. 
By  the  Treaty,  too,  it  was  arranged  that  while  the 
greater  part  of  the  Spanish  forces  were  to  be  sent 
to  Portugal,  28,000  French  troops  (to  be  followed  by 
another  40,000  if  required)  were  to  be  admitted  into 
Spain. 

Thus  the  partition  of  Portugal  was  to  be  carried 
out  for  two  objects  : — 

(1)  In   order   to   deal   a  severe   blow   at    Great 
Britain's  maritime  trade. 

(2)  In  order  to  provide  an  exchange  for  Tuscany. 
"  It  is,"  Napoleon  wrote,  "  very  difficult  for  a  branch 
of  the  House  of  Spain  to  be  established  in  the  middle 
of  Italy."      The  truth  of  this  is  apparent  when  it  is 
remembered    that     Napoleon    had     determined     to 
"secure   complete    domination   in    Italy    in   matters 
commercial,  religious,  and  political".     Portugal  was 


H 


i62          THE  LIFE  OF  NAPOLEON 

like  Venice  in  1797  to  be  sacrificed  in  order  to  satisfy 
the  political  and  commercial  aims  of  Napoleon. 

Though  Portugal  declared  in  October,  1807,  her 
adhesion  to  the  continental  system,  Junot  and  French 
troops  invaded  the  country  only  to  find  that  on  29 
November  the  Prince  Regent  had  escaped  by  the  aid 
of  the  British  fleet. 

The  possession  of  Spain  and  Portugal,  in  Na- 
poleon's opinion,  would  be  followed  by  far-reaching 
results.  The  supremacy  of  the  British  in  the  Mediter- 
ranean would  be  destroyed.  Sicily  and  Malta  would 
inevitably  fall  into  the  hands  of  France,  and  the  Span- 
ish naval  resources  would  enable  him  to  carry  out  his 
Eastern  schemes. 

At  the  time  of  the  Treaty  of  Tilsit  Napoleon 
had  heard  of  the  deposition  of  Selim  II,  the  reforming 
Sultan  of  Turkey,  and  the  accession  of  Mustapha  IV. 
In  concert  with  Alexander,  Napoleon  at  once  decided 
upon  a  joint  spoliation  of  the  Turkish  Empire.  Be- 
fore, however,  this  plan  could  be  carried  out  it  was 
necessary  to  secure  complete  predominance  in  Spain. 
Thus  Turkey  was  for  the  time  safe  from  French 
interference,  while  after  the  Conference  of  Erfurt 
prudential  motives  prevented  Alexander  from  under- 
taking any  extensive  operations  against  Turkey. 

Till  July,  1808,  however,  Napoleon  hoped  to  be 
able  to  carry  out  his  designs  for  the  subjugation  of 
Turkey,  and  for  the  conquest  of  Egypt  and  India. 
But  from  that  time  (July,  1808)  events  in  Spain  forced 
him  (i)  to  forego  his  Eastern  projects,  (2)  to  modify 


THE  TREATY  OF  TILSIT,   1807      l63 

his  plans  generally,  (3)  to  meet  Alexander  at  Erfurt. 
Thus  the  summer  of  1808  proved  to  be  of  momentous 
importance  in  Napoleon's  career,  while  to  Europe 
generally  the  effect  of  the  events  in  Spain  cannot  be 
over-estimated. 

During  all  the  years  from  1797  to  1808,  Napoleon 
had  never  dismissed  from  his  mind  his  Asiatic  and 
Colonial  designs.  H  is  views  were  by  no  means  limited 
to  a  mere  European  supremacy,  the  attainment  of 
which  was  by  him  regarded  as  a  preliminary  measure 
to  extensive  Eastern  conquests. 

During  the  first  six  months  of  1806,  before  his 
plans  were  interfered  with  by  the  hostility  of  Prussia, 
his  mind  was  mainly  occupied  with  designs  for  securing 
Sicily  and  the  Mediterranean.  By  the  conclusion  of 
peace  with  Great  Britain  he  hoped  to  obtain  a  respite 
from  war  long  enough  to  enable  him  to  form  a  powerful 
fleet. 

But  circumstances  forced  him  to  postpone  the  exe- 
cution of  these  projects  and  to  devote  all  his  attention 
to  the  struggles  with  Prussia  and  Russia. 

After  Tilsit,  however,  he  was  enabled  to  return 
to  his  earlier  plans.  The  Continent  was  now  under 
his  ascendancy.  It  was  united  under  his  command 
in  antagonism  to  Great  Britain,  and  he  himself  was 
apparently  in  a  position  to  resume  his  Asiatic  schemes. 
France  had  indeed  no  adequate  fleet,  but  he  hoped 
soon  to  be  in  a  position  to  use  the  fleets  of  Denmark, 
Spain,  and  Portugal,  and  having  established  his  supre- 
macy over  those  countries,  to  include  in  his  system  the 


1 64         THE  LIFE  OF  NAPOLEON 

Spanish  and  Portuguese  colonies  of  Central  and 
Southern  America.  Thus  in  order  to  secure  a  com- 
plete mastery  over  the  Baltic  and  the  Mediterranean, 
and  to  place  his  Empire  on  an  equality  with  Great 
Britain  as  a  colonizing  power,  Napoleon  had  merely 
to  secure  the  alliance  of  Denmark  and  Spain,  just  as 
he  had  secured  the  alliance  of  Bavaria  and  other 
German  secondary  States. 

The  war  with  Spain  broke  out  in  1 808,  and  though 
Napoleon  regarded  it  in  the  light  of  a  rising  which 
could  easily  be  suppressed,  its  outbreak  interfered  with 
the  execution  of  his  schemes  in  the  Mediterranean, 
and  forced  him  to  postpone  his  designs  with  regard  to 
Turkey  and  the  East  generally. 

Simultaneously  with  the  national  uprising  in  Spain 
in  1808,  marked  by  the  capitulation  of  Baylen  and  the 
Convention  of  Cintra,  there  became  apparent  a  feel- 
ing of  general  dissatisfaction  on  the  part  of  the  Tsar 
Alexander  with  the  conduct  of  Napoleon  in  relation 
to  the  Treaty  of  Tilsit.  Alexander  had  come  away 
from  Tilsit  with  his  mind  bent  upon  conquests  in 
Turkey.  The  French  alliance  was  never  popular  in 
Russia,  but,  as  Alexander  and  his  minister  Romanzoff 
were  well  aware,  successful  enterprises  against  Turkey 
would  still  all  discontent  and  satisfy  the  Russian 
people.  But  at  Tilsit  Napoleon  had  asserted  his  right 
to  act  as  arbiter  in  the  war  between  Russia  and 
Turkey,  for  he  feared  if  war  continued  Turkey  would 
throw  itself  into  the  arms  of  Great  Britain.  In  all 
future  operations  against  Turkey,  the  eventual  partition 


THE  TREATY  OF  TILSIT,  1807      165 

of  which  was  ever  in  Napoleon's  mind,  Russia  and 
France  in  his  opinion  must  act  simultaneously  and  in 
unison. 

Moreover,  Napoleon,  in  the  Secret  Treaty  con- 
cluded at  Tilsit,  had  definitely  laid  it  down  that  when- 
ever the  partition  of  Turkey  should  be  taken  in  hand 
"the  town  of  Constantinople  and  the  province  of 
Roumelia"  should  not  be  included  in  the  territory 
handed  over  to  Russia. 

If,  however,  Russia  was  bound  by  the  Treaty  of 
Tilsit  to  retire  from  the  Danubian  provinces,  Napoleon 
was  equally  bound  by  the  same  Treaty  (Article  4)  to 
withdraw  his  troops  from  Prussian  territory.  While 
the  wish  nearest  to  Alexander's  heart  was  the  annexa- 
tion of  much  of  Turkey,  including  Constantinople,  the 
determination  of  Napoleon  to  destroy  Prussia  was 
equally  strong.  Prussia  had  steadily  refused  to  enter 
into  the  Confederation  of  the  Rhine,  and  inconsequence 
Napoleon  was  resolved  to  bring  about  her  political 
annihilation.  A  suggestion  by  Napoleon  that  an 
arrangement  might  be  come  to  by  which  he  should 
work  his  will  upon  Prussia  without  interference,  while 
Alexander  should  be  allowed  to  keep  the  Danubian 
provinces,  was  peculiarly  distasteful  to  the  latter 
monarch.  His  sympathies  had  been  aroused  by  the 
misfortunes  of  the  Prussian  King  and  of  his  wife,  Queen 
Louise,  and  his  mind  revolted  from  a  bargain  which 
meant  the  utter  ruin  of  the  Hohenzollern  House. 

Thus  no  definite  settlement  was  come  to  on  these 
important  questions,  and  the  opening  of  1808  found 


1 66         THE  LIFE  OF  NAPOLEON 

the  French  and  Russian  Emperors  each  dissatisfied 
with  the  conduct  of  the  other.  While  things  were  in 
this  position  the  Spanish  rising  took  place.  Its  effect 
upon  the  relations  of  Napoleon  and  Alexander  was 
manifested  in  unmistakable  fashion  in  October,  1808, 
at  Erfurt.  No  one,  however,  least  of  all  Napoleon, 
imagined  during  the  early  months  of  that  year  that  the 
course  of  events  in  Spain  was  destined  to  be  more 
than  a  temporary  check  upon  the  development  of 
Napoleon's  fortunes. 

In  fact  Napoleon  imagined  that  his  position  after 
Tilsit  rendered  him  the  dictator  of  Europe,  and  it  was 
not  till  181 1  that  he  began  to  realize  fully  the  existence 
of  obstacles  to  the  full  attainment  of  his  ambitious 
views. 

One  result  of  the  position  attained  by  Napoleon  at 
the  time  of  the  Treaty  of  Tilsit  was  the  altered  tone 
which  he  adopted  in  his  relations  with  the  Papacy. 
It  became  evident  that  his  object  was  to  enslave  the 
Church.  He  pictured  himself  as  the  head  of  a  vast 
European  dominion  in  which  he  was  to  rule  the  con- 
sciences of  his  subjects  through  his  vassals,  the  Pope 
and  Bishops.  This  he  thought  could  be  accomplished 
without  any  direct  assumption  of  authority  in  things 
spiritual. 

To  this  scheme  Pius  VII,  to  his  eternal  credit, 
offered  strenuous  opposition,  and  in  consequence 
Napoleon  determined  to  transfer  the  Papacy  to  Paris 
or  some  other  French  town,  to  enforce  the  adoption 
of  the  distinctive  principles  of  Gallican  theology,  and 


THE  TREATY  OF  TILSIT,   1807      167 

generally  to  dictate  the  Papal  policy.  As  a  means  of 
carrying  out  this  vigorous  policy  Napoleon  relied  upon 
the  hearty  co-operation  of  the  Gallican  Episcopate. 

In  1806  he  issued  the  Catechism  of  the  Empire 
which  was  agreed  to  by  the  Papal  Legate  but  not  by 
the  Pope,  who,  however,  made  no  formal  protest. 
Early  in  1808  the  occupation  of  Rome  by  French 
troops  commanded  by  Miollis  announced  to  the  world 
the  declaration  of  war  between  the  French  Emperor 
and  the  Pope.  The  struggle  between  these  poten- 
tates was  nominally  over  that  article  in  the  Concor- 
dat which  provided  that  the  Prelates  nominated  by 
Napoleon  should  be  instituted  to  their  office  by  the 
Pope.  Pius  VII,  a  prisoner  at  Savona  since  5  July, 
1 809,  declined  to  recognize  the  appointments  to  vacant 
bishoprics,  on  the  ground  that  Napoleon,  being 
guilty  of  culpable  conduct  to  the  Papacy,  was  not  in 
a  fit  position  to  exercise  the  right  of  nomination,  and 
on  this  ground  he  refused  to  institute  Cardinal  Maury 
to  the  Archbishopric  of  Paris. 

In  consequence  of  this  determination  on  the  part  of 
Pius,  no  less  than  twenty-seven  sees  were  vacant  in 
1809,  and  Napoleon  in  order  to  secure  his  aims 
appointed  in  November,  1809,  an  Ecclesiastical  Com- 
mission to  deal  with  the  crisis.  He  further  attempted 
to  conciliate  Pius  by  offering  him  the  Papal  posses- 
sions south  of  the  Apennines.  Pius,  however, 
refused  to  treat  except  from  Rome,  which  he  was, 
however,  not  to  see  again  till  1814.  The  situation 
was  not  unlike  that  of  1682  when  Louis  XIV 


1 68         THE  LIFE  OF  NAPOLEON 

thought  of  setting  up  an  independent  Gallican  Church, 
and,  moreover,  Napoleon's  Commission  recommended, 
as  had  been  done  in  1682,  the  summoning  of  a  national 
representative  Council. 

The  reply  of  Pius  to  Napoleon's  appointment  of 
an  Ecclesiastical  Council  was  a  Papal  Bull  excom- 
municating all  who  had  been  guilty  of  aggressions 
against  the  Holy  See,  but  its  only  effect  at  the  time 
was  to  irritate  the  Commission  which  practically  en- 
dorsed Napoleon's  policy.  In  1809  the  question  of 
Napoleon's  divorce  from  Josephine  and  his  marriage 
with  Marie  Louise  of  Austria  (after  the  divorce  had 
been  recognized  by  the  Senate)  was  referred  to  the 
Consistory  Court  of  Paris.  This  marriage  caused 
much  searching  of  hearts  among  the  Cardinals  who 
in  November,  1809,  were  ordered  to  proceed  to  Paris. 
Many  who  were  doubtful  of  the  legality  of  the 
marriage  refused  to  go,  and  were  imprisoned  or 
exiled,  but  Maury  and  those  who  agreed  with  him 
drew  up  on  16  January,  1810,  an  address  in  support 
of  Napoleon's  wishes. 

From  this  time  Napoleon  made  no  secret  of  his 
zeal  for  the  Gallican  principles  as  laid  down  in  1682, 
and  for  the  extinction  of  the  independence  and 
autonomy  of  the  Church. 

During  1810  and  1811  the  struggle  proceeded 
and  in  June,  1812,  Pius  was  taken  to  Paris.  In 
December,  however,  the  failure  of  the  Russian  ex- 
pedition and  the  overthrow  of  the  Grand  Army  were 
accomplished  facts,  and  the  attitude  of  Napoleon  was 


THE  TREATY  OF  TILSIT,  1807      169 

at  once  changed.  In  January,  1813,  the  Treaty  of 
Fontainebleau  was  made  by  Napoleon  with  Pius  who, 
shortly  afterwards,  was  allowed  to  return  to  Rome. 
The  fall  of  the  Empire  was  accompanied  by  a  re- 
traction of  the  Treaty  by  Pius  who,  like  many 
temporal  monarchs,  regained  that  liberty  of  action  of 
which  he  had  been  like  them  deprived  for  so  many 
years.1 

At  St.  Helena  Napoleon  wrote  and  spoke  of  his 
religious  policy.  He  fully  realized  how  powerful  a 
lever  was  religion  in  the  hands  of  a  ruler,  and  how 
necessary  it  was  to  be  on  good  terms  with  the  Pope. 
"  By  being  on  good  terms  with  the  Pope,"  he  said, 
"  one  can  govern  the  consciences  of  a  hundred  million 
Catholics.  .  .  .  What  an  immense  influence  that 
means  !  What  a  hold  on  public  opinion  !  "  2  He 
explained  his  rupture  with  the  Papacy  by  the  facts 
that  though  Pius  VII  had  some  affection  for  him, 
politics  caused  the  breach  between  them.  The  Pope, 
he  declared,  desired  above  everything  else  temporal 
power,  and  that  as  soon  as  he  realized  that  he  could 
not  enjoy  it,  he  entered  upon  a  course  of  first  secret 
and  then  open  hostility  to  the  French  Emperors. 
Napoleon  declared,  moreover,  that  he  always  made  a 
distinction  between  the  Pope  as  Prince  and  the  Pope 
as  Pontiff.  At  the  same  time  he  firmly  asserted 

1This  subject  is  very  adequately  treated  in  Jervis's  "History 
of  the  Galilean  Church,"  a  work  to  which  I  am  much  indebted. 

2Gonnard,  "The  Exile  of  St.  Helena,"  p.  164.  London, 
Heinemann,  1909. 


1 70         THE  LIFE  OF  NAPOLEON 

(though  his  letters  furnish  conclusive  proof  that  the 
removal  of  Pius  to  Avignon  was  carried  out  by  his 
express  orders)  that  though  General  Miollis  was  jus- 
tified in  removing  the  Pope  from  Rome  yet  that 
he  acted  without  orders.  Rome  was  in  a  dangerous 
condition,  a  rising  was  probable,  and  the  removal 
of  Pius  to  Savona  was,  in  his  opinion,  a  wise  step. 
Though  Pius  was  well  treated  he  at  once  transformed 
"  the  political  conflicts  into  a  religious  war  "  ;  and  his 
refusal  to  institute  the  Bishops  chosen  by  Napoleon 
justified  the  calling  of  the  Council  of  1811.  The 
summoning  of  this  Council,  so  Napoleon  stated,  was 
meant  to  be  the  first  step  in  the  direction  of  handing 
over  to  the  State  the  immediate  control  of  religious 
affairs.  The  political  resistance  of  the  European 
sovereigns  had  led  to  an  extension  of  his  plans,  and 
similarly  the  struggle  with  Pius  caused  him  to  de- 
velop his  projects  for  securing  full  control  of  the 
religion  of  his  subjects.  But  all  his  projects  were 
overthrown  by  the  events  of  1812  and  the  following 
years,  owing  to  the  uprising  of  Europe  against  the 
French  domination.  Such  was  Napoleon's  explana- 
tion of  his  anti-papal  policy.  The  Papacy  had  its 
revenge.  After  1812  "the  Pope,  the  Spaniards,  and 
the  sailors  who  maintained  the  continental  blockade  " 
were  together  responsible  for  that  rising  of  the  nations 
which  eventually  freed  them  from  the  Napoleonic 
despotism. 

An   interesting   question   arises    with  respect   to 
Napoleon's  position  after  Tilsit     Had  he  not  under- 


THE  TREATY  OF  TILSIT,   1807 

taken  the  invasion  of  Spain  in  1807-8,  nor  of  Russia 
in  1812,  would  he  have  remained  Emperor  till  his 
death  ?  Madame  de  Stael  held  the  view  that  war  was 
necessary  to  him  for  the  preservation  of  his  absolutism. 
"  A  great  nation,"  she  says,  "  would  not  have  endured 
the  monotonous  and  degrading  weight  of  despotism,  if 
military  glory  had  not  continually  roused  and  animated 
public  sentiments."  Mr.  Bodley  holds  the  contrary 
view.  In  his  opinion,  Napoleon  having  finished  his 
great  work  of  organization,  but  "  given  to  the  army 
eleven  years  of  legitimate  glory  from  Castiglion  to 
Friedland,  had  an  unexampled  opportunity  of  ruling 
peacefully  a  contented  people".1  There  is  much  to 
be  said  in  support  of  this  view  ;  but  Napoleon,  ignorant 
of  the  real  strength  of  the  British  navy,  and  still 
more  ignorant  of  the  determination  and  vitality  of  the 
British  nation,  was  resolved  to  carry  out  his  Eastern 
schemes.  It  is  seldom  realized  how  dear  to  him  were 
those  schemes.  Supremacy  in  the  Mediterranean,  the 
downfall  of  the  British  power  in  India,  the  subjection 
of  England  to  his  will — these  seemed  to  him  in  1807-8 
when  at  the  height  of  his  power  to  be  objects  well 
within  his  reach. 

Consequently  after  Tilsit  his  character  degenerates. 
"  The  lawgiver,  the  organizer,  the  statesman  disap- 
pears ;  he  is  only  the  conqueror,  conscious  of  his  skill 
in  the  terrible  game  of  war,  which  distorts  his  imagina- 
tion and  drags  him  in  a  furious  wanton  course  to 
Madrid,  to  Moscow,  and  to  Leipsic." 2 

1  Bodley,  "  France,"  Vol.  I,  p.  1 1 1.          2  Ibid.  Vol.  I,  p.  1 1 1. 


172         THE  LIFE  OF  NAPOLEON 

"  After  Tilsit,  and  especially  after  the  Austrian  mar- 
riage," writes  another  biographer,1  "  Napoleon  was 
suffering  from  conceit  and  '  pride '.  For  ten  years  he 
had  wielded  absolute  power,  and  those  ten  years 
had  changed  him  from  a  strenuous  hard-worker,  who 
studied  the  situation  with  great  care,  to  a  self-willed 
despot,  who  expected  everything  to  go  as  he  wished 
because  he  wished  it,  and  imagined  himself  a  being 
apart  from  mankind  endowed  with  supernatural 
powers." 

Tilsit  saw  Napoleon  at  the  height  of  his  power. 
From  the  date  of  that  treaty  the  foundations  of  his 
empire  became  unsound.  Had  the  Emperor  abandoned 
projects  of  aggression,  had  he  modified  the  continental 
system,  had  he  refrained  from  endeavouring  to  force 
his  policy  upon  Spain,  had  he  recognized  the  immense 
power  of  the  Roman  Church,  it  is  quite  possible  that 
the  rule  of  his  family  in  France  might  have  been 
perpetuated.  But  his  "  restless  egotism "  and  the 
growth  of  "the  despotic  habit"  appeared  more  and 
more  unmistakably  after  1807,  and  his  policy  became 
"increasingly  dissociated  from  the  opinion  and  the 
tradition  of  France".  After  1807  France,  satisfied 
with  the  establishment  of  the  Napoleonic  Empire, 
desired  peace. 

The  substitution  of  Champagny  and  Maret  the 
Duke  of  Bassano  for  Talleyrand  as  confidential  ad- 
visers marks  the  increase  of  Napoleon's  impatience 
of  able  and  independent  advisers.  Thus  while  the 

1  Norwood  Young,  "The  Growth  of  Napoleon,"  p.  389. 


THE  TREATY  OF  TILSIT,  1807      173 

growing  opposition  to  the  continental  system  was 
tending  to  rouse  in  Germany  a  spirit  of  revolt,  in  Spain 
the  abhorrence  of  Napoleonic  rule  was  sapping  his 
military  strength.  Moreover,  as  the  years  following 
Tilsit  proceeded,  the  French  people  realized  that  the 
spirit  of  moderation  was  more  and  more  absent  from 
the  schemes  of  the  Emperor,  who,  moreover,  by  his 
anti-papal  policy,  alienated  many  of  those  who  adhered 
to  the  Roman  Catholic  faith. 

CHIEF  DATES 

War  between  Russia  and  Turkey    .         .         .     December,  1806. 
Napoleon  takes  Dalmatia  and  Ragusa    .         .     December,  1806. 
Venice  united  to  the  Italian  Kingdom    .         .     December,  1806. 
British  Orders  in  Council       ....         January,  1807. 

Eylau  .         .         .         .         .         .         .8  February,  1807. 

Convention  of  Bartenstein  (Russia,  Prussia,  Sweden)    April,  1807. 
Heilsberg     .......         10  June,  1807. 

Friedland     .         .         .         .         .         .         .         14  June,  1807. 

Treaty  of  Tilsit 9  July,  1807. 

Formation  of  Grand  Duchy  of  Warsaw  .         .      July,  1807. 

British  seizure  of  Danish  fleet  .  .  .  September,  1807. 
Treaty  of  Fontainebleau  ....  October,  1807. 
French  invasion  of  Portugal  .  October-November,  1807. 


CHAPTER   VI 

THE  BEGINNING  OF  NAPOLEON'S  INTERVENTION 
IN  SPAIN  AND  THE  CONGRESS  OF  ERFURT,  1807- 
1808 

After  Tilsit — Growth  of  national  feeling  and  of  national 
opposition  to  Napoleon — Junot's  invasion  of  Portugal — Napoleon's 
Mediterranean  schemes — The  importance  of  Spain — Napoleon 
in  Italy,  1807 — The  Milan  Decree — The  meaning  of  the  con- 
tinental system — Advantages  to  Spain  of  a  French  alliance — 
Its  importance  for  Napoleon's  Mediterranean  policy — Napoleon's 
policy  to  Spain — The  Bayonne  interview — Explanation  of  Na- 
poleon's action — The  influence  of  religion  in  Spain — Summary  of 
the  events  leading  to  the  Spanish  rising — Accession  of  Joseph — The 
Spanish  rising — Baylen  and  Cintra — Murat,  King  of  Naples — 
The  Congress  at  Erfurt — Its  meaning  and  importance. 

'TRILL  Tilsit  Napoleon  had  been  the  scourge  of 
Europe.  Europe  demanded  a  scourge,  and  in 
the  words  of  Lord  Rosebery,  he  purged  "the  floor 
of  Europe  with  fire  "-1  All  the  ancient  monarchies  were 
compelled  "to  set  their  houses  in  order,"  with  results 
highly  beneficial  to  themselves  and  to  Europe.  In 
1799  it  seemed  as  though  Europe  would  escape  from 
reform  ;  in  1815  she  had  not  only  been  forced  to  adopt 
reforms  but  had  experienced  a  revolution.  After 

xLord  Rosebery,  "Napoleon:  the  Last  Phase,"  p.  228. 
J74 


INTERVENTION  IN  SPAIN          175 

Tilsit  Europe  definitely  entered  upon  a  new  period  in 
its  career. 

The  Revolution  which  had  done  its  work  in  France 
had,  unwittingly  and  unconsciously,  instilled  new  life 
into  Europe.  National  feeling  was  created,  and 
simultaneously  with  its  unexpected  assertion  in  Spain 
began  to  show  itself  in  many  parts  of  Germany.  In 
1813  it  was  strong  enough  to  force  Napoleon  back 
into  France,  and  in  1814  it  brought  about  his  downfall. 
But  in  1807  Napoleon,  carried  away  by  his  successes, 
culminating  in  the  Treaty  of  Tilsit,  determined  to 
bring  the  Spanish  Peninsula  under  his  immediate  in- 
fluence. His  policy  towards  Spain  well  illustrated 
his  extraordinary  confidence  in  himself,  his  belief  in 
his  destiny,  his  audacity,  and  his  gambling  spirit.  At 
St.  Helena  he  recognized  how  mistaken  had  been  his 
policy  to  Spain. 

While  Junot  was  traversing  Spain  in  the  later 
months  of  1807  Napoleon's  activity  never  ceased. 
Junot  occupied  Lisbon  on  13  December,  1807;  on 
23  November  Napoleon  had  entered  Milan  on  his 
way  to  Venice.  He  was  resolved,  as  far  as  Italy 
was  concerned,  to  close  all  Italian  ports  to  English 
ships.  Leghorn  and  Ancona  were  at  once  forced 
into  obedience,  and  Napoleon  returned  to  those  pro- 
jects of  domination  in  the  Mediterranean  which  he 
had  cherished  when,  at  the  age  of  26,  he  had  com- 
manded 30,000  men  in  Egypt,  and  had  never 
abandoned.  France  had,  indeed,  owing  to  the  su- 
periority of  the  English  fleet,  lost  her  colonies  and 


176         THE  LIFE  OF  NAPOLEON 

much  of  her  commerce.  But  the  establishment  of 
French  supremacy  in  the  Mediterranean  implied  not 
only  the  conquest  of  Macedonia  and  of  Egypt  and 
complete  mastery  over  Dalmatia  and  the  Ionian  Isles, 
but  also  the  subjugation  of  Spain.  The  Mediterranean 
would  thus  be  closed  to  the  English,  Spain  in  pos- 
session of  Gibraltar  and  subservient  to  France  would 
hold  the  keys  of  this  new  Empire,  the  possession 
of  which  would  amply  compensate  France  for  the  loss 
of  her  colonies. 

The  way  to  the  complete  success  of  the  continental 
blockade,  therefore,  lay  through  Spain,  and  Napoleon's 
mind  during  this  period  never  wandered  far  from 
Spain.  Unless  his  plans  in  Spain  were  successful  all 
the  money  expended  in  the  south  of  Italy  would  be 
wasted.  And  Naples  had  proved  "un  gouffre  sans 
fond,  d'hommes  et  d'argent ".  Napoleon,  indeed,  was 
far  from  being  satisfied  with  Joseph's  government.  An 
easy-going  man,  without  any  special  political  capacity, 
and  one  who  was,  moreover,  apt  to  become  discon- 
tented with  his  position,  Joseph  was  tolerant  even 
with  those  who  openly  declared  their  preference  for  a 
Republican  to  an  Imperial  form  of  government.  What 
was  more  serious,  the  Calabrian  district  of  the  Neapoli- 
tan kingdom  was  infested  with  brigands,  while  at 
Reggio  the  English  held  their  own. 

On  his  return  to  Milan  after  visiting  Venice  and 
Mantua,  Napoleon  issued  on  17  December,  1807,  tne 
Milan  Decree — the  complement  of  the  Berlin  Decree  of 
21  November,  1806.  By  it  every  ship — no  matter  of 


INTERVENTION  IN  SPAIN          177 

what  country — which  accepted  the  English  Orders  in 
Council  was  declared  liable  to  capture.  Also  every 
ship  sailing  from  or  to  England,  or  from  or  to  one  of 
the  English  colonies,  was,  if  possible,  to  be  seized. 
In  fierce  terms  Napoleon  condemned  the  English 
declaration  that  the  flag  did  not  render  the  cargo  free 
from  the  danger  of  capture.  In  adopting  this  tone 
and  these  measures  Napoleon  was  in  fact  repeating 
the  French  Navigation  Act  of  September,  1793,  and 
the  declarations  of  the  Committee  of  Public  Safety. 

In  adopting  this  policy  Napoleon  ignored  the 
possibility  of  an  uprising  of  the  nations  against  a 
system  which  touched  every  man.  He  seems  to 
have  imagined  that  in  order  to  secure  adhesion  to  his 
disastrous  policy  he  had  simply  to  procure  the  easily- 
obtained  acquiescence  of  the  rulers.  By  the  con- 
tinental system  not  only  were  the  nations  of  Europe 
ruined,  they  were  humiliated.  For  their  acceptance 
of  the  continental  blockade  implied  absolute  sub- 
servience to  a  tyrannical  foreigner. 

The  tyranny  of  the  English  edicts  was  not  so 
apparent  to  the  ordinary  inhabitant  of  continental 
Europe  as  was  the  French  domination,  the  severity  of 
which  was  felt  by  him  every  day  of  the  week. 

If  he  happened  to  live  in  one  of  the  provinces 
which  had  been  torn  from  Austria  or  Prussia  he  found 
himself  placed  under  the  rule  of  a  stranger.  He  was 
surrounded  by  Custom  House  officials,  by  a  foreign 
gendarmerie ;  he  was  liable  to  domiciliary  visits ;  he 
saw  his  children  forced  to  serve  in  the  French  armies  ; 

12 


178          THE  LIFE  OF  NAPOLEON 

he  was  ruined  by  the  weight  of  taxation.  Owing  to 
the  continental  system  he  was  now  faced  by  the  fear 
of  starvation. 

Till  the  continental  system  threatened  Europe 
Napoleon  had  reason  to  believe  that  there  was  no 
danger  of  any  serious  opposition  to  his  supremacy. 
His  successes  had  been  extraordinary,  and  so  easily 
obtained  that  he  never  realized  their  superficial  char- 
acter. He  had  "partitioned  kingdoms,  overthrown 
dynasties,  erected  kings,"  but  he  never  realized  the 
possibility  of  Europe  rising  to  shake  itself  free  from 
his  domination.1 

For  the  success  of  his  schemes,  the  establishment 
of  the  French  power  in  the  Mediterranean  and  the 
active  co-operation  of  Spain  and  Portugal  in  the 
policy  of  the  continental  blockade  were  absolutely 
necessary.  That  accomplished  it  would  then  become 
necessary  to  make  some  satisfactory  arrangements 
with  Russia.  That  Power  had  interests  in  the  Medi- 
terranean which,  if  strenuously  upheld,  might  interfere 
seriously  with  Napoleon's  projects.  The  firm  friend- 
ship of  Russia  was  absolutely  essential  to  the  success 
of  his  plan.  While  he  was  forcing  the  acceptance  of 
his  will  upon  Spain  and  Portugal,  he  relied  upon  the 
Tsar  to  prevent  any  rising  on  the  part  of  Austria  or 
Prussia. 

To  a  man  of  the  imaginative  character  of  Napoleon 
nothing  was  impossible.  He  determined  to  use  all 

1Sorel,  "L'Europe  et  la  Revolution  Franchise,"  Vol.  VII, 
p.  236.  Paris,  Plon. 


INTERVENTION  IN  SPAIN          179 

his  efforts  to  turn  the  attention  of  Russia  towards  the 
Baltic.  The  seizure  of  certain  of  Sweden's  posses- 
sions would  necessitate  removal  of  Russian  troops 
from  the  Danube  to  Finland.  Later,  he  hoped  to 
turn  the  attention  of  Russia  towards  Asia.  The 
conquest  of  Russia  and  even  of  India  would  have 
a  twofold  effect.  Alarmed  at  the  threatened  attack 
upon  their  Indian  possessions  the  English  would 
evacuate  the  Mediterranean,  and  would  hasten  to 
make  peace  with  France.  And  at  the  same  time  the 
absence  of  the  Russian  armies  in  Asia  would  give 
Napoleon  a  free  hand  with  regard  to  Egypt  and 
Turkey. 

At  the  end  of  January,  1808,  Savary  returned 
from  a  mission  to  Russia  and  Napoleon  realized  that 
Alexander  would  not  acquiesce  as  easily  as  he  had 
hoped  in  his  schemes.  Moreover,  he  was  at  the  same 
time  brought  to  realize  that  the  British  Government, 
undeterred  by  its  apparent  isolation  in  Europe,  was 
resolved  to  continue  the  war  to  the  bitter  end.  The 
declared  opinion  of  the  English  Parliament  implied 
war  to  the  death. 

Nevertheless  no  thought  of  failure  crossed  Na- 
poleon's mind.  He  was  busy  arranging  for  the 
inclusion  of  the  whole  of  the  Spanish  Peninsula  in  his 
continental  system,  and  he  never  imagined  that  he 
would  meet  with  any  serious  opposition. 

Moreover,  during  the  early  months  of  1808,  he  had 
ever  reason  to  believe  that  French  supremacy  in  the 
Mediterranean  would  be  firmly  secured. 


i8o         THE  LIFE  OF  NAPOLEON 

The  Treaty  of  Tilsit,  as  has  been  seen,  "  had  en- 
abled Napoleon  to  turn  from  the  contests  of  the  North 
towards  his  cherished  schemes  for  securing  supremacy 
in  the  Mediterranean  "-1 

Alexander  had  relinquished  his  hold  on  the  Ionian 
Islands  in  favour  of  Napoleon,  who  in  February,  1808, 
dispatched  a  fleet  under  Ganth^aume  who  seized  and 
occupied  Corfu.  This  success  was  regarded  by 
Napoleon  as  a  preliminary  step  to  the  establishment 
of  his  supremacy  in  the  Mediterranean  and  to  the 
partition  of  Turkey  between  France,  Russia,  and 
Austria. 

But  before  these  ambitious  projects  so  dear  to 
Napoleon  could  be  carried  out,  the  Spanish  rising  took 
place,  an  event  which  led  to  the  overthrow  of  his 
Eastern  schemes  and  indirectly  to  his  own  fall. 

After  Tilsit  Napoleon,  as  has  been  pointed  out, 
looked  forward  confidently  to  the  overthrow  of  Great 
Britain,  the  ruin  of  her  Eastern  Empire,  and  the  firm 
establishment  of  France  as  the  leading  power  in  the 
world.  To  overcome  Great  Britain  he  relied  upon 
the  Russian  alliance,  the  Berlin  and  Milan  Decrees, 
his  coercion  of  Denmark  and  Portugal,  and  the  com- 
plete subservience  of  Spain. 

The  issue  of  the  Berlin  Decree  in  November, 
1 806,  was  followed  by  the  English  Orders  in  Council, 
January  to  November,  1807,  and  by  the  Milan  Decree, 
and  a  long  and  bitter  struggle  ensued — in  the  case  of 

1  Johnston,  "The  Napoleonic  Empire  in  Southern  Italy," 
Vol.  I,  p.  172.  London,  Macmillan  &  Co.,  1904. 


INTERVENTION  IN  SPAIN          181 

the  British  nation,  a  struggle  for  life.  As  Napoleon 
realized  that  he  could  not  attack  Great  Britain  directly 
he  devised  his  plan  of  commercial  strangulation.  In 
spite  of  the  temporary  relief  afforded  to  British  manu- 
facturers by  the  Spanish  rising  which  enabled  them  to 
pour  their  goods  into  Spain  and  the  Spanish  colonies, 
the  manufacturing  districts  in  England  underwent 
great  misery.  The  relief,  however,  afforded  to  British 
commerce  by  its  ability  to  trade  with  Spain,  Portugal, 
and  their  colonies,  together  with  Napoleon's  adhesion 
to  the  old  mercantile  theory,  enabled  the  British  nation 
to  struggle  through  the  terrible  years  1810  and  1811. 
Thus  Napoleon's  two  gigantic  blunders — the  war  with 
Spain  and  his  permission  to  export  corn  into  England 
— finally  put  an  end  to  all  chance  of  the  establishment 
on  the  part  of  France  of  a  great  world  Power  giving 
laws  to  Europe  and  developing  the  resources  of  a 
vast  colonial  Empire.1 

The  Berlin  and  later  the  Milan  Decree  no  doubt 
caused  great  inconvenience  to  the  inhabitants  of  Great 
Britain,  but  in  themselves  they  were  not  sufficient  to 
establish  Napoleon's  ascendancy  in  Europe.  The 
seizure  of  the  Danish  fleet  in  September,  1807,  relieved 
the  British  Government  from  any  fear  of  the  destruc- 
tion of  its  naval  power  in  the  Baltic,  but  at  the  time 
it  proved  but  a  slight  advantage  to  Great  Britain  and 
interfered  with  Napoleon's  plans  to  only  a  moderate 
extent. 

1  "  Lectures  upon  the  History  of  the  Nineteenth  Century," 
P-  77- 


i82         THE  LIFE  OF  NAPOLEON 

The  real  issue  between  Napoleon  and  Great 
Britain  had  to  be  fought  out  in  the  Spanish  Peninsula. 
Napoleon's  Empire  was  in  reality  staked  upon  his 
success  or  failure  in  Spain. 

With  Spain  as  a  cordial  ally,  Napoleon  would  be 
able  to  compete  with  Great  Britain  as  a  naval  and 
colonizing  power.  Since  1795  Spain  had  been  the 
nominal  ally  of  France,  and  her  ruler  was  as  subser- 
vient as  were  the  rulers  of  Bavaria  and  Wurtemberg. 
Portugal  could  not  hope  to  resist  any  force  that  Spain 
might  bring  against  her,  and  as  far  as  her  resources 
and  position  as  a  European  power  were  concerned 
might  be  placed  in  the  same  category  as  such  states 
as  Sardinia,  Naples,  Hanover,  and  Brunswick. 

For  Spain  the  advantages  to  be  derived  from  her 
reorganization  by  Napoleon  seemed  undeniable.  A 
hundred  years  previously  Louis  XIV  had  saved  her 
from  undergoing  the  fate  of  Poland  by  bringing  her 
into  close  relations  with  his  monarchy,  and  by  carrying 
out  by  means  of  his  agents  the  complete  rehabilitation 
of  the  Spanish  administration.  With  the  accession 
of  Philip  V,  the  Bourbon  grandson  of  Louis,  new  life 
was  instilled  into  Spain,  and  till  the  death  of  Charles 
III,  in  1788,  she  had  enjoyed  the  benefits  of  the 
efforts  made  by  her  Bourbon  rulers  and  by  such 
enterprising  ministers  as  Alberoni,  Patino,  Wall, 
Squillacci,  D'Aranda,  and  Campomanes. 

Spain  in  1807  was  still  passing  through  a  period 
of  misgovernment  which  followed  the  death  of 
Charles  III.  Her  army  was  worthless;  her  navy 


V.  < 

K  - 

£  ^ 

•-"  a 

(A  = 

C.  :- 

.  Z 


a  < 

!B    S? 


INTERVENTION  IN  SPAIN          183 

had  been  wellnigh  destroyed  at  Trafalgar.  But  had 
her  army  and  navy  been  placed  at  the  disposal  of 
Napoleon,  had  she  been  treated  as  an  honoured  ally 
of  France,  as  Bavaria  had  been  treated,  and  been 
given  a  share  of  Portugal — then  Spain  would  have 
become  a  client  state  of  France,  and  would  have 
aided  not  only  the  establishment  of  French  supremacy 
in  the  Mediterranean,  but  would  have  contributed  to 
the  complete  isolation  of  Great  Britain.1 

Instead,  however,  of  adopting  this  course  and 
taking  steps  to  make  his  alliance  with  Spain  durable 
and  valuable,  Napoleon  insisted  on  placing  his  brother 
Joseph  Bonaparte  on  the  Spanish  throne.  Louis  XIV 
had  indeed  pursued  a  somewhat  similar  course,  but  he 
acted  in  accordance  with  the  wishes  of  the  Spanish 
people.  In  1700  the  death  of  Charles  II  had  left 
Spain  without  a  ruler,  and  in  order  to  avert  partition 
at  the  hands  of  France,  Austria,  and  Great  Britain, 
the  Spaniards  invited  Philip,  the  grandson  of  Louis, 
to  become  their  king.  In  1807,  however,  Spain  had 
a  king  and  a  crown  prince,  but  Napoleon,  adopting 
a  high-handed  course,  procured  their  abdication,  and 
without  consulting  the  wishes  of  the  Spanish  nation 
forced  upon  it  as  king  Joseph  Bonaparte. 

Napoleon's  three  months'  sojourn  at  Bayonne  in 
1808  may  be  said  to  mark  the  turning-point  in  his 
career.  It  was  then  that  he  decided  upon  the  fatal 
mistake  of  transferring  his  brother  Joseph  from 
Naples  to  Spain. 

JSee  Seeley,  "Life  of  Stein,"  Pt.  IV,  ch.  i. 


1 84          THE  LIFE  OF  NAPOLEON 

Mistakes  he  had  already  made,  but  his  miscal- 
culation with  regard  to  the  true  policy  to  be  carried 
on  in  his  relations  with  Spain  proved  overwhelmingly 
disastrous.  Spain  had  always  gravitated  naturally 
towards  France,  and  Napoleon  could  without  much 
difficulty  have  counted  upon  the  ready  subservience 
of  the  Spanish  monarch. 

Some  justification  has  been  urged  on  behalf  of 
what  seems  to  be  an  extraordinary  blunder  and  a 
fatal  miscalculation  on  the  part  of  Napoleon.  The 
Government  of  Spain,  it  is  asserted,  and  with  truth, 
was  the  worst  in  Europe.  The  existing  abuses  were 
manifest  to  the  world,  and  their  existence  was  the  more 
incapable  of  defence  if  it  be  remembered  that  under 
Charles  III  abuses  had  been  checked  and  the  country 
placed  in  a  prominent  position  among  European 
Powers.  By  restoring  order  in  Spain  and  by  carry- 
ing out  reforms  similar  to  those  instituted  by  Charles 
III,  Napoleon,  it  would  seem,  might  have  resuscitated 
the  vast  Spanish  Empire,  modernized  it,  and  launched 
it  afresh  on  a  career  not  unworthy  of  its  past  traditions. 

In  an  age,  too,  which  has  been  styled  one  of  "in- 
ternational lawlessness,"  Napoleon  considered  that 
the  benefits  likely  to  accrue  to  Spain  and  her  people 
would  justify  in  the  eyes  of  the  world  his  daring 
and  revolutionary  policy.  To  a  man  of  Napoleon's 
vigour,  capacity,  enterprise,  and  ambitions,  the  oppor- 
tunity of  reforming  and  launching  on  a  successful 
career,  a  great  country  like  Spain  with  all  its  infinite 
resources  must  have  seemed  irresistible.  The  corrup- 


INTERVENTION  IN  SPAIN          185 

tion  in  every  department  of  the  Spanish  Govern- 
ment was  so  manifest  that  to  him  the  benefits,  which 
would  be  derived  from  the  reform  of  abuses,  would 
easily  outweigh  a  few  high-handed  and  revolutionary 
acts. 

Without  drastic  measures  it  would  seem  impossible 
to  rescue  Spain  from  the  effects  of  the  rule  of  the  most 
contemptible  of  the  Bourbon  race.  Moreover,  the 
very  existence  of  a  Bourbon  ruler  was  repugnant  to 
Napoleon  and  to  every  exponent  of  French  revolu- 
tionary principles. 

Napoleon,  too,  realized  that  the  misgovernment  of 
Spain  could  not  be  cured  under  the  weak  rule  of 
Charles  IV,  and  that  the  Spanish  alliance  during  the 
last  few  years  had  been  of  little  value  to  France.  Its 
debt  was  enormous,  its  fleet  was  practically  valueless, 
its  army  in  a  state  of  dissolution  :  in  a  word,  its 
alliance  with  France  had  proved  of  small  advantage  to 
Napoleon.  By  taking  possession  of  Spain,  Napoleon 
would  deal  "a  final  blow  to  the  House  of  Bourbon," 
he  would  remove  from  France  all  danger  of  finding  in 
Spain  during  the  ensuing  years  an  enemy,  he  would 
advance  the  interests  of  his  own  house,  and,  above  all, 
by  striking  a  blow  at  Great  Britain  from  which  as  he 
hoped  she  would  not  recover,  he  would  be  enabled  to 
carry  out  his  ambitious  Eastern  schemes  and  establish 
the  world-wide  supremacy  of  France.  He  had  thus 
many  and  plausible  reasons  for  treating  Spain  on  a 
plan  totally  different  from  that  which  he  had  adopted 
with  regard  to  Bavaria,  Wurtemberg,  and  Baden. 


1 86          THE  LIFE  OF  NAPOLEON 

With  his  immense  army  he  felt,  moreover,  able  to  act 
not  only  as  a  reformer  but,  if  necessary,  as  a  conqueror. 

Moreover,  the  establishment  of  Spain  under  his 
direct  control  would  mark  the  completion  of  the  con- 
tinental system  and  would  place  in  his  hands  her  fleet 
and  colonial  Empire.  Cadiz  and  Carthagena  would  be 
invaluable  bases  for  expeditions,  the  command  of  the 
Mediterranean  would  pass  to  France,  half  of  the  new 
world  would  be  under  her  rule.  Great  Britain  would 
assuredly  be  ruined. 

It  has  been  argued  that  the  true  policy  of  Spain 
was  to  accept  Napoleon's  intervention  and  reforms  in 
the  spirit  in  which  his  vassal  states  in  Germany  had 
accepted  them.  By  so  doing  Spain  like  Bavaria 
would  have  found  herself  in  a  strong  position  after 
Napoleon's  downfall.  Spain,  according  to  this  view, 
should  have  sacrificed  her  political  independence  for  a 
time  in  order  to  regain  prosperity  and,  later,  indepen- 
dence. Her  true  interests,  it  is  further  alleged,  were 
opposed  to  those  of  Great  Britain  ;  and  by  entering 
into  the  Peninsular  War  she  merely  supported  the 
cause  of  British  trade  and  that  of  the  Roman  Church. 

Plausible  as  this  view  may  seem,  it  errs  in  ignoring 
the  fact  that  Spain  in  resisting  Napoleon  was  struggling 
for  the  independence  of  Europe,  and  was  the  first 
continental  power  to  oppose  the  "  international  law- 
lessness "  which  characterized  the  Napoleonic  regime. 

There  is,  moreover,  no  doubt  that  Spain  differed 
widely  from  the  German  States  which  Napoleon  had 
so  far  been  chiefly  concerned  with.  No  national  life 


INTERVENTION  IN  SPAIN          187 

existed  as  yet  in  Germany  nor  in  Italy.  In  neither 
of  those  countries  had  he  been  opposed  by  the  people. 
His  entry  into  Berlin  after  Jena  was  accompanied  by 
the  plaudits  of  the  Prussian  inhabitants  of  that  city. 
Neither  in  Germany  nor  in  Italy  had  the  people  been 
allowed  any  share  in  political  affairs.  Both  countries 
also  had  been  divided  among  so  many  rulers  that  a 
feeling  of  nationality  did  not  exist.  Neither  Germany 
nor  Italy  were  independent  countries,  and  in  neither 
case  was  the  State  the  nation.  Neither  country  was 
held  together  by  that  all-powerful  influence — religion. 

In  no  respect  did  Spain  differ  from  Germany  so 
greatly  as  in  the  matter  of  religion.  In  Spain  religion 
was  the  strongest  existing  force.  To  Napoleon's 
offer  of  reforms  which  should  benefit  the  common 
interests  of  the  Spaniards,  the  reply  was  that  his 
projects  endangered  the  existence  of  Catholicism  in 
Spain.  The  Spaniards  were  held  together  by  a  tie  of 
supreme  force — that  of  religion,1  "  a  religion  fierce, 
ignorant,  intolerant ". 

Moreover,  in  Spain  the  feeling  of  patriotism,  which 
as  yet  did  not  exist  in  Germany  and  Italy,  was  always 
latent,  and  after  the  Bayonne  interview  was  roused 
and  rapidly  developed.  "  When  the  State  fell  to 
pieces  the  nation  held  together  and  proceeded  to  put 
forth  out  of  its  own  vitality  a  new  form  of  State." 
When  Napoleon  imagined  that  he  had  established  his 
brother  Joseph  on  the  throne  of  Spain,  he  was  startled 
by  finding  that  an  unexpected  obstacle  to  the  realiza- 

1  Seeley,  "  Life  and  Times  of  Stein,"  Pt.  IV,  ch.  i,  p.  83. 


188          THE  LIFE  OF  NAPOLEON 

tion  of  his  hopes  had  appeared — an  obstacle  which 
"proved  fatal  to  his  (Napoleon's)  Empire".1  With 
the  outbreak  of  this  Spanish  revolt  may  be  dated  the 
definite  beginning  of  the  fall  of  Napoleon. 

In  1806  it  had  become  evident  to  Napoleon  that 
the  tie  which  by  the  Treaty  of  1795  held  Spain  to 
France  was  a  very  slight  one.  During  the  campaign 
of  Jena  a  proclamation  issued  by  Godoy  calling  upon 
the  Spanish  people  to  prepare  for  war,  convinced 
Napoleon  "that  a  Bourbon  on  the  Spanish  throne 
was  a  tiresome  neighbour — too  weak  as  an  ally,  yet 
dangerous  as  a  possible  enemy  ".2  The  possibility  of 
an  attack  by  Spain  while  he  was  occupied  in  central 
Europe,  and  the  conviction  that  no  Bourbon  could  be 
a  faithful  ally  of  one  who  had  sprung  from  the  Revolu- 
tion, decided  Napoleon,  after  the  conclusion  of  peace 
with  Alexander  at  Tilsit,  to  take  in  hand  the  affairs  of 
Spain  and  Portugal.  Already  in  March,  1807,  he  had 
obtained  from  Godoy  18,000  of  the  best  Spanish  troops 
who  were  stationed  on  the  Baltic.  Thus  was  Spain 
at  a  critical  moment  in  her  history  deprived  of  an 
invaluable  source  of  defence.  At  the  end  of  July 
Napoleon  had  returned  to  Paris,  and  early  in  August 
French  troops  began  to  assemble  at  Bayonne  with  the 
ostensible  purpose  of  forcing  Portugal  to  carry  out 
the  Berlin  Decree.  The  half-measures  proposed  by 
the  Prince  Regent  in  reply  to  Napoleon's  demand  for 
the  seizure  of  all  British  merchants  in  Portugal  were 

1  Seeley,  "Life  and  Times  of  Stein,"  Pt.  IV,  ch.  i,  p.  85. 

2  Oman,  "  History  of  the  Peninsular  War,"  Vol.  I,  p.  3. 


INTERVENTION  IN  SPAIN          189 

not  considered  satisfactory.  On  13  October  a  pro- 
clamation was  issued  in  Paris  that  "the  House  of 
Braganza  had  ceased  to  reign  ". 

On  1 8  October  a  French  army,  under  Junot, 
entered  Spain,  and  on  30  November  he  entered 
Lisbon  only  to  find  that  on  the  previous  day  the 
Prince  Regent  sailed  for  South  America.  The 
formal  annexation  of  Portugal  by  France  was  the 
next  step  in  Napoleon's  policy.  On  13  December 
the  tricolour  was  hoisted  in  Lisbon. 

The  history  of  Napoleon's  occupation  of  Portugal 
is  of  considerable  interest.  It  shows  that  while  the 
Emperor  was  denouncing  Great  Britain  for  her 
rapacity  and  disregard  of  conventions  in  seizing  the 
Danish  fleet,  he  was  himself  contemplating  a  very 
similar  line  of  conduct  in  Portugal.  The  occupation 
of  Portugal  by  the  French,  too,  decided  Napoleon  to 
continue  his  designs  for  the  dethronement  of  the 
Spanish  Bourbons. 

On  14  April,  1808,  Napoleon  reached  Bayonne, 
and  the  next  day  he  wrote  to  acquaint  Joseph  in 
Naples  with  the  position  of  affairs.  "  I  am,"  he  said, 
"  expecting  the  Prince  of  the  Asturias  who  has  taken 
the  name  of  Ferdinand  VII,  and  I  am  also  expecting 
the  unfortunate  Charles  IV  and  the  Queen.  The 
Grand  Duke  of  Berg  (Murat)  is  at  Madrid,  General 
Dupont  is  at  Toledo.  I  have  divisions  at  Aranjuez 
and  at  the  Escurial,"  and  he  might  have  added  at 
Barcelona,  Figueras,  Pampeluna,  St.  Sebastian  and 
Burgos. 


igo         THE  LIFE  OF  NAPOLEON 

It  is  quite  clear  from  this  letter  and  one — a  very 
important  one — written  on  18  April  that  the  occupa- 
tion of  the  Spanish  Peninsula  by  French  troops  and 
the  substitution  of  Joseph  for  Charles  or  Ferdinand  was 
part  of  the  scheme  for  the  expulsion  of  the  English 
from  the  Mediterranean,  and  had  been  projected  long 
before  Canning's  seizure  of  the  Danish  fleet.  For, 
while  explaining  to  Joseph  the  political  situation  in 
Spain,  Napoleon  alludes  with  satisfaction  to  Corfu  and 
to  the  fact  that  Scylla — that  important  post — is  being 
fortified.  He  was  more  firmly  resolved  than  ever  to 
carry  out  the  continental  system  and  to  ruin  England, 
which  was,  as  he  knew,  beginning  to  suffer  from  the 
effects  of  her  long  war.  "  Nothing  but  peace  with 
that  country,"  he  declared,  "can  make  me  sheathe 
the  sword  and  restore  tranquillity  to  Europe." 

On  5  May,  1808,  Charles  IV  and  Ferdinand  VII 
resigned  the  crown  of  Spain  to  Napoleon.  Already 
on  2  May  a  serious  insurrection  had  broken  out  in 
Madrid,  which  might  have  warned  Napoleon  of  the 
danger  of  proceeding  too  hastily.  But  neither  that 
rising  nor  the  'insurrections  which  had  taken  place  in 
various  parts  of  Spain  between  22  and  30  May  had 
any  effect  upon  Napoleon's  plans.  On  1 1  May  he 
had  informed  Joseph  that  he  was  King  of  Spain,  and 
indicated  to  him  the  advantages  of  that  position.  "  It 
is  a  throne  which  places  you  at  Madrid,  a  three  days' 
journey  from  France.  ...  At  Madrid  you  are  in 
France ;  Naples  is  the  end  of  the  world."  Lucien 
Bonaparte  (the  Prince  of  Canino)  would  probably 


INTERVENTION  IN  SPAIN          191 

have  made  a  better  king  of  Spain  than  Joseph.  He 
had  considerable  oratorical  powers ;  he  had  more 
energy  :  the  success  of  the  coup  cFttat  of  Brumaire 
was,  to  a  great  extent,  due  to  him.  He  knew  his 
limitations  and  would  not  have  meddled  in  military 
affairs.  If  success  could  have  attended  the  Spanish 
experiment  (which  is  very  doubtful  after  the  perfidy  of 
Bayonne)  it  would  have  been  with  Lucien  or  Murat 
at  Madrid. 

Joseph  had,  however,  proved  himself  an  able 
diplomatist  both  at  Luneville  and  at  Amiens.  His 
work  at  Naples,  too,  had  been  most  creditable.  He 
had  restored  order  to  the  finances,  he  had  swept 
away  feudal  abuses,  he  had  reorganized  the  taxation, 
he  had  established  and  preserved  order.  In  trans- 
ferring him  to  Madrid,  however,  Napoleon  committed 
a  great  blunder. 

On  6  June  Joseph  was  proclaimed  King  of 
Spain  and  the  Indies  by  Napoleon ;  on  7  June  he 
arrived  at  Bayonne  ;  on  9  July  he  entered  Spain  ;  on 
20  July  he  arrived  at  Madrid.  Two  days  later 
Dupont's  capitulation  at  Baylen  took  place,  and  on 
i  August  Wellesley  landed  in  Portugal. 

Meanwhile  Joachim  Murat,  who  had  married 
Caroline  Bonaparte,  had  accepted  the  throne  of 
Naples  and  on  6  September  he  entered  his  capital. 
He  at  once  infused  new  life  into  his  kingdom,  in- 
augurated reforms,  and  endeavoured  though  in  vain 
to  capture  Sicily.  In  1812  he  joined  the  Moscow 
expedition  as  commander  of  the  cavalry.  It  was 


i92          THE  LIFE  OF  NAPOLEON 

evident  to  him  that  the  future  of  his  kingdom  of 
Naples  would  be  decided  in  the  north  of  Europe. 

The  rising  in  Spain  in  1808  marks  the  opening  of 
a  new  epoch  in  European  history.  It  shows  that  the 
real  meaning  of  the  Revolution  under  Napoleon  was 
gradually  becoming  patent  to  keen  observers.  The 
war  of  1792  can,  indeed,  be  adduced  as  the  first 
example  in  the  eighteenth  century  of  a  war  which 
was  essentially  national,  but  in  its  later  phases  the 
effects  of  the  Revolution  were  essentially  cosmo- 
politan and  anti-national. 

The  rising  in  Spain,  like  the  rising  in  Austria  in 
1809  and  of  Germany  in  1813,  was  decidedly  national, 
and  the  growth  of  the  spirit  of  nationality  was  directly 
opposed  to  the  teaching  of  the  Revolution.  The 
more  predominant  Napoleon's  influence  became  in 
Germany  the  more  the  spirit  of  nationality  was 
checked.  How  fatal  to  liberty  was  French  influence 
can  be  realized  if  it  be  noted  that  the  adoption  of 
French  doctrines  led  to  the  suppression  of  the  old 
estates  in  Bavaria  and  Wiirtemberg,  and  to  the  com- 
plete abolition  of  the  old-established  forms  of  self- 
government. 

The  rising  in  Spain  was,  if  we  look  into  its  real 
meaning,  the  unconscious  expression  of  a  revolt 
against  "the  uniformity  and  the  break  with  old-estab- 
lished customs  caused  by  the  French  ".  From  1 807 
onwards  were  sown  the  seeds  of  the  romantic  revival  in 
Europe,  and  of  the  reaction  against  Rousseau's  teach- 
ing. The  rising  in  Spain  illustrates  the  force  of  the 


INTERVENTION  IN  SPAIN          193 

opposition  which  the  French  Revolution,  as  directed 
by  Napoleon,  was  already — as  early  as  1808 — calling 
into  existence. 

Spain  had  hitherto  given  no  sign  of  being  able 
to  resist  invasion.  No  other  country  in  Europe  has 
suffered  so  many  conquests,  probably  none  has  been 
embroiled  in  so  many  civil  wars.  At  the  same  time,  in 
justice  to  the  Spanish  patriotism,  it  must  be  remembered 
that  the  French  invasion  of  Spain,  as  undertaken  by 
Napoleon,  was  the  best  organized  that  had  ever  swept 
over  the  land.  The  resistance  of  the  Spaniards,  which 
could  not  have  proved  as  effective  as  it  did  without 
the  aid  of  the  English  (any  more  than  the  English 
intervention  could  have  proved  as  effective  as  it  did 
without  the  Spanish  rising),  was  characterized,  like 
all  Spanish  risings,  by  reckless  bravery  and  by  lack 
of  discipline.  Probably,  however,  the  Napoleonic 
struggle  produced  the  nearest  approach  to  united 
action  on  the  part  of  the  Spaniards  that  has  ever  been 
witnessed. 

The  French  failure  in  the  Peninsula  is  mainly  to 
be  attributed  to  Napoleon  himself.  Only  his  violent 
breach  of  good  faith  could  have  united  the  Spaniards 
with  the  Portuguese  and  the  English.  Once  roused, 
the  stubborn  racial  identity  of  the  Spaniards  speedily 
asserted  itself,  and  the  national  antagonism  to  France 
was  intensified  by  religious  fanaticism.  The  Spanish  or- 
ganization, indeed,  never  rose  much  above  the  guerilla 
order,  but  with  the  aid  of  the  English  it  proved  suffi- 
cient to  hold  the  French  at  bay  till  the  break-down  of 

13 


i94          THE  LIFE  OF  NAPOLEON 

the  continental  system,  and  the  hostility  of  Russia 
forced  Napoleon  to  devote  his  chief  attention  to  Central 
and  North-Eastern  Europe. 

Instead,  therefore,  of  securing  the  naval  and  mercan- 
tile resources  of  the  Spanish  Peninsula,  Napoleon,  by 
his  haste,  by  his  lack  of  appreciation  of  the  difference 
between  Spain  and  Central  Germany,  was  led  to  com- 
mit one  of  his  greatest  blunders,  viz.  his  treacherous 
action  at  Bayonne.  Instead  of  adding  enormously  to 
the  naval  and  mercantile  resources  of  France  by  his 
seizure  of  Spain,  "  he  brought  on  a  struggle  that  was 
to  occupy  the  energies  of  a  quarter  of  a  million  or 
more  of  his  best  troops  for  five  years  to  come,  that 
was  to  empty  his  coffers,  and — worst  of  all  in  his  sight — 
was  to  give  most  timely  relief  to  England  V  From 
the  opening  of  the  Spanish  war  British  goods  began 
to  pour  into  Spain,  and  the  Spanish  colonies  for  the 
first  time  in  the  history  of  Great  Britain  began  to 
admit  British  merchandise.  Thus  Napoleon's  mis- 
taken policy  in  the  Spanish  Peninsula  saved  Great 
Britain  from  that  ruin  which  he  imagined  was  made 
inevitable  from  the  date  of  the  arrival  of  Junot  at 
Lisbon. 

In  saying  that  the  risings  in  Spain,  Austria,  and 
Germany  were  national,  care  must  be  taken  to  dis- 
tinguish the  movement  in  Spain  from  that  of  Germany, 
and  that  of  Germany  from  that  of  Italy.  It  is  often 
asserted  with  some  truth  that  the  Spanish  rising  in- 

1  "  Lectures  on  the  History  of  the  Nineteenth  Century  : 
England  and  Napoleon,"  p.  74. 


INTERVENTION  IN  SPAIN          195 

augurated  a  general  movement  in  Germany  and  Italy 
against  the  Napoleonic  regime,  and  that  before  the 
"  rising  of  the  nations  "  Napoleon  fell.  Symptoms 
of  a  national  movement  in  various  parts  of  Europe 
appeared  after  the  Treaty  of  Tilsit.  In  Spain,  in 
Austria,  and  in  Prussia  can  be  found  evidence  of  the 
steady  growth  of  political  feeling  antagonistic  to  the 
aims  of  Napoleon. 

In  that  struggle  against  the  French  predominance, 
we  must  distinguish  the  idea  of  nationality  as  it  showed 
itself  in  Spain  and  as  it  was  gradually  evolved  in  Italy, 
from  the  idea  of  nationality  as  it  was  adopted  in 
Germany. 

The  idea  of  nationality  as  it  appeared  to  the 
Spaniards  and  later  to  the  Italians  "pointed  to  the 
political  unification  of  populations  having  a  language 
and  literature,  a  character  and  memories,  in  common," 1 
while  on  the  other  hand  the  German  sentiment  was 
primarily  connected  with  the  feeling  of  race,  which, 
while  admitting  "  the  existence  of  ruling  and  subject 
races,  never  dreamt  of  relaxing  the  German  hold  on 
Poles  or  Italians  ".  Thus  at  the  Congress  of  Vienna 
the  hold  of  Prussia  and  Austria  over  parts  of  Poland 
or  Italy  was  recognized. 

In  the  Spanish  resistance  to  Napoleon  religion 
played  an  important  part.  Napoleon's  treatment  of 
the  Pope  was  deeply  resented  in  Spain.  In  the  war 
against  Napoleon  the  Spaniards  fought  not  only  for 

1 "  Lectures  on  the  History  of  the  Nineteenth  Century,"  p.  42. 


i96          THE   LIFE  OF  NAPOLEON 

national  independence,  but  also  for  the  cause  of  religion 
against  the  infidel. 

The  Spanish  rising  in  1 808,  however,  has  a  special 
importance  in  that  it  marked  the  beginning  of  a 
series  of  risings  before  which  Napoleon  eventually  fell. 

In  1809  the  Austrians  rose  ;  in  1812  the  Russian 
opposition  to  Napoleon  led  to  the  Moscow  expedition  ; 
in  1813  the  War  of  Liberation,  ending  with  the  down- 
fall of  the  French  Emperor,  began. 

In  1808  it  was  evident  to  Napoleon  after  the 
capitulation  of  Baylen  (July)  and  the  Convention  of 
Cintra  (30  August)  that  his  Eastern  schemes  must  be 
postponed,  and  that  the  opposition  to  the  execution  of 
his  plans  in  Spain  must  be  at  once  checked,  no  matter 
at  what  cost. 

Joseph  seems  from  his  arrival  in  Madrid  to  have 
gauged  the  situation  far  more  accurately  than  did 
Napoleon.  Before  he  had  heard  of  the  Baylen  dis- 
aster he  had  written  to  the  Emperor  pointing  out  the 
evil  results  which  must  follow  upon  Caulaincourt's 
pillage  of  churches  in  Cuenza.  And  on  24  July  he 
assured  Napoleon  that  he  (the  Emperor)  had  been 
deceived  and  that  glory  would  be  shipwrecked  in 
Spain.  At  the  same  time  he  promises  to  do  his  best 
in  the  difficult  situation  in  which  he  finds  himself. 
With  honest  generals,  good  troops,  and  50  millions, 
something  might  yet  be  done  to  retrieve  the  position. 

On  28  July  Joseph  heard  of  Dupont's  capitulation 
and  retired  from  Madrid  to  Miranda  between  Burgos 
and  Valencia,  having  been  only  eight  days  in  Madrid, 


JOSEPH    BONAPARTE 

FROM   A   LITHOGRAPH 


INTERVENTION  IN  SPAIN          197 

The  capitulation  of  Baylen  was  followed  by  a 
respite  from  serious  operations  by  the  French  for  a 
period  of  some  three  months.  Napoleon,  on  hearing 
of  the  disaster,  followed  a  few  weeks  later  by  the 
battles  of  Roliga  on  17  August,  ofVimeiroon2i  August, 
and  of  the  Convention  of  Cintra  on  30  August,  at 
once  ordered  a  large  body  of  his  most  experienced 
troops  which  were  then  in  Germany  to  march  into 
Spain.  The  necessity  for  the  departure  of  troops  for 
Spain  compelled  Napoleon  to  remove  all  his  soldiers 
from  Prussia,  though  he  left  garrisons  in  the  fortresses 
of  Custrin,  Glogau,  and  Stettin.  The  removal  of  the 
troops  was  not,  however,  begun  till  Prussia  had 
agreed  to  a  humiliating  convention,  which  only  per- 
mitted her  to  possess  an  army  of  42,000  and  forbade 
the  organization  of  any  form  of  a  militia.  The  French 
troops  could  not,  however,  reach  Spain  before  October, 
and  in  the  meantime  Napoleon  went  to  Erfurt  in 
order  to  assure  himself  of  freedom  from  all  anxiety 
in  central  Europe,  while  he  concentrated  his  efforts 
upon  the  suppression  of  the  Spanish  insurrection. 

His  policy,  which  included  the  Partition  of  Turkey 
and  the  conquest  of  Egypt  and  India,  had,  since  the 
Treaty  of  Tilsit,  developed  in  a  most  extraordinary 
fashion,  but  its  success  depended  on  (i)  the  acqui- 
escence of  Russia,  (2)  the  conquest  of  Spain.  At  first 
it  seemed  that  from  Russia  he  would  receive  cordial 
support  in  the  execution  of  his  plans.  In  Russia,  Count 
Budberg  had  been  succeeded  as  Minister  of  Foreign 
Affairs  by  Count  Romanzoff,  a  strong  supporter  of  the 


198         THE  LIFE  OF  NAPOLEON 

Russian  alliance  and  "  a  firm  believer  in  Russia's 
mission  to  effect  the  overthrow  of  Turkey  ",l  At 
Tilsit,  however,  Napoleon  had  played  the  part  of 
arbiter,  and  he  proposed  not  only  to  act  as  arbiter 
in  all  questions  relating  to  the  complex  Eastern 
question,  but  above  all  to  prevent  Constantinople 
and  the  province  of  Roumelia  from  falling  into  the 
hands  of  Russia. 

Alexander  was  naturally  irritated  at  Napoleon's 
attitude  with  regard  to  Constantinople,  and  as  the 
French  troops  had  not,  according  to  Article  4  in  the 
Treaty  of  Tilsit,  been  withdrawn  from  their  occupation 
of  certain  Prussian  fortresses  and  districts,  he  did 
not  withdraw  the  Russian  forces  from  the  Danubian 
provinces. 

Dupont's  capitulation,  followed  by  the  battles  of 
Roli^a  and  Vimeiro  and  by  the  Convention  of  Cintra, 
made  it  all  the  more  necessary  for  Napoleon  to  place 
his  relations  with  Alexander  on  a  firm  basis.  A  free 
hand  in  Spain  for  a  few  months  was  all  that  he  asked 
for.  He  sent  Ney  to  Spain,  and  he  wrote  to  Joseph 
to  say  that  shortly  100,000  more  men  would  be  sent 
to  his  assistance  and  that  in  the  autumn  Spain  would 
be  conquered.  Joseph,  however,  held  a  very  different 
view.  In  his  opinion  the  Spaniards  would  never  be 
reconciled  to  his  rule. 

Early  in  September,  then,  Napoleon  arranged  for 
vast  reinforcements  to  proceed  to  Spain,  while  he  im- 
pressed upon  Joseph  the  necessity  of  acting  withseverity 
1 "  Cambridge  Modern  History,"  Vol.  IX,  p.  805. 


INTERVENTION  IN  SPAIN          199 

towards  all  the  disaffected.  Three  weeks  later  he 
was  at  Erfurt,  where  on  the  2yth  the  conferences,  which 
lasted  till  1 3  October,  began.  At  this  brilliant  gather- 
ing, at  which  were  present  numerous  kings  and  princes, 
and  where  Goethe,  "the  representative  of  the  cosmo- 
politanism and  lack  of  patriotism  which  had  enabled 
Napoleon  to  attain  to  his  predominant  position,"1  re- 
ceived the  Cross  of  the  Legion  of  Honour,  the  French 
Emperor  was  compelled  to  yield  to  many  of  Alex- 
ander's demands.  On  13  October  he  wrote  that 
he  had  arranged  all  with  the  Emperor  of  Russia. 
As  the  price  of  Alexander's  non-interference  with 
Napoleon's  seizure  of  Spain,  Russia  was  to  have 
Finland,  Moldavia,  and  Wallachia.  "  I  am,"  he  said, 
"  to  start  to-morrow  for  Paris,  and  in  a  month's  time 
I  shall  be  at  Bayonne."  He  was  full  of  confidence. 
"  At  present,"  he  wrote,  "  the  enemy's  presumption  is 
so  great  that  I  am  inclined  to  think  he  will  remain 
where  he  is.  The  nearer  he  is  to  us  the  better.  A 
well -arranged  manoeuvre  might  terminate  the  war 
by  a  single  blow,  and  for  this  my  presence  is  neces- 
sary."2 

In  reality  the  price  which  he  had  paid  for  Russian 
non-intervention  with  his  plans  in  Spain  was  a  heavy 
one.  He  still  occupied  certain  fortresses  in  Prussia, 
which  he  never  intended  to  evacuate,  and  he  was 
willing  to  recognize  the  possession  by  Russia  of 
Moldavia  and  Wallachia  if  he  could  keep  Prussia,  the 

Atkinson,  "A  History  of  Germany,  1715-1815,"  p.  523. 
2  "  Napoleon's  Correspondence  with  Joseph,"  Vol.  I,  p.  336, 


200          THE  LIFE  OF  NAPOLEON 

total  ruin  of  which  he  desired,  in  his  possession.  This 
scheme  had  never  met  with  Alexander's  approval  and 
at  Erfurt  was  dropped,  owing  to  the  necessity  recog- 
nized by  Napoleon  for  doing  nothing  which  would 
in  any  degree  alienate  the  Tsar.  The  whole  Eastern 
question  was  left  unsettled,  for  it  was  recognized  that 
it  was  unadvisable  to  press  Turkey  lest  she  should 
throw  in  her  lot  with  England  Moreover,  it  was 
agreed  that  the  acquisition  by  Russia  of  Moldavia 
and  Wallachia  should  be  deferred.  "  The  Spanish 
rising,"  it  has  truly  been  said,  "saved  Prussia  from 

virtual  extinction  and  the  Turkish  Empire  from  parti- 

^"      » i 
tion. 

But  some  years  were  to  elapse  before  Napoleon, 
unlike  his  brother  Joseph,  realized  the  true  meaning 
of  the  Spanish  insurrection.  In  the  spring  of  1808, 
while  planning  the  deposition  of  the  Spanish  Bourbons, 
he  had  been  preparing  for  an  Eastern  expedition.  He 
continued  to  regard  the  opposition  in  Spain  to  Joseph 
as  a  matter  of  little  moment,  and  till  the  failure  of  the 
Moscow  expedition  he  never  seems  to  have  realized  the 
possibility  of  the  total  failure  of  his  schemes  in  Spain. 

Though  after  the  close  of  the  Erfurt  Conference 
Napoleon  was  in  Spain  during  November  and  Decem- 
ber, he  was  fully  aware  of  the  trend  of  events  in 
Germany,  and  at  the  end  of  December,  1808,  he 
declared  Stein  to  be  an  outlaw.  Stein,  who  had  been 
dismissed  on  24  November  by  Frederick  William,  to 
whom  his  ministers'  project  for  an  insurrection  was 
1  "Cambridge  Modern  History,"  Vol.  IX,  p.  31$. 


INTERVENTION  IN  SPAIN          201 

distasteful,  found  himself  obliged  to  leave  Berlin  with 
the  utmost  diligence  and  secrecy  on  6  January,  1809, 
and  fled  to  Buchwald,  the  residence  of  the  Count 
Reden  in  Silesia,  arriving  there  on  9  January.  Being 
in  imminent  danger  of  capture,  he  hastened  to  cross 
the  border  into  Austrian  territory,  and  thus  escaped 
Napoleon's  vengeance.  That  he  was  enabled  to 
escape  successfully  was  due  to  the  assistance  which  he 
received  from  the  Count  and  Countess  Reden.1  This 
incident,  one  result  of  which  was  that  Stein  was  en- 
abled later  to  influence  in  a  marked  degree  the  Tsar 
during  the  War  of  Liberation,  is  an  admirable  proof 
of  Napoleon's  resolve  to  crush  Prussia  completely,  and 
of  his  realization  of  the  danger  from  the  growth  of 
national  feeling  in  Germany.  It  is,  moreover,  an 
excellent  instance  of  the  pertinacity  with  which  he 
pursued  his  schemes. 

CHIEF  DATES 

Occupation  of  Portugal  by  Junot  .  .  .  November,  1807. 
The  Milan  Decree  .....  December,  1807. 
French  troops  occupy  Spanish  fortresses  .  February,  1808. 
Abdication  of  Charles  IV  of  Spain  .  .  March,  1808. 

Abdication  of  Ferdinand  at  Bayonne  .  .  .  May,  1808. 
Annexation  of  Tuscany  to  France  .  .  .  May,  1808. 

Joseph  Bonaparte  King  of  Spain  ....  May,  1808. 
Beginning  of  Spanish  risings  ....  May,  1808. 

The  Baylen  Capitulation  .....  July,  1808. 
Battle  of  Vimeiro,  Convention  of  Cintra  .  August,  1808. 
Congress  of  Erfurt  .....  October,  1808. 

1  "A  Pietist  of  the  Napoleonic  Wars  and  After,"  p.  81  seq. 
London,  John  Murray,  1905. 


CHAPTER  VII 

NAPOLEON  AT  THE  HEIGHT  OF  HIS  POWER, 
1808-1812 

After  Erfurt — Napoleon  in  Spain — Corunna — Napoleon's 
return  to  Paris — The  situation  in  Paris — War  with  Austria — Its 
causes — Prussian  neutrality — The  views  of  Stadion,  Archduke 
Charles,  Stein,  Scharnhorst — The  Wagram  campaign — Napoleon's 
Hungarian  policy — The  Peace  of  Vienna  (Schonbrunn) — Na- 
poleon in  Paris — The  Austrian  marriage — Napoleon  divorces 
Josephine — The  importance  of  the  Russian  alliance — The  con- 
tinental system  at  its  height — Position  of  Great  Britain — The 
continental  system  versus  the  continental  blockade — The  year 
1 8 10 — Abdication  of  Louis  King  of  Holland — The  Russian  Ukase 
of  31  December,  1810 — Its  importance  upon  the  relations  of 
Napoleon  and  Alexander. 

TTAVING   arranged   matters  at   Erfurt  with  the 

Tsar,  and  having  secured  a  free  hand  in  Spain, 

Napoleon  returned  to  France  with  the  intention  of 

crushing  without  delay  all  opposition  in  Spain  and  of 

driving  the  English  from  the  Peninsula. 

On  i  August,  1808,  Sir  Arthur  Wellesley  had 
landed  in  Portugal,  and  before  the  month  was  closed 
the  battles  of  Roli^a  and  Vimeiro  had  been  fought 
and  won  by  the  English,  followed  a  few  days  later  by 
the  Convention  of  Cintra. 

But    Napoleon   brushed   aside    these    events   as 

202 


THE   EMPEROR 

FROM    AN    ENGRAVING    BY    HENRY   AFTER   THE    DRAWING    BY   VIGNEUX 


AT  THE  HEIGHT  OF  HIS  POWER     203 

incidents  of  no  importance.  On  1 1  August  he  had 
assured  Joseph  that  the  English  were  not  worth  con- 
sideration, and  that  they  never  had  more  than  a 
quarter  of  the  troops  that  they  professed  to  have.  He 
was  resolved  to  overwhelm  all  opposition  in  Spain, 
and  had  arranged  for  the  removal  of  the  Grand  Army 
from  Germany  to  the  Peninsula  as  soon  as  he  was 
sure  of  Russia.  In  fact,  before  he  reached  Erfurt, 
considerable  bodies  of  troops  had  begun  to  march 
towards  Spain. 

He  had  left  Erfurt  on  14  October  and  arrived  in 
Paris  on  the  night  of  the  1 8th.  On  3  November  he 
was  at  Bayonne.  At  that  moment  the  French  fortunes 
in  Spain  were  at  a  low  ebb.  Joseph  had  been  com- 
pelled to  abandon  Madrid,  one  French  force  had 
capitulated  to  the  English  at  Cintra,  another  to  the 
Spaniards  at  Baylen.  The  remaining  French  troops 
had  retired  beyond  the  Ebro.  The  first  French  cam- 
paign in  Spain  had  failed.  With  the  arrival  of 
Napoleon  the  second  campaign  was  entered  upon 
with  vigour,  and  in  three  months  Joseph  had  re- 
entered  Madrid,  the  English  had  been  driven  out  of 
the  country,  and  the  Spanish  resistance  was  confined 
to  guerilla  warfare  in  the  southern  and  western  pro- 
vinces, and  to  the  defence  of  a  few  towns.  So  long 
as  Napoleon  was  in  Spain  his  generals  obeyed  his 
commands  and  acted  harmoniously.  But  it  was  only 
during  Napoleon's  stay  in  Spain  that  the  French 
cause  met  with  continuous  successes.  As  soon  as  he 
left  the  country  the  weakness  of  Joseph  and  the 


204         THE  LIFE  OF  NAPOLEON 

quarrels  of  the  French  generals  enabled  the  English 
first  to  acquire  a  firm  foothold  in  Portugal,  and  then 
gradually  with  the  aid  of  the  Spaniards  to  free  Spain 
of  the  French.  The  influence,  too,  of  the  priests,  an 
influence  which  Napoleon  ignored,  was  immense,  and 
was  used  to  encourage  the  peasants  to  take  advantage 
of  the  geographical  peculiarities  of  the  country,  and  to 
cut  off  isolated  French  columns  and  detached  parties. 

At  Bayonne,  however,  Napoleon  speedily  restored 
order  in  place  of  the  chaos  which  reigned  in  the 
French  armies.  He  at  once  saw  that  the  troops 
were  properly  clothed  and  fed.  Greatcoats  and  shoes 
were  the  chief  desiderata,  and  these  were  immedi- 
ately supplied. 

From  Burgos  he  instructed  Joseph  how  the  work 
of  reorganizing  the  police  and  the  finances  should  be 
carried  out.  His  presence  in  Spain  soon  made  itself 
felt.  On  10  and  n  November  Marshal  Victor  de- 
feated Blake  at  Espinosa;  on  23  November  Ney 
defeated  Castanos  at  Tudela  ;  while  a  week  later 
Napoleon  himself  overthrew  a  force  of  7000  at  Sono 
Sierra,  the  French  loss  being  "  almost  unappreciable  ". 
On  4  December  Napoleon  entered  Madrid. 

Meanwhile  Sir  John  Moore  had  marched  from 
Portugal  to  Sahagun  in  order  to  strike  a  blow  at 
Marshal  Soult  and  the  French  line  of  communica- 
tions, and  on  24  December  began  his  famous  retreat. 
Napoleon,  as  is  well  known,  turned  aside  in  order  to 
crush  the  audacious  English  general.  He  was  full  of 
hope  of  exterminating  Moore's  force.  "  If,"  he  wrote 


AT  THE  HEIGHT  OF  HIS  POWER     205 

on  27  December,  "they  retire,  they  will  be  pushed  so 
vigorously  to  their  ships  that  half  of  them  will  never 
re-embark." 

And  on  31  December  he  again  wrote:  "There 
could  not  have  been  a  better  sedative  for  Spain  than 
to  send  her  an  English  army ".  However,  on  the 
road  to  Astorga  Napoleon  received  dispatches  from 
Paris  which  not  only  acquainted  him  with  the  intrigues 
of  Talleyrand  and  Fouche,  but  also  informed  him  of 
the  warlike  preparations  being  made  by  Austria. 

Napoleon  therefore  returned  to  Benevento,  leaving 
to  Soult  the  duty  of  pursuing  Moore,  who  eventually 
defeated  the  French  army  at  Corunna,  and  though  he 
lost  his  own  life  in  the  battle  succeeded  in  securing 
the  embarkation  of  his  army  in  the  English  ships. 
From  Benevento  Napoleon  proceeded  to  Valladolid 
in  order  to  be  able  to  communicate  more  rapidly  with 
France,  and  remained  there  from  8  January,  1809,  till 
he  returned  to  Paris.  While  still  in  Spain  he  wrote 
many  interesting  letters  to  Joseph.  He  declared  that 
he  had  no  hopes  of  peace  in  Europe  during  1809, 
owing  to  the  fierce  hatred  of  England  and  to  the 
events  in  Constantinople.  As  far  as  Spain  was  con- 
cerned, however,  he  thought  that  she  was  settling  into 
tranquillity ;  and  while  at  Valladolid,  too,  he  en- 
deavoured to  place  the  French  army  in  Spain  on  a 
sound  footing  and  to  weed  out  all  incompetent 
officers.  He  criticized  very  severely  the  operations 
of  the  Duke  of  Dantzic  (Lefebre).  "  That  Marshal," 
he  wrote,  "  commits  nothing  but  follies  ;  he  cannot 


206          THE  LIFE  OF  NAPOLEON 

read  his  instructions.  It  is  impossible  to  entrust  him 
with  the  command  of  a  corps,  which  is  a  pity,  as  he 
shows  great  bravery  in  battle."1  On  10  January 
Napoleon  wrote  definitely  to  Joseph  :  "  Send  back 
the  Duke  of  Dantzic  to  me  at  Valladolid ;  he  shall 
no  longer  command  the  4th  corps  ".2 

During  his  stay  at  Valladolid  he  received  confir- 
mation of  the  hostile  attitude  of  Austria.  "  War  with 
Austria,"  he  wrote  on  7  January,  "seems  imminent, 
and  her  troops  are  already  encamped  upon  her  fron- 
tiers." In  consequence  he  at  once  began  to  with- 
draw several  of  his  more  able  generals  and  officers 
from  Spain  for  service  in  Germany. 

On  15  January  he  wrote  very  explicitly  to  Joseph  : 
"  The  Court  of  Vienna  is  behaving  very  ill ;  she  may 
have  to  repent  of  it.  Do  not  be  uneasy.  I  have 
troops  enough  even  without  touching  my  army  in 
Spain  to  go  to  Vienna  in  a  month." 

Then  he  adds  very  characteristically  :  "  You  must 
tell  every  one,  and  let  it  be  generally  believed  in  the 
army,  that  I  shall  return  in  three  weeks  or  a  month. 
In  fact  my  mere  presence  in  Paris  will  reduce  Austria 
to  her  usual  insignificance,  and  in  that  case  I  shall 
come  back  before  the  end  of  October. " 3 

He  had  no  presentiment  of  the  complications  and 
difficulties  which  were  to  result  from  his  enforcement 
of  the  continental  system,  and  which  would  prevent 
him  from  ever  returning  to  Spain.  He  imagined 

1  "Napoleon's  Correspondence  with  Joseph,"  Vol.  II,  p.  n. 
"^  Ibid,  p.  13.  3  Ibid.  p.  27. 


AT  THE  HEIGHT  OF  HIS  POWER     207 

when  he  left  Valladolid  on  16  January,  1809,  that 
Spain  would  settle  down  quietly  ;  and  so  convinced 
was  he  that  her  tranquillity  was  assured  that  he  told 
Joseph  that  as  soon  as  Saragossa  had  surrendered  he 
might  send  for  his  wife  and  children.  They  could 
stay  at  Marrac  (Napoleon's  villa  near  Bayonne)  for 
about  three  weeks  from  the  date  of  their  arrival 
there  on  25  February,  and,  Saragossa  fallen,  they 
could  then  proceed  to  Madrid. 

During  the  Emperor's  absence  from  Spain,  Bes- 
sieres,  the  Duke  of  I  stria,  who  was  in  command  of  the 
Imperial  Guard  and  whose  head-quarters  were  at 
Valladolid,  was  ordered  to  send  to  him  daily  a  courier 
with  dispatches. 

On  1 6  January,  at  6  a.m.,  Napoleon  mounted  his 
horse  and  rode  out  to  Valladolid  attended  only  by 
Savary,  and  began  his  journey  au  grandissime  galop 
across  "  the  lonely  guerrilla  haunted  mountains".  He 
arrived  in  Paris  on  23  January,  at  8a.m.,  in  excellent 
health.  With  the  return  of  Napoleon  to  France 
"  began,"  says  Thiers,  "  the  series  of  faults,  the  results 
of  the  selfishness  and  the  jealousy  of  our  generals, 
which  lost  the  cause  of  France  in  Spain,  and,  by 
losing  it  in  Spain,  lost  it  also  in  Europe  ". 

On  his  arrival  in  Paris  Napoleon  realized  the  exist- 
ence of  a  network  of  intrigues.  Not  only  were  the 
royalists  in  La  Vendee  active,  but  his  own  personal 
followers  were  engaged  in  plots  against  him.  Of 
these  the  chief  were  Fouche  and  Talleyrand.  All 
his  rage  was  concentrated  upon  Talleyrand,  and  on 


2o8          THE  LIFE  OF  NAPOLEON 

28  January  he  covered  his  minister  with  reproaches. 
"  Vous  etes  un  voleur,  un  lache,  un  homme  sans  foi " — 
such  were  the  terms  used  during  an  invective  which 
lasted  half  an  hour.  Though,  however,  Talleyrand 
was  removed  from  the  post  of  Chief  Chamberlain  he 
still  continued  in  Napoleon's  service.  In  later  years 
Napoleon  regretted  that  he  had  not  consigned  Talley- 
rand to  prison,  for  the  fallen  minister  never  ceased  to 
intrigue  with  the  Austrians  and  Russians. 

Napoleon,  however,  was  full  of  confidence  with  re- 
gard to  the  future.  On  the  27th  he  wrote  that  his 
prompt  arrival  in  Paris  had  at  once  changed  the  tone 
of  Austria,  and  that  "  fear  has  succeeded  to  her  ar- 
rogance and  her  extreme  confidence".  However,  he 
was  not  lulled  into  a  sense  of  false  security  ;  the  con- 
scription continued  to  be  levied  with  rapidity,  and 
troops  continued  to  march  towards  Italy  and  the 
Rhine. 

Since  her  overthrow  in  1805  Austria  had  steadily 
made  preparations  for  a  renewal  of  her  struggle  with 
Napoleon.  Count  Stadion,  who  became  Minister  of 
Foreign  Affairs  in  1806,  and  the  Archduke  Charles, 
Commander-in-Chief  since  February,  1806,  had  under- 
taken a  complete  reform  of  the  Austrian  army.  In 
the  autumn  of  1808  Stein  and  a  strong  party  in 
Prussia  and  in  Vienna  desired  the  immediate  declara- 
tion of  war.  All  north-west  Germany  was,  it  was 
thought,  ready  to  rise,  and  Napoleon's  absence  in 
Spain  seemed  to  be  an  admirable  opportunity  for 
throwing  off  the  French  yoke. 


AT  THE  HEIGHT  OF  HIS  POWER     209 

Both  Stein  and  Scharnhorst  desired  a  universal 
rising  of  the  German  nation,  "  in  concert  with  such 
armies  as  Prussia  could  send  to  the  field  under 
Scharnhorst  and  Gneisenau,  helped  by  the  money  and 
stores  of  England  ".*  Stein  argued  that  as  continued 
submission  to  Napoleon  on  the  part  of  Prussia  would 
lead  to  ruin,  resistance  in  alliance  with  Austria  to 
France  could  not  place  his  country  in  a  worse  position 
than  that  in  which  she  then  stood.  Prussia  had  little 
to  lose,  for  as  things  then  were,  her  annihilation  was 
certain  to  come  about  in  a  few  years  at  the  hands  of 
France. 

The  king,  however,  refused  to  adopt  the  war 
policy  of  his  ministers.  He  had  no  confidence  in  his 
own  subjects  ;  he  mistrusted  Austria,  the  hereditary 
foe  of  his  house ;  he  still  relied  upon  Russia.  His 
decision,  which  was  strengthened  by  an  interview  with 
Alexander  on  his  way  to  Erfurt,  proved  to  be  of  the 
most  immense  importance,  and  deeply  influenced  the 
future  history  of  Prussia  and  Germany.  As  things 
turned  out,  Prussia  was  eventually  saved  by  Russia, 
and  the  close  relations  which  in  consequence  subsisted 
between  the  two  Powers  deeply  affected  later  Euro- 
pean history. 

The  autumn  of  1808,  when  Napoleon  after  the 
Conference  of  Erfurt  had  proceeded  to  Spain,  seemed 
for  Austria  and  Prussia  an  admirable  opportunity  for 
rising  against  Napoleon.  But  the  inaction  of  Prussia, 
and  the  attitude  of  Alexander  who  had  promised  to 

1  Seeley,  "  Life  and  Times  of  Stein,"  Pt.  X,  ch.  n. 
14 


210         THE  LIFE  OF  NAPOLEON 

help  Napoleon  if  the  Emperor  Francis  attacked 
France,  prevented  Austria  from  beginning  hostilities 
during  Napoleon's  absence  in  Spain. 

As  it  was,  the  war  broke  out  in  the  spring  of  1809 
after  Napoleon  had  returned  in  triumph  from  Spain. 
Nevertheless  Napoleon's  position  in  Europe  was  by 
no  means  what  it  had  been  at  Tilsit.  The  events 
at  Bayonne  made  it  clear  that  no  confidence  could  be 
placed  in  his  promises,  and  "that  no  amount  of  sub- 
servience would  make  a  dependent  State  secure  even 
of  its  existence  if  it  should  suit  him  to  decide  other- 
wise".1 It  was  this  conviction  that  explains  and  justi- 
fies the  Austrian  determination  to  enter  upon  war 
with  Napoleon.  It  was  the  opinion  of  Stadion,  who 
was  supported  by  Metternich,  that  the  postpone- 
ment of  war  would  enable  Napoleon  to  choose  his 
own  time  for  attacking  Austria.  Further,  unless 
Austria  took  the  lead  no  rising  in  North  Germany, 
where  hatred  of  Napoleon  was  intense,  could  be  ex- 
pected. Moreover,  by  her  preparations,  Austria  had 
disclosed  her  hostility  to  Napoleon,  and  this  fact,  apart 
from  other  considerations,  justified  the  conference  of 
8  February,  1809,  m  deciding  upon  war. 

Napoleon,  who  since  his  return  from  Spain  had 
been  preparing  for  the  outbreak  of  hostilities  with 
Austria,  seems  to  have  expected  that  he  would  receive 
active  support  from  the  Tsar.  The  position  taken 
up  by  Russia  with  regard  to  Austria,  therefore,  came 
as  a  profound  disappointment  to  Napoleon.  Alex- 

1  Atkinson,  "A  History  of  Germany,  1715-1815,"  p.  525. 


AT  THE  HEIGHT  OF  HIS  POWER     211 

ander  had  already  gained  from  his  alliance  with 
Napoleon  all  the  advantages  that  he  could  hope  for. 
He  held  Finland ;  he  was  prepared  to  occupy  the 
Danubian  Principalities.  He  had  no  wish  to  see 
Prussia  or  Austria  trampled  under  foot  by  Napoleon. 
Speranski,  his  minister,  held  similar  views,  and  on 
various  grounds  advocated  for  Russia  a  firm  and 
pacific  policy.  He,  therefore,  in  January,  1809,  urged 
the  continuance  of  peace.  "It  is,"  he  said,  "  in  our 
interest  to  prevent  a  rupture  between  France  and 
Austria."  If  Austria  declared  war,  he  would  be 
compelled  by  his  engagements  with  France  to  oppose 
actively  the  Emperor  Francis.  If,  however,  France 
took  the  first  hostile  step,  the  Tsar,  though  realizing 
the  delicate  position  in  which  he  would  be  placed,  did 
not  consider  that  he  was  necessarily  compelled  to 
join  in  the  war.1 

On  30  March,  1809,  Napoleon  set  his  army  in 
motion,  and  the  war  broke  out.  For  the  last  time 
Austria  acted  as  the  national  leader  of  Germany. 
Alexander's  position  was  an  unenviable  one.  A  re- 
volution had  taken  place  in  Sweden,  the  Turks  had 
adopted  aggressive  measures,  and  war  was  on  the 
point  of  being  declared  by  them  upon  the  Tsar  over 
the  question  of  the  Danubian  Principalities.  Alex- 
ander adopted  a  middle  position.  He  issued  a 
manifesto  against  Austria,  and  at  the  same  time 

1Sorel,  "L'Europe  et  la  Revolution  Frangaise,"  Vol.  VII, 
p.  544- 


212          THE  LIFE  OF  NAPOLEON 

informed  Napoleon  that  he  was  fully  occupied  in 
Finland  and  on  the  Danube.  He  was  prodigal  of 
assurances  and  promises.  He  let  it  be  known  in 
Vienna  that  he  would  not  take  any  definitely  hostile 
line  of  action  ;  at  the  same  time  he  sent  a  most  trust- 
worthy agent  to  act  as  a  spy  upon  Napoleon's 
movements.  The  relations  between  the  French 
Emperor  and  the  Tsar  were  very  different  from  what 
they  had  been  at  Tilsit  or  even  at  Erfurt. 

In  the  campaign  which  followed  the  outbreak  of 
war  the  slowness  of  the  Austrians  in  April  consider- 
ably lessened  their  chance  of  success.  Their  failure 
at  Eckmiihl  on  22  April  destroyed  all  hope  of  a 
general  rising  in  Germany.  Risings  under  Ferdinand 
von  Schill  and  Frederick  William  of  Brunswick  did 
indeed  take  place  in  May  and  July.  But  Schill,  after 
heroic  efforts,  perished  in  Stralsund,  while  the  Duke, 
with  his  Black  Legion,  after  a  raid  into  Brunswick, 
was  compelled  to  escape  by  ship  to  Ireland. 

No  help  came  to  Austria  from  North  Germany, 
and  though  her  army  won  a  victory  on  21  and  22 
May  at  Aspern,  she  was  defeated  at  Wagram  on 
4  and  5  July. 

The  battle  of  Wagram  was  "a  masterpiece  of 
Napoleon's  strategy  and  organization  ".  Never  was 
his  genius,  his  determination,  and  his  resourcefulness 
better  exemplified.  Very  characteristically,  during  his 
preparations,  he  had  encouraged  every  kind  of  gaiety 
in  Vienna,  in  order  to  re-establish  on  the  part  of  his 
allies  and  army  full  confidence  in  himself.  At  the  same 


AT  THE  HEIGHT  OF  HIS  POWER     213 

time  he  realized  that  upon  his  own  energy  and  ability 
depended  the  success  of  his  efforts. 

The  practical  valuelessness  of  the  Russian  alliance 
was  now  manifest  to  him,  and  henceforth  he  was  aware 
that  he  could  no  longer  rely  upon  Alexander  to  aid  him 
in  his  enterprises. 

On  4  and  5  July  the  battle  of  Wagram  had  been 
fought  and  the  Austrians  had  been  defeated.  But  the 
French  losses  were  immense,  and  Austria  was  by  no 
means  crushed.  Her  defeat  was  in  part  due  to  the 
neutrality  of  Prussia,  and  to  the  aid  given  to  Napoleon 
by  certain  German  states.  With  Polish  aid  Austria 
could  have  been  completely  crushed,  but  to  take  any 
step  which  might  encourage  the  Poles  to  demand  in- 
dependence would  bring  about  the  total  alienation  and 
open  hostility  of  Russia. 

On  14  October  the  Treaty  of  Vienna  or  Schon- 
brunn  was  concluded.  The  war  had  proved  disas- 
trous to  Austria  and  to  all  her  supporters.  In  February, 
1810,  Hofer,  who  headed  the  Tyrolese  in  a  vain  attempt 
to  aid  Austria,  perished,  and  the  Tyrol  was  divided. 
Austria  was  by  the  Treaty  of  Vienna  cut  off  from  the 
sea  ;  she  lost  an  immense  amount  of  territory  ;  she  was 
forced  to  join  the  continental  system. 

To  Napoleon  the  war  with  Austria  in  1809  brought 
with  it  considerable  risks,  and  though  he  was  ultimately 
successful  the  contest  had  proved  an  unusually  severe 
one.  On  its  conclusion,  too,  the  prospects  of  the  reali- 
zation of  his  plans  were  not  altogether  bright.  Wel- 
lesley's  presence  in  the  Spanish  Peninsula  was  making 


2i4          THE  LIFE  OF  NAPOLEON 

itself  felt.  England  might  create  a  diversion  in  the 
Netherlands  or  in  North  Germany,  Prussia  might  join 
Austria,  national  risings  in  Germany  might  take  place. 

Moreover,  in  the  east  of  Europe  he  had,  so  far, 
been  unable  to  carry  out  his  ambitious  projects.  In 
a  letter  of  October,  1802,  he  had  said  :  "  My  plan 
would  be  to  make  Hungary  the  centre  of  a  great 
Eastern  Empire,  and  I  would  place  one  of  my  brothers 
at  the  head  of  it " .  This  idea  he  had  never  lost  sight 
of,  and  between  1800  and  1809  he  had  never  ceased 
his  efforts  to  detach  Hungary  from  its  allegiance  to  the 
House  of  Hapsburg.  He  hoped  to  effect  his  object 
by  negotiations  with  the  Magyars  which  would  result 
in  the  outbreak  of  an  insurrection.  These  efforts  went 
on  uninterruptedly  during  periods  of  war  no  less  than 
during  intervals  of  peace.  Secret  missions  were  sent 
to  Hungary,  and  the  persons  sent  carried  letters  from 
Napoleon  which  bear  witness  to  his  political  genius. 
They  show  his  ability  to  grasp  the  essential  points  of 
the  situation  in  Hungary,  though  he  had  had  few 
opportunities  of  knowing  anything  whatever  about 
that  country  or  its  inhabitants.  They  certainly  attest 
Napoleon's  knowledge  of  human  nature.  Proclama- 
tions were  dispatched  to  Hungary  in  the  Hungarian, 
French,  and  Slavonic  languages,  and  it  was  evident 
that  Napoleon  expected  the  outbreak  of  a  widespread 
insurrection  of  the  Magyars  against  the  reigning  Haps- 
burg House. 

In   May,    1809,  when  the  issue  of  his  campaign 
against  Austria  was  as  yet  doubtful,  he  addressed  a 


AT  THE  HEIGHT  OF  HIS  POWER     215 

proclamation  to  the  Hungarian  nation.  "  The  name 
Hungarian,"  he  had  declared  in  an  earlier  period,  "  is 
connected  abroad  with  the  idea  of  revolution  "  ;  and  in 
the  proclamation  he  openly  invited  the  Magyars  to 
desert  the  House  of  Hapsburg,  and  to  choose  a  king 
from  amongst  his  brothers.  But  the  proclamation 
had  not  the  expected  effect,  and  Napoleon's  projects 
in  Hungary  miscarried. 

Since  his  adoption  of  the  Imperial  title  Napoleon 
had  \ostprestige  with  the  Hungarian  population,  and, 
moreover,  his  treatment  of  the  Poles  had  roused  the 
fears  and  suspicions  of  the  Magyar  nobility.  Hungary, 
therefore,  did  not  prove  a  profitable  ground  for  French 
agitation  as  carried  on  by  Napoleon.  His  attempts, 
however,  to  establish  a  Napoleonic  dynasty  in  that 
country  are  a  further  illustration  of  his  ceaseless 
activity  and  of  his  ambitious  designs. 

The  overthrow  of  Austria  at  Wagram,  and  the 
conclusion  of  peace,  rendered  the  question  of  the  future 
policy  of  Napoleon  a  very  serious  one  for  all  European 
potentates  and  statesmen. 

Joseph,  King  of  Spain,  expected  that  the  French 
Emperor  would  himself  proceed  to  Spain  and,  with 
strong  reinforcements,  overwhelm  Wellington  whose 
success  at  Talavera  on  27  July  had  prevented  the 
French  from  invading  Portugal,  though  it  was  not 
sufficiently  decisive  to  save  Andalusia. 

Stein,  on  the  other  hand,  predicted  with  extraordin- 
ary accuracy  that  the  overthrow  of  Austria  would  be 
followed  by  an  attempt  on  the  part  of  Napoleon  to 


216          THE  LIFE  OF  NAPOLEON 

subjugate  Russia.  "  When  Russia  is  subjugated,"  he 
wrote,  "  France  will  find  in  the  use  it  will  make  of  its 
fragments,  in  the  passive  obedience  of  the  miserable 
and  selfish  German  princes,  and  the  insurrectionary 
spirit  of  the  1 2,000,000  Poles,  the  means  of  weakening 
Russia  still  further."  But  his  poor  opinion  of  the 
ability  of  Russia  to  defend  itself,  and  his  estimate  of 
the  character  of  the  Tsar  Alexander,  proved  to  be 
very  inaccurate.  He  styles  Alexander  "  a  weak, 
sensual  prince  who,  as  the  head  of  a  nation  the  great 
mass  of  which  are  slaves,  will  not  long  maintain  the 
fight  against  civilized  Europe  ". 

The  first  part  of  Stein's  prediction,  viz.  that 
Napoleon  would  deliberately  attack  Russia,  proved 
correct,  but  he  himself  in  1812  and  1813  willingly 
recognized  how  erroneous  were  his  estimate  of 
Alexander's  character  and  of  the  power  of  resistance 
possessed  by  the  Russian  nation. 

After  the  conclusion  of  the  Treaty  of  Vienna  on 
1 4  October,  Napoleon's  intention  seems  to  have  been 
to  conduct  in  person  the  war  in  Spain.  On  7  October, 
while  at  Schonbrunn,  he  writes  that  his  purpose  is  to 
proceed  to  Spain  in  December  with  80,000  infantry 
and  15,000  or  16,000  cavalry.  But  at  Paris  he  found 
himself  involved  in  an  infinity  of  distractions.  The 
Government  demanded  his  presence,  his  alliances 
required  his  constant  attention,  and  the  situation  in 
Holland  his  direct  supervision.  Moreover,  the  ques- 
tion of  a  second  marriage  now  began  to  occupy  his 
thoughts. 


AT  THE  HEIGHT  OF  HIS  POWER     217 

Though  compelled  to  renounce  all  idea  of  conduct- 
ing a  campaign  in  Spain,  he  never,  however,  con- 
sidered the  failure  of  the  French  arms  possible. 
Massena,  Ney,  and  Soult  would,  he  thought,  quickly 
overthrow  all  Spanish  opposition.  In  a  short  time 
he  hoped  to  unite  part  of  Spain  permanently  to 
France,  to  bring  about  the  resignation  of  Joseph, 
and  to  rule  the  remainder  of  Spain  by  means  of  his 
marshals.  In  1810  Holland  was  on  the  abdication  of 
Louis  brought  under  Napoleon's  immediate  super- 
vision. A  similar  fate  was  now  being  prepared  for 
Joseph  and  for  Spain. 

The  weeks  between  November,  1 809,  and  March, 
1810,  constitute  a  critical  period  in  Napoleon's  career. 
They  may  in  a  sense  be  regarded  as  the  turning-point 
in  the  history  of  the  French  Empire.  He  had  over- 
thrown all  his  enemies  on  the  Continent ;  Germany 
was  at  his  mercy  ;  the  Spanish  insurrection,  in  his  opin- 
ion, would  shortly  be  suppressed.  The  sea  power  of 
Great  Britain  alone  remained  unsubdued.  But  since 
the  Walcheren  disaster  Napoleon  was  more  confident 
than  ever  in  his  ability  to  subjugate  Great  Britain. 

The  enforcement  of  the  continental  blockade  for 
a  few  months  would,  he  felt  certain,  suffice  to  bring 
about  the  submission  of  the  English.  That  accomp- 
lished, and  the  conquest  of  Spain  effected,  he  would 
be  master  of  the  Continent,  and  be  able  to  return  to 
his  Eastern  schemes. 

Meanwhile,  though  outwardly  everything  seemed 
to  betoken  the  continuance  of  the  successful  career  of 


2x8          THE  LIFE  OF  NAPOLEON 

Napoleon,  signs  were  not  wanting  to  show  that  much 
discontent  prevailed  in  all  parts  of  Europe. 

"It  was  in  the  years  between  Wagram  and  the 
retreat  from  Moscow  that  the  attitude  of  the  German 
people  towards  Napoleon  finally  crystallized  into  one 
of  uncompromising  hostility."1 

In  France  the  desire  for  peace  was  almost  uni- 
versal ;  abroad  the  arrest  of  Frederic  Staps  on 
10  October,  1809,  nad  illustrated  the  hatred  felt  for 
Napoleon  in  Germany.  At  any  moment  illness,  or 
the  hand  of  an  assassin,  might  leave  France  with- 
out a  ruler. 

The  insecurity  of  his  position  which  such  events 
and  considerations  brought  home  to  Napoleon  made 
it  all  the  more  necessary,  in  his  opinion,  that  he  should 
have  an  heir,  so  strengthen  his  position,  and  found  a 
dynasty. 

His  intention  was,  after  having  divorced  Joseph- 
ine, to  contract  a  marriage  alliance  with  Russia.  By 
entering  the  sacred  circle  of  royalty  he  could  look 
forward  to  the  firm  establishment  of  his  position,  and 
eventually  to  peace. 

After  Wagram,  however,  he  appears  to  have  lost 
sight  of  the  fact  that  the  Napoleonic  system  in  Europe 
hinged  upon  the  Tilsit  and  Erfurt  arrangements,  in 
other  words  upon  the  friendly  co-operation  of  Russia. 
Neither  does  he  appear  to  have  fully  realized  the 
unpopularity  in  Russia  of  the  French  alliance.  From 
1807  to  1810  it  is  true  that  Alexander,  aided  by  his 
Atkinson,  "History  of  Germany,  1715-1815,"  p.  547. 


THE  EMPRESS  JOSEPHINE 

F«OM   THE    PAINTING    BY  GERARD  AT    VERSAILLES 


AT  THE  HEIGHT  OF  HIS  POWER     219 

minister  Michael  Speranski,  endeavoured  to  modernize 
Russia  somewhat  after  the  example  of  France — to 
abolish  the  absolute  Russian  autocracy  and  to  intro- 
duce to  some  degree  a  system  of  popular  representa- 
tion. But  the  Russian  nation  was  not  sufficiently 
civilized  to  appreciate  Alexander's  reforming  ideas, 
while  Napoleon's  increasing  ambition  and  his  Austrian 
alliance  forced  Alexander  in  1810  to  concentrate  his 
attention  upon  foreign  politics  and  upon  the  necessity 
of  securing  for  Russia  some  alleviation  from  the 
continental  system. 

In  1808  Napoleon's  opposition  to  any  scheme  by 
which  Russia  should  obtain  Constantinople  had  made 
a  rift  in  the  Russo- French  alliance,  and  that  rift  was 
widened  when  in  April,  1810,  the  French  Emperor 
married  Marie  Louise  of  Austria. 

Napoleon  had,  indeed,  after  the  Peace  of  Vienna 
in  1 809,  made  proposals  for  the  hand  of  the  Grand 
Duchess  Anna,  sister  of  the  Tsar.  But  the  Empress 
Dowager,  who  hated  Napoleon,  consistently  opposed 
the  match.  In  order  not  to  receive  a  refusal  the 
latter  had  entered  into  negotiations  for  the  hand  of  a 
Hapsburg  princess.  On  4  January,  1810,  a  conven- 
tion with  regard  to  Poland  had  been  signed  by  the 
representatives  of  Napoleon  and  Alexander.  This 
Napoleon  now  refused  to  ratify,  and  that  refusal, 
together  with  Napoleon's  marriage  in  April  with  Marie 
Louise,  implied  a  radical  change  in  his  foreign  policy 
and  foreign  relations.  In  this  matter  the  Russians 
were  at  fault.  As  a  condition  of  Napoleon's  marriage 


220          THE  LIFE  OF  NAPOLEON 

with  a  Russian  princess,  Alexander  had  extracted 
from  the  French  Emperor  a  promise  that  the  kingdom 
of  Poland  should  never  be  re-established.  But  then 
the  Russians  hoped  to  put  off  Napoleon  with  evasive 
words.  On  4  January,  1810,  the  Treaty  with  regard 
to  Poland  was  signed.  Alexander  thought  that  he 
had  won  a  signal  triumph,  that  he  had  carried  out  his 
wishes  with  regard  to  Poland,  and  that  he  had  saved 
his  sister  from  a  mesalliance.  But  he  soon  found  that 
Napoleon  had  outwitted  him. 

The  latter  had  already  laid  his  plans  with  consum- 
mate skill.  On  15  December,  1809,  the  divorce  of 
Josephine  had  been  finally  accomplished,  and  Napoleon 
had  at  once  sounded  first  Madame  Metternich  and 
then  Metternich  with  regard  to  a  marriage  with  Marie 
Louise  of  Austria.  Thus  when  on  27  January,  1810, 
Napoleon  convinced  himself  from  a  perusal  of  Caulain- 
court's  dispatches  from  Russia  that  Alexander  had  no 
intention  of  giving  him  his  sister  in  marriage,  he  at 
once  continued  with  Austria  the  negotiations  with 
regard  to  which  Alexander  was  ignorant,  and  more- 
over he  refused,  as  has  been  stated,  to  ratify  the 
Treaty  of  4  January,  1810. 

As  the  success  of  his  continental  system  apparently 
depended  entirely  upon  the  continuance  of  the 
Russian  alliance,  Napoleon  would  seem  to  have  been 
incurring  a  serious  risk  in  entering  upon  the  Austrian 
marriage.  He  seems,  however,  to  have  thought  that 
not  only  would  any  possible  loss  arising  from  the 
weakening  of  his  friendship  with  Russia  be  amply 


AT  THE  HEIGHT  OF  HIS  POWER     221 

compensated  for  by  the  Austrian  marriage,  but  that 
at  any  rate  the  Russian  alliance  would  continue  till  he 
had  forced  England  to  come  to  terms.  He  had  little 
doubt  that  England's  submission  would  be  brought 
about  within  a  very  short  period. 

On  28  January,  1810,  the  question  of  Napoleon's 
marriage  was  formally  discussed  at  a  meeting  of  the 
chief  French  Ministers  at  the  Tuileries,  all  except 
Talleyrand  being  unaware  of  what  had  already  oc- 
curred in  respect  of  this  matter.  Opinions  were 
divided,  some  being  in  favour  of  a  Russian,  some  in 
favour  of  an  Austrian  match. 

On  6  February,  however,  Napoleon  received  in- 
formation which  made  it  quite  clear  that  a  Russian 
match  was  impossible.  He  had,  as  has  been  seen, 
already  anticipated  a  refusal,  and  on  7  February  the 
marriage  contract  with  Marie  Louise,  daughter  of 
Francis,  Emperor  of  Austria,  was  signed.  This  mar- 
riage Napoleon  was  convinced  would  strengthen  his 
position  immensely. 

Meanwhile  it  was,  he  thought,  good  policy,  while 
strengthening  himself  in  Germany  by  means  of  his 
marriage  with  Marie  Louise,  to  continue  active  opera- 
tions in  Spain,  and  generally  to  maintain  the  status 
quo  in  Europe.  Thus,  should  Great  Britain  refuse  to 
come  to  terms  he  would  be  in  an  unassailable  position. 
The  year  1810  may  thus  be  said,  as  far  as  outward 
appearances  went,  to  mark  the  period  at  which  Na- 
poleon reached  the  summit  of  his  power. 

On  28  March  Marie  Louise  arrived  at  Compiegne, 


222          THE  LIFE  OF  NAPOLEON 

and  the  marriage  was  celebrated  in  Paris  with 
illuminations,  while,  with  the  exception  of  London 
and  St.  Petersburg,  congratulations  poured  in  from 
all  the  chief  European  capitals. 

Various  circumstances,  however,  soon  occurred  to 
bring  disillusionment  to  Napoleon's  ambitious  hopes. 
The  effect  of  the  marriage  upon  the  relations  of 
Austria  and  Russia  was  not  what  he  had  expected. 
Instead  of  Russia  and  Austria  becoming  mutually 
hostile,  they  tended  to  come  together.  Not  that  Na- 
poleon anticipated  an  outbreak  of  hostilities  between 
France  and  Russia,  but  he  relied  upon  the  assistance 
of  Austria  should  such  hostilities  take  place.  Further, 
he  hoped  to  force  England  to  make  peace,  and  in 
order  to  do  so  he  endeavoured  to  unite  all  the  con- 
tinental powers  against  the  Island  kingdom.  "  1810," 
writes  Sorel,  "  marque  1'heure  de  la  pleine  mer,  de  la 
mer  £tale  et  par  un  jour  radieux."  With  the  exception 
of  England  Europe  had  been  conquered,  for  in  Spain 
no  one  dreamt  of  the  ultimate  failure  of  the  French. 
Outwardly  Napoleon  seemed  satisfied.  Never  had 
he  spent  so  long  a  period  in  France  as  he  did  during 
1810.  Europe  had  seen  the  rise  and  fall  of  the 
Roman  Empire,  and  of  the  Empire  of  Charles  the 
Great ;  it  had  now  witnessed  the  rise  of  the  Na- 
poleonic Empire.  Napoleon  compared  himself  to  a 
Roman  Emperor  and  his  government  to  that  of 
Diocletian.  Since  1799  he  had  created  an  adminis- 
tration and  had  given  France  a  code,  and  his  work 


THE   EMPRESS   MARIE   LOUISE 

FROM    THE    TAINTING    BY   GERARD    AT   VERSAILLES 


AT  THE  HEIGHT  OF  HIS  POWER     223 

as  an  administrator  and  legislator  indeed  survived  his 
fall  and  lives  on  in  the  present  day. 

If  Frenchmen  did  not  enjoy  the  liberty  which  they 
had  gained  at  the  Revolution,  they  had  at  any  rate 
secured  equality.  Any  loss  of  liberty  was  amply  com- 
pensated for  by  the  position  which  France  had  gained 
in  Europe. 

Moreover,  France  was  prosperous,  and  such  was 
the  hatred  of  England  that  the  continental  system  was 
by  no  means  generally  unpopular  among  the  French 
people.  In  fact  the  hardships  incident  to  it  fell  mainly 
on  the  Germans,  the  Dutch,  and  the  Italians.  With 
the  producers  the  protective  system  was  popular,  and 
all  Frenchmen,  feeling  secure  in  life  and  property,  were 
united  in  supporting  Napoleon  in  his  fierce  crusade 
against  the  British.  War  was  confined  to  countries 
outside  France,  which  itself  did  not  feel  any  of  the 
hardships  of  war  with  the  exception  of  the  conscription 
which,  being  necessary,  was  generally  regarded  till 
1812  with  equanimity.  "  The  period  between  the  end 
of  1810  and  the  middle  of  1812,"  says  Pasquier,  "was 
the  calmest  period  enjoyed  by  the  French  nation  since 
the  consulate."  "  Never,"  writes  Balzac,  "  even  in  the 
great  days  of  the  monarchy,  was  the  French  aristocracy 
richer  or  more  brilliant. " l 

During  the  years  immediately  succeeding  the 
Treaty  of  Vienna,  Russia,  and  indeed  Austria,  were 

1  Quoted  by  Sorel,  "  L'Europe  et  la  Revolution  Franchise," 
Vol.  VII,  p.  466. 


224          THE  LIFE  OF  NAPOLEON 

however  merely  biding  their  time,  and  only  in  form 
were  adhering  to  the  continental  system.  Their  am- 
bassadors had  indeed  been  withdrawn  from  London, 
but  Metternich  avowed  to  Bathurst  before  his  depar- 
ture from  Vienna,  that  Austria's  peace  with  Napoleon 
was  simply  an  opportunity  for  preparations  for  war, 
while  between  England  and  Russia  no  open  hostilities 
had  taken  place,  the  Russian  fleet  captured  in  the 
Tagus  being  merely  detained  in  an  English  port  till  the 
inevitable  conflict  between  Napoleon  and  Alexander 
should  break  out. 

All  Napoleon's  hopes  of  carrying  out  the  contin- 
ental system  therefore  depended  upon  the  continuance 
of  the  Russian  alliance,  and  thus  Alexander  held  the 
key  of  the  position.  If  once  Alexander  relaxed  the 
restrictions  upon  English  trade  with  Russia,  all  hope 
of  bringing  about  the  submission  of  Great  Britain,  and 
of  seeing  the  realization  of  Napoleon's  European 
and  Oriental  schemes,  would  vanish  into  thin  air. 

After  the  overthrow  of  Austria  at  Wagram  and  the 
conclusion  of  the  Treaty  of  Vienna,  Napoleon  therefore 
seemed  to  all  outward  appearance  to  be  at  the  height 
of  his  power.  But  as  long  as  Great  Britain  continued 
to  defy  him,  his  successes  on  the  Continent  were  not 
sufficient  and  left  the  main  object  of  his  hopes  unsatis- 
fied. His  Eastern  schemes  could  not  be  carried  out 
so  long  as  the  English  fleet  rode  triumphant  on  the 
Mediterranean.  Malta,  and  Sicily,  and  Portugal  still 
remained  unconquered,  and  his  hold  upon  Spain  was 
fiercely  contested. 


AT  THE  HEIGHT  OF  HIS  POWER     225 

He  was,  therefore,  more  firmly  than  ever  resolved 
to  carry  out  the  continental  system  in  its  entirety  and 
to  compel  England  to  make  peace.  But  that  system 
had  as  yet  never  been  systematically  enforced.  In 
Holland  and  in  the  Austrian  dominions  British  goods 
found  an  entrance,  and  what  was  more  serious  Alex- 
ander showed  signs  of  disagreeing  with  Napoleon  on 
many  fundamental  points. 

It  was  only  by  the  most  constant  and  rigorous 
system  of  supervision  that  Napoleon  could  hope  to 
make  the  continental  system  effective.  Consequently 
it  was  of  the  greatest  importance  to  keep  Russia  true 
to  her  alliance  with  France. 

Already,  however,  in  1810,  it  was  beginning  to  be 
apparent  that  Napoleon's  continental  system  could 
not  be  strictly  enforced. 

The  war  of  1809,  though  temporarily  disastrous  to 
Austria,  had  had  one  noteworthy  result.  "  It  destroyed 
in  the  eyes  of  Europe  the  halo  of  invincibility  that 
had  encircled  the  head  of  Napoleon."1  It  had  syn- 
chronized, too,  with  the  risings  of  Schill,  the  Duke  of 
Brunswick,  and  Hofer,  which,  though  themselves  unsuc- 
cessful, indicated  the  growth  of  a  feeling  of  nationality 
in  Germany,  the  result  itself  of  the  French  victories 
and  domination.  At  the  same  time  Napoleon  showed 
no  misgivings  as  to  the  ultimate  success  of  his 
schemes. 

After  the  defeat  of  Austria  at  Wagram  and  the 
Treaty  of  Vienna  (Schonbrunn)  he  had,  however, 

1 "  Cambridge  Modern  History,"  Vol.  IX,  p.  360. 


226          THE  LIFE  OF  NAPOLEON 

some  justification  for  regarding  the  future  with  con- 
fidence. Germany  was  as  yet  far  from  being  united. 
Prussia,  owing  to  Frederick  William's  feeling  of  distrust 
of  Austria,  had  not  joined  in  the  late  war,  in  which 
indeed  Napoleon  had  been  aided  by  several  of  his 
German  vassal  states.  The  Bavarian  and  Fran- 
conian  rulers  regarded  him  as  their  defender  against 
the  Hapsburgs  and  Hohenzollerns,  and  in  other  parts 
of  Germany  the  people  showed  no  disposition  to  throw 
off  the  military  rule  imposed  by  France. 

It  was  not  till  after  the  Wagram  campaign  that  the 
Napoleonic  regime  became  generally  unpopular  in 
Germany,  and  that  "the  attitude  of  the  people  of 
Germany  towards  Napoleon  finally  crystallized  into  one 
of  uncompromising  hostility".1  This  change,  which 
brought  about  the  overthrow  of  Napoleon,  was  due  to 
the  gradual  enforcement,  after  the  Wagram  campaign, 
of  the  continental  system.  In  order  to  ruin  England 
Napoleon  threw  away  all  the  advantages  which  he  had 
hitherto  gained.  As  the  German  states  realized  that 
they  were  being  sacrificed  to  the  continental  system 
they  rapidly  developed  an  intense  feeling  of  hostility 
to  Napoleon. 

The  failure  of  the  Walcheren  expedition  in  the 
summer  and  autumn  of  1809  made  the  annexation  of 
Holland  an  easy  matter.  His  brother  Louis,  whom 
he  had  made  King  of  Holland,  had  ruled,  as  far  as 
possible,  in  the  interest  of  the  Dutch.  From  1806 
when  Louis  (the  morbid  elements  of  whose  singular 

1  Atkinson,  "A  History  of  Germany,  1715-1815,"  p.  547. 


AT  THE  HEIGHT  OF  HIS  POWER     227 

character  have  lately  been  well  brought  out1)  was 
placed  over  Holland,  trade  with  England  had  by  no 
means  been  wholly  prevented,  and  the  Dutch  coasts 
had  not,  in  accordance  with  Napoleon's  wishes,  been 
sealed  up  against  British  merchandise.  Napoleon  had 
indeed  stated  in  a  dispatch  to  Louis  that  he  intended 
"  to  conquer  the  sea  by  the  land,"  and  while  he  was  at 
Erfurt  in  October,  1808,  he  again  had  warned  Louis 
that  trade  between  England  and  Holland  was  carried 
on  and  that  it  must  be  put  an  end  to.  Louis,  however, 
whose  difficulties  under  the  terrible  grip  of  the  con- 
tinental system  were  only  equalled  by  the  generosity 
of  his  aims  for  his  Dutch  subjects,  paid  little  attention 
to  these  orders,  and  Napoleon  as  a  first  step  annexed 
the  Island  of  Walcheren  in  January,  1810. 

For  some  six  months  a  correspondence  between 
Napoleon  and  Louis  took  place,  while  at  the  same  time 
Fouche  entered  into  secret  negotiations  with  England. 
In  July  Napoleon  discovered  Fouche's  intrigue,  dis- 
missed him,  and  Louis  fled  to  Bohemia,  and  the  same 
month  Holland  was  annexed  to  the  French  Empire. 
Apparently  Napoleon,  like  Fouche,  had  himself  con- 
sidered the  possibility  of  coming  to  terms  with  Great 
Britain,  for  in  "The  Times"  of  Saturday,  17  March, 
1810,  it  is  stated  that  "a  French  flag  of  truce  from 
Boulogne  having  on  board  dispatches  for  the  British 
government  had  been  met  by  the  Cherokee  gunboat 
whose  captain  received  the  dispatches  from  the  French 
Foreign  Office  and  proceeded  with  them  to  Dover 

1  Atteridge,  "Napoleon's  Brothers".     Methuen,  1909. 


228          THE  LIFE  OF  NAPOLEON 

where  he  arrived  (accompanied  by  the  French  vessel) 
at  nine  o'clock  the  same  evening".  In  "  The  Times" 
comment  was  made  on  the  occurrence.  The  funds 
rose  a  trifle  on  the  prospects  of  peace,  but  it  is  evident 
from  the  attitude  of  the  article  that  there  was  small 
chance  of  peace.  "  There  are  not  twenty  men  in  the 
kingdom,"  it  stated,  "  who  think  that  anything  like 
security  is  to  be  obtained  by  a  treaty  of  peace.  We 
therefore  believe  that  Bonaparte's  proposals  will  meet 
with  a  cool  reception.  We  are  under  the  obligation 
of  a  solemn  compact  with  the  Spaniards  to  make 
common  cause  against  France,  and  not  to  make  peace 
with  that  Power  except  by  common  consent."  The 
article  goes  on  to  express  confidence  in  the  patriotism 
of  the  ministers,  though  it  criticizes  severely  their 
system  of  government,  and  the  necessity  for  internal 
reform.  "  Nevertheless,  in  spite  of  the  corruption,  ex- 
travagance, and  favouritism  which  it  is  asserted  mark 
the  existing  system  of  government,  it  is  hoped  that 
the  nation  will  not  droop,  but  maintain  a  manly  and 
erect  position  against  its  foreign  foe,  who  either  by 
treachery  or  violence  has  saddened  the  rest  of  Europe, 
and  who  only  proposes  peace  as  conducive  to  his 
designs  of  conquest.  Our  domestic  enemies  may  be 
gradually  shaken  off ;  or  if  not  they  do  but  weaken — 
the  other  will  overwhelm  us." 

This  expression  of  the  determination  of  the  British 
nation  to  struggle  on  is  especially  interesting  when  it 
is  remembered  how  dark  the  future  must  have  appeared 
to  thoughtful  Englishmen  in  1810,  when  the  effects  of 


AT  THE  HEIGHT  OF  HIS  POWER     229 

Napoleon's  commercial  system,  in  shaking  his  supre- 
macy in  Europe,  were  not  yet  apparent.  Though 
reduced  to  great  misery  the  English  people,  however, 
received  some  relief  from  the  export  of  corn  from  the 
states  ruled  by  Napoleon. 

Fortunately,  though  imports  from  England  were 
practically  forbidden,  Napoleon  permitted  the  export 
of  corn  from  the  Continent  to  Great  Britain,  and  thus 
enabled  his  enemy  to  survive  the  terrible  year  of  1810 
— a  year  when,  owing  to  the  failure  of  the  harvest,  the 
price  of  wheat  advanced  to  1 1 8s.  the  quarter. 

In  181 1  the  crisis  was  over,  and  in  March  of  that 
year  the  official  report  stated  :  "  From  Europe  the  im- 
portations from  places  from  which  the  British  flag  is 
excluded  have  been  immense  ".1 

Napoleon,  however,  was  still  full  of  confidence  as 
to  the  ultimate  success  of  his  policy,  and  he  had  some 
justification  for  that  confidence. 

In  1810  Wellesley  seemed  to  be  making  little 
headway  in  Spain,  and  taking  into  consideration  the 
failure  of  the  Walcheren  expedition  in  the  previous 
year,  the  marriage  of  Napoleon  to  Marie  Louise  in 
1810,  and  the  occupation  of  Russia  in  a  war  with 
Turkey — one  need  not  be  surprised  at  Napoleon's 
anticipation  of  a  triumph  over  England,  and  of  the 
firm  establishment  of  his  supremacy  over  Europe. 

On  24  March,  1811,  he  assured  a  deputation  from 
the  General  Councils  of  Commerce  and  Manufactures 

1  Quoted  in  "  Cambridge  Modern  History,"  Vol.  IX,  p. 
372- 


23o          THE  LIFE  OF  NAPOLEON 

in  France  that  "in  about  six  months  his  sword  would 
pierce  England  to  the  heart  V  At  the  very  moment, 
however,  that  Napoleon  made  this  statement  he  was 
aware  that  owing  to  the  action  of  Alexander  the  con- 
tinental system  was  breaking  down. 

In  1810  Napoleon  had  realized  that  there  was  no 
time  to  be  lost  and  energetic  measures  were  taken  to 
enforce  the  continental  system.  Before  the  end  of 
August  Napoleon  had  occupied  Liibeck,  Lauenburg, 
Hamburg,  all  the  left  bank'  of  the  Elbe  as  far  as 
Bremen,  and  Oldenburg — though  as  yet  it  was  not 
formally  united  to  his  Empire.2  He  had  thus  ac- 
quired the  means  of  constructing  a  vast  fleet,  and  he 
felt  confident  that  by  1812,  if  the  continental  blockade 
had  not  forced  the  English  nation  to  make  peace,  he 
would  have  Great  Britain  at  his  mercy.  He  never 
for  one  moment  imagined  that  Alexander  would 
adopt  a  hostile  attitude,  at  any  rate  before  1812. 
Alexander's  position  was  indeed  one  of  great  and 
unexpected  strength.  On  19  September,  1809,  he 
signed  a  treaty  with  Sweden  which  left  him  in  posses- 
sion of  Finland.  The  annexation  of  Finland  being 
thus  accomplished  he  was  able  to  concentrate  his  at- 
tention upon  Poland.  Alexander  wished  not  only  to 
abolish  the  name  of  Poland,  but  to  use  that  country  as 
an  advanced  western  post  of  the  Russian  Empire.  On 

1  Quoted  in  "  Cambridge  Modern  History,"  Vol.  IX,  p. 
380. 

2Sorel,  "L'Europe  et  la  Revolution  Franchise,"  Vol.  VII,  p. 
452- 


AT  THE  HEIGHT  OF  HIS  POWER     231 

this  subject  there  was  now  little  hope  of  an  agreement 
being  come  to  between  him  and  Napoleon,  and  the 
closing  months  of  1810  saw  the  beginning  of  a  crisis 
in  the  affairs  of  Europe  which  was  only  ended  at 
Waterloo.  That  crisis  was  brought  on  by  the  refusal 
of  Alexander  on  31  December,  1810,  to  carry  out  the 
continental  system. 

By  the  end  of  December,  1810,  Napoleon  was 
thus  suffering  from  two  misfortunes — the  Spanish 
resistance,  and  the  refusal  of  Russia  to  adhere  to  the 
continental  system.  Napoleon's  Spanish  blunder  in 
1808  had  saved  Great  Britain  from  the  necessity  of 
yielding  to  Napoleon.  At  the  beginning  of  1808  the 
British  merchants  were  threatened  with  bankruptcy, 
but  most  unexpectedly  Spain  and  the  markets  of 
Central  and  South  America  were  suddenly  thrown 
open  to  them.  The  transference  of  the  Portuguese 
Royal  Family  to  Brazil  was  accompanied  by  the 
opening  of  trade  between  Great  Britain  and  a  portion 
of  South  America. 

This  temporary  relief  was  followed  in  1810  and 
especially  in  1811  by  a  relapse  and  reaction,  and  Mr. 
Rose  says  that  "  1811  must  be  regarded  as  the  crisis 
in  the  commercial  struggle  between  us  and  our 
mighty  antagonist  ".* 

The  continental  system  which  was  at  its  height 

in  1810-11  has  suffered  from  endless  attacks,  but  from 

Napoleon's  point  of  view  it  was  defensible.     There  is 

nothing  to  show  any  determination  on  his  part  to  make 

1  Rose,  "  Napoleonic  Studies,"  p.  194. 


232          THE  LIFE  OF  NAPOLEON 

it  perpetual.  On  the  contrary  he  regarded  it  as  a 
temporary  measure  intended  to  bring  about  the  ruin 
of  Great  Britain.  "It  came,"  writes  Mr.  H.  H. 
Wilson,  "perilously  near  to  effecting  its  object.  .  .  . 
The  control  of  the  Baltic  by  Napoleon,  especially 
in  1810-11,  shook  England  to  her  foundations.  In 
1812  the  British  people  were  face  to  face  with  actual 
famine."1 

That  Great  Britain  had  not  yielded  earlier  was 
due  to  improved  agriculture  and  the  factory  system. 
She  was  not  dependent  upon  the  Continent  for  clothing, 
and  owing  to  the  introduction  of  machinery  was  able 
to  produce  goods  which  were  necessary  to  the  con- 
tinental nations  and  which  were  imported  secretly. 
After  Tilsit,  and  more  particularly  after  the  Treaty  of 
Vienna  in  1809,  Napoleon  had  entered  into  a  most 
determined  conflict  with  Great  Britain.  Against 
England's  continental  blockade  which  was  first  notified 
to  the  world  in  the  Orders  in  Council,  Napoleon  elabor- 
ated the  continental  system.  From  1809  Europe 
gradually  but  steadily  rose  against  Napoleon,  and  the 
continental  blockade  strangled  the  continental  system? 

Warnings  had  indeed  reached  Napoleon  of  the 
disastrous  effect  which  the  adhesion  to  the  continental 
system  would  have  upon  his  fortunes.  Bourrienne, 
whose  advice  was  so  often  disregarded,  after  a  visit 
to  Hamburg  for  the  purpose  of  enforcing  the  con- 
tinental system  upon  the  citizens,  wrote  that  "the 

1  "Cambridge  Modern  History,"  Vol.  IX,  p.  241. 
2 Rose,  "Napoleonic  Studies,"  p.  197. 


AT  THE  HEIGHT  OF  HIS  POWER     233 

hurling  of  twenty  kings  from  their  thrones  would  have 
excited  less  hatred  than  this  contempt  for  the  wants  of 
nations  ".l 

The  Continent  depended  upon  the  fleets  of  England 
for  cloth,  leather,  and  colonial  produce,  which  Napoleon 
believed  came  entirely  from  English  colonies.  In 
spite  of  Napoleon's  orders  to  the  contrary,  Bourrienne 
relates  how  he  was  compelled  to  obtain  army  clothing 
from  England.  Had  he  not  done  so  the  French 
troops  then  quartered  in  Hamburg,  Bremen,  and 
Liibeck  would  have  perished  from  cold.2 

The  famous  Russian  Imperial  Ukase  of  31  De- 
cember, 1810,  was  the  result  of  this  intolerable  pressure 
which  Napoleon  had  brought  to  bear  upon  Russia. 
The  British  commerce  with  Russia  had  been  for  a 
time  cut  off,  and  Alexander  found  it  necessary  to 
break  away  gradually  from  the  continental  system. 

A  crisis  in  Napoleon's  fortunes  was  indeed  arrived 
at  on  31  December,  1810.  On  that  day,  as  has  been 
stated,  Alexander  issued  his  edict  modifying  his  ad- 
hesion to  the  continental  system.  Napoleon  was 
furious.  "This  was,"  he  exclaimed,  "the  leak  that 
was  sinking  the  ship."  His  rage  was  natural.  He 
had  deliberately  staked  all  upon  the  overthrow  of 
Great  Britain  by  means  of  his  continental  system. 

On  6  August,  1810,  he  had  issued  a  severe  decree 
to  check  English  smuggling,  but  in  order  to  enforce 
that  decree  he  had  posted  French  troops  in  Stettin, 
in  the  Prussian  ports,  in  Lubeck,  Hamburg,  Lauen- 

1  Rose,  "Napoleonic  Studies,"  p.  198.  2 Ibid.  p.  199. 


234         THE  LIFE  OF  NAPOLEON 

berg,  and  along  the  west  bank  of  the  Elbe.  On 
19  October  he  had  issued  his  famous  order  that  all 
British  goods  were  to  be  publicly  burnt,  and  on 
10  December  he  announced  to  the  Senate  the  an- 
nexation of  all  the  Hanse  towns  and  the  region  be- 
tween them  and  Holland,  which  included  Oldenburg. 

Oldenburg,  however,  was  held  by  a  relative  of 
the  Tsar,  but  was  a  favourite  resort  of  smugglers,  and 
therefore  was  included  in  this  order ;  thus  Russia's 
dynastic  interests  were  affected. 

Napoleon  had  also  on  17  November  forced  Sweden 
to  declare  war  upon  England,  and  he  hoped  to  close 
the  Baltic  to  English  commerce.  It  seemed  as  though 
a  few  months  of  consistent  adhesion  by  Napoleon's 
allies  to  the  continental  system  would  have  the  desired 
effect,  and  that  Great  Britain  would  be  compelled  to 
accept  the  French  terms.  But  Alexander's  decision 
to  break  away,  even  in  a  slight  degree,  from  the 
trammels  of  the  continental  system  ruined  Napoleon's 
plans,  and  saved  Great  Britain  from  all  necessity  of 
even  considering  the  question  of  entering  upon  ne- 
gotiations. It  also  led  to  the  events  of  1813  and  1814 
— the  Moscow  campaign,  the  battle  of  Leipzic,  and 
the  abdication  of  Napoleon. 

CHIEF  DATES 

Napoleon  in  Spain December,  1808. 

Stein  advocates  declaration  of  war  by  Prussia 

and  Austria December,  1808. 

Battle  of  Corunna          .....  January,  1809. 

Napoleon  returns  to  France  ....  January,  1809. 


AT  THE  HEIGHT  OF  HIS  POWER     235 


War  with  Austria  .... 

Battles  of  Abensberg  and  Eckmiihl 

Napoleon  annexes  the  Papal  States 

Battle  of  Aspern  .... 

Battle  of  Talavera 

Battle  of  Wagram 

The  Walcheren  expeditions 

Peace  of  Vienna  (Schonbrunn) 

Convention  between  Russia  and  France  about 

Poland  (not  ratified)      .... 
Marriage  of  Napoleon  to  Marie  Louise 
Annexation  of  Holland  by  Napoleon 
Invasion  of  Portugal  by  Massena  . 
The  Fontainebleau  Decrees 
The  Russian  Ukase  modifying  its  support  of 

the  continental  system 


March,  1809. 
.    April,  1809. 
May,  1809. 
May,  1809. 
July,  1809. 
July,  1809. 
July-November,  1809. 
October,  1809. 


January,  1810. 

April,  1810. 

July,  1810. 

August,  1810. 

October,  1810. 

December,  1810. 


CHAPTER   VIII 

THE  FALL   OF   NAPOLEON,  MOSCOW,    LEIPZIG, 
WATERLOO,  1813-1815 

Napoleon's  religious  policy  a  cause  of  his  fall — The  effect  of 
the  continental  system — The  Decree  of  31  December,  1810 — 
Alexander's  alienation  from  Napoleon — The  Polish  question — 
The  Moscow  expedition — The  composition  of  Napoleon's  army 
— Borodino — Moscow — The  retreat — At  Smorgoni  Napoleon 
leaves  the  army — In  Paris — Lutzen  and  Bautzen — The  Armistice 
of  Plaswitz — Leipzic — The  campaign  of  1814 — The  abdication 
of  Napoleon — The  restoration  of  Louis  XVIII — The  allied 
sovereigns  in  England — Napoleon  in  Elba — the  Congress  of 
Vienna — Indifference  of  the  allies  to  the  possibility  of  Napoleon's 
escape — Napoleon's  return  to  France — The  Hundred  Days — 
Waterloo — Napoleon  in  St.  Helena. 

'~pvHE  fall  of  Napoleon  was  brought  about  by  a 
-*-  variety  of  causes — religious,  commercial,  political. 
Of  these  the  religious  causes  are  apt  to  be  overlooked, 
though  their  importance  cannot  be  exaggerated. 
During  the  Consulate  and  the  early  years  of  the 
Empire  he  posed  as  the  friend  and  champion  of  religion. 
"Religious  liberty"  seemed  to  him  as  dear  as  civil 
liberty.  Though  Roman  Catholicism  was  restored, 

and  became  the  State  religion  of  France,  the  Jews 

236 


THE  FALL  OF  NAPOLEON         237 

and  Protestants  were  treated  with  the  utmost  tolera- 
tion. 

During  his  exile  he  asserted  that  he  had  been 
anxious  to  establish  universal  liberty  of  conscience, 
and  that  he  desired  "  all  men  whether  Catholics,  Pro- 
testants, Mohammedans,  or  Deists  to  be  equal".  But 
during  the  years  of  his  decline  and  fall  the  Protestants 
alone  of  the  various  religious  bodies  in  France  had  no 
ground  of  complaint  against  him.  Among  the  Jews 
and  the  Roman  Catholics,  on  the  other  hand,  there 
had  grown  up  a  bitter  feeling  of  hostility  to  the 
Emperor.  With  the  Jews  opposition  to  Napoleon 
first  began  when  on  17  March,  1808,  he  issued  a 
decree  for  the  regulation  of  their  worship  and  trade. 
The  articles  which  were  contained  in  the  decree 
were  considered  by  the  Jews  an  infraction  of  the 
assurances  which  he  had  already  given  them,  and 
were  couched  in  insulting  terms.  As  a  result,  a 
powerful  opposition  was  at  once  engendered  among 
the  Jews,  who  henceforth  supported  the  efforts  of  the 
secret  societies  to  effect  the  Emperor's  downfall. 

The  alienation  of  the  Roman  Catholic  Church  was, 
however,  far  more  serious.  The  great  majority  of 
his  subjects  belonged  to  that  Church,  and  its  influence 
was  enormous  and  widespread.  Perhaps  the  greatest 
mistake  made  by  Napoleon  was  his  attack  on  the 
Papacy  and  his  imprisonment  of  Pius  VII.  The 
security  of  his  government  depended  upon  the  good- 
will of  the  Pope,  and  though  Napoleon  recognized 
the  immense  influence  of  Roman  Catholicism  in 


238          THE  LIFE  OF  NAPOLEON 

France,  Spain,  Italy,  and  Southern  Germany,  he 
seems  after  1807  to  have  thought  that  he  was  strong 
enough  to  insist  upon  the  passive  obedience  of  the 
Papacy. 

The  alienation  of  the  Church,  more  than  any 
single  cause,  had  contributed  to  the  fall  of  James  II 
of  England  ;  it  had  brought  about  the  failure  of  the 
schemes  of  the  Emperor  Joseph  II  ;  it  proved  the 
most  important  factor  in  undermining  the  basis  of 
Napoleon's  power.  As  First  Consul  Napoleon  had 
fully  recognized  the  importance  of  religion  as  repre- 
sented by  Roman  Catholicism,  and  none  of  his 
measures  were  more  statesmanlike  than  those  by  which 
he  won  over  the  French  Roman  Catholics  to  his 
side.  As  Emperor,  however,  he  gradually  drifted 
away  from  that  statesmanlike  position  towards  religion 
which  as  First  Consul  he  had  adopted.  His  loss  of  the 
goodwill  of  the  Pope  was  accompanied  by  the  ever- 
increasing  hostility  of  the  French  clergy,  whose  in- 
fluence among  the  mass  of  the  people  cannot  be 
overrated.  Thus,  during  the  later  years  of  the 
Emperor,  the  resentment  of  the  clergy  even  to  his 
rule  was  ever  increasing.  Having  "  undermined  the 
basis  of  popular  support "  on  which  Napoleon  had 
placed  his  throne,  the  Church  intrigued  for  a  return  of 
the  Bourbons. 

Thus  Napoleon's  religious  policy  teemed  with 
blunders.  He  drove  the  Jews  to  intrigue  with  the 
powerful  secret  societies  ;  he  failed  to  realize  "  that  the 
Holy  See  was  a  power  to  be  reckoned  with "  ;  he 


THE  FALL  OF  NAPOLEON          239 

turned  against  him  the  religious  opinion  of  most  of 
his  subjects. 

The  commercial  and  political  causes  of  Napoleon's 
fall  are  closely  interwoven.  The  submission  of  Austria, 
the  overthrow  of  Prussia,  the  formation  of  the  Confed- 
eration of  the  Rhine,  the  powerlessness  of  Italy,  and  the 
Russian  alliance  had  enabled  Napoleon  to  develop 
gradually  but  steadily  his  continental  system.  The 
rising  in  Spain  he  regarded  merely  as  a  temporary 
difficulty  which  would  shortly  be  overcome.  The 
success,  however,  of  Napoleon's  policy  depended 
chiefly  upon  the  continuance  of  the  alliance  of 
Russia,  the  only  continental  Power  which  could  treat 
with  Napoleon  on  equal  terms. 

It  was  therefore  of  first-rate  importance  to  keep 
Alexander  firm  to  his  alliance  with  Napoleon. 

The  refusal,  therefore,  of  Alexander,  on  31  De- 
cember, 1810,  to  adhere  strictly  to  the  continental 
system  was  a  deadly  blow  to  Napoleon's  most  cherished 
designs.  Napoleon,  as  has  been  stated  in  a  previous 
chapter,  had  earlier  in  the  same  year  refused  to  sign  a 
convention  with  Alexander  directed  against  the  aspira- 
tions of  the  Poles  for  national  independence.  Thus 
at  the  beginning  of  181 1  serious  differences  had  arisen 
between  the  two  monarchs.  Each  had  been  wounded 
in  his  tenderest  point. 

To  Alexander  the  definite  refusal  of  Napoleon's 
aid  in  suppressing  the  Polish  national  aspirations  was 
as  important  as  was  the  continuance  of  the  continental 
system  to  Napoleon.  Naturally,  therefore,  the  year 


240          THE  LIFE  OF  NAPOLEON 

1 8 1 1  was  an  anxious  one  for  both  sovereigns,  each 
of  whom  accused  the  other  of  making  preparations 
for  war.  Upon  that  war  hung  the  fate  of  Poland,  as 
well  as  that  of  the  continental  system,  if  not  indeed 
that  of  Europe. 

For  this  struggle  Napoleon  was  not  as  well  pre- 
pared as  he  had  been  for  the  war  of  1805  or  indeed 
for  the  war  of  1809.  The  Grand  Army  of  1805  was, 
according  to  Napoleon,  "  the  best  he  had  ever  com- 
manded," and  the  overthrow  of  Austria  had  been 
followed  by  the  willing  submission  of  the  states  which 
were  formed  into  the  Confederation  of  the  Rhine.  In 
1 809,  though  he  again  conquered  Austria,  signs  were 
not  wanting  that  the  French  victory  was  not  likely  to 
be  followed  by  results  as  satisfactory  to  Napoleon  as 
those  which  flowed  from  the  victory  of  Austerlitz. 

The  alliance  of  Napoleon  and  Alexander  at  Tilsit 
had  appeared  to  affirm  the  complete  overthrow  of  the 
European  system  and  to  establish  the  Napoleonic 
supremacy  in  Central,  Western,  and  Southern  Europe. 
That  Napoleon  himself  thought  such  was  the  case  is 
evident  from  the  zeal  which  he  showed  in  carrying 
out  the  continental  system,  hoping  thereby  to  effect 
within  a  short  period  the  commercial  strangulation  of 
Great  Britain. 

But,  as  has  been  stated,  the  enforcement  of  the 
system  tended  to  encourage  the  new  national  move- 
ment in  Central  Europe,  which  was  itself  encouraged 
by  the  outbreak  of  the  Spanish  resistance  to  Napoleon's 
schemes. 


THE  FALL  OF  NAPOLEON         241 

In  1809  the  determination  of  Austria  to  defeat 
Napoleon  was  based  upon  national  considerations. 
Austria  in  1809  represented  the  rising  spirit  of  nation- 
ality in  Germany,  and  at  the  same  time  continued 
that  struggle  with  France  for  supremacy  in  Europe, 
which  dated  from  the  wars  of  Charles  V  and  Francis 
I.  The  war  roused  great  enthusiasm  in  Germany, 
and  though  Austria  was  defeated  it  was  now  recognized 
that  Napoleon  was  not  invincible.  The  national 
awakening  of  Germany  had  begun — "the  first  step 
towards  the  overthrow  of  Napoleon's  power  ".* 

Nevertheless,  in  spite  of  the  warnings  from  Ger- 
many and  in  spite  of  the  continuance  of  the  Spanish 
war,  and  the  growing  tension  between  France  and 
Russia,  Napoleon  continued  to  insist  upon  the  en- 
forcement of  the  continental  system. 

In  181 1  he  regarded  war  with  Russia  as  necessary 
for  the  success  of  his  plans  for  the  destruction  of 
Great  Britain.  In  order  to  make  success  certain  he 
assembled  an  army  which  numbered  "610,000  men 
with  1242  field  pieces,  and  130  siege  guns".2 

But  neither  Napoleon  nor  his  army  were  what 
they  had  been  in  1805.  In  1812  he  was  himself 
physically  and  mentally  unequal  to  the  immense 
strain  of  the  Russian  campaign,  while  his  army  was 
largely  composed  of  soldiers  of  various  subject  nations, 
and  was  lacking  in  coherence  and  not  well  officered ;  the 

1  "  Cambridge  Modern  History,"  Vol.  X,  p.  360. 

2  Ibid.  p.  488. 
16 


242          THE  LIFE  OF  NAPOLEON 

commissariat,  also,  was  far  from  being  in  a  satisfactory 
condition. 

At  Verdun,  through  which  a  great  part  of  the 
Imperial  Guard  passed  on  their  way  to  Wilna  (the 
head-quarters  of  the  forces  which  were  being  assembled 
to  act  against  Russia),  an  Englishman,  J.  Spencer 
Stanhope,  was  living  on  parole,  having  been  taken 
prisoner  while  travelling  in  Spain. 

He  gives  an  interesting  description  of  Napoleon  as 
he  saw  him  passing  through  Verdun  in  his  carriage  on 
his  way  to  the  front. 

Napoleon  had  travelled  all  night  and  did  not  look 
at  his  best.  "His  face  looked  swollen,  his  complexion 
sallow  and  livid.  In  his  eyes  was  a  depth  of  reflection, 
a  power  of  intention  (if  I  may  so  call  it)  of  seeing 
into  the  souls  of  men  ;  there  was  a  murkiness,  a  dark 
scowl,  that  made  me  exclaim  '  nothing  in  the  world 
would  tempt  me  to  go  one  hour  in  that  carriage  with 
that  man  ! ' " 

The  late  M.  Albert  Sorel  brings  forward  a  long 
list  of  authorities  to  show  the  accuracy  of  his  statement 
that  as  early  as  August,  1810,  Alexander  had  be- 
gun his  preparations  for  an  attack  upon  the  French 
Emperor.1  He  estimates  that  in  February,  1811, 
Alexander  had  230,000  men  ready  to  further  his  plans. 
Those  plans  included  the  substitution  of  Russian  for 
French  influence  in  Poland,  and  a  close  alliance  with 
Prussia,  Sweden,  and  Austria.  Once  a  general  rising 

1  Sorel,  "  L'Europe  et  la  Revolution  Frangaise,"  Vol.  VII, 
p.  508. 


THE  FALL  OF  NAPOLEON         243 

had  been  planned  against  the  French  domination, 
Alexander  felt  that  he  could  count  upon  the  support 
of  the  Dutch,  the  active  assistance  of  Great  Britain, 
and  the  continued  opposition  in  Spain  to  Napoleon's 
plans.  Moreover,  the  dispersion  of  the  French  troops 
would  in  his  opinion  facilitate  the  success  of  an  aggres- 
sive movement  by  an  army  strong  in  numbers  and 
impregnated  with  a  hatred  of  French  domination. 

Alexander  had  many  substantial  reasons  for  his 
determination  to  resist  the  growth  of  Napoleon's  in- 
fluence. The  latter's  avowed  intention  of  securing 
a  mastery  over  the  Mediterranean  and  the  adjacent 
countries,  his  retention  of  the  Ionian  Islands,  his  op- 
position to  the  idea  of  a  Russian  occupation  of  Con- 
stantinople, his  sudden  marriage  on  2  April,  1810, 
with  the  Austrian  Duchess  Marie  Louise,  before  the 
proposed  match  between  him  and  a  Russian  princess 
had  been  formally  broken  off,  the  hardship  suffered  by 
Russian  trade  owing  to  the  continental  system,  and 
lastly  the  annexation  on  10  December,  1810,  of  the 
Duchy  of  Oldenburg  (with  the  whole  coast-line  from 
Friesland  to  Denmark),  which  belonged  to  a  near  rela- 
tive of  the  Russian  Tsar — had  decided  Alexander  to 
take  a  step  which  led  directly  to  Napoleon's  Moscow 
expedition. 

Among  the  causes  of  the  friction  between  Alex- 
ander and  Napoleon  the  Polish  question  was  an  import- 
ant one.  Both  the  monarchs  fully  recognized  the 
military  value  of  Poland  ;  both  became  rivals  for  the 
friendship  of  the  Poles.  In  this  contest  for  the  favour 


244         THE  LIFE  OF  NAPOLEON 

of  Poland  Alexander  was  worsted,  though  early  in 
1811  he  made  a  vigorous  attempt  to  gain  the  Poles 
by  liberal  promises.  In  1812  Napoleon  definitely 
realized  that  Alexander  would  not  support  the  con- 
tinental blockade.  The  Tsar's  refusal  to  unite  with 
Napoleon  "  in  severe  repressive  measures  against 
British  and  American  trade,"  made  it  necessary  for 
Napoleon  either  to  abandon  the  continental  system 
or  to  compel  Alexander  to  support  it. 

The  alienation  of  Alexander  began,  as  has 
been  shown,  in  1810.  In  1811  that  monarch 
entered  upon  his  preparations  for  war ;  on  29  March, 
1812,  he  dismissed  his  chief  minister  Speranski,  who 
was  succeeded  by  ShishkofF,  a  representative  of  the 
old  Russian  party  which  was  opposed  to  the  policy  of 
Tilsit.  29  March,  1812,  is  said  to  mark  "a  turning- 
point  in  Alexander's  career,  for  he  now  entered  deliber- 
ately upon  a  life-and -death  contest".1  The  date  has, 
indeed,  a  wide  significance,  for  it  marks  the  opening 
of  the  period  of  Russia's  supremacy  in  Europe — a 
period  which  was  not  closed  till  the  Crimean  War. 

Early  in  May,  1812,  Napoleon  proceeded  to  Dres- 
den, where  he  met  the  rulers  of  Austria  and  Prussia  and 
a  host  of  German  princes.  While  there  he  heard  that 
Alexander,  who  in  April  had  secured  the  alliance  of 
Sweden,  had  concluded  on  28  May  the  Peace  of  Bucha- 
rest with  the  Turks. 

Moreover,  in  June,  Napoleon,  who  till  his  arrival 
at  Moscow  remained  hopeful  of  winning  over  Alex- 

1  "Cambridge  Modern  History,"  Vol.  IX,  pp.  487-8. 


THE  FALL  OF  NAPOLEON          245 

ander,  disappointed  the  Poles  by  refusing  to  recognize, 
in  accordance  with  the  wishes  of  the  Polish  Diet,  the 
restoration  of  the  kingdom  of  Poland. 

Nevertheless  Napoleon  remained,  as  ever,  con- 
fident in  the  success  of  his  policy.  His  army,  which 
included  contingents  from  Austria,  Prussia,  Poland, 
Italy,  Saxony,  the  Rhine  Provinces,  and  Westphalia, 
was  superior  in  numbers  to  that  of  Alexander  and  was 
under  experienced  officers. 

But  Napoleon  himself  was  not  in  good  health, 
and  mentally  he  had  weakened,  not  having  the  same 
power  of  decision  as  heretofore,  and  not  having  the 
same  sense  of  proportion.  Though  immense,  his 
army  had  no  coherence,  and  was  now  called  upon  to 
undertake  a  campaign  under  conditions  not  hitherto 
met  with. 

On  24  June  the  French  army  crossed  the  Niemen  ; 
on  17  August  Napoleon  drove  the  Russians  out  of 
Smolensk ;  on  7  September  he  fought  the  drawn 
battle  of  Borodino.  Had  Napoleon  used  his  guard 
he  would  have  won  a  decisive  victory.  Se"gur  asserts 
that  he  was  ill  at  Borodino  ;  this  assertion,  however, 
has  been  denied.  In  any  case  the  non-employment  of 
the  guard  at  Borodino  was  a  blunder  of  some  mag- 
nitude, and,  moreover,  seems  to  indicate  that  he  was 
no  longer  the  Napoleon  of  the  Italian  campaigns. 

As  is  well  known,  the  arrival  of  the  army  at  Moscow, 
which  was  destroyed  by  fire  by  the  Russians,  was  the 
limit  of  Napoleon's  success.  Alexander  refused  to 
yield,  and  Napoleon  had  no  alternative  but  to  retreat. 


246          THE  LIFE  OF  NAPOLEON 

In  that  famous  retreat  which  began  on  October,  1812, 
the  French  army  was  decimated  by  cold,  disease,  and 
the  continuous  onslaught  of  the  triumphant  Russians. 
Having  arrived  at  Smorgoni,  Napoleon,  on  5  December, 
decided  to  leave  his  army  and  with  a  few  companions 
to  return  rapidly  to  Paris. 

The  description  given  us  by  Spencer  Stanhope  of 
Napoleon's  arrival  in  Paris  from  Smorgoni  is  full  of 
interest.  "  I  hurried  to  the  Tuileries.  He  was,  indeed, 
returned,  but  in  an  inferior  sort  of  a  hackney  carriage. 
Paris  was  much  agitated,  and  menacing  placards  con- 
tinued to  be  posted,  though  they  were  rapidly  re- 
moved by  the  police.  Napoleon,  however,  who  was 
in  excellent  health,  opened  the  Senate  in  state,  the 
brilliancy  of  the  Imperial  procession  being  little  less 
than  magnifique.  The  glass  coach  in  which  he  and 
the  Empress  sat  was  drawn  by  cream-coloured  horses, 
and  in  its  progress  to  the  Chamber  he  greeted  the 
crowd  with  a  smile  which  was  strikingly  beautiful  ; 
there  was  a  fascination  about  it  which  even  in  spite  of 
my  previous  impressions  (at  Verdun)  I  could  not 
resist." 

In  his  speech,  which  was  written,  Napoleon  an- 
nounced the  total  destruction  of  his  army,  but  declared 
that  he  required  neither  men  nor  money. 

The  events  in  the  east  of  Europe,  however,  soon 
necessitated  a  new  conscription,  and  Napoleon  went 

1  "  Memoirs  of  Anna  Maria  Wilhelmina  Pickering,  together 
with  Extracts  from  the  Journal  of  her  Father,  John  Spencer 
Stanhope,"  pp.  487-90.  London,  Hodder  &  Stoughton,  1903. 


THE  FALL  OF  NAPOLEON         247 

in  person  to  the  Invalides  to  ascertain  if  any  of  the 
pensioners  were  fit  for  service.  His  return  from  this 
visit  was  marked  by  an  absence  of  cries  of  "vive 
I'Empereur"  and  by  a  shower  of  petitions  which  were 
thrown  in  at  his  carriage  window.  Before  the 
Emperor  left  for  the  front  a  masked  ball  was  given 
at  the  Tuileries.  The  Emperor  was  present  and 
had  a  long  conversation  with  Cambace'res. 

What  the  effect  of  a  successful  war  against  Russia, 
upon  Europe  generally,  and  Great  Britain  in  particular, 
would  have  been  can  only  be  surmised.  By  her 
seizure  of  the  Danish  fleet  and  by  her  interven- 
tion in  the  Spanish  Peninsula,  Great  Britain  had 
taken  very  effective  steps  to  hamper  Napoleon's 
efforts  to  dominate  Europe.  But  the  success  of  the 
campaign  against  Russia  would  have  laid  Europe  at 
the  feet  of  Napoleon,  and  it  is  quite  possible  that  he 
would  have  returned  to  his  plan  of  1804-5  °f  an 
invasion  of  England.  Thus  the  success  or  failure  of 
Napoleon's  invasion  of  Russia  was  a  matter  of  vital 
interest  to  the  inhabitants  of  Great  Britain  no  less 
than  it  was  to  the  Spaniards,  and  indeed  to  the  whole 
of  continental  Europe.  In  July,  1812,  both  countries 
had  made  treaties  with  Alexander,  upon  whose  suc- 
cess so  much  depended. 

The  colossal  failure  of  the  Russian  campaign, 
ending  in  Napoleon's  hasty  departure  from  Smorgoni 
for  Paris  on  5  December,  had  brought  upon  France 
defeat  and  disaster.  In  spite  of  Napoleon's  herculean 
efforts  in  the  spring  of  1813,  rewarded  as  they  were 


248          THE  LIFE  OF  NAPOLEON 

by  the  victories  of  Lutzen  and  Bautzen,  Central 
Europe  was  determined  to  shake  itself  free  from  his 
control.  Its  efforts  were  unexpectedly  facilitated  by 
Napoleon's  assent  to  the  armistice  of  Plaswitz. 

The  armistice  of  Plaswitz  on  4  June  proved  to  be 
one  of  Napoleon's  most  fatal  blunders.  Lutzen  and 
Bautzen  had  certainly  proved  costly  victories,  and  his 
troops  were  not  in  a  fit  condition  for  another  campaign. 
But  the  Austrians  were  not  as  yet  openly  hostile,  the 
Russo- Prussian  alliance  could  not  survive  more  defeats, 
and  further  victories  would  strengthen  Napoleon's 
wavering  allies.  It  is  true  that  there  were  many 
arguments  in  favour  of  an  armistice.  The  Saxon 
campaign,  with  its  hardly-won  victories,  had  convinced 
Napoleon  of  the  necessity  of  refitting,  reorganizing, 
and  increasing  his  forces.  Moreover,  he  wished  to 
delay  further  operations  until  his  army  in  Italy,  under 
Eugene,  was  able  to  make  a  demonstration  on  the 
frontier  of  Carniola.  Napoleon  did  not  realize  the 
magnitude  of  his  failure  in  Spain,  nor  the  possibility 
of  Austria  joining  his  foes,  nor  the  national  character 
of  the  opposition  to  him  in  Northern  Germany. 

That  the  acceptance  by  Napoleon  of  the  armistice 
of  Plaswitz  was  a  blunder  of  the  most  enormous 
magnitude  is  now  recognized.  In  an  Austrian  State 
Paper,  written  in  1813,  are  these  remarkable  criti- 
cisms :  "  La  plus  grande  faute  qu'ait  fait  Napoleon 
dans  sa  carriere  militaire,  c'^tait  avoir  consenti  a 
1'armistice  ".  And  again  :  "  Enfin,  en  commetant  la 
faute  de  consentir  a  1'armistice,  il  en  fit  une  qui  lui  otait 


THE  FALL  OF  NAPOLEON         249 

la  chance  de  rester  le  plus  puissant  souverain,  c'£tait 
de  n'avoir  pas  entendu  les  propositions  de  paix  a 
Prague,  a  prix  de  legers  sacrifices  de  son  cote  ".J  In 
making  this  armistice  Napoleon  was  clearly  throwing 
away  the  advantages  which  he  had  gained  by  his 
victories  at  Liitzen  and  Bautzen. 

No  doubt  Napoleon  was  convinced  that  his 
reasons  for  making  the  armistice  were  sound.  He 
desired  a  period  of  peace  during  which  he  could  reor- 
ganize his  cavalry,  and  strengthen  it  by  reinforcements. 
Moreover,  he  underrated  the  strength  of  Austria 
and  was  confident  that  he  could  overcome  his  foes. 

During  the  armistice,  which  lasted  till  10  August, 
the  Russians  and  Prussians  were  able  to  reorganize 
their  forces,  to  recover  from  their  defeats  at  Liitzen  and 
Bautzen,  and  to  arrange  a  plan  of  campaign.  Early 
in  July  the  news  arrived  of  Wellington's  victory  at 
Vittoria,  and  it  had  a  most  encouraging  effect  upon  the 
allies.  Moreover,  Austria,  then  guided  by  Metternich, 
finally  decided,  in  consequence  of  Napoleon's  refusal 
to  accept  her  proposals,  to  join  Russia,  Prussia,  and 
Sweden.  Between  10  August  and  15  October  a 
number  of  pitched  battles  were  fought,  the  total  result 
of  which  was  that  the  French  army  was  finally  brought 
to  bay  at  Leipzic,  where  on  16,  17,  18  and  19  Oc- 
tober the  allies  won  a  decisive  success.  All  that  re- 
mained for  Napoleon  was  to  make  a  rapid  retreat  to 
France  pursued  by  the  allied  forces. 

1  Quoted  by  J.  Holland  Rose  in  his  "  Napoleonic  Studies," 
P-  255. 


250          THE  LIFE  OF  NAPOLEON 

The  battle  of  Leipzic  brings  into  prominence  many 
of  the  chief  causes  of  the  decline  and  fall  of  Napoleon. 
In  the  first  place,  he  was  not  able,  as  in  former  years, 
to  count  upon  the  whole-hearted  support  of  the  French 
nation  nor  upon  continual  supplies  of  French  soldiers. 

The  condition  of  France  in  1799  had,  indeed, 
rendered  Caesarism  inevitable  and  necessary.  But 
"the  break-down  of  system  and  tradition  in  France," 
we  read,  "  left  men  unsettled  and  prepared  for  contin- 
ual change".  The  failure  of  the  Russian  campaign 
brought  out  all  the  weak  points  of  Napoleon's  position. 
He  had  no  second  in  command  in  whom  he  could 
place  absolute  confidence  ;  many  of  the  great  generals 
of  his  early  wars  were  dead  or  worn  out.  National 
enthusiasm  is  now  seen  in  the  Prussian  not  in  the 
French  armies,  composed  as  they  were  at  this  time  to 
a  large  extent  of  foreigners.1 

During  the  campaign  which  opened  on  10  August 
and  ended  at  Leipzic  Napoleon  had  committed  many 
blunders.  The  numerous  isolated  engagements  fought 
in  August  and  September  had  all  ended  in  defeat,  and 
were  in  direct  defiance  of  the  principles  which  guided 
his  famous  campaign  in  Italy  in  1796  and  1797. 

When  the  battle  of  Leipzic  was  fought  he  had  at 
least  100,000  troops  holding  various  fortresses.  The 
absence  of  these  troops  on  the  days  of  the  battle 
rendered  Napoleon's  defeat  certain.  At  Leipzic  and 
in  the  ensuing  campaigns  in  1814  and  1815  it  is  the 

1  About  60  per  cent  of  Napoleon's  army  in  1812  were  non- 
French. 


THE  FALL  OF  NAPOLEON         251 

Prussians  not  the  French  who  show  a  national  enthusi- 
asm. It  is  the  Prussians  who  were  "electrises  au 
dernier  degre". 

After  Leipzic  there  was  no  attempt  made  on  the 
part  of  the  Grand  Army  to  resist  its  foes  till  the  Rhine 
had  been  crossed.  For  great  as  were  the  military 
results  of  the  battle,  its  political  results  were  no  less 
striking.  Bavaria  had  on  10  October  made  terms 
with  Austria  at  the  Treaty  of  Ried ;  after  Leipzic  the 
other  members  of  the  Confederation  of  the  Rhine 
hastened  to  follow  her  example.  The  tide  of  nation- 
alism, to  Metternich's  alarm,  rose  rapidly,  and  till 
Napoleon's  overthrow  received  no  check. 

After  winning  at  Hanau  on  28  and  29  October 
over  the  Bavarians  his  last  victory  on  German  soil, 
Napoleon,  with  the  remains  of  his  army,  passed  the 
Rhine.  Germany  was  at  last  freed  from  the  rule  of 
the  French  Emperor. 

Much,  however,  remained  to  be  done  if  Europe  was 
to  be  relieved  of  all  fear  of  future  attacks  by  France. 
Napoleon  had  no  intention  of  acquiescing  in  his  defeat 
at  Leipzic.  France  was,  it  is  true,  exhausted,  but 
Napoleon,  who  most  unwisely  had  left  many  French 
garrisons  in  Northern  Germany,  trusted  that  the 
threat  of  invasion  would  have  effects  similar  to  those 
produced  in  1792  and  1793,  when  France,  even  in  an 
unprepared  condition  and  with  only  young  and  un- 
disciplined troops,  defeated  and  broke  up  a  European 
coalition. 

But  there  was  a  radical  difference   between   the 


252          THE  LIFE  OF  NAPOLEON 

situation  in  1793  and  1813.  In  1813  Europe  no 
longer  as  in  1793  relied  upon  effete  monarchies  in  its 
struggle  with  the  French  Revolution.  In  1793  France 
alone  of  European  countries  was  alive  with  the  spirit 
of  nationality  and  patriotism;  in  1813  practically  the 
whole  of  Europe  was  actuated  by  that  spirit,  and  was 
burning  to  drive  the  French  invaders  within  their  own 
boundaries.  Had  Napoleon  accepted  the  excellent 
terms  known  as  the  "  Proposals  of  Frankfort,"  offered 
to  him  in  November,  France  would  have  received  the 
boundaries  of  the  Rhine,  the  Alps,  and  the  Pyrenees. 

But,  fortunately  for  Europe,  Napoleon  trusted  to 
the  dissensions  of  the  allies,  and  his  refusal  of  the 
terms  rendered  peace  impossible,  and  for  a  time  united 
the  allies  in  one  common  object — viz.  his  own  over- 
throw. 

Thus  Napoleon's  self-confidence,  coupled  with  his 
obstinacy,  and  his  failure  to  realize  the  strength  of  the 
desire  for  revenge  which  animated  the  Russians  and 
Prussians,  as  well  as  the  growth  of  a  national  feeling 
in  Germany,  and  the  increasing  discontent  in  France 
at  the  continuance  of  expensive  wars,  led  him  irresist- 
ibly to  his  fall. 

That  the  allies  fully  realized  the  magnitude  of  the 
task  involved  in  the  overthrow  of  Napoleon  is  evident 
when  we  remember  that  their  forces  numbered  some 
300,000  men.  That  these  forces  were  not  too  numer- 
ous is  evident  when  one  studies  the  marvellous  cam- 
paign in  France  during  the  first  three  months  of  1814. 
Never  had  Napoleon  shown  greater  skill  than  during 


THE  FALL  OF  NAPOLEON         253 

those  months,  when  with  a  comparatively  small  army 
he  kept  his  enemies  at  bay,  and  maintained  in  the  most 
masterly  fashion  an  unequal  struggle  against  over- 
whelming odds. 

On  25  January,  1813,  Napoleon,  having  appointed 
the  Empress  Regent  and  placed  Joseph  in  charge  of 
Paris,  set  out  for  Chalons -sur- Mar ne,  the  head-quarters 
of  his  army.  At  Chatillon  the  allies  held  a  congress 
and  entered  into  negotiations  with  the  Duke  of  Vicenza 
who,  as  Napoleon's  envoy,  was  endeavouring  to  ex- 
tract from  them  terms  which  the  Emperor  would  accept. 

But  as  yet  Napoleon  refused  to  acknowledge 
defeat,  or  the  necessity  of  considering  seriously  the 
question  of  terms.  The  allies,  on  account  of  the  diffi- 
culties of  obtaining  adequate  supplies,  had  distributed 
their  forces  over  a  wide  area,  thus  giving  that  great 
master  of  the  art  of  war,  Napoleon,  a  splendid  op- 
portunity of  attacking  them  in  detail. 

Wide  intervals  separated  the  invading  forces,  which 
ought  to  have  concentrated  their  efforts  upon  the  im- 
mediate destruction  of  Napoleon's  remaining  army. 

Thus  the  army  led  by  Schwarzenberg  advanced 
down  the  valley  of  the  Seine  to  Troyes,  while  the 
smaller  army,  headed  by  Bliicher,  marched  along  the 
valley  of  the  Marne  to  St.  Dizier.  Napoleon  at  once 
decided  to  attack  the  latter.  On  28  January  he  at- 
tacked the  enemy  at  St.  Dizier  and  separated  the 
divisions  commanded  by  Bliicher  and  York.  At 
Brienne  on  29  January  he  attacked  Bliicher  whose 
forces  consisted  mainly  of  Russians,  and  forced  him 


254         THE  LIFE  OF  NAPOLEON 

back  in  the  direction  of  Schwarzenberg's  army.  How- 
ever, on  i  February,  Bliicher  advanced,  and  after  a 
severe  struggle  during  a  snowstorm  occupied  La 
Rothiere.  Bliicher's  victory  cost  Napoleon  some 
6000  men  and  seventy  guns. 

Napoleon  then  fell  back  upon  Nogent-sur-Seine, 
while  Bliicher,  breaking  up  his  army  into  detachments, 
endeavoured  to  march  north  of  him  and  so  to  reach 
Paris. 

Napoleon  now  seized  the  opportunity  which  the 
over-confidence  of  the  allies  had  given  him.  He  at 
once  fell  upon  a  force  of  5000  detached  Russians  whom 
he  practically  annihilated,  and  with  the  aid  of  Marmont 
drove  larger  detachments  under  Sacken  and  York 
towards  Soissons.  Bliicher  was  compelled  to  forego 
his  ambitious  scheme  and  hastily  fell  back.  Napoleon 
then  turned  rapidly  upon  Schwarzenberg's  advanced 
guard,  and  with  the  aid  of  Oudinot  and  Macdonald 
drove  it  back  in  disorder  beyond  Troyes. 

Bliicher,  however,  on  24  February  attacked  Mar- 
mont on  the  Marne  and  forced  him  to  retire  towards 
La  Ferte-sons-Jouarre. 

Till  Castlereagh's  arrival  at  the  allied  head- 
quarters, Napoleon's  hopes,  that  owing  to  jealousies 
the  "cohesion  of  the  Coalition"  would  weaken,  were 
by  no  means  groundless.  And  those  jealousies 
were  increased  by  the  initial  successes  of  Napoleon 
in  the  early  days  of  the  campaign  of  1813. 

Napoleon's  energy,  activity,  and  determination, 
indeed,  never  left  him  during  this  trying  time.  On 


THE  FALL  OF  NAPOLEON         255 

5  March  he  tells  Joseph,  who  was  then  in  Paris,  that 
he  has  ordered  the  instant  trial  and  execution  of  the 
commandant  of  Soissons,  who  had  evacuated  that 
town  without  firing  a  shot.  On  the  following  day 
he  writes  that  he  intends  to  drive  the  enemy  towards 
Laon  and  then  to  march  upon  Chalons  and  Arcis. 
"  It  is,"  he  says,  "indispensable  to  hold  the  Seine  for 
five  or  six  days  at  Nogent,  Bray,  and  Montereau." 
On  8  March  he  won  the  battle  of  Craonne,  defeating 
the  Russian  army  under  Sacken,  but  the  following  day 
Joseph  wrote  a  despairing  account  of  the  situation  as 
it  appeared  to  him  in  Paris.  There  the  funds  had 
fallen  on  8  March  to  ^51.  Civil  war,  with  the  head- 
quarters of  the  opposition  to  Napoleon  at  Bordeaux, 
seemed  likely  to  break  out,  while  all  through  these 
anxious  days  the  allied  troops  were  steadily  drawing 
nearer  to  Paris.  To  Joseph  a  peace,  giving  France 
her  ancient  limits,  seemed  absolutely  necessary.  But 
Napoleon  showed  no  sign  of  yielding  to  Joseph's  en- 
treaties. On  9  March  Bliicher  defeated  at  Laon  the 
French  Emperor,  who  retreated  to  Rheims. 

Napoleon  was  thus  seriously  threatened  by  two 
armies,  that  of  Bliicher  and  that  of  Schwarzenberg. 
Still  hoping  for  success  Napoleon  resolved  to  attack 
the  Austrians.  On  20  March  the  decisive  battle  of 
Arcis-sur-Aube  was  fought,  and  Napoleon's  troops 
were  completely  overwhelmed  by  Schwarzenberg's 
army.  The  decisive  character  of  this  battle  gives 
it  a  place  among  the  notable  battles  of  the  world. 
Napoleon  had  played  his  last  card,  and  had  lost. 


256          THE  LIFE  OF  NAPOLEON 

On  28  March  the  envoy  Wessenberg,  on  his  way 
from  London  to  join  the  Austrian  Emperor,  was 
brought  by  some  French  troops,  as  a  captive,  to  St. 
Dizier,  the  head-quarters  of  Napoleon.  The  French 
Emperor  had  still  hopes  of  winning  Austria  to  his 
side.  He  therefore  released  Wessenberg,  and  be- 
fore the  latter's  departure  endeavoured  to  impress 
upon  him  the  difference  of  the  interests  of  Austria 
from  those  of  her  allies.  He  asked  Wessenberg  to 
tell  his  sovereign  how  anxious  he  (Napoleon)  was 
for  peace,  and  assured  him  that  all  he  asked  for  was 
France  with  the  frontiers  that  he  found  on  his  acces- 
sion to  the  throne.  He  declared  that  he  was  even 
ready  to  give  up  all  his  colonies  if  he  could  keep  the 
mouth  of  the  Scheldt,  for  he  was  sure  that  England 
would  not  insist  on  the  cession  of  Antwerp  if  Austria 
did  not  support  her.1  Events  later  in  the  year  1814, 
when  England,  and  Austria,  and  France  united 
against  Russia  and  Prussia  in  opposition  to  the 
schemes  of  those  powers  at  the  Congress  of  Vienna, 
somewhat  justified  his  declaration  to  Wessenberg 
that  "  the  time  will  come  when  Austria  will  stand  in 
need  of  me  ". 

It  was,  however,  too  late,  for  three  days  later  the 
allies  were  before  Paris.  Napoleon,  with  some  justi- 
fication, throughout  these  eventful  weeks  had  based 
his  hopes  upon  the  break-up  of  the  alliance  in  conse- 
quence of  the  differences  which  had  always  existed 
between  the  allies.  The  objects  aimed  at  by  Russia 
1  Quoted  by  Rose  in  "  Napoleonic  Studies,"  p.  266. 


THE  FALL  OF  NAPOLEON         257 

and  Prussia  were  by  no  means  acceptable  to  Francis 
of  Austria  or  to  Metternich.  And  Napoleon's  rush 
eastwards  was  "  based  on  diplomatic  no  less  than  on 
military  grounds  V  Instead,  however,  of  the  alliance 
breaking  up,  his  enemies  marched  upon  Paris.  Since 
20  March  Austria  had  unreservedly  thrown  in  her  lot 
with  the  other  members  of  the  alliance,  and  from  that 
date  all  negotiations  with  Caulaincourt  had  ceased. 
The  cause  of  this  unexpected  union  of  the  allies  is  to 
be  found  in  a  letter  sent  on  1 9  March  by  Maret  to 
Caulaincourt.  This  letter,  evidently  dictated  by 
Napoleon,  had  fallen  into  the  hands  of  the  allies.  The 
letter  speaks  for  itself : — 

"  1'Empereur  desire  que  vous  restiez  dans  le  vague 
sur  tout  ce  qui  serait  relatif  a  la  livraison  des  places 
d' Anvers,  Mayence,  et  Alexandrie,  si  vous  6tiez  obligd 
a  consentir  a  ces  cessions,  etant  dans  1'intention,  meme 
quand  elle  aurait  ratifie  le  traite  de  prendre  conseil  de 
la  situation  militaire  des  choses.  Attendez  a  dernier 
moment."2 

The  end  was  now  at  hand.  On  29  March  the 
Empress  fled  from  Paris,  and  on  30  March  the  last 
battle  took  place  outside  Paris.  As  soon  as  the 
victory  of  the  allies  seemed  assured  Joseph  and  Jerome 
Bonaparte  fled  from  the  capital,  while  an  armistice  was 
arranged. 

On  the  same  day   Napoleon  left   Fontainebleau 

1Rose,  "Napoleonic  Studies,"  p.  268. 

2  Quoted  by  Mr.  Rose  from  Fournier's  work  on  the  "  Congress 
of  Chatillon  ". 


258         THE  LIFE  OF  NAPOLEON 

with  some  cavalry  for  Paris.  On  hearing  that  Paris 
had  capitulated  he  returned  in  despair  to  Fontaine- 
bleau. 

On  3 1  March  the  Tsar  and  the  King  of  Prussia 
rode  into  Paris.  Napoleon  had  staked  all  upon  the 
chance  of  quarrels  breaking  out  among  the  allied 
sovereigns,  and  had  lost.  During  the  ensuing  ten 
days  he  was  the  prey  to  doubt  and  uncertainty.  On 
4  April  the  Senate  decreed  his  deposition,  and 
Napoleon  found  that  his  resolve  to  strike  a  last  blow 
was  not  supported  by  his  marshals.  He  then  decided 
to  abdicate  in  favour  of  his  son.  Meanwhile, 
Marmont,  on  condition  "  that  the  personal  safety  and 
liberty  of  Napoleon  should  be  respected,"  had  decided 
to  throw  in  his  lot  with  the  allies.  There  was  now 
nothing  to  fear  from  any  action  on  the  part  of 
Napoleon,  and  on  the  initiative  of  Alexander,  the 
envoys  from  Fontainebleau — Caulaincourt,  Ney,  and 
Macdonald — were  informed  that  Napoleon's  abdica- 
tion must  include  his  whole  family. 

On  1 3  April  Napoleon  accepted  the  terms  offered 
him  by  the  allies — known  as  the  Treaty  of  Fontaine- 
bleau. By  that  treaty  he  was  granted  a  liberal 
revenue,  and  the  island  of  Elba,  which  he  had  chosen 
in  preference  to  Corsica  or  Corfu,  in  full  sovereignty. 

Moreover,  the  Empress  was  given  the  Duchies  of 
Parma,  Piacenza,  and  Guastalla. 

A  week  later,  after  an  affecting  farewell  to  those 
troops  who  were  still  faithful  to  him,  Napoleon  set  out 
for  Elba. 


THE  FALL  OF  NAPOLEON         259 

Owing  to  the  firmness  of  the  English  ministers 
all  the  statuary  taken  from  the  Vatican  to  the  Louvre 
was  restored  except  a  few  statues  of  little  value. 
Many  magnificent  pictures  taken  from  various  Italian 
churches  were  sent  back  to  Pius,  and  with  them  and 
some  500  MSS.  carried  off  by  the  French  in  1798  and 
in  1814  restored,  he  laid  the  foundation  of  the  famous 
Vatican  Library.  Still,  the  invasion  and  occupation 
of  Italy  had  resulted  in  no  little  loss  as  regards  its 
art  treasures.  The  costly  tiara  of  Paul  III  had  been 
broken  up  by  Napoleon,  and  its  loss  was  by  no  means 
compensated  for  by  the  Sevres  candalabra  which  he 
presented  to  the  Pope  in  1814. 

Napoleon's  journey  to  Elba  was  full  of  incident. 
He  was  accompanied  by  Colonel  Campbell,  and  was 
forced  to  adopt  all  sorts  of  expedients  and  disguises 
to  avoid  the  fury  of  the  populace  in  the  South  of 
France.  At  one  time  he  dressed  himself  as  a  post- 
boy and  wore  a  white  cockade — a  necessary  disguise, 
for  the  mob  in  one  place  had  erected  a  gallows  and 
were  determined  to  hang  him.  Once  on  board  the 
English  frigate  he  declared  to  Colonel  Campbell,  with 
whom  he  was  on  very  friendly  terms,  that  for  the  first 
time  for  several  years  he  felt  in  security.1 

The  Duchess  d'Abrantes  gives  an  interesting  ac- 
count of  Napoleon's  departure  from  Fontainebleau. 
On  20  April,  with  him,  she  tells  us,  were  Colonel 
Campbell,  General  Schuvalov,  General  Koller,  M.  de 

1  "  Chronicles  of  the  Families  of  Atholl  and  Tullibardine," 
Vol.  IV,  pp.  253,  254. 


260         THE  LIFE  OF  NAPOLEON 

Schack,  representing  England,  Russia,  Austria,  and 
Prussia  respectively,  and  an  escort  of  1500  foreign 
troops.  In  his  carriage,  which  was  drawn  by  six  horses, 
was  General  Bertrand.  The  Emperor,  we  are  told, 
was  calm  and  serene,  and  "bowed  with  that  wonted 
smile  so  peculiar  to  him  ".  At  Orgon  his  life  was  in 
danger  from  an  infuriated  mob,  and  at  Avignon  he 
disguised  himself  in  a  travelling  coat  of  General 
Roller's.  Before  embarking  for  Porto  Ferrajo  he 
stayed  a  day  and  a  half  with  his  sister  Pauline. 

The  reaction  in  France  after  Napoleon's  fall  has 
been  described  by  many  writers.  From  all  parts  of 
the  world  people  flocked  to  the  French  capital. 
Among  other  visitors  was  Lord  James  Murray  who, 
sailing  from  Southampton  on  25  April,  arrived  at  Paris 
on  the  27th.  In  his  letters  he  describes  many  interest- 
ing incidents.  The  Rue  Napoleon  had  been  at  once 
changed  into  the  Rue  de  la  Paix,  and  Napoleon's 
statue  in  the  Place  de  Vendome,  hitherto  at  "  the  top 
of  a  most  beautiful  column  of  bronze,  made  out  of  the 
cannon  that  had  been  taken  by  him  at  different  periods," 
had  been  "  lowered  down  with  a  rope  about  the  neck  ".1 
On  3  May  the  King  of  France  made  his  entry  into 
Paris,  the  carriages  and  horses  used  on  this  occasion 
being  those  that  had  belonged  to  Napoleon,  but  "it 
was  easy,", we  are  told,  "to  perceive  that  his  arms  had 
been  blotted  out  for  those  of  the  Bourbons  ".  Never- 
theless there  was  no  good  feeling  in  Paris  between  the 

1 "  Chronicles  of  the  Families  of  Atholl  and  Tullibardine," 
Vol.  IV,  pp.  252,  253. 


THE  FALL  OF  NAPOLEON         261 

French  and  the  allies.  Duels  were  frequent,  and 
many  lives  were  lost.  The  country  was  in  a  most 
unsettled  state  and  Paris,  so  long  as  the  allied  armies 
were  in  occupation,  remained  unsettled. 

At  Malmaison  the  ex-Empress  Josephine  was 
living  and  received  some  of  the  allied  officers  with 
courtesy.  On  7  May  Lord  James  Murray  visited 
her,  and  a  few  days  later  was  invited  to  a  dejeuner 
at  her  house. 

On  7  June  there  arrived  in  London  the  Tsar,  the 
King  of  Prussia,  and  his  sons,  Marshal  Blucher,  Count 
Platoff,  General  Barclay  de  Tolly,  and  many  other 
heroes  in  the  struggle  against  Napoleon.  They  re- 
mained in  England  till  the  end  of  the  month,  visiting 
Oxford  and  being  present  at  the  Ascot  races.  In  the 
autumn  the  famous  Congress  of  Vienna  took  place, 
and  hardly  had  the  most  important  matters  been  settled 
when  in  March,  1815,  the  news  arrived  of  Napoleon's 
escape  from  Elba.  The  army  declared  in  his  favour, 
and  Louis  XVIII  fled  to  the  Netherlands.  In  Ger- 
many, as  elsewhere,  the  consternation  caused  by  these 
events  was  extreme. 

During  Napoleon's  residence  in  the  Villa  San 
Martino  in  Elba,  the  whole  of  Europe  had  been  in  a 
state  of  unsettlement.  The  question  of  the  future  of 
Italy  was  in  itself  sufficient  to  occupy  the  energies  of 
the  leading  statesmen  of  Great  Britain,  Austria,  Russia, 
and  Prussia.  While  the  Hapsburgs  openly  desired  to 
re-establish  their  power  in  Italy,  it  was  felt  that  if  the 
Austrian  policy  was  carried  out  Italy  would  find  her- 


262          THE   LIFE  OF  NAPOLEON 

self  more  crushed  and  humiliated  than  ever,  and,  more- 
over, that  a  strong  inducement  would  be  given  to  the 
Italians  to  welcome  the  restoration  of  the  power  of 
Napoleon.  In  July,  1814,  it  was  rumoured  that 
Napoleon  and  Murat  were  united  in  planning  some 
operation  in  Italy.  And  in  September  it  was  evident 
to  the  Austrians  themselves  that  the  movement  in 
favour  of  Italian  independence  must  be  recognized, 
and  that  great  care  should  be  taken  not  to  arouse  the 
fears  of  the  Italian  patriots.  It  was  necessary  for 
Austria  to  manager  f  esprit  National  de  £ Italie.  There 
was  no  doubt,  too,  that  Castlereagh,  who  represented 
English  opinion,  was  in  favour  of  constitutional  go- 
vernment in  Italy.  In  order  "to  scare  the  Bourbons, 
Piedmont,  Tuscany,  and  the  rest,  into  granting  or 
maintaining  constitutional  rule,"1  he  held  out  to  those 
Powers  the  possibility  of  Napoleon's  escape. 

It  is  seldom  realized  at  the  present  day  not  only 
how  ineffective  were  the  obstacles  placed  by  the  allies 
to  the  escape  of  Napoleon  from  Elba,  but  also  with 
what  indifference  some  of  the  allies  regarded  the  possi- 
bility of  such  an  escape.  In  fact  the  leading  Powers 
were  far  more  concerned  with  securing  their  own 
gains  than  in  safeguarding  Europe  from  the  return  of 
the  Corsican. 

The  united  action  of  the  allies  in  effecting  the 

complete  downfall  of  Napoleon  after  Leipzic,  as  has 

been  already  remarked,  was  only  brought  about  by 

Castlereagh's  persuasion,  strengthened  by  the  perusal 

1"  Quarterly  Review,"  January,  1810,  p.  255. 


THE  FALL  OF  NAPOLEON         263 

of  the  letter  which  disclosed  the  duplicity  of  the 
French  Emperor.  After  Napoleon's  arrival  in  Elba 
the  danger  of  the  establishment  of  Russian  influence 
in  Europe  appeared,  at  any  rate  to  Metternich,  to  be 
the  paramount  question. 

Napoleon  had  indeed  succumbed,  but  now  Alex- 
ander was  raising  pretensions  which  might  easily 
become  of  a  Napoleonic  character.  If  Napoleon 
escaped  from  Elba,  overthrew  the  Bourbons,  and 
established  himself  in  Paris,  it  might  be  advisable  for 
Austria  to  ally  with  him.  Such  an  alliance  would 
upset  the  plans  of  the  Italian  secret  societies  of  which 
Metternich  was  deadly  afraid ;  it  would,  moreover, 
seriously  interfere  with  Alexander's  projects  with  re- 
gard to  Poland.  In  fact,  Alexander,  when  faced  by 
the  alliance  of  Austria,  France,  and  Great  Britain, 
which  was  arranged  in  3  January,  1815,  had  threatened 
to  "let  the  monster  go" — (the  "monstre  que,"  in 
Talleyrand's  words,  "  le  Czar  se  reservait  de  lacher  "). 

In  fact,  early  in  1815,  "each  of  the  allies  was 
threatening  the  others  with  Napoleon  ".*  But  while 
Metternich's  attention  was  chiefly  devoted  to  the 
task  of  checking  Russian  aspirations  and  safeguarding 
Austrian  interests  in  Italy,  Castlereagh  was  honestly 
desirous  of  securing  the  maintenance  of  constitutional 
government  in  France,  Piedmont,  and  Tuscany. 
The  fear  of  the  escape  of  Napoleon  from  Elba  would, 
he  hoped,  force  the  representatives  of  the  ancient 
dynasties  to  realize  how  much  depended  upon  the 

1 "  Quarterly  Review,"  January,  1910,  p.  255. 


264         THE  LIFE  OF  NAPOLEON 

contentment  of  the  peoples  over  which  they  ruled. 
In  fact,  unless  the  rulers  of  France,  Piedmont,  and 
Tuscany  acted  upon  liberal  principles,  it  was  certain 
not  only  that  the  Italian  party  of  independence  would 
cause  trouble,  but  that  in  Paris  itself,  where  there  were 
"so  many  discontented  and  so  little  to  prevent  mis- 
chief," there  would  be  a  dangerous  upheaval  which 
would  lead  to  disturbances  throughout  France. 

The  Treaty  of  3  January,  1815,  which  had  divided 
the  allies  into  two  parties,  had  revealed  to  the  world 
the  possibility  of  endless  confusion  and  uncertainty. 
However,  though  the  prospects  of  peace  remained  for 
a  time  clouded,  the  realization  of  the  immense  impor- 
tance to  Europe  of  the  continuance  of  friendly  rela- 
tions between  the  allies  led  to  an  amicable  settlement 
of  all  outstanding  difficulties,  and  Napoleon  could  no 
longer  count  upon  disunion  among  his  enemies. 

But  in  France  it  was  otherwise.  The  return  of 
the  Bourbons  had  called  forth  a  certain  amount  of 
enthusiasm,  but  before  the  end  of  1814  that  enthusi- 
asm had  vanished,  the  army  had  become  disaffected, 
the  peasants  had  become  anxious  for  their  property  ; 
in  the  ministry  of  Louis  XVIII  there  could  not  be 
found  either  strength  or  discretion  ;  the  king  himself 
showed  no  ability  for  dealing  with  a  situation  which 
required  a  strong  man  and  a  coherent  policy. 

"  Paternal  anarchy  "  was  the  description  given  to 
the  Government  which  was,  moreover,  faced  with  the 
necessity  of  imposing  heavy  taxes  in  order  to  meet 
the  financial  deficit  The  Imperial  Guard,  too,  was 


THE  FALL  OF  NAPOLEON          265 

alienated,  while  the  attitude  of  the  monarchy  towards 
the  Legion  of  Honour  caused  deep  dissatisfaction. 
The  affair  of  General  Excelmans,  who  was  prosecuted 
by  the  Government  (for  writing  a  letter  in  which  he 
offered  his  services  to  the  King  of  Naples  should  he 
be  deposed  by  the  Congress  of  Vienna),  and  acquitted 
on  25  January,  1815,  did  much  to  weaken  the  Bour- 
bons. In  the  early  months  of  1815  the  condition  of 
things  in  Paris  and  in  the  provinces  might  be  described 
as  a  state  of  tension.  Rumours  of  plots  and  counter- 
plots added  to  the  excitement,  and  Fouche  planned 
the  deportation  of  Napoleon  to  some  distant  spot,  and 
the  setting  up  of  the  regency  of  Marie  Louise  in  place 
of  the  Bourbon  monarchy. 

Meanwhile  Napoleon  was  calmly  watching  the 
course  of  events  from  Elba.  He  had  hoped  for  the 
outbreak  of  war  between  the  great  Powers  ;  but 
though  his  hopes  in  this  respect  were  disappointed,  the 
situation  in  France  became  each  day  more  favourable 
to  him,  and  less  favourable  to  the  Bourbons.  The 
allies  were  well  aware  that  he  was  inadequately 
guarded,  and  both  Louis  XVIII  and  Castlereagh 
realized  that  there  should  have  been  chosen  "another 
position  in  lieu  of  Elba  for  the  seat  of  Napoleon's 
retirement".  Louis  himself  had  written  that  unless 
Napoleon  was  deported  to  Africa  "ouverrait  un  jour 
rhomme  de  1'ile  d'Elbe  paraitre  en  Italic". 

After  the  beginning  of  1815  a  descent  from  Elba 
by  Napoleon  was  regarded  by  all  the  Powers  as 
possible,  if  not  actually  imminent.  Their  disputes  and 


266          THE  LIFE  OF  NAPOLEON 

conflicting  interests  had  prevented  the  adoption  of  any 
adequate  measures  for  preventing  the  escape  of  Na- 
poleon from  his  island  home. 

On  28  March  the  Countess  Reden,  on  hearing  of 
Napoleon's  escape  from  Elba,  writes  that  she  is  "in  no 
fear  of  that  horrible  Napoleon  being  able  to  make  any 
lasting  progress  ".  A  few  days  later,  on  3 1  March,  she 
adopts  a  more  despondent  tone :  "  It  is  a  long  time," 
she  says,  writing  from  Silesia,  "  that  I  have  been  so 
upset  as  I  have  been  by  the  news  to-day.  I  never  could 
have  imagined  that  it  could  be  so  bad,  nor  that  the 
advance  could  be  so  rapid  as  120  miles  in  twenty 
days,  and  no  difficult  march  but  a  triumphal  progress." ] 

On  5  March  it  was  announced  in  Paris  that 
Napoleon  had  landed  in  France.  His  arrival  at  once 
dissipated  into  thin  air  intrigues  of  Fouche  against 
the  Bourbons,  and  shook  the  insecure  foundations  of 
the  Bourbon  monarchy  itself.  Nothing  testifies  elo- 
quently to  the  sagacity  of  Napoleon,  and  to  his 
marvellous  influence,  as  does  the  history  of  the  return 
from  Elba.  Whatever  may  be  said  in  criticism  of  his 
life  and  policy,  it  is  impossible  to  overlook  the  fact 
that  he  was  head  and  shoulders  the  most  influential 
man  of  his  time.  Mr.  Fisher,  whose  knowledge  of 
Napoleon  and  the  period  is  so  profound,  has  in  a  few 
lines  described  the  position.  "  Napoleon,"  he  writes, 
"  was  not  brought  over  from  Elba  by  plot  or  con- 
spiracy. He  came  because  he  had  correctly  divined 

1  "A  Pietist  of  the  Napoleonic  Wars  and  After,"  p.  100. 
London,  John  Murray,  1905. 


THE  FALL  OF  NAPOLEON         267 

the  situation  in  France.  His  march  to  the  capital  is 
one  of  the  miracles  of  history.  He  fought  no  battle  ; 
he  shed  no  blood ;  he  was  greeted  by  the  peasantry 
all  along  the  route  as  a  saviour  and  a  friend  ;  not  a 
soldier  would  fire  on  him ;  his  name  was  a  talisman 
which  drew  all  the  valour  of  the  kingdom  to  itself. 
He  often  rode  before  his  troops  unattended ;  yet  no 
one  offered  him  violence.  .  .  .  Never  had  the  instinct 
for  action  been  more  faultless,  his  demeanour  more 
enchanting  in  its  direct  and  spontaneous  ease  :  Roule 
to,  boule,  roi  cotillon,  Rends  ta  Couronne  &  Napotton, 
blithely  sang  men,  women,  and  children  along  his 
triumphal  way."1 

Between  1795  and  1799  the  French  nation  had 
accepted  and  tolerated  the  increasingly  vicious  and 
unpopular  rule  of  the  Directory,  because  the  Bourbons 
and  their  supporters  would  not  promise  to  accept  the 
land  settlement  which  had  been  effected  between  1789 
and  1795;  in  March,  1815,  the  Bourbons  fell,  and 
Napoleon  returned  because  Louis  XVIII  had  taken 
no  steps  "to  make  secure  every  peasant- holding  in 
France  ".  The  suspicions  of  the  provinces  had  been 
aroused,  while  the  susceptibilities  of  the  army  had  not 
been  soothed.  Thus  not  only  the  army  but  the  whole 
of  Northern,  Eastern,  and  Central  France  welcomed 
the  return  of  the  Napoleonic  regime. 

"  The  Cent  Jours"  it  has  been  truly  said,  "  will  al- 
ways remain  one  of  the  most  extraordinary  epochs  "  of 
Napoleon's  life.  "  Within  three  months  he  created  an 
1  "Cambridge  Modern  History,"  Vol.  IX,  pp.  573-4. 


268          THE  LIFE  OF  NAPOLEON 

army  which  all  but  proved  successful  in  the  Water- 
loo campaign.  Is  there  in  history  any  more  astound- 
ing exhibition  of  human  energy?"  In  his  Memoirs 
Thi£bault  declares  that  he  observed  in  April,  1814,  a 
marked  change  in  Napoleon's  appearance.  "His  look," 
he  says,  "  had  lost  its  power  and  intentness  ;  his  fea- 
tures had  lost  all  their  expression  and  their  character  of 
strength.  His  contracted  mouth  no  longer  retained  its 
old  magic.  His  head  had  no  longer  that  carriage  which 
marked  the  ruler  of  the  world."  Nevertheless, 
Napoleon,  as  in  the  1814  campaign,  was  about  to 
enter  into  a  struggle  during  which  his  energy  as  in 
1814  would  startle  the  European  world. 

Napoleon,  having  broken  the  convention  of  April, 
1814,  was  now  in  the  position  of  an  outlaw,  and  was 
regarded  by  the  allies  "  as  the  enemy  and  disturber 
of  the  peace  of  the  world  "•  To  secure  the  support  of 
all  Frenchmen  he  posed  as  a  liberal  sovereign,  and 
issued  a  liberal  programme  known  as  the  Acte  Addi- 
tionelle.  But  he  had  no  opportunity  for  giving  satis- 
factory proofs  of  his  readiness  to  rule  as  a  constitutional 
monarch,  for  with  the  overthrow  of  King  Joachim 
(Murat)  in  Naples,  in  May,  he  found  himself  destitute 
of  allies  and  compelled  single-handed  to  withstand  all 
Europe.  In  the  famous  campaign  that  followed 
Napoleon  won  Ligny,  though  Quatre  Bras  was  a  dis- 
tinct check  to  his  troops. 

Napoleon,  it  is  said,  ought  to  have  attacked  early 
on  the  morning  of  18  June.  But  at  St.  Helena 
Napoleon  speaks  of  "  the  pelting  rain  which  so 


THE  FALL  OF  NAPOLEON         269 

soaked  the  ground  that  it  was  impossible  for  me  to 
attack  at  daybreak  ". 

All  evidence  points  to  the  fact  that  the  state  of  the 
ground  throughout  the  day  made  it  difficult  for  the 
gunners  to  work  their  guns.  Napoleon,  therefore,  who 
had  good  reason  for  knowing  what  an  important  part 
was  played  by  artillery,  was  fully  justified  "  in  allowing 
the  ground  to  dry  sufficiently  to  permit  of  the  move- 
ment of  the  guns".  It  was  not  till  about  11.30  a.m. 
that  the  battle  of  Waterloo  began. 

The  French  army  was  drawn  up  in  three  lines,  and 
throughout  the  day  Napoleon  insisted  on  frontal  attacks, 
refusing  to  follow  Reille's  advice  and  to  try  flank 
movements.  He,  like  Grouchy,  had  failed  to  foresee 
Bliicher's  great  flank  march  to  join  Wellington. 
Napoleon,  however,  after  he  had  realized  that  the 
Prussians  were  marching  to  aid  Wellington,  hoped  to 
win  the  battle  before  their  arrival.  While  separate 
attacks  were  made  upon  the  farms  of  Hougoumont 
and  La  Haye  Sainte,  four  vast  columns  at  1.30  at- 
tacked Wellington's  left  centre.  After  a  fierce  struggle 
the  French  were  driven  back.  At  4  p.m.  Milhaud 
led  a  cavalry  charge  (5000  horsemen)  against  the 
British  squares  which,  however,  though  crippled  by  the 
French  artillery,  were  unbroken. 

Ney  thereupon  brought  to  Milhaud's  aid  the  re- 
mainder of  the  cavalry,  5000  strong,  but  they  too  failed 
to  break  in  upon  the  British  and  German  squares.  By 
this  time  (4-6  p.m.)  the  leading  Prussian  divisions 
under  Biilow  were  in  touch  with  Napoleon's  right 


270         THE  LIFE  OF  NAPOLEON 

flank,  and  Napoleon  was  compelled  to  use  against  them 
some  14,000  of  his  reserve.  But  the  steadiness  of  the 
British,  together  with  a  fatal  delay  on  the  part  of 
Napoleon,  enabled  Wellington  to  win  the  day.  At 
6.30  the  French  captured  La  Haye  Sainte,  but  it  was 
not  till  forty  minutes  later  that  Napoleon  decided  to 
send  forward  the  old  guard  to  deliver  a  final  attack 
upon  Wellington's  squares.  During  these  precious 
forty  minutes  Wellington  reformed  and  strengthened 
his  fighting  line,  "  and  a  solid  front  was  once  more 
displayed "  by  the  British  army.  He  was  thus  able 
to  resist  the  final  assault  of  the  French  columns  led  by 
Ney.  The  fire  of  Maitland's  Brigade  and  of  Col- 
borne's  battalion  (the  52nd  Regiment)  threw  the 
French  into  hopeless  disorder,  and  at  that  moment 
Ziethen's  Prussian  corps  advanced  from  the  north- 
east towards  La  Belle  Alliance. 

The  battle  of  Waterloo  thus  proved  a  decisive 
French  defeat,  and  Napoleon  fled  to  Paris,  arriving 
there  on  21  June.  The  Chambers  at  once  asserted 
their  authority  which  Napoleon,  broken  down  in  spirit, 
decided  not  to  oppose,  though  his  brother  Lucien 
counselled  resistance. 

On  22  June,  in  deference  to  a  message  from  the 
Chambers  threatening  his  deposition,  unless  he  him- 
self resigned  the  throne,  he  decided  to  take  the  advice 
of  Lucien  and  to  resign  in  favour  of  his  son,  whom  he 
styled  Napoleon  II. 

On  25  June  he  retired  to  Malmaison,  where  he 
remained  till  29  June.  On  7  July  the  allies  entered 


THE   KING   OF   ROME 

FROM    THE   1'AIXTIXG   BY   SIR   T.    LAWRENCE    IN'   THE   COLLECTION   OK  THE    DUKE   OF    BASSAKO 


THE  FALL  OF  NAPOLEON         271 

Paris;  on  the  8th  Louis  XVIII  returned  to  the 
Tuileries  ;  on  3  July  Napoleon  arrived  at  Rochefort, 
and  on  the  i5th  he  surrendered  to  Captain  Maitland 
of  the  "  Bellerophon  ". 

Napoleon's  attempt  to  carry  out  a  revolution  in 
1815  had  thus  ended  in  failure.  Brumaire  signified 
the  desire  of  the  majority  of  Frenchmen  for  the 
establishment  of  order  at  home  and  an  honourable  con- 
clusion of  the  war.  There  was  then  no  break  in  the 
course  of  the  French  Revolution ;  the  men  who 
applauded  the  overthrow  of  the  Directory  were 
supporters  of  the  Constitution  of  1791.  The  same 
men  deserted  Napoleon  in  1814.  In  17 99  the  French 
nation  saw  in  Napoleon  their  one  hope  of  the  estab- 
lishment of  order  and  of  a  glorious  peace  ;  in  1814 
Napoleon  had  made  use  of  the  powers  given  him  to 
establish  a  despotism,  while  his  desire  for  a  universal 
supremacy  united  all  Europe  against  France.  In 
1815  Napoleon  attempted  too  late  to  return  to  the 
programme  of  1799. 

At  St.  Helena  Napoleon  insisted  that  he  was  al- 
ways anxious  to  bring  to  an  end  his  dictatorship,  and 
that  if  he  had  conquered  at  Waterloo  he  would  have 
established  constitutional  government  in  France.  If 
he  had  defeated  the  Russians  in  181 2,  he  said,  he  would 
have  associated  his  son  with  the  Empire  and  his  con- 
stitutional reign  would  have  begun.  On  his  return  from 
Elba  he  realized  that  the  French  nation  was  not  satis- 
fied with  equality  but  desired  liberty  in  addition.  He 
assured  O'Meara  that  his  victory  at  Waterloo  would 


272          THE  LIFE  OF  NAPOLEON 

have  been  followed  by  the  adoption  of  a  constitutional 
form  of  government.1  But  he  refused  to  realize  the  im- 
mense disasters  which  his  ambition  since  the  Treaty  of 
Tilsit  had  brought  upon  Europe,  and  that  in  the 
interests  of  European  peace  the  British  Government 
was  justified  in  sending  him  to  St.  Helena. 

CHIEF  DATES 

Birth  of  the  King  of  Rome         ....     March,  1811. 

Battle  of  Albuera      ......         May,  1811. 

Alliance  of  Sweden  with  Russia         .         .         .       April,   1812. 
Peace  of  Bucharest  between  Russia  and  Turkey  .         May,  1812. 
Outbreak  of  war  between  Russia  and  France       .        June,   1812. 
Peace  between  England  and  Russia    .         .         .         July,   1812. 
Battle  of  Salamanca  ......         July,  1812. 

Battle  of  Borodino     .....        September,  1812. 

The  French  enter  Moscow         .         .         .       September,    1812. 
The  French  evacuate  Moscow    ....  October,   1812. 

Napoleon  leaves  the  army  at  Smorgoni  .  5  December,  1812. 
Treaty  of  Kalisch  between  Russia  and  Prussia  February,  1813. 
Beginning  of  the  War  of  Liberation  .  .  February,  1813. 
The  battles  of  Liitzen  and  Bautzen  .  .  .  May,  1813. 
The  Armistice  of  Plaswitz  .  .  4  June-g  August,  1813. 

Battle  of  Vittoria June,  1813. 

Treaty  of  Toplitz  (Austria  and  Prussia)  .  September,  1813. 
Treaty  of  Ried  (Austria  and  Bavaria)  .  10  October,  1813. 
Battle  of  Leipzic  .....  16-19  October,  I%13- 
Wellington  in  France  ....  November,  1813. 
The  Conference  of  Chatillon  ....  February,  1814. 
The  decisive  battle  of  Arcis-sur-Aube  .  .20  March,  1814. 
The  allies  enter  Paris  .  .  .  .  .31  March,  1814. 
Abdication  of  Napoleon  ....  13  April,  1814, 

1  Gonnard,  "The  Exile  of  St.  Helena,"  p.  132. 


Cfl      i. 


273 

First  Treaty  of  Paris      ......   May,   1814. 

The  allied  sovereigns  in  England    ....    June,  1814. 

Congress  of  Vienna  meets      ....  September,   1814. 

Return  of  Napoleon March,    1815. 

The  Hundred  Days        ....         March- June,    1815. 

The  battle  of  Waterloo 18  June,  1815. 

Second  abdication  of  Napoleon       ....  June,  1815. 

He  lands  in  St.  Helena 17  October,  1815. 

Second  Peace  of  Paris    .....  November,   1815. 
Death  of  Napoleon         .....         5  May,   1821. 


18 


CHAPTER  IX 

SUMMARY  OF  NAPOLEON'S  CAREER 

Justification  of  Napoleon's  victories — Political  morality  in 
Europe  at  a  low  ebb — The  cases  of  Silesia  and  Poland — The 
European  situation  in  1807 — Summary  of  the  events  leading  to 
Napoleon's  supremacy — His  political  sagacity  at  Brumaire — His 
decline  and  fall  after  Tilsit — The  political  effects  of  the  continental 
system — The  rising  of  the  peoples  of  Europe. 

~\JO  one  who  has  studied  the  history  of  the 
•*•  ^  eighteenth  century  can  regret  the  rise  of 
Napoleon.  Similarly,  no  one  can  deny  that  the 
rising  of  the  nations  in  the  years  succeeding  the 
Treaty  of  Tilsit  was  justified  and  necessary. 

Europe,  in  the  closing  years  of  the  eighteenth 
century,  required  a  revolution.  The  aims  and  policy 
of  Frederick  the  Great  and  Catherine  II  made  it 
quite  evident  that  government,  according  to  the 
principles  of  "  enlightened  despotism,"  was  a  failure. 
The  seizure  of  Silesia  and  the  partitions  of  Poland 
were  acts  of  robbery,  and  deprived  Europe  of  any 
adequate  ground  of  complaint  when  Napoleon  treated 
Austria  and  Prussia  as  they  had  treated  Poland  and 
Silesia.  The  jealousy  which  divided  Prussia  and 

Austria,  the  corrupt  character  of  many  of  the  300  odd 

274 


SUMMARY  OF  HIS  CAREER        275 

states  into  which  Germany  was  divided,  the  domina- 
tion of  the  foreigner  in  Italy,  were  circumstances 
which  seemed  to  preclude  any  improvements  in  the 
political  condition  of  Europe.  In  other  words,  Europe 
required  a  revolution,  and  till  that  revolution  had  taken 
place  it  was  worse  than  useless  for  a  country  like 
England  to  pour  money  into  the  treasuries  of  the 
Powers  whose  triumph  over  the  French,  before  1810, 
would  have  been  a  European  disaster.  Till  his 
death  Pitt  never  realized  how  thoroughly  rotten  was 
the  political  condition  of  the  countries  which  he  was 
supporting  with  funds.  Instead  of  allowing  his  health 
to  be  weakened  by  anxieties  concerning  Austria  and 
Prussia,  he  should  have  confined  his  energies  to  the 
strengthening  of  Great  Britain's  army  and  navy. 

It  was  not  till  all  Europe,  having  passed  through 
a  severe  ordeal,  was  in  arms  that  Napoleon  succumbed. 

It  was  indeed  fortunate  for  Europe  that  the  French 
Revolution  produced  a  man  whose  personality  and 
abilities  were  as  pronounced  as  those  of  Alexander 
the  Great,  Julius  Caesar,  Charles  the  Great  or  Louis 
XIV.  During  the  years  from  1807  to  1812,  Napoleon 
seemed  to  have  the  whole  of  continental  Europe  in  his 
power.  Europe  was  completely  overawed  by  him ; 
it  was  doubtful  in  1810-1  if  Great  Britain  would 
not  be  starved  into  surrender ;  it  seemed  not  un- 
likely that  his  influence  would  impress  itself  upon 
Asia  and  Africa. 

That  France  had  acquired  this  enormous  influence, 
that  these  immense  possibilities  lay  before  her,  was 


276         THE  LIFE  OF  NAPOLEON 

due  to  the  ability  of  a  single  man — Napoleon,  and  to 
the  absence  of  any  national  feeling  in  Germany  and 
Italy.  Without  him  the  French  Revolution  would 
not  have  had  its  immense  significance  to  Europe  ;  but 
at  the  same  time  it  must  be  remembered  that  without 
the  French  Revolution  Europe  would  not  have  fallen 
under  the  sway  of  Napoleon. 

The  French  Revolution  had  by  1794  run  its 
course.  France  was  secure  from  foreign  invasion  ; 
her  boundaries  had  been  extended  ;  her  foes  were 
divided  ;  the  fate  of  Poland  attracted  the  chief  atten- 
tion of  the  three  great  Powers — Russia,  Prussia,  and 
Austria.  Consequently,  on  the  relaxation  of  external 
pressure,  the  need  for  rigorous  and  precautionary 
measures  at  home  ceased.  The  Committee  of  Public 
Safety,  whose  policy  was  identified  with  despotism  and 
terror,  was  no  longer  united  or  necessary  to  France. 
Its  instability  was  evident,  and  its  abolition  was  con- 
sequently desirable.  At  the  same  time  a  strong 
though  a  milder  form  of  government  was  desirable, 
for  the  European  war  still  continued,  and  it  was 
necessary  to  stamp  out  the  civil  war  in  La  Vendee 
and  elsewhere.  In  1794  and  1795  France  was  in 
urgent  need  of  the  restoration  of  order  and  of  the 
establishment  of  a  settled  form  of  government.  In 
October,  1795,  the  revolution  of  Vend&niaire  was 
crushed  by  Napoleon,  and  France  was  given  the 
government  of  the  Directory. 

During  the  following  years  Napoleon  was  twice 
called  upon  to  interfere  in  the  internal  affairs  of  France. 


SUMMARY  OF  HIS  CAREER        277 

In  1797  his  soldiers  suppressed  the  rising  of  Fructidor, 
and  in  1799  he  himself  carried  out  the  revolution  of 
Brumaire,  on  which  occasion  he  represented  the  desire 
of  the  great  majority  of  the  French  nation  for  the  over- 
throw of  the  Directory,  for  the  conclusion  of  an  honour- 
able peace  abroad,  and  for  the  restoration  of  order  at 
home.  For  the  carrying  out  of  these  aims  a  states- 
man as  well  as  a  soldier  was  required. 

It  was  indeed  necessary  that  the  chief  of  the  army 
should  be  a  man  of  surpassing  intellectual  force — a 
man  who  not  only  could  defeat  his  enemies  in  the 
field  but  who  could  reduce  order  out  of  chaos,  who 
could  place  the  religious  question  on  a  satisfactory 
basis,  who  could  restore  the  finances,  and  who,  in  a 
word,  could  unify  France  and  give  her  a  stable  govern- 
ment. For  this  work  "  an  irresistible  force  of  head  and 
sword  was  necessary  ".  That  force  was  Napoleon. 

It  had  never  appeared  likely  that  the  Directory 
would  be  more  than  a  temporary  expedient.  The  de- 
fects in  its  constitution  had  been  amply  demonstrated. 
From  the  moment  of  its  establishment  it  was  obvious 
that  the  Directory  could  not  hope  to  provide  a  perma- 
nent solution  of  the  existing  political,  social,  and 
religious  problems  ;  it  proved  merely  a  step  towards 
the  establishment  of  a  military  despotism. 

That  Napoleon  was  able  to  take  advantage  of  the 
situation  at  Brumaire  was  due  to  the  fact  that  while  in 
1799  he  represented  the  need  of  order  and  settlement 
in  France,  he  also  represented  a  period  of  conquest 
and  glory.  The  failure  of  the  French  generals  in 


278          THE  LIFE  OF  NAPOLEON 

Italy  during  his  absence  in  Egypt  merely  tended  to 
increase  the  reputation  of  the  man  whose  victories  in 
Italy  in  1796  and  1797  had  been  crowned  by  the 
Peace  of  Campo  Formio.  Valmy  had  inaugurated 
the  beginning  of  a  war  of  aggrandizement,  and  with 
it  the  Napoleonic  era.  Superior  in  intellectual  qualities 
to  Hoche,  Massena,  and  other  revolutionary  generals, 
Napoleon  had  shown  superiority  in  military  qualities. 
Thus  in  1799  he  was  pre-eminent  among  the  revolu- 
tionary generals,  he  was  the  outcome  and  child  of  the 
militant  Revolution,  and  he  was  fitted  to  become  its 
leader  and  master. 

In  1 799  he  rescued  France  from  a  serious  dilemma. 
To  the  majority  of  Frenchmen  the  "  Principles  of 
1789"  and  the  Constitution  of  1791  represented  their 
aspirations.  The  middle  classes  and  the  peasants  had 
acquired  much  of  the  national  property.  Moreover, 
the  weakness  of  the  government  of  the  Directory, 
which  was  at  the  same  time  oppressive  and  ineffective, 
had  been  unable  to  preserve  order,  or  to  enforce 
the  law,  or  to  afford  protection  to  the  majority  of  the 
French  people.  A  restoration  of  the  Bourbons  would 
mean  a  sacrifice  of  all  that  had  been  gained  by  the 
Revolution.  At  this  crisis  Napoleon  stepped  in. 
Having  succeeded  in  securing  the  adhesion  of  the 
army  he  acted  in  accordance  with  public  opinion,  and 
obtained  the  support  not  only  of  the  peace-loving 
middle  classes  but  also  of  the  working  classes  of  Paris 
who  shared  in  the  general  fear  of  a  royalist  reaction. 
Brumaire,  followed  by  Marengo,  implied  the  stability 


SUMMARY  OF  HIS  CAREER        279 

of  the  Revolution,  and  secured  the  establishment  of  an 
orderly  and  methodical  government.  A  centralized 
despotism  was  indeed  set  up,  but  freedom  was  with 
certain  modifications  recognized,  and  equality  so  dear 
to  Frenchmen  was  maintained.  France  apparently 
had  secured  all  that  she  desired — peace  with  her 
boundaries  extended  to  her  "natural  frontiers,"  and 
an  admirable  administration. 

The  outbreak  of  war  in  1 803  was  indeed  contrary 
to  the  wishes  of  the  French  people,  but  the  glory  of 
Napoleon's  victories,  and  the  plunder  of  the  conquered 
nations,  soothed  any  irritation  that  might  have  been 
felt,  and  reconciled  the  nation  to  a  period  of  war  and 
conquest  which  culminated  at  Tilsit. 

The  victory  of  Napoleon  at  Austerlitz  in  December, 
1805,  had  been  followed  by  the  completion  of  the 
necessary  revolution  in  Germany,  marked  by  the  final 
disappearance  of  the  system  of  the  Holy  Roman 
Empire;  the  humiliation  of  Prussia  in  January,  1806 
— the  event  which  finally  caused  Pitt's  death — was  a 
necessary  preliminary  step  to  the  complete  reorgan- 
ization of  that  power  after  Jena. 

From  1807,  however,  Napoleon  gradually  entered 
upon  the  period  of  his  decline  and  fall.  His  successes 
in  Germany  and  Italy  blinded  him  to  the  fact  that  in 
attempting  to  conquer  Russia  he  might  meet  with 
geographical  difficulties  which  were  not  to  be  found 
in  central  Europe.  Moreover,  he  failed  to  appreciate 
the  steady  growth  in  Germany  of  a  national  sentiment 
which  his  conquests  had  produced.  Nor  did  he  realize 


28o         THE  LIFE  OF  NAPOLEON 

that  in  Spain  religious  fanaticism  might  lead  to  a 
resistance  the  like  of  which  he  had  not  hitherto  met 
with.  Indeed,  his  remarkable  ignorance  not  only  of 
economic  truths  but  also  of  the  character  of  the  British 
constitution,  and  of  the  political  and  social  condition 
of  the  British  nation,  led  him  to  commit  the  greatest 
blunder  of  his  career — the  attempted  enforcement  of 
the  continental  system  upon  all  Europe.  His  policy 
to  the  Papacy  after  1807  was  also  a  blunder  of  the 
greatest  magnitude  and  its  effects  were  far-reaching. 

At  St.  Helena  he  declared  that  the  malignant  and 
implacable  jealousy  of  England  made  a  lasting  peace 
impossible,  as  that  Power  insisted  upon  the  withdrawal 
of  France  within  its  former  limits.  The  statement 
was  obviously  inaccurate.  As  is  well  known,  Napoleon 
was  resolved  to  force  England  to  accept  his  terms  of 
peace.  Had  she  done  so  Napoleon  would  have  been 
firmly  established  as  master  of  Europe.  His  de- 
termination to  overthrow  Great  Britain,  therefore,  led 
him  to  dominate  every  European  Power  which 
possessed  a  harbour.  Only  thus  he  believed  could 
he  carry  out  effectively  the  continental  system  and 
conquer  England. 

From  the  outbreak  of  war  with  Great  Britain  in 
1803  Bonapartism  could  under  no  circumstances  be 
described,  as  Napoleon  at  St.  Helena  described  it, 
as  essentially  pacific.  There  is  much  that  can  be 
said  in  defence  of  his  aggressions  and  conquests 
before  Tilsit,  and  little  sympathy  can  be  felt  for  the 
fate  of  Austria  and  Prussia  so  long  as  their  policy  was 


SUMMARY  OF  HIS  CAREER        281 

dictated  by  selfishness,  and  so  long  as  neither  sought 
the  welfare  of  Germany  or  considered  even  the  welfare 
of  their  own  subjects.  In  1807,  however,  France  had 
secured,  through  the  heroism  of  her  Republican 
armies,  her  "  natural "  boundaries — the  Rhine,  the 
Alps,  and  the  Pyrenees.  There  was  no  question  of 
his  sacrificing  these  boundaries  so  dear  to  every 
Frenchman.  But  at  this  period  the  ambition  of 
Napoleon  ran  counter  to  the  national  interests  of 
France.  It  was  obvious  that  "  it  was  not  for  the  good 
of  France,  but  to  satisfy  his  own  restless  and  extra- 
vagant ambition  that  the  flower  of  her  youth  were 
taken  from  the  fields  to  perish  in  the  snows  of  Russia 
or  the  sierras  of  Spain  ". 

Henceforward  "the  spirit  of  moderation  and  good 
sense"  in  France,  "which  had  been  overcome  by  the 
brilliant  romance  of  the  early  victories,  revolted  against 
the  extravagance  which  marked  the  later  designs ". 
These  designs,  which  included  the  subjugation  of 
Great  Britain,  the  conquest  of  Spain,  the  re-establish- 
ment of  the  Polish  kingdom  and  the  defeat  of  Russia, 
miscarried,  because  in  the  first  place  while  Spain  was 
struggling  for  its  independence,  the  invasion  of  Russia 
was  undertaken  and  ended  in  failure,  and  secondly, 
because  central  Europe  gradually  revolted  against 
the  intolerable  pressure  of  the  continental  system. 
Upon  the  success  of  that  system  Napoleon's  schemes 
hung.  Moreover,  when  the  revolt  against  the  con- 
tinental system  definitely  began,  Germany,  now 
roused  from  her  "sleep  of  lethargy"  and  taught  by 


282          THE  LIFE  OF  NAPOLEON 

adversity,  had  acquired  national  aspirations  and  took 
the  lead.  The  Confederation  of  the  Rhine  had  been 
an  alliance  between  Napoleon  and  the  princes,  and 
the  War  of  Liberation  was  "  a  movement  of  peoples 
rather  than  princes  ". 

The  chief  blunders  of  Napoleon's  career  thus  seem 
to  have  been,  first  his  treatment  of  the  inhabitants  of 
the  states  which  formed  the  Confederation  of  the  Rhine. 
He  not  only  took  no  steps  to  gain  the  affection  of 
the  peasants,  but  allied  himself  with  the  princes  and 
relied  upon  these  alliances,  his  "personal  prestige," 
and  especially  upon  the  force  of  arms  for  the  perman- 
ent establishment  of  his  authority. 

Moreover,  after  1807,  ^e  alienated  from  him  the 
inhabitants  of  the  German  states  by  the  continental 
blockade,  and  by  the  fiscal  system  which  he  imposed 
upon  them. 

By  1812  the  prosperity  which  these  states  had 
formerly  enjoyed  was  absolutely  destroyed  by  the 
continental  system,  by  military  billeting,  and  by  the 
forced  enlistment  in  the  French  armies  of  the  youthful 
portion  of  the  inhabitants.  Unlike  the  Rhine  Depart- 
ments on  the  left  bank  of  the  river  which  were  wisely 
ruled,  and  which  until  1814  did  not  surfer  from  the 
visitation  of  war,  the  states  on  the  right  bank  of  the 
Rhine  which  were  included  in  the  Confederation  seized 
the  opportunity  offered  them,  after  the  disasters  of 
the  Moscow  campaign,  and  joined  in  the  War  of 
Liberation. 

The  second  of  Napoleon's  disastrous  blunders  was 


SUMMARY  OF  HIS  CAREER        283 

the  invasion  of  Spain  and  the  attempt  to  place  Joseph 
on  the  Spanish  throne.  Later,  at  St.  Helena,  he  re- 
cognized how  mistaken  had  been  his  policy  in  the 
Peninsula.  The  third  of  his  chief  mistakes  was  his 
treatment  after  1807  of  the  Pope.  It  is  impossible 
to  estimate  the  full  effects  of  this  policy,  for  the  influ- 
ence of  the  Roman  Church  was  widespread  and  im- 
possible to  appreciate  at  its  exact  value.  Napoleon 
like  a  gambler  had  staked  all  upon  the  success  of  the 
continental  system,  and  had  lost. 

In  1813  and  1814  the  effect  of  all  his  blunders 
and  miscalculations  made  themselves  felt,  and  resulted 
in  the  fall  of  the  great  French  Emperor. 


CHAPTER  X 

ST.  HELENA,  1815-1821 

Arrival  of  Napoleon — His  religious  views — Lord  Rosebery's 
criticisms  of  the  leading  biographers — Captain  Henry  Meynell's 
Memoirs — Napoleon's  appearance — His  habits — His  opinions 
upon  Ossian's  "  Poems,"  Egypt,  the  growth  of  nationalities,  India, 
a  Suez  Canal,  the  siege  of  Toulon,  Vende"miaire,  the  Moscow 
expedition,  the  Italians,  the  character  of  the  French  people, 
the  invasion  of  Spain,  the  true  policy  of  Louis  XVIII,  Ney, 
Scotland  and  England — The  question  of  the  treatment  of  Napoleon 
— Views  of  Lord  Rosebery  and  Dr.  Rose — The  debt  of  Europe  to 
Napoleon. 

15  July,  1815,  Napoleon  took  refuge  in  the 
"  Bellerophon,"  hoping  to  find  a  refuge  in  Eng- 
land. After  an  anxious  month  of  waiting,  he  heard  that 
the  British  Government  had  on  28  July  decided  that  he 
was  to  be  sent  to  St.  Helena,  an  island  belonging  to 
the  East  India  Company.  The  voyage  to  that  island, 
under  the  charge  of  Admiral  Cockburn,  began  on  7 
August,  and  on  17  October,  1815,  Napoleon  arrived  at 
his  destination. 

After  a  sojourn  of  two  months  in  a  cottage  called 
"The  Briars"  he  moved  on  10  December  to  Long- 
wood,  in  which  residence  he  spent  the  rest  of  his  life. 

With  Napoleon  were  twenty-five  persons,  includ- 

284 


NAPOLEON   AT   LONGWOOD 

FROM    A   SKETCH    BY   GENENAL   GOURGAUD 


ST.  HELENA,  1815-1821  285 

ing  Generals  Bertrand  and  Gourgaud,  the  Count 
Montholon,  Dr.  Barry  O'Meara,  and  Las  Cases  as 
secretary.  He  was  allowed  about  a  dozen  servants, 
and  Bertrand  and  Montholon  were  accompanied  by 
their  wives. 

Till  14  April,  1816,  Admiral  Cockburn,  who  was 
in  command  of  the  squadron,  was  responsible  for  the 
care  of  the  Emperor  and  for  the  government  of  the 
island.  He  was  succeeded  as  commander  of  the 
squadron  first  by  Admiral  Malcolm,  and  on  June,  1817, 
by  Admiral  Plampin,  while  Sir  Hudson  Lowe  took 
over  the  government  of  the  island. 

With  Cockburn  and  Malcolm  Napoleon  was  on 
friendly  terms.  His  relations  with  Plampin  were  not 
very  intimate,  while  with  Hudson  Lowe  they  soon 
became  strained. 

The  exile  of  Napoleon  is  of  some  importance, 
owing  partly  to  the  sympathy  which  his  captivity 
aroused,  and  partly  to  his  writings.  By  the  latter  the 
Napoleonic  legend  was  created  which  later  had  an  un- 
mistakable influence  upon  French  and  indeed  upon 
European  politics. 

Napoleon  desired  that  his  life  on  St.  Helena  should 
be  regarded  by  posterity  as  a  period  of  martyrdom, 
and  so  far  as  the  French  nation  was  concerned  he 
succeeded  in  his  aim.  For,  owing  to  the  "haze  of 
sentiment"  aroused  by  the  captivity  of  the  great  Em- 
peror and  by  his  writings,  his  nephew,  Napoleon  III, 
was  enabled  to  found  that  second  Empire  which  came 
to  so  untimely  an  end  in  1870. 


286          THE  LIFE  OF  NAPOLEON 

Whether  or  not  Napoleon  "  had  religion "  will 
always  remain  a  moot  point.  From  his  conversa- 
tions with  Gourgaud  on  St.  Helena  it  would  seem 
that  he  was  distinctly  hostile  to  Christianity.  But  he 
probably  spoke  deliberately  in  a  spirit  of  opposition 
to  Gourgaud  who  was  a  professed  Christian.  The 
Revolution  had  abjured  Christianity,  and  the  army  was 
distinctly  non-Christian.  Napoleon  as  the  child  of 
the  Revolution,  and  as  the  head  of  the  army  which  was 
his  chief  support,  showed  marked  strength  of  mind 
when  he  insisted  upon  the  restoration  of  the  French 
Church  and  the  conclusion  of  the  Concordat.  Never- 
theless, it  is  impossible  to  say  that  Napoleon  had  ever 
any  definite  religious  beliefs.1 

Lord  Rosebery  gives  us  some  sound  criticism  upon 
the  chief  descriptions  left  us  of  Napoleon  in  St.  Helena. 
" Gourgaud's  account,"  he  says,  "is  the  most  faithful 
transcript,  and  far  superior  to  the  other  records. 
Montholon  is  not  so  reliable,  or  so  intelligent.  Las 
Cases  pads  and  fabricates.  O'Meara's  book  is  a 
translation  into  English  of  conversations  carried  on  in 
Italian.  It  is  both  spirited  and  interesting,  but  does 
not  inspire  any  confidence."2  The  "Memoranda  of 
Conversations  with  Napoleon,"  by  Captain  Henry 
Meynell,  has,  however,  lately  been  privately  printed 
since  the  appearance  of  Lord  Rosebery's  work,  and 
upon  it  the  present  chapter  is  based. 

Captain   Henry   Meynell  saw    Napoleon   on    20 

xLord  Rosebery,  "Napoleon:  the  Last  Phase,"  p.  171. 
2  Ibid.  p.  165. 


w  > 

•J    a 
X    I 


ST.  HELENA,  1815-1821  287 

June,  1816,  on  the  occasion  of  a  formal  visit  to  Long- 
wood  by  the  English  admiral.  His  description  of 
Napoleon's  personal  appearance  is  of  interest.  "  He 
struck  me,"  writes  Meynell,  "as  resembling  a  picture 
painted  by  Robert  Lefevbre,  only  Considerably  stouter. 
His  face  remarkably  pale,  a  very  thick  neck,  and 
Broad  Shoulders,  a  well-made  Leg  and  Foot,  in  Height 
about  5  feet  5  inches  (it  was  remarked  by  Lady 
M.,  a  few  days  afterwards,  that  he  had  also  a  very 
Handsome  Hand).  In  his  dress  he  was  not  particularly 
neat.  He  wore  a  single-breasted  Green  Coat,  or  Habit 
de  Chasse  with  a  velvet  Collar  and  Silver  Buttons, 
having  the  figures  of  different  animals  on  them.  He 
had  on  the  Star  of  the  Legion  of  Honour,  White 
Breeches,  Silk  Stockings,  and  Shoes,  with  Gold  Oval 
Buckles.  He  kept  his  Cocked  Hat  under  his  left  arm, 
with  that  hand  generally  in  his  Pocket,  the  other  was 
occupied  with  a  Snuff  Box  out  of  which  he  took  a  good 
deal  of  snuff.  His  figure  though  fine  is  certainly  not 
graceful.  He  spoke  quick,  and  I  thought  his  French 
difficult  to  understand.  His  countenance  was  pleasant 
and  he  seemed  in  good  humour."  Then  Meynell 
describes  his  course  of  life.  "He  is  irregular  in  his 
meals,  but  generally  breakfasts  at  n  and  dines  at 
eight.  He  Remains  in  his  Apartment  until  4  in  the 
afternoon  when  he  walks  or  drives  out  until  sunset. 
Bertrand  has  since  informed  me  that  he  often  gets  up 
in  the  middle  of  the  night  and  writes,  or  reads  for  an 
hour  or  two,  having  contracted  that  habit  at  an  early 
period  when  Commanding  his  Armies." 


288         THE  LIFE  OF  NAPOLEON 

On  25  June,  1816,  the  Admiral  and  Lady  Malcolm, 
with  Meynell,  again  visited  Napoleon  who  was  most 
gracious.  He  talked  a  good  deal  to  Lady  Malcolm, 
asked  her  if  she  liked  hunting,  as  he  understood  that 
ladies  in  England  were  partial  to  that  amusement.  He 
also  talked  to  her  about  Ossian's  "  Poems,"  which  he 
admired,  said  that  he  had  brought  them  into  fashion  on 
the  Continent  and  declared  that  he  had  ever  been  ac- 
cused of  having  his  head  filled  with  Ossian's  clouds. 
The  Italian  translation  of  them  he  admired  the  most. 
He  further  asked  her  if  she  thought  them  genuine,  and 
whether  she  did  not  think  that  Macpherson  had  written 
them.  Lady  M.  replied  "  that  she  did  not  think  Mac- 
pherson capable  of  writing  them,  that  the  Highland 
Society  had  taken  much  pains  to  investigate  it,  and 
proved  their  authenticity  V 

Captain  Meynell  frequently  accompanied  the  Ad- 
miral and  Lady  Malcolm  on  their  visits  to  Napoleon, 
and  made  careful  notes  of  the  conversations  in  which 
he  took  part.  These  visits  extended  over  a  year,  with 
a  break  from  21  September  to  25  November,  1816, 
during  which  period  the  Admiral  and  Captain  Mey- 
nell visited  the  Cape. 

The  "  Memoranda "  contain,  as  can  be  guessed, 
much  that  is  of  very  great  interest.  One  of  Napoleon's 
favourite  topics  was  Egypt.  He  declared  that  Admiral 

1  Captain  Henry  Meynell  (H.M.S.  "  Newcastle  "),  "  Memo- 
randa of  Conversations  with  Napoleon,  St.  Helena,  1816,"  pp.  i,  2, 
3.  (Printed  for  private  circulation.)  Guildford,  A.  C.  Curtis, 
1909. 


ST.   HELENA,  1815-1821  289 

Brueys  could  have  averted  his  destruction  at  the  Battle 
of  the  Nile  if  he  had  followed  his  (Napoleon's)  advice 
and  taken  the  fleet  into  Alexandria. 

Any  orders  of  his  (Napoleon's),  however,  were 
rendered  futile  by  the  Bedouin  Arabs  who  interposed 
between  Alexandria  and  his  army  which  he  had  led 
into  the  interior.  He  spoke  a  good  deal  about 
Kleber  whom  he  considered  a  brave  and  clever  man, 
and  expressed  the  opinion  that  had  that  general  lived 
the  French  occupation  of  Egypt  would  have  continued. 
If,  Napoleon  said,  the  French  had  kept  possession  of 
Egypt,  the  English  would  sooner  or  later  have  lost 
India.  For,  in  possession  of  the  Red  Sea,  all  Indian 
commerce  would  have  been  controlled  by  the  French. 
Therefore,  he  was  of  opinion  that  Alexandria  was 
of  more  importance  to  England  than  Malta,  for  as 
things  were  it  was  only  the  weakness  and  ignorances 
of  the  Turks  which  prevented  the  British  trade  with 
India  from  being  ruined. 

One  day  or  another,  he  said,  you  will  see  Egypt 
destroy  the  East  India  Company.  The  preservation 
of  Turkey  as  a  European  power,  was,  however,  in 
his  opinion  as  essential  for  British  as  it  was  for  French 
interests. 

One  of  the  most  emphatic  of  Napoleon's  assertions 
at  Longwood  was  that  Bonapartism  was  essentially 
pacific.  He  asserts  repeatedly  that  he  was  always 
pacific,  and  that  it  was  only  "the  malignant  and 
implacable  jealousy  of  England  that  rendered  a 
peaceful  policy  on  his  part  impossible  ",  To  him  at  St. 

'9 


29o          THE  LIFE  OF  NAPOLEON 

Helena  it  seemed  that  the  best  means  to  render 
Bonapartism  acceptable  to  the  France  of  the  Restora- 
tion was  to  represent  it  as  not  only  peaceful  but  as 
the  patron  and  supporter  of  nationalities.  That  there 
was  a  certain  amount  of  truth  in  these  assertions  is 
undeniable,  for  one  result  of  Napoleon's  career  was 
to  rouse  the  feeling  of  nationality  in  Italy  which  was 
never  quenched,  while  it  is  undoubted  that  the 
restoration  of  Poland  as  a  kingdom  would  have  re- 
sulted from  Napoleon's  defeat  of  Russia  in  the  Moscow 
campaign.  But  Napoleon's  Empire  was  not  peaceful, 
its  existence  was  not  compatible  with  liberal  institu- 
tions, and  it  was  only  in  a  very  modified  sense  the  ally 
of  the  Church. 

"At  Tilsit,"  he  said,  in  the  hearing  of  Captain 
Meynell,  "  the  Emperor  Alexander  was,  as  always, 
strongly  desirous  of  driving  the  Turks  out  of  Europe." 
But  a  study  of  the  map,  Napoleon  declared,  convinced 
him  that  it  was  not  in  the  interests  of  France  to  allow 
Constantinople  to  fall  into  the  hands  of  the  Russians 
and  Austrians.  He  was,  however,  well  aware  that 
in  the  event  of  a  war  between  Russia  and  Turkey  the 
Greeks  would  on  this  matter  side  with  the  Russians, 
who  would  free  them  from  the  Turkish  yoke.1 

These  views  represent  the  attitude  taken  by  France 
towards  Turkey  since  the  days  of  Francis  I,  while  in 
Louis  XIV's  reign  the  importance  of  Egypt  to  the 
French  monarchy  had  been  insisted  upon,  though  in 

1  As  is  well  known,  Greece  secured  its  independence  a  few 
years  after  Napoleon  uttered  these  words. 


ST.  HELENA,  1815-1821  291 

vain,  by  Leibnitz.  As  it  was,  Louis  XIV  entered 
into  close  relations  with  Siam,  and,  had  he  not  been 
fully  occupied  in  Europe,  he  might  have  anticipated 
the  policy  of  the  Directory  and  of  Napoleon  in 
Egypt. 

At  St.  Helena  Napoleon,  we  are  told,  had  in  his 
possession  a  memoir  on  the  subject  of  opening  the 
Ancient  Canal  from  Suez  to  Cairo.  "He  thought  it 
practicable,  and  it  was  his  intention  to  have  done  it. 
He  had  ascertained  that  the  Nile  at  Cairo  was  nearly 
on  a  level  with  the  Red  Sea.  He  proposed  effecting 
this  by  means  of  the  waters  of  the  Nile,  the  embank- 
ments of  which  are  4  feet  higher  than  the  Red 
Sea."1 

Napoleon,  as  is  well  known,  had  very  elaborate 
plans  for  establishing  the  French  power  in  Egypt,  and 
for  using  Egypt  as  a  stepping-stone  to  India.  In 
addition  to  the  canal  from  Suez  to  Cairo,  he  had  in  his 
mind  one  from  the  Red  Sea  to  the  Mediterranean. 

The  Red  Sea  had  been  carefully  surveyed,  the 
proposed  Canal  was  declared  practicable,  the  expense 
was  calculated  to  amount  to  about  18,000,000  francs, 
and  two  years'  labour  would,  he  thought,  suffice  for 
its  construction.2 

If  the  French,  he  said,  had  kept  Egypt,  sooner 
or  later  the  English  would  have  lost  it,  and  he  would 
have  made  the  India  (!)  Company  trade  with  him. 
"  Merchants,"  he  declared,  "were  of  the  country  that 
gave  them  most  profit.  Those  of  London  had  fre- 

1  Meynell,  loc,  tit.  p.  14.  2  Ibid. 


292          THE  LIFE  OF  NAPOLEON 

quently  supplied  him  with  money.  On  his  return 
from  Elba  he  had  several  propositions,  one  from  a 
very  rich  house.  He  had  this  proposal  with  him. 
He  was  to  repay  them  with  Government  funds,  but  it 
was  to  have  been  a  secret  how  those  funds  were  dis- 
posed of.  The  Admiral  (Sir  Pulteney  Malcolm),  as 
on  a  former  occasion,  observed  that  he  hoped  one  of 
these  days  we  should  see  all  these  things  published. 
B.  laughed."  l 

On  the  same  day  on  which  he  spoke  of  Egypt  he 
related  how  Paoli  had  advised  him  to  enter  the 
English  service.  But  he  considered  that  a  revolution 
offered  opportunities  for  a  young  man,  apart  from  the 
fact  that  he  spoke  French,  "  was  of  their  religion  and 
understood  their  manners".  Paoli  was  angry,  but 
the  two  men  respected  each  other. 

A  few  years  later  the  siege  of  Toulon  gave 
Napoleon  an  opportunity  of  showing  his  military 
abilities.  That  siege,  he  declared,  "  was  the  beginning 
of  my  rise,"  and  owing  to  the  fact  that  a  number  of 
the  soldiers  had  been  made  officers  there  were  few 
artillery  men  there  who  were  men  of  science.  His 
success  at  Toulon  gained  for  him  reputation,  and  he 
was  "  fortunately  in  Paris  just  in  time  for  the  Revolu- 
tion of  the  1 3  Vend6miaire  ".  Then  he  was  sent  to 
Italy  where,  as  he  added  somewhat  modestly,  he 
"gained  further  reputation,"  while  from  Egypt  he 
returned  at  "  a  fortunate  moment ". 

With  regard  to  the  Russian  campaign,  he  declared 

1Meynell,  loc.  cit.  p.  12. 


ST.  HELENA,  1815-1821  293 

that  he  "  was  in  too  much  of  a  hurry.  I  should  have 
remained  a  year  on  the  Niemen  and  in  Prussia,  and 
then  devoured  Prussia."  But  had  he  taken  Moscow 
and  crushed  Russia,  he  might  have  returned  to  his 
Eastern  schemes.  "  Would  it  not  then  be  possible 
for  a  great  French  army  with  auxiliaries  from  Tiflis 
to  attain  the  Ganges?  Once  touched  by  a  French 
sword,  the  scaffolding  of  mercantile  power  in  India 
would  fall  to  the  ground.  It  would  be  a  gigantic 
expedition,  I  admit,  but  practicable  in  the  nineteenth 
century." l  He,  however,  consoles  himself  with  the 
reflection  that  the  Russians  already  in  Persia  (!)  have 
not  far  to  go  to  reach  India. 

The  burning  of  Moscow,  he  confessed,  in  Captain 
Meynell's  hearing,  strengthened  the  position  of  Russia 
in  the  East,  for  it  not  only  enraged  the  Greeks,  whose 
religious  susceptibilities  were  roused,  but  it  also  ruined 
his  plans.  He  went  to  Moscow  instead  of  to  St. 
Petersburg,  because  "round  Moscow  there  was  a 
fine  country  with  abundance  of  grain,"  and  he  felt 
that  he  could  have  dictated  terms  of  peace  from 
Moscow. 

The  much  criticized  invasion  of  Russia  was  caused 
by  Alexander's  non-fulfilment  of  the  Treaty  of  Tilsit, 
and  by  his  (Napoleon's)  desire  to  establish  on  a  solid 
foundation  the  kingdom  of  Poland  ''as  a  barrier 
against  the  Russians,  for  sooner  or  later  they  would 
overrun  Europe  ". 

1  Quoted  by  Lord  Rosebery,   "Napoleon:  the  Last  Phase," 
p.  201. 


294         THE  LIFE  OF  NAPOLEON 

His  remarks  about  the  Belgians,  Piedmontese,  and 
Italians  contained  much  that  was  true.  All  these,  he 
asserted,  wished  for  his  success  at  the  battle  of  Water- 
loo. "  The  Piedmontese  preferred  being  a  province  of 
France  to  being  an  independent  kingdom  under  that 
king  of  Sardinia." 

Speaking  of  his  invasion  of  Spain,  he  confessed 
that  the  system  which  he  pursued  in  that  country  was 
contrary  to  the  opinion  of  the  nation,  and  that  there- 
fore he  failed.  In  his  opinion,  expressed  in  the 
"  Memorial  de  Sainte-H£lene,"  1  Spain  and  England 
were  in  a  similar  political  condition,  both  countries  being 
dominated  by  a  tyrannical  oligarchy.  "The  Spanish 
nation  despised  its  government ;  it  was  crying  out  for 
regeneration.  I  felt  sorry  for  Spain,  and  seized  the 
only  opportunity  for  regenerating  the  country." 

He  showed,  as  was  only  to  be  expected,  an  accurate 
knowledge  of  the  character  of  the  French  people,  and 
his  remarks  with  regard  to  the  Bourbons,  had  they 
been  known  and  acted  upon  by  that  family,  would 
have  saved  France  from  the  Revolution  of  1830. 

Louis  XVIII  on  his  return  to  France  would,  in 
his  opinion,  have  done  wisely  "to  have  considered 
himself  as  the  Beginner  of  the  Fifth  Dynasty,"  and 
he  ought  to  have  said  to  the  people  ..."  Grave 
changes  have  induced  you  to  recall  my  family  to  the 
throne  ;  I  will  forget  all  that  is  past  and  commence  a 
new  dynasty  ".  As  it  was,  the  Bourbons  were  inse- 

1  P.  Gonnard,  "The  Exile  of  St.  Helena,"  p.  142.  London, 
William  Heinemann. 


'JEfR-ZE  MSS 

DOCTEVR     ' 

JE  Ay  TAOWX  ET  A 


DE  CRO1  Rl-     TOUT  CE  (>V? 

rrrEME 

<?UE  JZ  C 


PORTRAIT   CAMEO   OF   NAPOLEON   AND   SPECIMEN   OF   HIS 
WRITING   FROM   ST.    HELENA,   1818 


ST.   HELENA,  1815-1821  295 

curely  seated  on  the  throne,  "  that  they  sat  on  a 
smothered  volcano  ".* 

On  another  day  he  again  spoke  of  the  Bourbons. 
Louis  XVIII  "was  a  well-disposed  man,  but  there 
was  a  party  that  he  could  not  keep  in  order  who  would 
Boulverse  France  ".  That  party  contained  the  most 
violent  royalists  whom  the  Government  could  not 
control.  In  fact,  his  estimate  of  the  Bourbons  was 
singularly  correct.  The  Duke  of  Orleans,  in  his 
opinion,  was  "  the  only  one  of  the  Bourbons  who 
could  settle  France.  .  .  .  He  had  made  himself  popu- 
lar by  wearing  the  Legion  of  Honour — which  was 
apparently  a  trifle,"  but  "apparent  trifles  are  great 
things  at  times  in  France.  Reason  nothing."5 

Of  the  Comte  d'Artois  he  had  formed  a  poor 
opinion,  which  was  fully  justified  after  his  accession  as 
Charles  X  to  the  French  throne.  His  wearing  of  the 
Order  of  St.  Esprit,  "  which  all  those  who  have  been 
born  since  the  Revolution  hate  "  because  it  demands 
from  the  wearer  "  four  generations  of  nobility  of 
Blood,"  was  a  great  blunder.  He  had  also  twelve 
officers  on  his  staff  not  one  of  whom  had  fought  with 
the  army,  and  as  they  had  fought  in  the  ranks  of  his 
enemies  none  bore  the  Legion  of  Honour. 

He  was,  moreover,  of  the  opinion  that  Louis 
XVIII  should  have  abolished  the  Legion  of  Honour. 
"  It  will,"  he  said,  "always  call  me  to  remembrance, 
but  as  they  have  continued  it  they  should  not  vilify 
me,  they  should  praise  me  for  what  I  did,  that  brought 

1  Meynell,  loc,  cit.  p.  5.  '2  Ibid.  p.  18. 


296         THE  LIFE  OF  NAPOLEON 

glory  to  France."  And  then,  with  true  prophetic 
instinct,  he  added  :  "  I  will  tell  you  what  will  happen, 
when  I  am  personally  out  of  the  question  in  thirty 
years,  the  Government  will  be  obliged  to  yield  to 
public  opinion,  and  raise  a  monument  to  me  for  the 
glory  of  the  nation  ". 

He  gave,  too,  an  interesting  account  of  his  return 
from  Elba,  but  added  little  to  what  is  generally  known, 
beyond  a  few  personal  details  of  his  experiences  on 
his  journey  to  Paris.  He  spoke  highly  of  Colonel 
Moncey  and  of  Soult,  but  of  Ney  he  remarked  that 
while  "  a  hero  in  the  field  he  was  not  clever  in  other 
respects".  He  clearly  showed  that  "he  had  com- 
mitted himself  to  the  Bourbons.  His  conduct  on  the 
whole  was  bad." 

Many  of  his  remarks  showed  discernment  and  a 
correct  appreciation  of  political  situations.  Thus,  he 
said  with  some  truth  that  Italy  was  longing  for  a 
constitution  as  were  many  of  the  German  states. 
And  he  was  probably  right  in  his  surmise  that  when 
the  Emperor  of  Austria  travelled  through  Italy  he 
mistook  the  applause  he  met  with — for  it  was  intended 
not  for  him  but  for  his  daughter  (Bonaparte's  wife) 
who  was  travelling  with  him.  In  fact  the  Belgians, 
Italians,  and  Piedmontese  preferred  his  (Napoleon's) 
rule  to  that  of  their  present  masters. 

In  all  his  remarks  about  the  Continent  he  showed, 
as  was  to  be  expected,  accurate  knowledge.  But  in 
all  his  statements  and  questions  regarding  England 
and  Scotland  there  is  that  curious  ignorance  which  is 


ST.  HELENA,  1815-1821  297 

still  to  be  found  on  the  Continent.  The  character  of 
the  British  nation  is  proverbially  misunderstood  in 
Europe,  and  Napoleon  on  that  subject  was  no  more 
well  informed  than  the  large  majority  of  his  subjects. 

There  was,  perhaps,  some  ground  for  his  belief 
that  the  inhabitants  of  Scotland  drank  very  hard,  and 
that  the  Prince  Regent,  when  young,  had  been  a  hard 
drinker.  He  seemed  interested  in  Scotland,  spoke  of 
its  manufactures,  and  declared  its  climate  was  too 
damp  for  poetry — a  remark  which  will  not  be  appreci- 
ated by  the  admirers  of  Burns. 

He  could  not  understand  how  Scottish  Peers  could 
become  English  Peers,  and  asserted  that  the  Douglas 
family  was  the  greatest  in  Scotland.  On  these  points 
the  Admiral  enlightened  him,  explaining  the  position 
of  Scottish  Peers  since  the  Union,  and  telling  him  that 
in  addition  to  the  family  of  Douglas  the  Campbells 
and  others  held  positions  of  some  importance. 

His  ignorance  of  the  English  and  of  England  was 
indeed  profound.  He  often  asserted  that  his  landing 
in  England  and  entry  into  London  would  be  followed 
by  the  overthrow  of  the  British  monarchy  with  the 
ready  acquiescence  of  the  British  people.  At  the 
same  time  he  recognized  that  the  national  spirit  of  the 
British  was  superior  to  that  of  the  French,  that  the 
English  were  more  practical  than  the  French,  and 
were  braver.  Like  many  historians,  he  could  not 
understand  why  at  the  conclusion  of  peace  in  1814-5 
they  derived  so  little  benefit  from  the  long  war. 

With  regard  to  the  strict  enforcement  of  regulations, 


298         THE  LIFE  OF  NAPOLEON 

based  on  the  view  that  the  escape  of  Napoleon  from 
St.  Helena  was  possible,  it  is  unnecessary  to  say  much. 
Lord  Rosebery  has  lately,  in  his  incomparable  style, 
thrown  ridicule  upon  the  measures  taken  by  Sir 
Hudson  Lowe  to  ensure  the  safety  of  his  prisoner. 
He  shares  the  opinion  held  by  the  Duke  of  Welling- 
ton, that  considerable  freedom  might  have  been  allowed 
to  Napoleon  provided  the  landing-places  were  carefully 
guarded.  But  apparently  the  great  Duke  was  not 
aware  of  the  actual  position  of  affairs  on  St.  Helena, 
and  Lord  Rosebery  ignores  the  Government  records 
of  the  years  covering  Napoleon's  captivity.  Napo- 
leon's escape  from  Elba  was  in  every  one's  memory, 
and  Napoleon's  success  in  quietening  the  suspicions  of 
Sir  Neill  Campbell,  the  Commissioner,  was  a  warn- 
ing to  the  officials  in  St.  Helena.  Escape  from  St. 
Helena  was  possible ;  schemes  of  escape  were  being 
devised,  and,  with  Campbell's  example  before  him, 
Lowe  was  fully  justified  in  adopting  all  necessary  pre- 
cautions. Napoleon,  it  is  true,  stated  at  St.  Helena 
that  he  had  no  desire  to  escape  ;  he  had  made  similar 
statements  while  in  Elba.  And  moreover,  there  is, 
we  are  assured  by  Mr.  Rose,1  evidence  in  the  British 
Archives  which  fully  explains  and  justifies  Lowe's 
precautions. 

As  is  well  known,  Napoleon,  during  his  exile  on  St. 
Helena,  left  all  the  materials  for  the  formation  of  the 
Napoleonic  legend.  He  claimed  that  he  represented 

^ose,  "Napoleonic  Studies,"  p.  328.  George  Bell  &  Sons, 
1904. 


NAPOLEON'S   LAST  DAY 

FROM   THE   SCUL1TURE    BY   VICENZO   VELA   AT   VERSAILLES 


ST.  HELENA,  1815-1821  299 

the  principles  of  the  Revolution,  and  that  as  far  as 
was  possible  he  had  recognized  those  principles.  He 
asserted  that  equality — the  passion  of  the  French 
middle  and  lower  classes — was  fully  established  by 
him — "an  equality  of  the  burdens,  and  an  equality  of 
all  rights  ".  The  Legion  of  Honour  which  could  be 
offered  to  every  one  was,  he  asserted,  the  symbol  of 
equality.  Whether  the  creation  of  a  new  nobility  did 
not  collide  with  the  principle  of  equality  was  a  point 
on  which  at  St.  Helena  he  expressed  some  doubts. 
"  I  fancy  I  was  wrong,"  he  said,  "  because  it  weakened 
that  system  of  equality  which  the  nation  liked  so 
much."1 

As  regarded  the  principle  of  liberty,  Napoleon  as- 
serted that  he  did  support  liberal  institutions — that  both 
civil  and  religious  liberty  existed  in  France  under  him. 
But  he  declared  with  justice  that  in  1 799  and  during 
the  ensuing  years  a  strong  government  in  France  was 
absolutely  necessary. 

"  I  never  usurped  the  crown,"  he  said  ;  "  I  lifted  it 
out  of  the  gutter,  and  the  people  put  it  on  my  head." 
France  at  that  time  ( 1 799)  was  isolated,  and  might 
"have  perished  under  the  blows  of  United  Europe". 
He  had  ample  justification  for  his  policy  during  the 
Consulate.  The  French  were  incapable  of  self-govern- 
ment, and  Napoleon  was  acting  wisely  in  ruling  with 
a  firm  hand.  On  his  escape  from  Elba  he  declares  he 
realized  that  the  French  had  become  capable  of  ap- 
preciating the  value  and  meaning  of  liberty,  and  con- 

1  Rosebery,  "Napoleon  :  the  Last  Phase,"  p.  125. 


300         THE  LIFE  OF  NAPOLEON 

sequently  that  he  was  prepared  in  future  to  rule 
constitutionally. 

With  regard  to  his  treatment  of  foreign  nations, 
Napoleon's  position  was  less  sound.  He  owned, 
however,  that  he  had  made  a  mistake  in  attempting 
to  place  Joseph  on  the  Spanish  throne,  for  he  thus  had 
wounded  the  national  feeling  of  the  Spaniards.  He 
apparently  thought  that  England  was  in  a  political 
condition  similar  to  that  existing  in  Spain,  and  that 
both  countries,  like  France  before  1789,  required  com- 
plete regeneration. 

The  Moscow  expedition,  however,  prevented  him 
from  achieving  success  in  Spain.  That  expedition, 
he  declared,  was  forced  on  him  by  the  hostility  of 
Russia.  Had  it  succeeded  he  would  have  established 
Poland  as  a  powerful  barrier  to  the  advance  of  Russia 
westwards. 

Much  that  he  said  about  the  future  aggrandizement 
of  Russia,  and  of  the  future  rivalry  of  Russia  and 
Great  Britain  in  Asia,  showed  remarkable  prescience. 

Throughout  his  conversations  and  writings  it  is 
never  apparent  that  he  recognized  the  influence  of  the 
continental  system  in  bringing  about  his  downfall. 
He  never  seemed  to  realize  that  from  1805  the  growth 
of  national  feeling  in  Germany  constituted  a  real 
danger  to  his  vast  schemes.  Nor  did  he  realize  that 
England,  Prussia,  Russia,  and  Austria  would  under  no 
circumstances  accept  peace  on  his  impossible  conditions. 
His  continued  assertions  at  St.  Helena  that  his  Em- 
pire meant  peace,  and  that  his  pacific  intentions  were  not 


ST.  HELENA,  1815-1821  301 

understood,  have  never  yet  been  accepted  by  any  one 
who  has  made  even  a  cursory  study  of  Napoleon's  life. 

The  closing  years  of  Napoleon's  exile  on  St. 
Helena  have  been  admirably  described  by  Mr.  Rose 
in  his  "  Life  of  Napoleon". 

In  1820,  when  his  relations  with  the  governor  had 
become  more  cordial,  and  the  restrictions  imposed 
upon  him  were  lessened,  he  seems  to  have  been  con- 
tented. Early  in  1821  illness  supervened,  and  on 
5  May  he  died.  In  1840  his  ashes  were  removed 
with  great  pomp  to  the  Invalides  in  Paris.  A  few 
years  afterwards  a  member  of  his  family,  Napoleon  III, 
restored  the  Empire  which  lasted  till  1870.  A  great 
ruler  and  an  unsurpassed  leader  in  war,  Napoleon 
remains  one  of  the  most  remarkable  products  of 
European  civilization.  He  was  the  man  "  who  bridled 
the  Revolution,  and  remoulded  the  life  of  France,  who 
laid  broad  and  deep  the  foundations  of  a  new  life  in 
Italy,  Switzerland,  and  Germany,  who  rolled  the 
Western  on  the  East,  in  the  greatest  movement  known 
since  the  Crusades".1 

He  did  more  :  in  France  "  he  restored  the  adminis- 
trative centralization  of  the  ancien  regime  with  those 
improvements  which  the  Revolution  had  rendered 
possible — a  centralization,  scientific,  uniform,  all-per- 
vasive, untrammelled  by  the  spirit  of  locality,  caste,  or 
corporation  ;  no  great  modern  community  of  men  has 
ever  received  so  much  from  a  single  human  mind  ".2 

1Rose,  "Life  of  Napoleon,"  Vol.  II,  p.  574. 

2 "Cambridge  Modern  History,"  Vol.  IX,  pp.  769,  771. 


302          THE  LIFE  OF  NAPOLEON 

But  he  left  England  supreme  on  the  sea,  with  her 
colonial  and  maritime  power  more  firmly  established 
than  ever,  and  he  left  the  Continent  to  a  great  extent 
subservient  to  Russian  influence  till  the  close  of  the 
Crimean  War.  Napoleon's  career  may  be  termed 
"  an  explosion  of  human  energy  ".  Was  it  a  maleficent 
or  a  superb  one  ?  I  think  superb. 


APPENDICES 

I.  LIST  OF  NAPOLEON'S  MOST  FAMOUS  GENERALS. 
II.  LEADING  MINISTERS  DURING  THE  EMPIRE. 
III.  NAPOLEON'S  MARSHALS. 

IV.  THE  MEMORANDA  OF  CAPTAIN  H.  MEYNELL,  R.N. 
V.  LORD  BARHAM. 
VI.  A  LIST  OF  THE   CHIEF   AUTHORITIES    FOR  THE 

NAPOLEONIC  PERIOD. 
VII.  THE  EDICT  OF  19  OCTOBER,  1810. 
VIII.  GENEALOGY  OF  THE  BONAPARTES. 


I.  NAPOLEON'S  GENERALS 

Augereau,  Duke  of  Castiglione. 

Bernadotte,  Prince  of  Ponte-Corvo,  Crown  Prince  of  Sweden. 

Berthier,  Duke  of  Neufchatel,  Prince  of  Wagram. 

Bessieres,  Duke  of  Istria. 

Davoust,  Duke  of  Auerstadt,  Prince  of  Eckmuhl. 

Beauharnais,  Eugene,  Viceroy  of  Italy,  Prince  of  Venice. 

Grouchy,  Count  of  the  Empire. 

Jourdan,  Count. 

Junot,  Duke  of  Abrantes. 

Lannes,  Duke  of  Montebello. 

Lefebre,  Duke  of  Danzic. 

Macdonald,  Duke  of  Taranto. 

Marmont,  Duke  of  Ragusa. 

Massena,  Duke  of  Rivoli,  Prince  of  Essling. 

Moncey,  Duke  of  Conegliano. 

Mortier,  Duke  of  Treviso. 

Murat,  Grand  Duke  of  Berg  and  Cleves,  King  of  Naples. 

Ney,  Duke  of  Elchingen,  Prince  of  Moskwa. 

Oudinot,  Duke  of  Reggio. 

St.  Cyr,  Gouvion,  Marquis. 

Soult,  Duke  of  Dalmatia. 

Suchet,  Duke  of  Albufera. 

Victor,  Duke  of  Belluno. 

20  305 


3o6          THE  LIFE  OF  NAPOLEON 

II.  LEADING  MINISTERS  DURING  THE  EMPIRE 

Cambace'res,  Prince  of  Parma,  1804. 
Caulaincourt,  Duke  of  Vicenza. 
Champagny,  Duke  of  Cadore. 
Clarke,  Duke  of  Feltre. 
Fouche,  Duke  of  Otranto. 

Lebrun,  Duke  of  Plaisance,  Governor-General  of  Holland. 
Maret,  Duke  of  Bassano. 
Savary,  Duke  of  Rovigo. 

Talleyrand,  Prince  of  Benevento,  1804 ;  Vice  Grand  Elector,  1807  ; 
Prince  of  Talleyrand,  1814. 


III.  NAPOLEON'S  MARSHALS 

Massena 
Jourdan 
Bernadotte 

Lannes 

-  appointed  in  1804. 
Soult 

Ney 

Davoust 

Kellermann  __ 

Victor,  appointed  in  1807. 

Macdonald  \ 

Marmont      j- appointed  in  1809. 

Oudinot       J 

Suchet,  appointed  in  1811. 

St.  Cyr,  Gouvion,  appointed  in  1812. 

Pomatowski,  appointed  in  1813. 


APPENDICES  307 

IV.  THE  MEMORANDA  OF  CAPTAIN  H.  MEYNELL, 

R.N. 

Captain  Meynell  was  born  in  1789,  and  was  the  second  son 
of  Hugo  Meynell  of  Hoar  Cross,  Co.  Stafford,  his  mother  being  the 
Hon.  Elizabeth  Ingram,  daughter  of  Charles,  gth  Viscount  Irwi^ 
of  Temple  Newsam,  Yorkshire.  Having  entered  the  Navy  in 
1803,  he  saw  service  in  the  Mediterranean  and  in  the  East  Indies. 
In  1816  he  was  serving  as  Captain  in  the  "  Newcastle,"  the  flagship 
of  Rear-Admiral  Sir  Pulteney  Malcolm,  the  Commander-in-Chief 
at  St.  Helena  station.  He  often  accompanied  the  Admiral  on  the 
latter 's  visits  to  Napoleon,  and  his  recollections  "  undoubtedly 
contain  fresh  matter  in  addition  to  what  is  related  "  in  "  A  Diary  of 
St.  Helena,  1816-1817,"  by  Lady  Malcolm  :  "  They  supplement  and 
confirm  the  account  given  in  the  '  Diary,'  and  are  of  value  and 
importance  as  showing  the  effect  upon  Captain  Meynell  of 
Napoleon's  manner  and  personality.  For  these  reasons  Captain 
Meynell's  independent  recollections  have  been  rightly  thought 
worthy  of  publication." 


V.  LORD  BARHAM 

Charles  Middleton,  first  Baron  Barham,  had  served  in  the  Navy 
and  risen  to  the  rank  of  Admiral.  In  1794  he  was  Lord  Com- 
missioner of  the  Admiralty;  in  1805  became  First  Lord  of  the 
Admiralty  and  was  created  Baron  Barham. 


3o8          THE  LIFE  OF  NAPOLEON 

VI.  BIBLIOGRAPHY 

[A  full  bibliography  of  the  Napoleonic  Period  is  to  be  found 
in  Vol.  IX  of  the  "Cambridge  Modern  History".] 

AUTHORITIES— GENERAL 

Taine,  "  Les  origines  de  la  France  Contemporaine  ". 

Lanfrey,  "  Histoire  de  Napoleon  ".    Paris,  1875. 

Rose,  "Life  of  Napoleon  I".     London,  Bell,  1902. 

Browning,  "Napoleon  :  the  First  Phase".     London,  Lane,  1905. 

Fournier,  "Napoleon  I". 

Mahan,  "  The  Influence  of  Sea  Power  upon  the  French  Revolution 

and  Empire  ".     London,  1892. 
Marbot,  "  Memoires,"  3  vols.     Paris,  1891. 
"Thiebault,  Memoires  de,"  5  vols.     Paris,  Plon,  1893-5. 
Seeley,  "  Life  and  Times  of  Stein  ". 
Bodley,  "France  ".     London,  J.  Murray. 
Morse  Stephens,  "  Periods  of  European  History,"  Vol.  VII  (1789- 

1815).     Rivingtons. 

Atkinson,  "A  History  of  Germany".     London,  Methuen,  1909. 
Pasquier,  "Histoire  de  mon  temps,"  6  vols.     Paris,  1893. 
Johnston,  "Napoleon:  a  Short  Biography ".     London,  1904. 
"  The  Cambridge  Modern  History,"  Vols.  VIII  and  IX. 
Rose,  "  The  Revolutionary  and  Napoleonic  Era  and  the  French 

Revolution  and  Napoleonic  Epoch  ".    Cambridge  University 

Press. 
Wheeler,  "The  Story  of  Napoleon".    London,   Harrup  &  Co., 

1910. 

Fisher,  "  Bonapartism  ".     Oxford,  1 908. 
Sorel,  "  L'Europe  et  la  Revolution  Franchise,"  8   vols.      Paris, 

1904. 

Sloane,  "  Life  of  Napoleon  Bonaparte,"  4  vols.     New  York,  Cen- 
tury Company. 
Mahan,  "  Life  of  Nelson  ". 


APPENDICES  309 

Camden,   Theophilus,  "The  History  of  the  Rise,  Progress,  and 

Overthrow  of  Napoleon  Bonaparte  ".    London,  Nuttall,  Fisher 

&  Dixon,  1814. 

Fyffe,  "  Modern  Europe,"  Vol.  I. 
Seeley,  "  A  Short  History  of  Napoleon  ".     London,  Seeley  &  Co., 

1886. 
Wolseley,    "The    Decline   and    Fall    of   Napoleon".      London, 

Sampson,  Low,  Marston  &  Co.,  1895. 

AUTHORITIES— SPECIAL 

Masson  and  Biagi,  "  Napoleon  Inconnu  ". 

Marcaggi,  "  La  Genese  de  Napoleon  ". 

Brotonne,  "  Les  Bonapartes  et  leur  Alliances  ". 

Colonna  de  Cesare  Rocca,  "  Le  Nid  de  L'Aigle  ". 

Chuquet,  "  La  jeunesse  de  Napoleon  ".     Paris,  1 899. 

Norwood    Young,    "  The    Growth    of    Napoleon ".       London, 

J.  Murray,   1910. 

Masson,  "Napoleon  et  sa  famille".     Paris,  1897. 
Nasien,   "  Memoires  sur  1'Enfance  .  .  .  de  Napoleon ".      Paris, 

1852. 

Levy,  "Napoleon  Intime".     Paris,  Plon,  1893. 
Debidour,  "L'Eglise  et  I'dtat  en  France".     Paris,  1898. 
Thiers,  "  The  Consulate  and  the  Empire  ". 

Fisher,  "Napoleonic  Statesmanship  in  Germany".    Oxford,  1903. 
Browning,  "  England  and  Napoleon  in  1803".     London,  1887. 
Petre,  "Napoleon's  Campaign  in  Poland".     London,  1901. 
Vandal,  "Napoleon  et  Alexandre  ".     Paris,  1896. 
Johnston,  "  The  Napoleonic  Empire  in  Southern  Italy  ".    London, 

Macmillan  &  Co.,  1904. 

Ducere,  "Napoleon  a  Bayonne".     Bayonne,  1897. 
Vandal,    "  L'Avenement    de    Bonaparte,"    and    "  Napoleon    et 

Alexandre  ". 
Wheeler  and  Broadley,  "  Napoleon  and  the  Invasion  of  England  ". 

London,  1909. 
Gonnard,  "  The  Exile  of  St.  Helena  ".    London,  Heinemann,  1909. 


3io          THE  LIFE  OF  NAPOLEON 

Mallet,  "  Mallet  du  Pan  and  the  French  Revolution  ".     London, 

1902. 
Michel,  "  Correspondance  ine'dite  de  Mallet  du  Pan  avec  la  Cour 

de  Vienne,  1794-8".     Paris,  1884. 
Hall's  "Voyages".     Constable,  Edinburgh,  1826. 
Abell,  "Recollections  of  the  Emperor  Napoleon  on  the  Island  of 

St.  Helena  ".    London,  Sampson  Low,  Marston  &  Co.,  1873. 
Coquelle,  "  Napoleon  et  1'Angleterre  ".     Paris,  1 904. 
Desbriere,  "La  Compagne  Maritime  de  1805,  Trafalgar".    Paris, 

1907. 

Eraser,  "The  Enemy  at  Trafalgar".     London,  1906. 
Segur,  "  Hist,  de  Napoleon  et  de  la  Grande  Armee  pendant  1812  ". 

Paris,  1824. 

Atteridge,  "Napoleon's  Brothers".     London,  Methuen,  1909. 
Rose,  "Napoleonic  Studies".     London,  Bell,  1904. 
Rose,  "The  Berlin  Decrees"  (Eng.  Hist.  Review). 
Bourrienne,   "  Memoires  sur  Napoleon"    (1795-1814),    10  vols. 

Paris,  1823-30. 

Bourrienne  "Vie  de  Napoleon,"  3  vols.     Paris,  1831. 
Chaptal,  "  Mes  Souvenirs  sur  Napoleon".     Paris,  1893. 
Horsburgh,  "  Waterloo  :  a  Narrative  and  Criticism  ".    Methuen. 
Houssaye,  "1814,  1815".     Paris,  1910. 
Rosebery,    "  Napoleon  :  the  Last  Phase  ".     London,  Humphrey, 

1900. 
Gourgaud,  "Sainte-He"lene  Journal  inedit  de  1815  a  1818,"  2  vols. 

Paris,  Flammarion,  1899. 

Lady  Malcolm  (the  Journal  of),  "  A  Diary  of  St.  Helena  ".     Lon- 
don, Innes,  1899. 
Meynell,  "  Memoranda  of  Conversations  with  Napoleon,  St.  Helena, 

1816".     (Printed  for  private  circulation.)    Guildford,  Curtis, 

1909. 

Oman,  "The  Peninsular  War  ".     Oxford,  1909. 
Shand,  "The  War  in  the  Peninsula". 
Ilchester,   "The  Spanish  Journal  of  Elizabeth  Lady  Holland". 

Longmans,   1911. 


APPENDICES  311 

George,  "  Napoleon's  Invasion  of  Russia  ". 

Blennerhassett,  "  Life  of  Talleyrand  ". 

Dorchester,  "Recollections  of  a  Long  Life".     London,  1909. 

Weil,  "Joachim  Murat  ".     Paris,  1909,  1910. 

Ropes,  "Campaign  of  Waterloo".    London,  1893. 

Jackson,  "Memoirs".     London,  1903. 


VII.  THE  EDICT  OF  19  OCTOBER,  1810 

"  The  Times  "  of  5  November,  1810,  has  some  severe  remarks 
upon  Napoleon's  Decree  (ordering  all  British  goods  to  be  burnt) 
of  1 9  October,  "  which  must  increase  in  an  immeasurable  degree 
the  universal  detestation  in  which  he  (this  despot)  is  held  on  the 
Continent. 

"  We  could  hardly  have  conceived  that,  violent,  despotic,  and 
unjust  as  we  know  him  to  be,  he  would  have  had  recourse  to  an 
act  of  such  tremendous  and  general  oppression,  as  will  be  found 
in  the  Decree.  .  .  . 

"  Nothing  less  than  military  execution  can  enforce  the  horrible 
provisions  of  such  a  Decree,  which  affords  a  triumphant  proof  of 
the  inadequacy  of  all  the  previous  laws  against  the  introduction  of 
Colonial  produce,  and  British  manufactures." 


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INDEX 


ACRE,  45-47- 

"  Acte  Additionelle,"  the,  268. 

Addington,  69,  98,  107. 

Ajaccio,  8,  9,  10,  ii. 

Alberoni,  182. 

Alexander  I,  66,  125,  149-152, 
162,  163,  178-180,  188, 
198-200,  209,  216,  225, 
23°,  231,  233,  234,  239, 
240,  244,  245,  261,  263, 
292. 

Alexander   the    Great,   47,    96, 

275-. 

Alexandria,  27,  45. 
Alvinzi,  24,  29,  30. 
America,  Central,  164,  231 ; 

Southern,  164,  189,  231. 
Amiens,  Peace  of,  70,  73,  93-95, 

97-99,  107,  158,  191. 
Ancona,  32,  175. 
Andalusia,  215. 
Anna,  Duchess,  219. 
Antwerp,  257. 
Arcis  -  sur  -  Aube,     Battle     of, 

255- 

Arcola,  Battle  of,  30. 
Argaum,  Battle  of,  103,  107. 
Armed  Neutrality,  the,  65-68. 
Ascot,  261. 
Asia,  179,  300. 
Aspern,  Battle  of,  212. 


Assaye,  Battle  of,  103,  107. 

Astorga,  205. 

Auerstadt,  Battle  of,  125,  127, 
144. 

Augsburg,  114. 

Austerlitz,  Battle  of,  24,  25,  114, 
115,  119,  1 20,  128. 

Austria,  102,109,  111-128,  146, 
149,  161,  168,  172,  177, 
180,  194,  206,  209,  210, 
218-222,  225,  240,  241, 

244,  245,  252,  256,  263, 
274,  276,  290,  300. 

Austrian   Succession  War,    the, 

124. 

Auxonne,  6,  7,  8. 
Avignon,  n,  170. 

BADAJOS,  Treaty  of,  68. 
Baden,  31,  93,  120,  122,    128, 

129,  132,  185. 
Baltic,  the,  181,  232. 
Balzac,  223. 
Bank  of  France,  88. 
Barante,  106. 
Barbe"-Marbois,  75. 
Barclay  de  Tolly,  261. 
Barras,  19,  20,  22,  35. 
Basel,  31,  38. 

Bassano,  Duke  of.     See  Maret. 
Bastia,  8. 


313 


THE  LIFE  OF  NAPOLEON 


Bathurst,  224. 

Bautzen,  248,  249. 

Bavaria,  31,  69,  in,  121,  122, 

127,    128,    129,   132,   182, 

183,  185,  1 86,  192,  251. 
Baylen,    Capitulation    of,    191, 

196,  197,  263. 
Bayonne,  187,  199,  203. 
Beaulieu,  24,  29. 
Belgium,  64,  294. 
Belle-Isle,  123. 
"  Bellerophon,"  the,  271. 
Berg,     128-151  ;    Grand   Duke 

of.     See  Murat. 
Berlin  Decree,    the,    147,    148, 

160,  176,  180,  181,  188. 
Bernadotte,  16. 
Bernis,  122. 
Berthier,  61. 
Bessieres,  207. 
Bialystock,  151. 
Black  Legion,  the,  212. 
Blake,  General,  204. 
Bliicher,  253-255,  261. 
Bodley,  Mr.,  88,  171. 
Bologna,  32. 
Bondet,  62. 
Borodino,  245. 
Boulogne,  106,  107. 
Bourbons,  the,  35. 
Bourrienne,  47,  66,  105,  233. 
Brazil,  231. 
Bremen,  114,  230. 
Brescia,  153. 
Brueys,  Admiral,  44,  59. 
Brumaire,    53,    56-58,    77,    88, 

191,  271,  277,  278. 
Brune,  100. 
Brunswick,  182;  Duke  of,  126, 

141,  212,  225. 
Bucharest,  Treaty  of,  244. 


Budberg,  Count,  150,  197. 
Bulow,  269. 

CADIZ,  1 86. 

Cadoudal,  85,  86. 

Calabria,  176. 

Caldiero,  29. 

Cambaceres,  247. 

Campbell,  Colonel,  259,  298. 

Campbells,  the,  297. 

Camperdown,  Battle  of,  41. 

Campo  Formio,  Treaty  of,  36, 
48,  94,  in,  112,  278. 

Campomanes,  182. 

Canino,  Prince  of,  190. 

Canning,  160,  182,  190. 

Cape  of  Good  Hope,  69. 

Carniola,  248. 

Carnot,  15,  22,  23. 

Caroline  Bonaparte,  n,  191. 

Carteaux,  13. 

Carthagena,  186. 

Castanos,  204. 

Castlereagh,  2,  254,  262,  263. 

Catherine  II,  274. 

Cattaro,  151. 

Caulaincourt,  196,  220,  257, 
258. 

Ceylon,  69. 

Champagny,  172. 

Chaptal,  75. 

Chardon,  Abbe,  4. 

Charles  III,  182,  184;  IV,  31, 
185,  189,  190;  V,  Em- 
peror, 241 ;  the  Great,  93, 
96,  222;  the  Archduke, 
33,  208. 

Charles  Bonaparte,  2-4. 

Cherasco,  27. 

Cherokee,  the,  227,  228. 

Cholmondeley,  Lord,  70. 


INDEX 


Church,  the,  77  seq. 

Cintra,  Convention  of,  164,  196- 

198,  202,  203. 
Cisalpine  Republic,  the,   10,  33, 

36. 

Cleves,  128. 
Clichians,  the,  35. 
Cobenzel,  36,  39,  64. 
Cockburn,   Admiral,    285,    288, 

292. 

Code  Napoleon,  the,  76,  77,  88. 
Colli,  26. 

Comedie  Franchise,  the,  88. 
Concordat,  the,  73,  79,  80-82. 
Confederation  of  the  Rhine,  the, 

31,  93,  121-129,  135,  142, 

145,  147,    165,    239,  240, 

251,  282. 
Coni,  27. 
Constantinople,  100,  165,   205, 

219,  290. 
Constitution   of   1791,  the,   19, 

54,  73»  27!>  278. 
Consulate,  the,  109,  300. 
Continental   System,    the,    177- 

179,   217,    219,  222,    224, 

225,  230-234,  244. 
Convention,  the  National,  91. 
Copenhagen,  160. 
Corfu,  151,  156,  157,  180,  190, 

258. 

Cornwallis,  Lord,  94. 
Corsica,  3-6,  8,  9,   n,   12,   15, 

23-26,  31,  41,  258. 
Costa  de  Beaurepaire,  26. 
Cottbus,  151. 
Craonne,  Battle  of,  255. 
Crimean  War,  the,  302. 
Czartoryski,  150. 

DANUBIAN     Principalities,    the, 
211. 


D'Abrantes,  Duchess,  259. 

Dalberg,  128. 

D'Aranda,  182. 

D'Artois,  295. 

Daru,  100. 

Davoust,  23,  43,  106,  141. 

De  Barrin,  8. 

Decaen,  100,  103. 

Decres,  75. 

Dego,  27. 

Dejean,  75. 

D'Enghien,  85,  86. 

Delhi,  103. 

Denmark,  65,  66,  68,  152,  160, 

163,  181,  189,  247. 
Desaix,  62,  107. 
De  Schack,  260. 
Desiree,  16. 
Diocletian,  222. 
Diplomatic     Revolution,      the, 

122. 
Directory,  the,   20,  31,  32,  48, 

54-56,    7i,    91,    !34,  267, 

271,  277. 

Dommartin,  12,  13. 
Don  Juan,  115. 
Ducos,  58. 
Dugommier,  13,  14. 
Dumerbion,  15. 
Dupont,  189,  196,  198. 
Du  Teil,  13,  14. 

EAST  INDIES,   100,  101. 
Egypt,     14,   24,  40-48,  68,  71, 

162,  175,    176,    179,  289- 

292. 
Elba,  67,  72,  92,  98,  259-266, 

271. 
Elbe,  234 ;   Convention  of  the, 

102. 

Elisa  Bonaparte,   u. 
Emmet,  Robert,  107. 


316 


THE  LIFE  OF  NAPOLEON 


England,  25,  35,  36,  40-47,  84, 
86,  89,92,  94,  97-103,  105, 
109,  142,  147,  162-164, 
179,  182,  183,  193,  194- 
216,  217,221-224, 256,261. 

Erfurt,  163,  167,  200,  202,  209, 

212. 

Espinosa,  Battle  of,  204. 
Etruria,  Queen  of,  67,  161. 
Ettenheim,  85. 
Eylau,  148. 

FERDINAND    VII,      189,    190; 

Archduke,  25. 
Ferrara,  32. 
Fesch,  Abbe,  u. 
Finland,  211,  230. 
Fisher,  H.  A.,  quoted,  266. 
Fleury,  121,  127. 
Florence,  37  ;  Treaty  of,  97. 
Fontainebleau,  258  ;  Treaty  of, 

161,  169. 

Fouche,  75,  207,  227,  266. 
Fox,  C.  J.,  70,  147. 
Francis  I,  93,  127,  241,  290;  II, 

no,   120,    133,    147,   210, 

211,   221,    296. 

Frankfort,    114;    Proposals   of, 

252. 

Frederick  the  Great,  274. 
Frederick  William  II,  31  ;  III, 

149-151,  200,  226,  261. 
Frejus,  51,  53. 
Friedland,  Battle   of,    25,    148, 

149. 

Fructidor,  36,  37,  50,  52,  277. 
Fulda-Corvey,  144. 

GALLICAN  CHURCH,  the,  168. 
Gantheaume,  180. 
Genoa,  33. 
George  III,  66. 


German  Revolution,    the,    110- 

114. 
Germany,    110-114,    J73>    J94» 

221,  241,  279-282,  301. 
Gibraltar,  41. 
Godoy,  31,  161,  188. 
Gonsalvi,  81. 
Gordon,  Duchess  of,  70. 
Goree,  98. 
Gourgaud,  59,  286. 
Great  St.  Bernard,  61. 
Grouchy,  269. 
Guastalla,  258. 
Guizot,  83. 
Gurlay,  General,  120. 

HAGUE,  the,  99. 

Hamburg,  114,  142,  230,  233. 

Hanau,  Battle  of,  135,  251. 

Hanover,  101,  102. 

Hanse  Towns,  the,  234. 

Hardenberg,  150. 

Herat,  65. 

Hesse-Cassel,    in,     113,    126, 

142,  144. 

Hesse-Darmstadt,  128. 
Hoche,  35,  278. 
Hochstadt,  63. 
Hofer,  213,  225. 
Hohenlinden,  63. 
Hohenlohe,  Prince,  141. 
Holkar,  103. 
Holland,  35,  41,  69,  92,  94,  96, 

97,    ioo,    166,    216,    223, 

226,  227. 
Holy  Roman  Empire,  the,   73, 

in,  279. 
Ho  wick,  Lord,  147. 

ILE  DE  FRANCE,  103. 
India,  41,  44,  45,  65,  92,  162, 
171,  293. 


INDEX 


Ionian  Islands,  33,  36,  38,  48. 
Ireland,  65. 

Italy,  15,  53,  56,  159,  160,  161, 
223,241,261,278,279,301. 

JAFFA,  46. 

Jena,  Battle  of,  25,  125,  133, 
134,  144,  187,  188. 

Jerome  Bonaparte,  n,  151. 

Jervis,  Sir  John,  31,  32. 

Jeunesse  Dore"e,  the,  19. 

Jews,  the,  236,  237. 

Joseph  Bonaparte,  3,  9,  10,  12, 
16,  37,  81,  121,  132,  153- 
157,  176,  183,  187,  190, 
191,  203,  217,  255,  257, 
283. 

Joseph  II,  238. 

Josephine,  23,  37,  44,  45,  48, 
49,  168,  218,  261. 

Jourdan,  33. 

Julius  Caesar,  275. 

Junot,  43,  189,  194 ;  Madame,  3. 

KAUNITZ,  122. 
Kellermann,  23,  62. 
Kent,  40. 
Keralio,  5. 
Khiva,  65. 
Kleber,  43,  46. 
Koller,  259,  260. 
Kray,  63. 
Kurakin,  150. 

LAETETIA,  2,  3. 

La  Fere,  5. 

La  Haye,  Sainte,  269,  270. 

Lake,  General,  103. 

Lannes,  30,  43. 

Laon,  Battle  of,  255. 

Larevelliere,  35. 

La  Rothiere,  Battle  of,  254. 


Las  Montholon,  286. 

La  Vendee,  207. 

Lauenburg,  230,  233,  234. 

Lebanon,  the,  42. 

Lechtenstein,  Prince,  120. 

Lefebre,  148,  205,  206,  287. 

Leghorn,  175. 

Legion  of  Honour,  295. 

Legislative  Body,  the,  74,  75. 

Leibnitz,  47,  290. 

Leipzic,  Battle  of,  171,  234,  249- 

251,  262. 

Leoben,  30,  31,  33,  35. 
Lepelletier  Section,  19. 
"Le  Souper  de  Beaucaire,"  12. 
Levant,  the,  36,  41. 
Leveson-Gower,  150. 
Liberation,  War  of,  25,  28,  130- 

132,  196,  201. 
Ligny,  Battle  of,  268. 
Ligurian  Republic,  33,  99. 
Linois,  Admiral,  103. 
Lisbon,  189,  191. 
Loano,  26. 
Lodi,  28. 
Louis  XIV,  43,  47,  91,  93,  123, 

134,   181,   275,  290,    291; 

XVIII,  260,  261,  267,  271, 

294-296;  King  of  Holland, 

8,  n,  217,  226,  227. 
Louisbourg,  115. 
Louisiana,  67,  99. 
Liibeck,  114,  230,  233. 
Lucien   Bonaparte,   n,  12,  56, 

75,  190,  191,  270. 
LuneVille,  Treaty  of,  64,  65,  73, 

in,  112,  157-158,  191. 
Lutzen,  Battle  of,  248,  249. 
Lyons,  n. 

MACDONALD,  254. 
Macedonia,  176. 


THE  LIFE  OF  NAPOLEON 


Mack,  115. 
Madras,  103. 
Madrid,  204. 
Magyars,  the,  214,  215. 
Maida,  138,  147,  153. 
Mainz,  39,  113. 
Maitland,  Captain,  271. 
Malcolm,    Lady,   288;    Sir   P., 

285,  292. 

Mallet  du  Pan,  19,  20. 
Malmaison,  261,  270. 
Malta,  41,  69,   70,  94,   97-100, 

224. 

Mantua,  29,  30,  176. 
Marbot,  55. 
Marengo,  Battle  of,  51,  62,  63, 

71-73.   77.  I07>  U9.  I57, 

278. 

Maret,  172. 
Marianne,  n. 
Marie    Louise,     168,    219-222, 

229,  257,  258. 
Marmont,  106,  254,  258. 
Marrac,  207. 
Marseillaise,  the,  1  7  . 
Marseilles,  u,  16. 
Martinique,  98. 
Massena,  30,    54,  55,  61,  217, 

278. 

Mauritius,  the,  73. 
Maury,  168. 
Mazarin,  121,  123. 
Mediterranean,  16,  31,  36,  41, 


44,  92> 


142, 


163,   164,    171,    175,    176, 

178,  179,  183,  190,  224. 
Melas,  62. 

Me'neval,  103,  104,  106,  107. 
Metternich,  210,  220,  224,  249, 

263. 
Meynell,    Captain   Henry,    286 

fff. 


Milan,  29,  42,  157,  175  ;  Decree 
of,  143.  J76,  177,  181. 

Milesimo,  27. 

Milhaud,  269. 

Minorca,  98. 

Miot  de  Me"lito,  105. 

Miquelon,  98. 

Mississippi,  the,  99. 

Moldavia,  199,  200. 

Moncey,  296. 

Mondovi,  27. 

Montenotte,  26-28. 

Moore,  Sir  John,  204. 

Moreau,  33,  55,  61,  63,  85,  86. 

Mortier,  102. 

Moscow,  171,  196,  218,  245, 
246,  293,  300. 

Munich,  115. 

Murat,  147,  262,  268. 

Murray,  James,  261. 

Mustapha  IV,  162. 

NAPLES, 1 7,  37,97, 121, 153, 154, 

157,  182,  183. 
Nassau,  129. 

Navigation  Act,  French,  177. 
Nelson,  45,  108,  117. 
Ney,   106,  217,  258,  296. 
Nice,  26-27. 
Nimeguen,  102. 
Notre  Dame,  81. 
Nuremberg,  114. 

OLDENBURG,  230. 

O'Meara,  271,  286. 

Orange,   William   Frederick    of, 

144. 
Orezzo,  8. 
Orgon,  260. 
Ossian,  288. 
Osterode,  155. 
Otranto,   157. 


INDEX 


Oudinot,  30,  254. 
Oxford,  261. 

PALM,  135. 

Paoli,  3,  6,  8,  292. 

Papacy,  the,  238,  280,  283. 

Paris,  5,  6,  9-1 1,  203,  222. 

Parma,  17,67,  92,  258. 

Pasquier,  223. 

Passeriano,  37. 

Patino,  182. 

Paul  I,  31,    60,  63,65,  66;  III 

(Pope),  259. 
Pauline,  260. 
Perron,  103. 
Persia,  149,  293. 
Philip  V,  182. 
Piacenza,  72,  258. 
Pichegru,  5,  85. 
Piedmont,  33,  69,  97-99,  263, 

264. 

Pitt,  107,  121,  134,  275. 
Pius  VI,  32,  37,  38,  44;  VII, 

105,    106,    166-170,    237, 

259,  283- 
Plampin,  285. 

Plaswitz,  Armistice  of,  248,  249. 

Platoff,  261. 

Poland,  69,  141,  153,  215,  219, 

220,     230,     239,    245,     263, 

274,  276,  290, 293. 

Pondicherry,  103. 

Portugal,  68,  152,  159-164,  178, 
180,  188,  189,  193,  204, 
215,  224. 

PreTets,  the,  76. 

Pressburg,  Treaty  of,  no,  121, 
122,  146. 

Prince  Regent,  the  (English),  162, 
297 ;  (Spanish),  188,  189. 

Principal  Resolution  of  the  Im- 
perial Deputation,  no,  in. 


Prussia,  55,65,66, 109-113,115, 
116,  121,  123-126,  129, 

iSS^S6.    *39>     MO,  144, 

146,  163,    165,    177,  178, 

195,   209,   239,   244,  245, 

247-249,    252,    256,  258, 

261,   269,  271,    274,  276, 
279,   300. 
Pyramids,  Battle  of  the,  45. 

QUATRE  BRAS,  268. 
Quiberon,  17. 

RAPP,  43. 

Rastadt,  38,  39,  87. 

Ratisbon,  Diet  of,  112. 

Reden,  Countess,  266 ;  Count, 
201. 

Reggio,  176. 

Regnier,  75. 

Reubell,  35. 

Reynaud,  5. 

Richelieu,  93,  121,  123,  127. 

Ried,  Treaty  of,  251. 

Robespierres,  the,  8,  15. 

RoliQa,  Battle  of,  197,  198. 

Romanzoff,  197. 

Rome,  32. 

Rose,  Dr.,  106. 

Rosebery,  Lord,  174,  286. 

Roumelia,  165. 

Rousseau,  6,  7. 

Russia,  47,  53,  65,  101-102, 
135,  148-158,  160,  166, 
179,  180,  222,  233,  234, 
239,  246-249,  251,  253, 
254,  258,  261,  271,  290, 
300. 

Ryswick,  Treaty  of,  158. 

SACKEN,  254. 
Sahagun,  204. 


320 


THE  LIFE  OF  NAPOLEON 


St.  Helena,   13,  59,  82,  93,  94, 

i3J.    J43»    l69.   268,    271, 

280,  283-302. 
Saint  Marcouf,  98. 
St.  Petersburg,  Treaty  of,  66. 
Saint  Pierre,  98. 
St.  Vincent,  Battle  of,  32,  41. 
Salicetti,  12. 
Salzburg,  113. 
San  Domingo,  99,  101. 
San  Ildefonso,  Treaty  of,  31,  67. 
Saragossa,  207. 
Sardinia,  n,  18,  182. 
Savary,  207. 
Saxony,  in,  129,  144,  245,  250, 

251. 

Schadow,  144. 
Scharnhorst,  209. 
Schill,  212,  215. 
Schonbrunn,     Treaty    of.      See 

Vienna. 

Schuvalov,  259. 
Schwarzenberg,  254,  255. 
Scindiah,  103. 
Scotland,  297. 
Scylla,  190. 
Sebastiani,  100,  148. 
Second  Coalition,  the,  51,  66. 
Secret  Societies,  237. 
Selim  II,  162. 
Senate,  the,  75. 
Seven  Years' War,  the,  124. 
Shishkoff,  244. 
Siam,  291. 

Sicily,  136-139,  162,  191,  224. 
Sieves,  55-57. 
Silesia,  274,  276. 
Smith,  Sir  Sidney,  42,  45,  46. 
Smolensk,  215. 
Smorgoni,  43,  246,  247. 
Sono  Sierra,  204. 
Sorel,  A.,  87,  91,  222,  223. 


Soult,  119,  217,  296. 

Spain,  17,  41,  93,  96,  101,  102, 
159-164,  166,  170,  171, 
175,  176,  178,  181-190, 
193,  210,  213,  215-217, 

221,     224,     229,     231,     239, 

240,    247-249,    279-282, 
294,  300. 

Spencer  Stanhope,  246. 

Speranski,  211,  219,  244. 

Squillacci,  182. 

Stadion,  161,  208-210. 

Stae'l,  Madame  de,  68. 

Staps,  218. 

Stein,  161,  200,  201,  209,   215, 

216. 

Strassburg,  115,  212. 
Stuart,  Sir  John,  147. 
Suez  Canal,  A,  44,  291. 
Suhlingen,  Convention  of,   102, 

103. 

Suvorov,  54,  61. 
Sweden,  65,  152,  211,  230,  249. 
Switzerland,  69,  97-99,  301. 

TAINE,  88. 

Talavera,  215. 

Talleyrand,  120,  122,  149,  155, 
172,  207,  208,  263. 

Taranto,  62,  157. 

Thermidor,  15. 

Thiebault,  268. 

Thiers,  207. 

Third  Coalition,  War  of  the,  no. 

Thugut,  30,  31,  34. 

Tilsit,  Treaty  of,  2,  24,  25,  125, 
148,  150-153,  156,  158, 
162-165,  170-175,  180, 
188,  195,  197,  198,  212, 
232,  272,  274,  279,  290, 

,. 293; 

Times,"  the,  227,  228. 


INDEX 


321 


Tippoo,4i,  45. 
Tolentino,  Treaty  of,  32. 
Tortona,  27. 
Toulon,  23,  292. 
Trafalgar,  43,  160. 
Tribunate,  the,  74,  75. 
Trinidad,  69. 
Tudela,  Battle  of,  204. 
Tuileries,  the,  246,  247. 
Turkey,   18,    69,  92,   100,   140, 

i52»  T59>  l62>  X79>  J97, 
198,  200,  211,  229,  244, 
290. 

Tuscany,  67-264. 

Tyrol,  the,  213. 

UDINE,  37. 
Ulm,  115. 
University,  the,  88. 
Utrecht,  Treaty  of,  158. 

VALENCE,  5,  7. 

Vatican  Library,  the,  259. 

Vendee,  La,  36,  39,  59. 

Vendemiaire,  18-20,  292. 

Venice,  175,  176. 

Verdun,  242,  246. 

Verona,  153. 

Victor,  Marshal,  207. 

Vienna,  Treaty  of  (1809),  216, 

224-226  ;  Congress  of,  261- 

266. 
Vimeiro,  Battle  0^197,  198. 


Vincennes,  85. 
Vittoria,  Battle  of,  249. 

WAGRAM,  Battle  of,  212,  218, 
225,  226. 

Walcheren,  217,  227;  Expedi- 
tion, 226,  227,  229. 

Wall,  182. 

Wallachia,  199,  200. 

Warsaw,  Duchy  of,  151. 

Waterloo,  Battle  of,  231,  269. 

Wellesley,  Arthur,  2,  191,  202, 
215,  229. 

Wessenberg,  256. 

West  Indies,  101. 

Westphalia,  96,  126,  127,  245. 

Wetzlar,  112. 

W'hitworth,  Lord,  101. 

Wilna,  242. 

Wilson,  Mr.  H.  H.,  232. 

Wright,  Captain,  115. 

Wurmser,  24,  29. 

Wurtemberg,  31,  93,  113,  121, 
122,  128,  129,  132,  185, 
192. 

Wurzburg,  139. 

YORK,  General,  253,  254. 

ZACK,  62. 
Ziethen,  270. 
Zurich,  Battle  of,  54. 


21 


ABERDEEN  :    THE   UNIVERSITY    PRESS 


Date  Due 


••  IMP  !  9  "59 

HIP  28  '60 

M      UUU  b^ 

DEC  28 

1964 

DEC     4 

I9M 

HMD  9 

1    IQ71 

IWMK  d 

1    10/0 
vi'u  0 

OCR 

rDEC  r 

1986 

I\U  v  , 

Library  Bureau  Cat.  No.  1137 


